

तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय

SANTINIKETAN
VISWA BHARATI
LIBRARY

052

C.R

V. IX

SELECTIONS

FROM THE

CALCUTTA REVIEW

Vol. IX.) Feb.—May 1884.

CONTAINING ARTICLES FROM

Nos. LXXIX—LXXXVII. March 1864—Jan. 1866.

"No man who hath tasted learning but will confess the many ways of profiting by those who, not contented with stale receipts, are able to manage and set forth new positions to the world: and, were they, but as the dust and cinders of our feet, so long as in that Motion, they may yet serve to polish and brighten the armoury of truth even for that respect they were not utterly to be cast away."—MILTON.

CALCUTTA :

THOS. S. SMITH, "CITY PRESS," 12, BENTINCK STREET.
MESSRS. THACKER, SPINK & CO., GOVERNMENT PLACE, N.
LONDON : MESSRS. TRÜBNER & CO., 57 AND 59 LUDGATE HILL,
AND MAY BE ORDERED OF ALL BOOKSELLERS.

1884.

CONTENTS.
NOS. XXXVII—XL., VOL. IX.

[No. 37, February 1884.]

	PAGE.
DIPPINGS IN THE PURANAS	1
BENARES, PAST AND PRESENT	19

PHASES OF HINDUISM.

1. La Religion Primitive des Indo-Européens ; par Eugene Flotard. 8vo. Paris, 1864	61
2. The Rig-Vida Sanhita, Liber Primus, 1 vol. 4to. London. Oriental Translation Fund, Allen and Co., 1836	<i>ib.</i>
3. The Chondogya Upanishad of the Sama Veda ; with Extracts from the Commentaries of Sankara Acharya. Translated from the original Sanskrit, by Rajendro Lal Mitra, Calcutta, Baptist Mission Press, 1862	<i>ib.</i>
4. Sankara Bejoy, by Anunda Giri. MSS.	<i>ib.</i>
5. Chaitanaya Charita Mrita, or Life of Chaitanaya. Bengali, 1 vol. 4to.	<i>ib.</i>
6. Discourses read in the Meetings of the Hindu Theophilanthropic Society, vol. 1. Calcutta : by P. S. D'Rozario & Co., 1844	<i>ib.</i>
7. Tattwa Bhodini Potrika	<i>ib.</i>
8. The Brahmo Somaj Vindicated, being the substance of a Lecture delivered <i>ex-tempore</i> at the Calcutta Brahmo Somaj Hall, on Saturday, 18th April 1863. Calcutta : Savielle and Collier, Cossitollah, 1863	<i>ib.</i>

[No. 38, March 1884.]

JOUNPORE.

1. Jounporenámah, by Fuqueer Khairooddeen Mahomed, Allahabadi ; Persian MS.	97
2. Ferishta's History of Kings of Jounpore, translated by Briggs	<i>ib.</i>

SIR HUGH ROSE.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

1. Parliamentary Papers relating to the War in the Crimea, &c., &c.	142
2. General Rose and Stuart's Indian Campaigns. Lowe	<i>ib.</i>
3. General Orders by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, 1860-65	<i>ib.</i>

THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

PAGE

1. Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845 188
2. Nouvelle Biographie Générale depuis les temps plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1861 *ib.*
3. The Modern part of an Universal History, from the earliest accounts to the present time, compiled from the original authorities. London, 1781 *ib.*
4. A History of the Mahrattas. By James Grant Duff, Esq., London, Longmans, 1826 *ib.*
5. Carnatic Chronology. By Charles Philip Brown, late of the Madras Civil Service. London, Bernard Quairtch, 15 Piccadilly *ib.*
6. Histoire Général de l'Inde Ancienne et Moderne, par M. de Marliès. Paris, 1828 *ib.*

[No. 39, April 1884.]

THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

1. Histoire des Indes Orientales, per l'Abbé Guyon. Paris, 1744. 3 volumes 221
2. Memoire pour le Sieur de la Bourdonnais, avec les pièces justificatives. Paris, 1750 *ib.*
3. Memoir pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la Compagnie des Indes avec les pièces justificatives. A Paris, 1859 *ib.*
4. An account of the war in India between the English and French on the Coast of Coromandel, &c., &c. By Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq., London, 1761 *ib.*
5. A Voyage to the East Indies, &c. By Mr. Grose, London, 1770 *ib.*
6. The Modern part of an Universal History from the earliest accounts to the present time : London, 1781 *ib.*
7. A Philosophical and Political History of the settlements and trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies. By the Abbé Raynal.—A new translation—Edinburgh, 1782 *ib.*
8. A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indoostan from the year 1745. By Robert Orme, Esq., F. A. S. 1883—reprinted by Pharos and Co., "Athenæum" Press, Mount Road, 1861 *ib.*
9. History of the Mahrattas. By James Grant Duff, Esq., Longmans, 1826 *ib.*
10. The Bengal and Agra Annual Guide and Gazetteer for 1841. Calcutta, William Rushton & Co., 1861 *ib.*
11. Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844 *ib.*
12. Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845 *ib.*
13. History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army. By Captain Arthur Broome. Calcutta, Thacker & Co., 1850 *ib.*
14. A Gazetteer of Southern India. By Pharos & Co., Madras, 1855 *ib.*

THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.—(Contd). PAGE.

15. The History of British India. By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes; London, John Madden, Leadenhall Street, 1850 221
16. The National Review. Volume XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193, Piccadilly, 1862 *ib.*
17. Nouvelle Biographie Générale depuis les temps les plus reculés, jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862 *ib.*
18. Carnatic Chronology. By Charles Philip Brown, late of the Madras Civil Service. London, Bernard Quaritch, 15 Piccadilly, 1863 *ib.*
19. The History of India. By John Clark Marshman. Part I. London, Harrison, Pall Mall, 1864 *ib.*
20. Madagascar and its People. By Lyons McLeod, Esq., late British Consul at Mozambique. London, Longmans, 1865 *ib.*

LA BOURDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

1. Mémoire pour le Sieur de la Bourdonnais, avec les pièces justificatives. Paris, 1750 273
2. Supplément au mémoire du Sieur de la Bourdonnais, Paris, 1751 *ib.*
3. Pièces justificatives supprimées par le Sieur de la Bourdonnais, Paris, 1751 *ib.*
4. Lettre, à M. de * * * sur le mémoire du Sieur de la Bourdonnais, Paris, 1751 *ib.*
5. Mémoire pour le Sieur de la Gatinais, Capitaine du Vaisseau dans les Indes, Paris, 1751 *ib.*
6. Mémoire à consulter pour la famille du Sieur Dupleix, Paris, 1751 *ib.*
7. Second Mémoire à consulter pour la famille du Sieur Dupleix, Paris, 1751 *ib.*
8. Observations sur les deux Mémoires à consulter distribués par la famille du Sieur Dupleix, Paris, 1751 *ib.*
9. Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix, contre la Compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives, Paris, 1759 *ib.*
10. A Voyage to the East Indies, &c., by Mr. Grose. 2 vols. London, 1772 *ib.*
11. A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Hindostan from the year 1745, by Robert Orme, Esq., F. A. S. 1803 *ib.*
12. Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844 *ib.*
13. Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Adi-de-Camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond. Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845 *ib.*
14. A Gazetteer of Southern India, by Pharaoh & Co., Madras, 1855 *ib.*
15. The History of British India, by Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, John Madden & Co., Leadenhall Street, 1858 *ib.*
16. The National Review, Volume XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193, Piccadilly, 1862 *ib.*
17. Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862

[No. 40, May 1884.]

THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

PAGE.

1. Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives. Paris, 1759 ... 325
2. A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, from the year 1745, by Robert Orme, Esq., F. A. S., 1803 ... *ib.*
3. Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844 ... *ib.*
4. Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845 ... *ib.*
5. The History of British India. By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, John Madden and Co., Leadenhall Street, 1851 ... *ib.*
6. The National Review, Volume XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193, Piccadilly, 1862 ... *ib.*
7. Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862 ... *ib.*
8. An authentic account of the late Admiral Boscawen during the time he commanded in Coromandel, and of the transactions of the fleet and army under his command. Asiatic Annual Register, 1802 ... *ib.*

FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

1. Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives. Paris, 1759 ... 357
2. An account of the War in India between the English and the French on the coast of Coromandel, from the year 1750 to the year 1760. By Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq. London, T. Jeffereys, 1761 ... *ib.*
3. A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, from the year 1745. By Robert Orme, Esq., F. A. S. 1803 ... *ib.*
4. Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844 ... *ib.*
5. Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845 ... *ib.*
6. The History of British India. By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, John Madden and Co., Leadenhall Street, 1851 ... *ib.*
7. The National Review, Vol. XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193 Piccadilly, 1862 ... *ib.*
8. Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862 ... *ib.*

THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX, WITH ADVERSITY. . .

BY COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.		PAGE,
1.	Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives. Paris, 1759 ...	359
2.	A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, from the year 1745. By Robert Orme, M.A. F.A.S., 1803	<i>ib.</i>
3.	Histoire de la conquête de l' Inde par l' Angleterre, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844	<i>ib.</i>
4.	Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du Roi d' Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845 ...	<i>ib.</i>
5.	The History of British India. By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, Madden and Co., Leadenhall Street, 1858	<i>ib.</i>
6.	The National Review, Volume XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193 Piccadilly, London	<i>ib.</i>
7.	An Account of the War in India, between the French and English, on the Coast of Coromandel, from the year 1750 to the year 1760. Compiled by Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq., London, T. Jeffereys, 1761	<i>ib.</i>
8.	Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés, jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862	<i>ib.</i>

SELECTIONS FROM THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

DIPPINGS IN THE PURANAS.

FEW literary productions are better known by name than the Hindoo Puranas, and yet we believe there is much ignorance amongst general readers as regards the true character of their subject-matter. The popular European notion appears to be that they are a dull and confused collection of childish inventions and impure ideas, which are either hopelessly unintelligible, or else inconceivably repulsive. There is some truth in this judgment, but still we believe that it is formed from a superficial knowledge of the Puranas themselves. We admit that if the whole mass was published to-morrow, it would appear at first sight to be a literary jungle, in which long disquisitions upon the importance of fasting on one day rather than on another, or on the superiority of Vishnu to Siva, or of Siva to Vishnu, or of Krishna to either one or the other, would be mingled in wild confusion with wearisome accounts of the virtues of the Tulsi plant, or childish legends connected with particular places of pilgrimage, or contradictory genealogies, family traditions, accounts of the creation, fabulous geography, and miracles that would not impose on any boy or girl in an English charity school. But for all that, we maintain that the Puranas contain much that is interesting for all time; many genuine legends which carry us back to an age when nearly every condition of society and domestic tie differed in the widest possible manner from the conditions of modern civilisation. These old stories are frequently lost amidst the heavy Brahminical literature already indicated. Their very popularity has proved their ruin. For ages they appear to have been sources of delight to the people of this country, the "household words" of families and villages dating back to the days of Rama; but to the European of the present day, and perhaps of any past day, they are as utterly unknown as were the plays of Shakspeare to the brilliant court of Louis Quatorze. And yet, whilst these old stories call up strange and picturesque visions of the past, and exhibit the play of the affections under circumstances altogether foreign to our own experience, they are invested with a truthfulness to human nature, and an unmistakeable reality, as impressive as the life-like pictures in Defoe's novels, and equally calculated to excite a universal interest and awaken a widespread sympathy. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible

for the European to form a just estimate of the effect of suttee and polygamy upon the old social life of the people of India ; but even under such circumstances the story of a wife's devotion, a woman's jealousy, or a mother's love will find some response in every bosom ; and perchance may excite emotions in the heart of the European reader, almost as lively as those which animate the group of Hindoo villagers who may have gathered beneath the trees to hear the chanting of the ancient ballad, and whose excitement at every turn in the narrative is manifested in their lips and eyes.

Before, however, proceeding to dip into the Puranas, it will be necessary to indicate the character and period of these writings. The ancient history of India may be divided for all practical purposes into three great epochs, namely, the old Hindoo period, the Buddhist period, and the modern Hindoo or Puranic period. The old Hindoo period finds expression in the Vedas, and in the two famous epics known as the Ramayana and Mahabharata. The Buddhist period extends from about the fifth century before Christ down to the eighth or tenth century of the present era ; and it should be borne in mind that this Buddhism was opposed to Hindooism, or rather to Brahminism, and especially rejected the caste system. But the Buddhist religion, after triumphing over Brahminism, began to decay in its turn, and finally was expelled from India during a national reaction in favour of Brahminism. It was during this national reaction that the Puranas appear to have originated. They may be regarded as the theological discourses by which the Brahmins converted back the people to their ancient faith ; and in order to render their religious teaching more popular, the Gooroos occasionally adopted those oral traditions which they found current amongst the masses as a vehicle for religious instruction, and of course largely interpolated each legend with Brahminical precepts and interpretations. Modern Brahminism is therefore only to be found in the Puranas ; but Brahminism is not the field of enquiry which we propose to enter upon the present occasion. The religious history of the Hindoos cannot be drawn from the Puranas alone, but only from a comprehensive and exhaustive study of the Vedas and Epics aided by the Puranas ; and the results of such investigations would occupy volumes, and could not be even indicated within the limits of a mere essay. Our dippings will therefore be chiefly confined to the legends already indicated, which lie buried deep in the Puranic jungle, and can only be recovered and cleared from the superabundant growth of Brahminical fable and superstition at a considerable expense of time and labour. Moreover, we shall rigidly confine ourselves to

one branch of the Puranic literature; namely, that which illustrates social life and manners. Students in Puranic cosmogony, geography, or chronology, or in Puranic ideas of government, religion, or morality, will find little or nothing in the present article to satisfy their cravings. We shall merely note such stories or observations as serve to throw a light on the old domestic life of the Hindoo as preserved in Puranic tradition, and procure if possible some glimpses into the human heart under circumstances so widely different from those which are familiar to ourselves. Some of these old traditions undoubtedly refer to the ancient Hindoo period which preceded Buddhism; whilst many of the precepts and ideas which have been added on to the story bear reference to the later Brahminical age which followed the decline and fall of the Budhistic system.

Our first illustration of ancient social life in India shall be drawn from the story of the marriage of a young Prince in the Tamul country in Southern India, as recorded in the Padma Purana. The outline of the story may be stated in a few words:—A distinguished sage or Muni had paid a visit to the palace of the Rajah, and had been most agreeably served by the Rajah's son, the Prince in question. In his delight at the attendance, the victuals, the garlands, and the perfumes, the sage acquainted the Prince that he was destined to die in his sixteenth year, but might escape his fate by going on a pilgrimage to Benares. There were but a few days to spare, and the young Prince, in his fear of approaching death, at once set off on the long journey. On his way he met with a strange adventure. A certain Rajah had betrothed his son to the daughter of a neighbouring Rajah, but the latter discovered that he had been deceived. It seems that the proposed bridegroom was an ugly hunchback, and his father had accordingly put forward the handsome son of a dependant to personate him at the betrothal. On the truth being known, after the betrothal and prior to the marriage ceremony, the father of the proposed bride declared war, when the other Rajah fell in with the young Tamul Prince, on his way to Benares, and induced him to personate the bridegroom, and after the marriage to leave the bride in the possession of the hunchback. This arrangement was carried out. The father of the Princess was again deceived, the Tamul Prince was married to the young lady, the pair were left alone, and the bridegroom fell down in a fainting fit. The alarm of the poor girl is described in appropriate language, and at length in reply to her affectionate entreaties, the Prince relates the true state of the case, bids her to be a dutiful wife to the hunchback, and

assures her that he himself is going to Benares to die.* Here follows an affecting scene which we give *in extenso*; premising that the Prince's name is Brahmaketu, and that the name of the father of the hunchback was Suchandra:—

"She, the bride, was thunderstruck on hearing what the Prince said. Tears trickled down from her eyes, her heart palpitated, and with a soft voice she said,—‘O most fortunate, you say you are the substitute of the son of Suchandra: how shall I know it? I know you are my husband, who have accepted my hand, and besides whom, O dear Prince, I know nobody to be my husband. You have married me before the fire: does it become you to leave me? Having been forsaken by you, I will neither wait on the hunchback, nor on any other person, though he were as beautiful as Kama.’”

"Brahmaketu said,—‘O most beautiful, I shall die to-morrow; I have been told so by the Muni; it cannot be otherwise; what will you do with me who am come to the end of my existence? Wait on that son of Suchandra who is to live for a length of time.’ The Princess replied:—‘O husband, if the Muni has told you that you must die, I will also die, for I am a woman who does not survive her husband. If there be any means of your being saved tell me; I will contrive it, even at the expense of my life.’”

"Brahmaketu said:—‘O most elegant, that Muni has told me the means of preserving my life. I may be saved through the favour of Vaivaswata, whom I shall meet at Benares. O wife, I am going there; it admits of no delay. I have made a promise to Suchandra, tell me how can I break it.’ The Princess observed:—‘Go out of the room and tell the hunchback in conformity to your agreement to enter the bride-chamber; and when you are gone, I will drive the son of Suchandra away, affirming that I have married you. Messengers shall be sent after you by the order of my father, who will bring news of you every moment to me. If you expire, I will also die, and if you be saved, I also will live: I am doomed to die on the funeral pile.’”

"Brahmaketu said:—‘The Muni has told me that I shall positively die, but be restored to life by Vaivaswata. Be pacified, O bride, do not detain me. I am going: if I lose time, I shall not arrive at Benares.’”

"Having said this to the Princess, the very famous Brahmaketu came out, and saw the hunchback, to whom he smil-

* The translations here and elsewhere have been extracted from Wilson's *inedited MSS.* in the library of the Asiatic Society.

"ingly said,—'Take the young wife,* I am going to Benares.
"After saying this he with great difficulty arrived at Benares.
"The son of Suchandra afterwards entered the bridal chamber,
"and his servant blew out the lamp. The Princess knowing
"that the deformed entered the room, and perceiving that the
"lamp has blown out, began to cry. The bridesmaids repaired
"to the room on hearing the loud noise, and enquired the cause
"of it. They perceived the room dark, which rendered them still
"more sorrowful. They lighted the lamp, and began to laugh
"on seeing the hunchback. The Princess on seeing him went
"out of the room crying, and related the whole account to her
"mother, who informed the king of all that Brahmaketu had
"said. Suchandra hearing what happened became ashamed, and
"returned home with his hunchbacked son, his forces, and de-
"pendants."

Here the interest of the story ends, and it will be sufficient to say that the Tamul Prince died at Benares, but was restored to life, and accordingly returned to his lovely bride, and lived happily ever afterwards. We have omitted much which, however interesting to Hindoo readers, would awaken no sympathy in the heart of the European. Thus we have passed over the distress of Suchandra in the early part of the story at being unable to procure a fitting wife for his hunchbacked son; as well as the distress of Brahmaketu at thinking that he would die without having been even formally married; two concurring circumstances which led to the deception. But the natural description of all that occurred after the Princess had been made acquainted with the deception, is equal in force, and far superior in truthfulness, to any scene we can remember in any sensational novel of modern times.

Our second illustration refers to an old institution, which carries us back to the heroic times, when the Kshetriyas were great in the land, and not as yet subjected by the Brahmins.*

* Traces of this ancient Kshetriya custom are still to be found in old Greek tradition; and Herodotus relates a story current in his time which may be reproduced here, as showing the relationship of the Hellenes not to the Brahmins, but to the Kshetriyas. Once upon a time, Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, won the prize of the chariot race at the Olympic games, and then and there publicly declared his intention of giving the hand of his beautiful daughter Agarista to the best husband he could find for her in all Greece. Accordingly all candidates were invited to present themselves at Sicyon within sixty days; and Clisthenes pledges himself that at the end of one year, counting from the end of the sixty days, he would be prepared to name the man whom he had chosen for the husband of his daughter. A considerable number of young heroes, of all the best families in Greece, presented themselves at Sicyon at the appointed time, and were entertained right royally for a whole

This institution was known as the Swayambara, at which the daughters of Rajahs were permitted to choose their own husbands. Our space here will not permit us to explain the probable origin and general characteristics of the Swayambara, for the latter differed widely, and the entire subject would by itself require a separate dissertation. It will be sufficient to say that in the Markandeya Purana, there is a story of a young hero, handsome and wise, of great strength and exceeding valour. Very many daughters of Rajahs chose him for their husband at their respective Swayambaras; and if a Princess declined to throw the necklace round his neck, that being the sign by which she indicated her choice, he carried her off by force, and made her his wife *volentem volentem*. On one occasion a beautiful Princess declining to choose him for her husband, he attempted to carry her off as usual, but was pursued by the disappointed suitors. A desperate battle ensued, during which for a long time he fairly kept his enemies at bay, but at length they surrounded him, contrary to the Kliestriya laws of honour, and overcame him and took him prisoner. Meantime, and here is a beautiful touch of nature, the Princess had been looking on

twelvemonth. Clisthenes tried their physical powers in the Gymnasia, and their intellectual powers in the Banqueting Hall, and Herodotus significantly observes that the trials at the banquet table were the greatest of all. The greatest favourite was Hippoclides, son of Tisander; and when the year was over, and the great day arrived, it was universally expected that Hippoclides would be chosen. The festivities on that day commenced with the sacrifice of a hundred oxen, followed by a great banquet to all the suitors, and to all the people of Sicyon. After the feast the suitors vied with each other both in music, and in delivering *ex tempore* speeches on given subjects; and here again Hippoclides distanced all competitors. Meantime hard drinking had set in, and Hippoclides called on the flute player to strike up a dance, and commenced dancing to the tune, much apparently to his own satisfaction. Clisthenes, however, looked dubiously on, much in the same way as might have been expected from a Rajpoot chief under similar circumstances. But by this time Hippoclides was excited beyond all reason. He mounted a table and danced first of all some Laconian figures, and then some Attic ones. Still Clisthenes looked on in silence, though well nigh bursting with rage. At length Hippoclides stood upon his head, and tossed his legs about, and Clisthenes could contain himself no longer. 'Son of Tisander,' he cried, 'thou hast danced thy wife away!' 'What does Hippoclides care?' retorted the sullen suitor. But Clisthenes commanded silence, and then addressed the whole assembly, giving his daughter to Megacles, the son of Alcmaeon, and presenting each of the other suitors with a silver talent to alleviate his disappointment. In after ages the union of Megacles and Alcmaeon became celebrated throughout Greece, for it was their son who founded the Athenian democracy, and from the same line sprang the famous Pericles, the greatest Athenian statesman, and perhaps the most brilliant democratic ruler that ever guided the destinies of a democratic empire. Compare Herodotus, lib. vi, c. 126, *et seq.*

the battle, and seeing her ravisher overcome by numbers, fell deeply in love with him ; and when the battle was over, and she was desired by her father to choose a husband from amongst the conquerors, she declined on the plea that the day had been inauspicious. Subsequently the father of the defeated Prince raised an army and defeated the suitors, and procured his son's release from captivity. The father of the Princess now offered his daughter in marriage to the liberated Prince, but the latter, smarting from being defeated in her presence, refused to take her as his wife. Moreover, animated by those notions of honour which actuated the ancient Kshetriya and still actuate the modern Rajpoot chief, the young Prince declared that having been dishonoured by strangers he would neither marry her nor any other damsel, and that she had better choose a husband whose fame was without a stain. Here we extract the dialogue between the king, whose name was Visala, and his daughter :—

"King Visala now observed to his daughter : ' O child, you have heard what this great Prince has said ; choose therefore yourself another person for your husband, whom, O good girl, you may like, or let us give you to any one whom you may desire : O fine-faced, do either of these.' "

"The girl answered :—' His defeat by many in my presence is not just : O king, his fame and strength are not in the least lessened by the battle. He is like a lion capable of destroying any who may oppose him. He has displayed his great heroism by abiding in the field ; yes, he not only stood his ground, but repeatedly repulsed his numerous enemies, nor did he show any signs of fatigue. The kings have unfairly defeated him who is possessed of heroism and valour, and fought with a due observance of rules : what shame is there in it ? I am not, O father, charmed by his beauty alone, but his heroism, strength, and fortitude have ravished my heart. To spare too many words, you should solicit him for my sake ; no one else shall be my husband.' "

"Visala then said to the young hero :—' O Prince, what my daughter has said is just. True, there is no youth on the face of the earth equal to you. Your courage is unexampled, and your strength is exceedingly great. Do you purify my family by accepting my daughter in marriage.' "

"The Prince replied :—' O king, I will not take or marry this, nor any other female.' "

"Knowing that the Prince was fixed in his resolution, the very sorrowful Visala said to his daughter :—' O daughter, do you then give up your desire for him, and take another for your husband ; there are many other Princes.' " The girl

“answered :—‘ I will, O father, take this hero for my husband, and should he refuse my request, I will devote myself to religious austerities, and none else be my husband in this life.’ ”

The story now becomes Brahminised, but the following scraps are still interesting. The Princess goes into the woods, whilst the Prince leads a life of celibacy in his father’s palace. At length one day, whilst his father, the Raja, was sitting at his ease, his ministers versed in the Sastras spoke to him as follows :—

“ O king, you have passed the greater part of your life in the government of your dominions ; you have but one son, who is without issue. O king, when you die the earth will be enjoyed by your enemies, your family be extinct, and your ancestors have no funeral cakes and oblations. Do you therefore endeavour to make your son contribute to the good of your forefathers.”

Under these circumstances the king requested his son to marry, and it so chanced that about this time whilst the Prince was hunting, he fell in with the Princess, who had been carried off by a Rakshasa. Of course he slew the Rakshasa, and thus having gained a victory in her presence, he married her in due course, and in the fulness of time presented a beautiful young grandson to the delighted old Raja.

The exquisite knowledge of human nature which led the Hindoo bard to represent a young lady falling in love with the Prince who had attempted to carry her off, is perhaps unsurpassed even in English literature. The rare genius which enabled Thackeray to represent Rebecca Sharpe admiring her husband at the moment the big guardsman was knocking down Lord Steyne, is scarcely superior in delicate appreciation of the female heart to that displayed by the unknown author of this ancient story. The young Princess sees the man whom she herself rejected, and who has carried her away contrary to her will, engaged in deadly conflict with enemies superior in number, but whom for a long time he successfully resists, until at last he is overcome by foul play and carried off a prisoner ; and this is the moment when the poet represents her as falling in love with the defeated warrior. Here her affection arises from no elective affinity, but from a number of widely different emotions all tending to one point ;—admiration of his bravery, his physical strength, his martial skill combined with that chivalrous sympathy with a brave and gallant hero who has the odds against him, and who is moreover victimized by the foul play of his opponents, together with her knowledge of his passion for her as evidenced by the forcible abduction. Thus the heart of the girl sympathises with the warrior, until admiration and affection culminate in a deep and unpying love.

Our next narrative culled from the Puranas, throws some light on the misery which a young spouse can produce in the family of a Rajah, who is already married to several worthy wives. The original story will be found in the Naradiya Purana, where it has been recklessly interpolated by the Brahminical author, though it must be admitted that some of the interpolations are as suggestive as the original legend. The outline of the story appears to be as follows :—Once upon a time a certain elderly Rajah left his kingdom in charge of his son, and proceeded on a hunting expedition in the neighbourhood of the Himalayahs. There he met with a beautiful nymph named Mohini, and straightway fell in love with her, and found no difficulty in inducing her to become his wife. Some opposition appears to have been anticipated from the Rajah's other wives, but this question was postponed, and the old Rajah and his young bride proceeded on horseback to the Rajah's city. The son came out to meet them, in accordance with the strict Hindoo notions of filial duty, and duly praised his young stepmother, and congratulated his father on such an acquisition. He then, whilst his father rested from the fatigues of the journey, entertained his new stepmother in his own house, gave her numerous presents, and even induced his own mother to wait upon her, in the following language, which is evidently an interpolation intended to enforce the duty of senior wives under such delicate circumstances :—

“ He (the son) afterwards spoke to his own mother in favour of Mohini, as follows :—‘ We ought to follow the directions of the king, and his commandments are of great weight to us. He who endeavours to injure the object of her husband's love suffers in hell for a period equal to the time of fourteen Indras ; and if she contrives to alienate the affections of her husband from another beloved spouse, through the jealousy which is natural to sisters-in-law, she is condemned to the hell called Tanvraprashtha. A wife should always do what may fairly please her husband, and treat fairly her sister-in-law, whom he may be fond of ; she ought to regard her equally with her husband, for by securing such a sister-in-law, even if she be a very mean creature, heaven is attained. By worshipping her who is the beloved wife of the husband, a woman can attain all enjoyments ; and she that gives over envy and vanity, goes to the region of Vishnu. A wife who is devoted to the gratification of her husband's favourite consort, her sister-in-law, attains many regions of the virtuous.’ ”

The senior wife according to the story is convinced of her duty by these pious observations of her son, and consequently serves

up a delicious meal to Mohini. Shortly afterwards the old Rajah visits his young wife, and she prudently advises him to conciliate his other spouses ; but we give the words :—

“ Mohini said :—‘ Do you, O king, console your former spouses, who are all highly afflicted by your marrying me ; because, O king of the earth, he that takes a new wife without reconciling his old consorts to it, cannot attain heaven. Besides, what felicity can I enjoy, if I be incessantly burnt up, as it were, by the tears of my elder sisters ? ’ ”

The son now undertakes to reconcile the other wives of his father, to the new marriage ; but the ladies reply in a flood of remonstrance which we cannot produce in all its fulness, but of which the following extract may serve as a specimen :—

“ The mothers answered, —‘ O son, who fosters his own devourer ? Who sets fire to his own body ? Who poisons himself, and who cuts off his own head ? Who wishes to traverse an ocean with a heavy piece of stone tied to his neck ? Who faces an elephant, and who lays himself down on a sharp sword ? What woman affords delight to her husband, when she finds him delighting in the company of her sisters-in-law ? Far better is it to a woman to have her head immediately severed, when she sees her husband devoted to the society of another wife. You know of all annoyances, the sight of the husband attached to a young damsel, is the most rueful to a woman. We, your mothers, will rather die, than see the king our husband in company with Mohini. ’ ”

This language is of course foreign to modern ideas, but it is the natural expression of insulted wives, writhing under an agony which can be understood, but cannot be described. The son, however, proved himself to be equally energetic with his refractory mothers and fully prepared to overcome all difficulties connected with their opposition. He threatened to put to death any one, even his own mother, who by word, action, or thought gave pain to his father, and then to poison himself afterwards. The women accordingly gave in, and promised compliance if the king would make them suitable presents, and quoted the following law on the subject :—“ If a person takes a second wife while his first consort is alive, he is to give his first wife, twice the sum that may be expended on his new marriage, and having thus reconciled her to it, he may marry with her consent. The man who takes a new wife, without pleasing his old spouses, performs sacrifices in vain. ”

The Prince agreed to give presents to each one, and it is amusing to observe the halo of Brahminical exaggeration which surrounds the original legend. We give the extract in full,

exaggeration and all, indicating what we believe to have been the original kernel of the description, before the Brahmins had set it round with oriental extravagance, by bracketing the words in italics :—

“ The Prince was highly delighted at the words of his mothers, and gave to each of them the following things: one crore of Suvarna weight of gold ; one thousand cities ; as many villages ; eight golden cars drawn by four horses each ; ten thousand pieces of cloth, the value of which was more than ten thousand rupees each ; one hundred servants, and the same number of maids ; ten thousand cows, whose teats were as big as waterpots ; one thousand bullocks of burden ; ten different sorts of rice ; ten thousand pots of ghee ; as many pots of oil ; innumerable goats and sheep ; ornaments made of thousands of thousands of Suvarna weight of gold ; fifteen bracelets studded with gems as large as the Amala fruits ; a string of two hundred and fifty of those pearls which are found in the heads of elephants ; [*a great quantity of saffron and sandal ; several plates, drinking vessels, and pots of ghee, milk, and other beverages of various descriptions*] two thousand and four hundred cooking pots of gold, eight hundred golden pots, hundreds of hundreds of pieces of fine cloth, and seventeen well adorned vehicles.”

The various wives of the old Rajah were sufficiently mollified by these presents, and accordingly engaged not to interfere with an arrangement by which the old Rajah again relinquished the kingdom to the care of his son, and devoted himself entirely to the beautiful Mohini. But soon the progress of the story reaches a natural *denouement*, which would have involved a moral lesson, had it not been hopelessly hampered with Brahminical interpolations. The story had been originally aimed at the institution of polygamy ; but the object of the Brahminical interpolator was to enforce the observances of certain fast days in the month of Kartika. Accordingly in the old ballad the narrative appears to have laid the chief stress upon the evil influence exercised by the young wife Mohini upon the old Rajah, until at last she inveigles him into a promise which he is reluctant to fulfil, and rather than fulfil is actually induced to cut off the head of his own son, this bloody alternative being demanded by the fiendish Mohini. The Brahmin interpolator represents this promise as having been a general one on the part of the Rajah to give to his young wife whatever she asked for, whereupon she requested him not to keep the appointed fast days in the month of Kartika ; but he being a pious old Rajah refuses compliance, and insists upon fasting on the days in question, and in abstaining from any gratification. Thus the Kshetrya

legend turns on the evil of a polygamist marrying a young wife; whilst the Brahminical additions turn upon the importance of keeping certain fast days. The whole story is in the highest degree sensational, abounding in oriental exaggerations and descriptions, which are not only foreign, but downright repulsive to European ideas; but here and there are flashes of human nature and expressions of deep passion wonderful in their very reality and earnestness. Thus the old Rajah endeavours to coax Mohini to let him observe the Vrata, *i. e.*, to keep the three days fast, by making the most wonderful offers, and urging what he probably considered to be the most conclusive arguments, of which the following extract will serve as a specimen:—

“The Rajah said:—‘How shall I do that shameful act in my old age, which I was not guilty of in my infancy and youth? Be propitious to me, O handsome girl, and do not interrupt my observance of the Vrata; I am ready to give up my kingdom to you instead of it, or if you do not like it, I will do anything else to please you. I will have you conveyed to wherever you please, O beautiful girl, on a vehicle borne by my wives, and I myself will run before you; or if you please, I will day and night swing you for several years on a well adorned cradle of seven lakhs of pearls as large as Amalaki fruits, supported on a frame made of gold or coral. Do not you, O my beloved damsel, prevent me from observing the Vrata. It is better to eat the flesh of a Chandala, that of a dog, nay that of one’s own body, than to take meals on the eleventh lunar day.’”

Mohini, however, was in a rage with the king for refusing to keep his promise of doing whatever she desired. “She was inflamed with anger, and her eyes were reddened.” She threatened to leave the old Rajah, saying,—“There is no king, even among the Mlechchhas, who would not do what he promises.” At this juncture the Prince arrives, but finding that he cannot effect a reconciliation, sends for his own mother, the senior wife of the Rajah. Then comes the *denouement*. The senior wife offers to comply with any request that Mohini may please to make, provided only that she will permit the old Rajah to fast on the eleventh lunar day. Mohini thereupon demands the head of her son, the Prince who was ruling the kingdom of his father; and this demand, horribly unnatural as it must appear to English readers, is perfectly in accordance with Hindoo notions, inasmuch as the Hindoo reader would readily perceive that Mohini was envious that her older rival should have a son, whilst she herself could scarcely hope to bear children to such an elderly husband.

The remainder of the story is too long for extract. The grief and alarm of the mother are depicted at considerable length, when the son comes forward with a sense of filial duty amounting to heroism, and offers his own life rather than that his father should neglect the observance of the fast. The story actually ends with the scene of the old Rajah cutting off the head of his son.

A somewhat similar plot is to be found in another ancient legend, which is narrated at great length in the Padma Purana. According to this story, which is evidently very ancient, Brahma prepared to celebrate a great sacrifice or Yajna, at which according to Vedic ideas the wife ought to be present, or at any rate ought to be present at one particular moment, or the sacrifice would be rendered of no effect. A large area was prepared, the Brahmins filled the heavens with recitations of the Vedas, the Kshetriyas guarded the sacrifice with their weapons, the Vaisiyas prepared the provisions and drinks, whilst the Sudras served all the others. At the critical moment, however, Savitri, the wife of Brahma, delayed her coming, on the plea that she was waiting for the wives of the other gods; and in this sudden emergency a beautiful girl, the daughter of a cowman, was found, and married to Brahma forthwith, in order that she might take the part of his wife at the great sacrifice. Meantime Savitri and the wives and daughters of the gods, having at last dressed themselves in their most attractive attire, proceeded in procession to the sacrifice, carrying baskets of fruits, sweetmeats, cakes, and every thing that is nice and agreeable. On entering the Sabha, the lotus-eyed Savitri saw the young lady dressed in silk acting the part of chief wife to Brahma. Brahma hung down his head, and Savitri saw in a moment what had taken place. But we may now bring forward a few extracts :—

“ The fine faced Savitri then fell into a passion, and thus addressed Brahma who was sitting silent in the Sabha :—
“ ‘ O Deva, what could induce you to do this thing? You have committed a crime by leaving me and taking another wife. The daughter of the cowman is the meanest of the mean, she is not equal to me. People say that a worthy woman is suitable to a worthy man. You have done a blamable act owing to the desire for the possession of a beauty. You are the grandfather of the gods, and the great grandfather of the Rishis—consider your old age; are you not ashamed to take a wife? You have excited the laughter of superior persons, and have also dishonoured me. If you continue thus, Deva, stay here, I salute you. How shall I show my face to

"my female friends, or tell them that my husband has married another wife?"

Here Brahma endeavours to excuse himself by pleading the necessity for a wife arising out of the festival, and tries also to throw the blame upon Indra, who brought the girl, and upon Vishnu, who married him to her; and then winds up with the following compliments and vows:—

"O thou, who possessest fine eyebrows, forgive what I have done. O most virtuous, I will never commit such a crime again. O Devi, pardon me who have thrown myself at your feet."

Savitri, however, was not to be so appeased. She cursed Brahma and the cow girl, Indra and Vishnu, and all the gods and goddesses then and there assembled, in the most natural and emphatic manner, and then retired and went away to another country; but here the original story melts away into an overgrowth of Brahminical superstition from which it is impossible to recover the conclusion of the legend.

The foregoing story is chiefly remarkable as being of the Homeric type. The gods and goddesses are mere men and women, neither good nor bad, but acting as we may suppose ordinary mortals to have acted in patriarchal times. The so-called sacrifice was little more than a great feast or entertainment, in which the various divinities were supposed to take their share; and the only difficulty in the Puranic legend is to discover who and what were the divine beings to whom Brahma and the others offered sacrifice. But in the present article we studiously avoid religious discussion, which must necessarily travel over far too wide a field for a reviewer; and accordingly we reserve all such topics for a future opportunity, as especially requiring to be treated exhaustively.

The basis of all civilisation is to be found in the relations of the sexes, and having brought forward such individual cases as serve to illustrate ancient manners, we may now produce certain extracts which lay down general rules for the duty and conduct of women, and which serve to illustrate other phases in the ancient social life of the Hindoos. The previous stories, with the exception of that of the old Rajah and his young wife, seem to indicate that husband and wife met generally on terms of equality; although in the exceptional case quoted, it is evident that polygamy was already exercising a slavish and debasing influence upon the weaker sex. We shall now produce two sets of extracts, the one from perhaps the most ancient Purana, and the other from perhaps the most modern Purana. The Agni Purana, which carries with it the greatest air of antiquity, serves to illustrate the ideas prevailing amongst the Kshetriyas, or soldier

caste, at the time when that caste predominated over the whole population, and polygamy was common. The Brahmana Vaidvarta Purana, which is chiefly devoted to enforcing the more modern worship of Krishna, shows how the condition of women became still more slavish and debased under a licentious and besotted priesthood during the period when the Brahmins held the masses in their thrall.

The Agni Purana simply furnishes rules by which Rajahs should manage their zenana or inner apartments. We give the passage entire, with only such curtailments as were necessary to fit it for the eyes of European readers :—

"I shall now, said Pushkara, tell you the management of the inner apartments where the female part of the family dwell. Mutual care is required in this management; the queen and king should reciprocally be regardful of each other. Triverga (the triple object of human life) is a large tree, its root is virtue, its trunk wealth, and its fruit pleasure; by cherishing it in the inner apartments its fruit will be put forth. Women are fond of pleasure, therefore precious stones should be collected for their use. A prince who studies his own pleasure should enjoy with moderation the society of his wives. Agreeable wives are to be treated with attention and tenderness. A wife who is ill-behaved, regardless of the words of her husband, attached to his enemies, rude and arrogant, rubs her face the instant that she is kissed, is not thankful for anything given her, sleeps earlier and gets up later than her husband, shrinks at his touch, turns away from him, and pays little attention even if he were to relate anything interesting, turns away from his friend, is indifferent to other women of whom her husband may be enamoured, and does not put on her dress and jewels in due time, is devoid of affection. The husband therefore may abandon her, and devote his affections to an affectionate wife, who is known by being sincerely pleased instantly at the sight of her husband, and by glancing at him. Being looked at by her husband, she keeps her eyes wandering over a variety of objects, but is not able to turn them full in his face. When she sees her husband, although she be in her earliest youth, she will embrace and kiss him; she is ready to answer him; she asks for things that are easy to be obtained, and is quite satisfied even with trifles. She is instantly pleased at the very mention of his name, and is thankful for it. She makes present of various fruits to her husband, and kindly accepting those made by him, holds them to her breast. Thus should a prince manage his women, in whom he ought not to place any trust, and particularly in such as are become the mothers of children."

The passages in the *Brahmana Vaivarta Purana*, are still more melancholy, for they exhibit in the strongest light the cold-hearted selfishness of that later race of Brahmins, who reduced the condition of the wife into that of a slave, and actually compelled her to worship her husband as a divine being ; and who to gratify a sentiment utterly false and hollow would induce the unfortunate widow to become suttee, or condemn her to a life of such misery as in later years would often lead her to regret that she had not burnt herself with her husband on the funeral pile. The following is the detail given in this later Purana of the duties of a virtuous wife :—

“ Instead of performing Vratas and austerities, and worshipping the gods, a chaste woman should serve the feet of her husband and gratify him. A virtuous woman shall not do anything without the sanction of her husband. She shall take only such food as is used by him, and never leave his company. She shall never return him an answer, nor be angry with him. She shall first feed her husband, and then present him betel. She must not wake him when he is asleep, and shall love him a hundred times more than her son. To a woman her husband is her friend, lord, and prosperity ; and she shall always look at him with a smiling countenance, with respect, and in a pleasing manner. Such a woman delivers one hundred of her generations. The husband of such a woman is disentrained from all his sins by the influence of his wife’s virtues. All the holy places that are in the world lie on the feet of a virtuous woman. The brilliancy of all the gods and Munis reside in her ; and she acquires all the fruition which the devotees, the austere, and the charitable, obtain by their penances, observances, and gifts. Vishnu, Siva, and even Brahma the creator always fear her. By the dust of a suttee’s feet the earth is instantly purified ; and by saluting such a woman, a person is delivered from all his sins. A virtuous woman can in an instant reduce the three regions to ashes by her influence. The husband and sons of a suttee are ever secure ; they have nothing to dread even from the gods and Yama.

“ A virtuous woman should, after rising in the morning, faithfully and delightedly salute and pray unto her husband. She shall then transact all domestic affairs, and having bathed shall worship her husband with white flowers. She should give him fine clothes to wear, and wash his feet with respect. She should make him sit on a seat, anoint him with sandal paste, put wreaths of flowers round his neck, and having worshipped him with nicely cooked food, and with the formulas revealed in the *Sama Veda*, salute him with reverence. She shall present

"him flowers, sandal paste, water for washing, a lamp, a dhupa, clothes, eatables, finely scented water, well formed betel, and then read paryers to him as follows :—

"Salutation to thee, my husband, who art identical with Siva and with the moon. Salutation to thee who art identical with Brahma, who art dearer than the soul to a virtuous woman, and identical with the pupils of her eyes, and the source of knowledge. The husband is identical with Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. The husband, who art the soul with Brahma, I salute. O lord, forgive all the faults that I have committed knowingly and unknowingly. O friend of thy wife, O ocean of kindness, pardon the faults of thy maid."

Such is the way in which religion has been employed by the later Brahmin to reduce their wives to the condition of slaves, and any one who regards the existing state of a large class of the Hindoos, may feel that nature has avenged the sins of the fathers upon the children. The sons of such mothers have been born with slavish hearts and slavish intellects, and unless the natives at large emancipate their females from the trammels of such ignorance and superstition, their children will continue to be little better than slaves down to the end of time. But the following extract, referring to the duties and deprivations of Hindu widows, can scarcely be read without indignation as well as pity :—

"A widowed female of the Brahmin caste, must always be free from the passion of love. She shall take one meal in a day in the evening. She must not wear fine clothes, nor anoint her body with perfumes and fine scented oils. She shall not put on wreaths of flowers, sandal paste, nor dots of vermillion. She shall meditate upon Vishnu every day. It is her duty to consider all men as sons. She must not eat luxurious food, nor live in grandeur. She must not take betel, nor sleep on a couch, nor ride on a vehicle. She must not put unguents to her hair, nor braid her hair. She must not anoint herself, nor look into a looking glass, nor see the face of strange men. She must not be present at a dance or festival, nor look at dancers, singers, and beautiful and well-adorned men. She shall always be told of her duties, which are communicated in the Sama Veda."

Such was, and is, the hapless condition of many a poor Hindoo widow ; perchance some girl of tender years, whose husband has died in boyhood, and who is thus doomed not merely to a life of joyless celibacy, but to a life of hopeless misery and degradation, and sometimes half maddened by gazing on happiness which she may never share. But the influence of the Brahmin is

declining, and let us hope that the day is not far distant when the Hindoo female may regain her position and rights, and, no longer cabined and enslaved, may bring forth a nobler race of sons.

We have thus dipped into the Puranas for the purpose of enquiring how far they would add to our knowledge of human nature, but we would fain hope that we have corrected some popular errors, as regards the true value and character of their subject-matter. General Cunningham, to whom we wish to refer with every respect for his learning and enthusiasm, has put forward an opinion in the preface to his valuable work on the Bhilsa topes, that a report on all the Buddhist remains in India would prove of more value for the ancient history of India, than the most critical and elaborate edition of the eighteen Puranas. We admit the value of the Buddhist remains, but we deny General Cunningham's conclusion as regards their relative value to the Puranas. There is a tendency in the present day to neglect the history of Hindooism, and to devote an undue attention to Buddhism ; but the fact is that both are essential towards acquiring a true knowledge of the history of India. The student in European history must be at least as well acquainted with Roman Catholicism as with the Reformation, and to neglect the one, and place an undue stress upon the other, is calculated to warp the judgment. If the Buddhist remains only threw a light upon the history of dynasties, or the names and dates of departed kings, they would prove of little more value than the chronicles of Manetho, or the list of the victorious runners in the Olympic games. But so far as they throw a light upon Buddhist civilisation, or on modes of thought, or forms of faith, so far they are invested with a real value, in which, however, they are by no means superior to the sacred books of the Hindoos, a conclusion which we trust may safely be inferred from the foregoing dippings in the Puranas.

BENARES, PAST AND PRESENT.

THE great antiquity of India is proved directly and indirectly in so many ways, that it has come to be regarded as one of the ordinary truisms about which all the civilized world are agreed. Yet it is remarkable that, although it admits not of the smallest question, no evidence in its favour should be afforded by any monument of art hitherto discovered in the country. There is no known specimen of architecture existing of any character, the date of which carries us back beyond the third century before Christ. The pillars of Asoka, which belong to this period, are the very earliest sculptured remains yet found. Of these, says Mr. Fergusson, "one is at Delhi, having been re-erected by Feroze Shah in his palace, as a monument of his "victory over the Hindus. Three more are standing near the "river Gunduck in Tirhoot ; and one has been placed on a "pedestal in the fort of Allahabad. A fragment of another "was discovered near Delhi, and part of a seventh was used as a "roller on the Benares road by a Company's engineer officer." There is reason for supposing that some of the Bhilsa topes may be assigned to this epoch, while others are undoubtedly of a somewhat later date. Of the cave temples, so interesting not only to the archæologist but likewise to all lovers of the curious, not one was excavated earlier than the first century before Christ. The great Karli cave dates from the beginning of the Christian era. The Ajunta caves belong to several epochs, and some are as recent as the ninth or tenth centuries A. D. The Viswakarma cave at Ellora is of the seventh or eighth century A. D. Among the caves in Behar there is one called the Lomas Rishi, which from certain peculiarities in its construction may, it is conjectured, have been excavated prior to

* *Fergusson's Handbook of Architecture*, p. 7.

the Christian era, although the inscription which covers it is ascribed only to the fourth century after Christ.

It has been asserted on strong authority, that no ancient temples or religious monasteries apart from the cave structures exist in India, on the ground that the pre-Buddhist Hindus, that is, those living previous to the sixth century B. C., were as yet simple and unsophisticated, and performed the rites of their religion to a great extent without idols or temples, or if with them, those objects were made of perishable material. The fact of no temples or other edifices having been discovered, is regarded as a powerful reason in substantiation of this assertion. Now, to say the least, it is exceedingly premature to hazard such an opinion founded on such a basis, inasmuch as the study of Indian antiquities with exactness is only of yesterday. Scarcely a generation has passed since Prinsep deciphered the inscriptions on Asoka's pillars and ascertained their date. Moreover, the spirit of archæological inquiry has but slightly manifested itself among the British rulers of India. Of the large number of educated Englishmen who have visited the country during the last one hundred years, and have resided in it for a longer or shorter period, perhaps not one in a thousand has taken the smallest practical interest in bringing to the light of day its hidden historical treasures. It is a hopeful sign of the times that curiosity on this subject is now being extensively excited, but it has hardly yet passed into the stage of eager desire displaying itself by earnest and persistent effort in the pursuit of archæological investigations. The discoveries of the last few years have been so remarkable and abundant, and have added so many increments to our small stock of knowledge respecting ancient India, that the appetite for these researches has become more strongly whetted, and the belief has been originated that the Indian mine is rich and deep, and is ample enough to repay the efforts of a whole army of explorers.

The ancient edifices of India with which we are acquainted are not of that primitive and rude character as to lead us to imagine that they are the very first productions of Indian architectural skill. On the contrary, they indicate an advanced stage both in the knowledge and application of permanent material, and in devising and executing elegant designs in it. No one can look upon Asoka's monoliths and believe for an instant that the knowledge of architecture which they display was acquired simply during that monarch's reign. Nor can it be credited that the beautiful cave temples were without their predecessors. It may be replied, however, that from a minute and careful examination of Indian, Assyrian, and Egyptian

architecture, the conclusion may almost be demonstrated, that the models of the two former styles were originally wooden, while those of the last mentioned were of stone, and that therefore there is a necessary limit to our investigations beyond which it is useless to attempt to go, for the wooden models have mostly, if not entirely, perished, and the stones are of a later period. Granting that this theory is in the main true, we are not compelled to believe that the earliest stone erections were as recent as the third century before Christ, or, if there were any before that date, that they have all been destroyed. Of the ancient Assyrian palaces discovered by Layard, those most elaborately sculptured were built about B. C. 700, while others in a less ornamented style were erected before this. And even these were preceded by wooden buildings. If this be correct, why should not at least the same antiquity be conceded to Indian sculptures subsequent to the wooden period? Is it at all likely that the Aryan race existed in India for between one and two thousand years, that they conquered a large portion of the country, that they attained to greatness and glory, and made wonderful progress in civilization, equalling, if not surpassing, their contemporaries in other parts of Asia, and yet that, during all this time, they were satisfied with only transitory symbols of greatness, and never conceived the idea of leaving behind them durable monuments of their power which should hand down their name to many generations? They must have heard of the vast structures erected in Egypt, and of the splendid palaces, and stairs, and pillars, and other edifices with which the Assyrian monarchs adorned their cities. They were not lacking in genius or in the desire for knowledge; on the contrary, their minds investigated the highest subjects, and whatever was of interest to humanity in general, they regarded as of importance to themselves.

But, it may be said, the Hindus borrowed their architecture from the Assyrians, or that the architecture of the two races was of a common origin. Both suppositions may be true, and in our opinion it is almost certain that in whatever way it was brought about, both countries, in some respects, followed the same models. Whether Assyrian or Persian sculptors were the architects of the earliest Hindu buildings, is open to question, but if they were, it seems absurd to suppose that they should have erected edifices altogether of wood, while in their own country the public buildings were to a large extent of stone, especially seeing that various kinds of durable stone were easily procurable in India. If, on the other hand, the architects were natives who had learnt the principles of their

art chiefly from Assyria or Persia, it appears equally strange that they should have perpetuated the construction of wooden buildings in India for centuries after they must have known them to have been abandoned in those countries, and to have given place to vast edifices of wood and stone combined, covered with carvings and sculptures.

We arrive therefore at this conclusion, that as there is every reason to believe that solid buildings, partly if not entirely of stone, were erected in India several hundred years preceding the third century B. C., the earliest date, as already remarked, of any monuments hitherto discovered, the probability is, that if a diligent search were instituted, some fragmentary remains of them would be found. It is a circumstance highly favourable to the prosecution of this search, that the ancient abodes of the Aryan race in India have been for the most part well ascertained. All those places will be, we hope, in the course of time thoroughly examined, and every object of interest, tending to throw any light on the subject before us, or on the ancient history of India generally, noted and described.

Among the primitive cities founded by this people, must indisputably be reckoned the city of Benares. When it was first founded, and by what prince or patriarch, is altogether unknown. But of its great antiquity, stretching back through the dim ages of Indian history far into the clouds and mists of the Vedic and perhaps pre-Vedic periods, there can be no doubt. By reason of some subtle and mysterious charm, this city has linked itself with the religious sympathies of the Hindus through every century of its existence. For the sanctity of its inhabitants, of its temples and tanks, of its wells and streams, of the very soil that is trodden, of the very air that is breathed, and of everything in it and around it, Benares has been famed for thousands of years. The poor deluded sensualist, whose life has been passed in abominable practices, or the covetous *mahajan* who has made himself rich by a long course of hard-fisted extortion, or the fanatical devotee, fool and murderer, more simple than a babe, yet guilty of the foulest crimes, still comes as of old from the remotest corners of India, as the sands of time are slowly ebbing away, and fearful lest the golden thread should be snapped before his long journey is ended, he makes desperate efforts to hold on his course, until, arriving at the sacred city and touching its hallowed soil, his anxious spirit becomes suddenly calm, a strange sense of relief comes over him, and he is at once cheered and comforted with the treacherous lie, that his sins are forgiven, and his soul is saved.

It is natural therefore to believe that *prima facie* Benares

offers as fair a field for archæological investigation in regard to the earliest forms of Hindu architecture as any city in India. It is confessedly true that no very ancient remains have yet been found there, but the reason may be, because they have not been properly sought after. It is only within the last three or four years that, so far as we are aware, any inquiries have been made in a regular manner respecting the old buildings existing in Benares. Mr. James Prinsep, the great Indian archæologist, was the Magistrate of the city for several years, but it does not appear that he made any important discoveries in it. His "Views of Benares" are chiefly of a popular cast, and do not give evidence of any extensive observation or research. Major Kittoe, the late Government Archæologist and Architect of the Government College, a beautiful gothic structure in the suburbs of the city, although interesting himself in the excavations at Sarnath, some three miles to the north of Benares, did not, so far as is known, examine the city itself. Indeed, so inattentive was he to its claims to antiquity, that he removed many cart-loads of heavy stones, some of which were curiously carved, from Bakariya Kund on the confines of the city and not more than a mile from the college which he was erecting, without reflecting that they might possibly be the relics of ancient buildings formerly situated on that side. As a fact, they were connected with a series of Buddhist edifices covering perhaps, as much space as those, the foundations and remains of which, are found at Sarnath. A third archæologist, Mr. Thomas, late Judge of Benares, and a distinguished numismatist, trod in the same footsteps, only taking interest in the coins discovered in the city. As instances of ruthless spoliation, we may here remark, that in the erection of one of the bridges over the river Burna, forty-eight statues and other sculptured stones were removed from Sarnath and thrown into the river to serve as a breakwater to the piers; and that in the erection of the second bridge, the iron one, from fifty to sixty cart-loads of the stones from the Sarnath buildings were employed. But this Vandalism hardly equals that of Baboo Jagat Sing, who in the last century carted away an entire tope from the same vast store-house, with which he built Jagat Gunge in the suburbs of the city.

The chief reason why Benares has been thus neglected is, in our judgment, attributable partly to its great extent, and partly to the general ignorance as to the position of its ancient portions; and consequently the explorer in commencing his task would be in considerable doubt where to begin. Now it is necessary to state, that much of the existing city has been erected in comparatively modern times, and with the exception of an occa-

sional bit of old frieze or cornice, or a broken bas-relief or statue inserted into recent walls, deposited over drains, or lying neglected by the side of the road, there is nothing of an ancient character visible. But all the northern quarter of the city, a district little frequented by European visitors, exhibits signs of antiquity in abundance. Independent of a few separate buildings, or parts of buildings here and there to be seen, of an early style of Hindu architecture, sculptured stones of many kinds are distributed amongst the walls and foundations of the modern houses and in all places wherever solid masonry is required in such great profusion, that it is impossible not to believe that on this site stood Benares in olden times. Moreover, the very scattered nature of these remains, shows that a vast period has elapsed since they occupied their proper places in their own original edifices. It might be utterly impracticable to collect the entire materials of any one building, but this is not necessary, seeing that the age of a building can be commonly determined by observing only a fragment of its ruins. In the case, however, of ancient Hindu remains, so little has been done in their investigation, especially in comparing one with another, that the question of their antiquity cannot be at once decided. From an ignorance of primitive types, mistakes of five hundred or a thousand years or upwards may be easily made. In judging therefore of the age of the relics found in Benares, we have in reality very little to guide us.

If there be anything in the argument based on the simplicity of a style or on its ornamentation relative to its greater or less antiquity, then can we predicate of the buildings which formerly stood in this part of Benares every stage of antiquity, from the most remote to the most recent. Some of the capitals, pillars, bases, architraves, and mouldings, are most severely simple in their type, while others are crowded with ornamentation, and both species are very different from the styles in modern use. The first species is doubtless the forerunner of the second, but at what interval it is at present impossible to affirm.

There is no question that a large proportion of the ancient remains in Benares are of Buddhist origin, but of various epochs, and in some cases those on the same site are of different ages. For instance, the Buddhist monastery and temples, of which traces are found at Bakariya Kund, differ in their styles of architecture. Of the two chaitys, or temples, parts of which are still standing, the pillars of the one are square and without ornament, while those of the other, situated about three hundred yards off, are first square, then eight-sided, and then sixteen-sided, and are adorned with exquisitely carved devices.

Moreover, from the masonic symbols engraved upon many of the stones, it is manifest that, while a portion of the buildings was erected during the Gupta dynasty, or from the third to the sixth centuries A. D., yet that another portion must have been built much earlier, possibly at the time when the Pali language was spoken.

There are several ancient edifices in Benares, which, if not original, are certainly to a large extent built of old materials. In these, more especially in their columns, may be traced a gradation of style. When we compare the simple bracket or cruciform capital and its plain square shaft and base, such as we find in the pillars of the cloisters around the platform of Aurungzebe's mosque behind the modern Bisheshwar temple, and also in the pillars of a Mahomedan cemetery in the neighbourhood of Tilia Nala, with the elaborately ornamented columns of the mosque in the Raj Ghaut Fort, we are at once struck at the contrast, and at the extraordinary development which the style, the same fundamentally in both instances, has received. Various intermediate stages of diversity are represented in other buildings to which we cannot here further allude. But the first class of pillars must, we contend, be of a very early date. It does not follow, however, that the other class belongs necessarily to a recent epoch. The mosque in which the columns of this class are found, consists apparently of two Buddhist cloisters, or possibly of two divisions of a Buddhist temple, and has been at times so extensively altered and repaired, that it is hard to say that any one column stands exactly as originally placed. The columns are four in each row, and are seventy in number. They are all carved, as also, with a few exceptions, are the architraves, and the carvings in one division are uniform. The carvings in the other division, are bolder and more profuse, but nevertheless are totally free from degeneracy of style. Some of the pillars are of striking beauty, and for grandness of conception and correctness of execution, are not surpassed anywhere in India. Now, as some of the beautifully carved pillars at Bhilsa were set up in the second or third centuries before Christ, we must be careful in our estimate of the date to which the Raj Ghaut pillars, which are of equal excellency and purity of style, ought to be assigned.

But we do not suppose that the architectural remains scattered over this quarter of Benares are all of Buddhist origin. At the same time, we do not forget the remark of Fergusson, (*Hand-book of Architecture*, p. 100) that "the earliest authentic building that we have of the Hindu religion in Hindustan, is the great temple of Bhobaneswar, (in Orissa,) built

" by Lelat Indra Kesari, A. D. 657, " which, if true at the time he wrote, is nevertheless in our judgment a remark made without sufficient investigation. The same eminent writer has elsewhere hazarded the erroneous observation respecting Buddhist structures, that no built examples whatever exist in India of Buddhist temples (chaityas) and monasteries (vihars) ; and has besides strangely confounded Jain and Buddhist monuments. Previous to the Buddhist supremacy in India, we know that Benares was a Brahminical city, and there is no proof that at any period of that supremacy Brahminism was entirely extirpated therefrom. For our part, we are inclined to believe that some of these ancient remains may be attributed equally to Hindu and Buddhist origin. The simple style of architecture, to which we have alluded, was, without doubt, the earliest introduced into Benares, perhaps into Hindustan, and whether the work of Buddhists or Hindus, is of high antiquity.

It will be remembered by some of our readers, that the large Buddhist tope at Sarnath was seen by the Chinese traveller Hwan Thsang in the seventh century of our era, and probably by Fa Hian, another Chinese pilgrim, in the beginning of the fifth. These persons not only saw the tope, but also other buildings in its immediate neighbourhood. The former says, that one hundred separate chapels or shrines, surmounted by golden arrows, and possessing gilt images, encompassed the tower ; and the latter speaks of several towers and of two monasteries erected on this spot. The excavations at Sarnath have revealed portions of some of these edifices, and have brought to light numerous images or statues deposited in them. The structures seen by Fa Hian were probably erected for the most part in the fourth century or earlier, but of their date we have no exact information. A discovery of much importance has been made in carrying on the excavations, namely, that below the foundations of the later building are the remains *in situ* of an earlier structure, the epoch of which must be placed far anterior to that of the upper one. When we reflect that Sakya Muni first "turned the wheel of the law" at Sarnath in the sixth century B. C., and that from that period downwards this spot was held in the greatest sanctity by all pious Buddhists, it is certain that buildings of some sort must have existed there from that early era continuously down to the time of the visit of the Chinese travellers. The most primitive of them may have been of wood, but to us it seems absurd to suppose, that at the time Asoka erected stone monuments in honour of Buddha all over India, this place of Buddha's first labours should have

possessed only wooden structures, especially when we remember that inexhaustible quarries of the finest sandstone existed only a few miles off, namely, near the sites of the modern towns of Mirzapore and Chunar.

It is worthy of notice as indicative of the nature of Mahomedan rule in India, that nearly all the buildings in Benares of acknowledged antiquity have been appropriated by the Mussulmans, being used as mosques, mausoleums, dargahs, and so forth, and also that a large portion of the separate pillars, architraves, and various other ancient remains, which, as before remarked, are so plentifully found in one part of the city, are contributing to the support or adornment of their edifices. Not content with destroying temples and mutilating idols with all the zeal of fanatics, they fixed their greedy eyes on whatever object was suited to their own purposes, and without remorse or any of the tenderness shown by the present rulers, seized upon it for themselves. And thus it has come to pass, that every solid and durable structure, and every ancient stone of value, being esteemed by them as their peculiar property, has with very few exceptions passed into their hands. We believe it was the boast of Alaaddin that he had destroyed one thousand temples in Benares alone. How many more were razed to the ground, or transformed into mosques through the iconoclastic fervour of Aurungzebe, there is no means of knowing, but it is not too much to say that he was unsurpassed in this feature of religious enthusiasm by any of his predecessors. If there be one circumstance respecting the Mahomedan period which Hindus remember better than another, it is the insulting pride of the Mussulmans, the outrages which they perpetrated upon their religious convictions, and the extensive spoliation of their temples and shrines. It is right that Europeans as well as Hindus should clearly understand that this spirit of Mahomedanism is unchangeable, and that if by any mischance India should again come into the possession of men of this creed, all the churches and colleges, and all the Mission institutions, with perhaps every other product of Christianity, would not be worth a week's purchase.

When we endeavour to ascertain what the Mahomedans have left to the Hindus of their ancient buildings in Benares, we are startled at the result of our investigations. Although the city is bestrewn with temples in every direction, in some places very thickly, yet it would be difficult, we believe, to find twenty temples in all Benares of the age of Aurungzebe. The same unequal proportion of old temples as compared with new is visible throughout the whole of Northern India. Moreover, the dimi-

native size of nearly all the temples which exist, is another powerful testimony to the stringency of the Mahomedan rule. It seems clear that for the most part the emperors forbade the Hindus to build spacious temples, and only suffered them to erect small structures of the size of cages for their idols, and these of no pretensions to beauty. The consequence is, that the Hindus of the present day, blindly following the example of their predecessors of two centuries ago, commonly build their religious edifices of the same dwarfish size as formerly, but instead of plain, ugly buildings, they are often of elegant construction. Some of them, indeed, are so delicately carved on their exterior face, are so crowded with bas-reliefs and minute sculpturing, and are so lavishly ornamented, that the eye of the beholder becomes satiated and wearied. In regard to size, there is a marked difference between the temples of Northern and Southern India, the latter being frequently of gigantic dimensions, yet in respect of symmetry and beauty, the difference is immensely in favour of the Northern fanes.

The form of religion prevailing among the Hindus in Benares is Puranic, which in all probability originated in the country generally at the time when the Buddhist religion began to lose its hold upon the people, or about the fifth or sixth century A.D. Vedantism more or less tinctures the philosophical creed of many, but the staple religion of the masses, is the lowest and grossest form of idolatry—is the worship of uncouth idols, of monsters, of the lingam and other indecent figures, and of a multitude of grotesque, ill-shapen, and barbarous objects. Some of them are wild parodies on the animal kingdom, representing imaginary creatures made up in a variety of ways. There is no city in India in which the reverence paid to images is more absolute and complete than in Benares. It is remarkable, too, as showing the extent to which the spirit of idolatry has permeated all classes, that pundits and thinking men, who ought to know better, join in the general parctice. The only persons who do not heartily engage in it, are the young men educated at the public colleges and schools, who out of deference to their parents and friends perform carelessly and flippantly the prescribed religious duties, but who have already perceived the hollowness and absurdity of Hinduism, and do not scruple occasionally to betray their sentiments, and even to scoff at their own religion. To this class, which is constantly increasing, should be added those persons, the number of whom may be large, but which it is impossible to calculate, who have paid serious attention to the exposition of Christian truth by Missionaries in the bazar, and who although not outwardly accepting Chris-

tianity, are yet to some extent convinced of the falsity of Hinduism.

Since the country has come into our hands a great impetus has been given to the erection of temples and to the manufacture of idols in Northern India. In Benares, temples have multiplied at a prodigious rate, and this rate, at the present moment, is we believe rather increasing than diminishing. Judging from its external appearances, Hinduism was never so flourishing as it is now. With general prosperity and universal peace, and with a Government based on neutral principles, and always very respectful to the national religious systems, Hinduism, under the leadership of men of the old school—princes, pundits, banyas, and priests,—is making extraordinary efforts to maintain its position against the new doctrines of European civilization and religion which they now begin to recognize as formidable opponents. The remarks of the Rev. Dr. Mullens, on the extension of Hinduism, materially and outwardly, in "Christian Work" for July 1864, strongly bear out these observations:—

"There can be little doubt," he says, "that a hundred years ago the temples, mosques, and shrines of India belonging to all the native religions, were by no means in a flourishing condition. Large numbers, indeed, must have been in a state of decay. The anarchy that prevailed throughout the Mogul empire after the death of Aurungzebe, the constant wars, the terrible visits of foreign armies, the civil contests, the struggles of petty landholders, all tended to produce a state of insecurity which paralysed trade, which even hindered agriculture, and involved all classes in a poverty which the empire had not suffered for many years. Never were invasions more fierce; never were famines more cruel. Though freed from the persecutions of the bigoted emperor, the temples suffered grievously from the general want; and it was probably only in the Mahratta provinces that Hinduism flourished; in them realizing its prosperity from the plunder of successful Mahratta armies, whose piety rewarded the shrines of their protecting divinities with a shower of endowments and offerings which remain in measure to the present day. Hinduism now is, externally, in a much more flourishing condition than it was then. All over North India especially, the native merchants and bankers who have prospered by English protection, by contracts with English armies, by the security given by English law to their extensive trade, have filled Benares and other cities with new and costly shrines; and many a Rajah, and many a banker, when visiting in state the holy city, has poured into the lap of the attendant

"priests unheard-of sums, which must have satisfied even their covetous and grasping souls. Thus strangely has the revival of prosperity under English rule added something of external strength to the ancient idolatry, the resources of which had in so many places begun to fail. The new school, enlightened and doubting, ceases to build new temples, or endow the old ones. The old school, prospering in trade, growing in wealth, still trusting to the ancient superstitions, and anxious to earn merit for themselves, build new temples and present new gifts; though feeling that the days of their faith are numbered, and that other views are gradually pressing their own into oblivion."

It remains to be seen whether the new religion or the old—Christianity or Hinduism—is the more powerful. The contest between them has already commenced. It is felt throughout all the divisions of native society. It is inflaming the blood of the higher castes, and is calling forth all the subtlety of the Brahmins, all their intellect, and all their mysterious authority. We must expect the opposition to Christianity to be in many places organized and systematic, determined and dogged. But if Christians in India be faithful to themselves and to their Divine Master, the triumph of their cause is certain.

Upwards of thirty years ago Mr. James Prinsep, then Magistrate of Benares, took a census of the city, and also made a computation of the number of temples and mosques existing in it. From his calculation, which was made with considerable care, there were at that time in the city proper, exclusive of the suburbs, 1,000 Hindu temples and 333 Mahomedan mosques. But this number of temples, which has since been much increased, did not include, we imagine, the small shrines, the niches in the walls, the cavities inside and outside many of the houses, and the spaces on the ghauts, in which images in immense multitudes were, and are, still deposited. These secondary shrines, if they be worthy of this designation, each occupied by one or more idols, are in some parts of the city exceedingly numerous. Figures of every form, from a plain stone to the most fantastic shape, whole and mutilated, painted and unpainted, some without adornment, and others decorated with garlands or wet with sacred water, meet the eye in every direction. These remarks especially refer to the neighbourhood of the bathing ghauts and of the principal temples. Yet all over the city, idols and temples are seen scattered in marvellous prodigality.

The Hindus have a strange fancy for accumulating idols in certain spots. Not content with depositing one image in a temple, they ornament its portico and walls with deities, or

arrange them in rows in the temple enclosure. You may sometimes see twenty, fifty, and even a hundred of these idols in one place, many of which will perhaps receive as much homage as the god who is exalted to the chief seat within the temple itself. If it would be difficult to count the small shrines and sacred niches abounding in the city, it would be incomparably more so to count the idols actually worshipped by the people. These inferior shrines were on one occasion by a curious contrivance immensely increased, and yet the increase could hardly have been generally perceived. Rajah Mán Singh of Jeypore wishing to present one hundred thousand temples to the city, made this stipulation, that they were all to be commenced and finished in one day. The plan hit upon was, to cut out on blocks of stone a great many tiny niches, each one representing a temple. The separate blocks, therefore, on the work being completed, exhibited from top to bottom and on all sides a mass of minute temples. These blocks are still to be seen in various parts of Benares, the largest being situated above the Dassasumedh Ghaut, near the Mán Mandil observatory. In regard to the number of idols of every description actually worshipped by the people, it certainly exceeds the number of people themselves, though multiplied twice over, and cannot be less than half a million, but may be many more. Indeed, the love for idolatry is so deep-seated and intense in the breast of the Hindu, that it is a common thing for both men and women to amuse themselves with a pious intent with manufacturing little gods from mud or clay, and after paying divine honours to them, and that, too, with the same profound reverence which they display in their devotions before the well-known deities of the temples, to throw them away.

Although most of the temples are of modern date, yet the old sites still remain, where for many ages shrines dedicated to certain deities have stood, and have been adored by a ceaseless stream of Hindu worshippers. It is therefore a common reply which one receives on inquiring the date of any given shrine, that it is without date and has existed for ever. These original sites are numerous, and each has a history of its own. For instance, the pundits say that Ganesh is worshipped in fifty-six places, the goddess Yogani in sixty-four, Durga in nine, Bhairon in eight, Shiva in eleven, Vishnu in one, and the Sun in twelve, all of which date from the mythical period when Deodás, the famous Rajah of Benares, whose name is a household word among the people, was prevailed on to permit the gods to return to their ancient and sacred home. But these places do

not by any means represent the present number of shrines at which these deities are venerated. Ganesh especially, the god of wisdom, son of Shiva and Parvati, is very extensively worshipped in Benares; and there is scarcely a temple in some niche or corner of which his ill-shapen figure may not be found.

The temple receiving the highest meed of honour in the whole city is that dedicated to the god Bisheshwar or Shiva, whose image is the lingam or a plain stone set up on end. Bisheshwar is the reigning deity of Benares, and in the opinion of the people holds the position of king over all the other deities, as well as over all the inhabitants residing not only within the city itself, but also within the circuit of the Panch-kosi road or sacred boundary of Benares extending for nearly fifty miles. In issuing his orders he acts through Bhaironath, who is the deified kotwal or god-magistrate of Benares and its extensive suburbs. Every matter of importance is presumed to be brought in a regular manner by the kotwal before his royal master. The agents of the kotwal are stationed all along the Panch-kosi road, and are the gods or idols, located there, who are supposed to act as chowkidars or watchmen over the entire boundary. The office of these watchmen is to ward off all evil from the sacred city, to contend with such enemies as they may meet with endeavouring to break in upon the outer enclosure, and to send in their reports to the god-magistrate Bhaironath.

Bisheshwar in his capacity of idol-king of Benares demands the homage of his subjects, and will not resign his rights to the other deities who throng his dominions. His subjects must first of all worship him, and must bring their offerings to his shrine, of which he, or rather his rapacious priests, are exceedingly fond. Although without mouth or throat, his thirst seems to be great, for one of the most plentiful offerings presented to him, is that of Ganges water, with which in the hot season he is kept perpetually drenched.

It is no matter of surprise, therefore, that Bisheshwar should receive more adoration than any other idol in Benares. Not only the permanent inhabitants of the city, but also pilgrims and other travellers may be seen pressing into the temple during the greater portion of the day. The worshippers are of all classes and conditions, and present a singular and even picturesque variety of appearance. Among the most prominent of these is, we need hardly say, the proud, half-naked Brahmin, with shaven head, save a long tuft depending from his crown behind, the *Janeo* or sacred thread being thrown over one shoulder or ear, and the symbol of Shiva being displayed upon his forehead,

who performs his devotions with punctilious nicety. The faqir, too, in almost primitive nakedness, his hair dyed and matted together, and his body bedaubed with ashes, though scarcely noticed by other people, arrests the attention of the stranger. Few of the men have much clothing upon their persons, and yet many of them, by their carriage and by the jewels and gold with which they are adorned, show that they occupy a very respectable position in native society. The women are for the most part thoroughly clothed, and some of them occasionally are profusely decorated with gold and silver ornaments studded with precious stones. All the worshippers carry offerings in their hands, consisting of sugar, rice, ghee, grain, flowers, water, &c. One of the most beautiful of the flowers presented is the lotus, the form and colour of which bear some resemblance to a large tulip or water-lily.

Over the narrow doorway which constitutes the chief entrance to the temple, is a small figure of Ganesh, upon which some of the worshippers, as they pass in sprinkle a few drops of water. On entering the enclosure several shrines are visible. The worshipper pays his homage to any god or all, as he may elect, but he must of necessity approach the paramount deity of the place, that is to say, the plain oblong stone already alluded to. He makes his obeisance to the god either by bowing his head, his hands being folded in adoration, or by prostrating himself upon the ground; after which he presents his offering, and rings one of the bells suspended from the roof of the temple. This is to arrest the attention of the god—for it is possible he may be asleep, or otherwise occupied—and to fix it upon himself. The adoration of an idolater is sometimes distressingly solemn. His whole soul seems to be overawed, but with what sentiments, it is impossible to affirm; and the solemnity, if any, is singularly transient, and only lasts so long as he is in the presence of the idol. It is difficult to analyze his feelings, or to affirm precisely that they are of this or of that nature; nevertheless, there can be little doubt that his mind is occasionally filled with dread and anxiety, amounting it may be to alarm. The idolater cherishes no love for the idols he worships, but, on the contrary, regards them as beings to be feared, and therefore to be propitiated by adoration and suitable offerings. Nearly all the worshippers engage in their devotions in a quiet, orderly, and decent manner, but with manifest perfunctoriness and with little or no thought beyond the desire to perform thoroughly the task they have set themselves even to the minutest particular.

The temple of Bisheshwar is situated in the midst of a quadrangle covered in with a roof, above which the tower of the

temple is seen. At each corner is a dome, and at the south-east corner a temple sacred to Shiva. When observed in the distance from the elevation of the roof, the building presents three distinct divisions. The first is the spire of a temple of Mahadeo, whose base is in the quadrangle below. The second is a large gilded dome. And the third is the gilded tower of the temple of Bisheshwar itself. These three objects are all in a row in the centre of the quadrangle, filling up most of the space from one side to the other. The carving upon them is not particularly striking; but the dome and tower glittering in the sun look like vast masses of burnished gold. They are, however, only covered with gold leaf, which is spread over plates of copper overlaying the stones beneath. The expense of gilding them was borne by the late Maharajah Runjeet Singh of Lahore. The tower, dome, and spire, terminate severally in a sharp point. Attached to the first is a high pole bearing a small flag and ending with a trident. The temple of Bisheshwar, inclusive of the tower, is fifty-one feet in height. The space between the temples of Bisheshwar and Mahadeo, beneath the dome, is used as a belfry, and as many as nine bells are suspended in it. One is of elegant workmanship, and was presented to the temple by the Rajah of Nepal.

Outside the enclosure to the north, is a large collection of deities raised upon a platform, called by the natives "the court of Mahadeo." They are for the most part male and female emblems. Several small idols likewise are built into the wall flanking this court. These are evidently not of modern manufacture. Their age, however, does not seem to be known. The probability is, that they were taken from the ruins of the old temple of Bisheshwar, which stood to the north-west of the present structure, and was demolished by the Emperor Aurungzebe in the seventeenth century. Extensive remains of this ancient temple are still visible. They form a large portion of the western wall of the Mahomedan mosque, which was built upon its site by this bigoted conqueror of the Hindus. Judging from the proportions of these ruins, it is manifest that the former temple of Bisheshwar must have been both loftier and more capacious than the existing structure; and the courtyard is four or five times more spacious than the entire area occupied by the modern temple. The architecture of the ruins seems to be of a mixed character, and composed both of Jain and Hindu orders. If this conjecture be correct, the old Hindu temple must have been preceded by a Jain temple. Indeed, it is not impossible that a few slight traces of Buddhist architecture might be detected also. What makes this latter supposition plausible is, that on

three sides of the perpendicular face of the terrace on which the mosque stands, Buddhist pillars of a simple and very early type, forming recesses or rooms, but which were originally in all probability cloisters, are distinctly visible.

The mosque, though not small, is by no means an imposing object. It is plain and uninteresting, and displays scarcely any carving or other ornament. Within and without, its walls are besmeared with a dirty whitewash mixed with a little colouring matter. Its most interesting feature is a row of Buddhist or Hindu columns in the front elevation. The presence of this mosque, erected under such insulting circumstances in a place held so sacred by the Hindus and around which their closest sympathies are gathered, is a constant source of heart-burnings and feuds both to Hindus and Mahomedans. The former, while unwillingly allowing the latter to retain the mosque, claim the courtyard between it and the wall as their own. Consequently, they will not permit the Mahomedans to enter the mosque by more than one public entrance, which, instead of being in front of that building, is situated on one side of it. The Mahomedans have many times wished to build a gateway in the midst of the spacious platform in front of the mosque, but although they once erected a gateway, they were not suffered to make use of it, on account of the excitement which the circumstance occasioned among the Hindu population, which was only allayed by the timely interference of the Magistrate of Benares. The gateway still stands, but the space between the pillars has been filled up. A peepul tree, adored as a god, overhangs both the gateway and the road; but the Hindus will not allow the Mahomedans to pluck a single leaf from it. The Collector of Benares, as a kind of trustee of the mosque, still pays periodically the interest of money belonging to it deposited in his hands, notwithstanding the Act lately passed forbidding such a practice.

Between the mosque and the temple of Bisheshwar, is the famous well known as Gyán Bápec or Gyán Kúp, the "well of knowledge," in which, as the natives believe, the god Shiva resides. Tradition says, that once on a time no rain fell in Benares for the space of twelve years, and that in consequence great distress was, experienced by the inhabitants. In order to provide water for the people, and so to relieve them from the terrible calamity which had befallen them, a *rishi*—one of the mythical beings not exactly divine, and certainly not mortal, who to the number of eighty-seven thousand, are revered by the Hindus—grasping the trident of Shiva, dug up the earth at this spot, and forthwith there issued from beneath a copious

supply of water. Shiva, on becoming acquainted with the circumstance, promised to take up his abode in the well, and to reside there for ever. It is stated, moreover, that on occasion of the destruction of the old temple of Bisheshwar, a priest took the idol of the temple and threw it down for safety. The natives visit this well in multitudes, and cast in water or flowers and other offerings as a sacrifice to the deity below. The compound mixture thus produced is necessarily in a constant state of putrefaction, and emits a most disgusting odour. The well is surrounded by a handsome low-roofed colonnade, the stone pillars of which are in four rows and are upwards of forty in number. The building is small, but has been designed and executed with considerable taste. It is of very recent date, and was erected in the year 1828 by Sri Maut Baija Bai, widow of Sri Maut Dowlat Rao Sindhia Bahadoor of Gwalior.

Immediately to the east of this colonnade is the figure of a large bull about seven feet high, cut in stone, dedicated to the god Mahadeo; and a few steps farther east is a temple built in honour of the same deity. The bull is a gift of the Rajah of Nepaul, and the temple of the Rance of Hyderabad. On the south side of the colonnade is an iron palisade, in the enclosure of which are two small shrines, one of white marble, the other of stone, and between them a scaffolding of carved stone, from which a bell is suspended.

Standing in this courtyard, the chief objects in which have been thus briefly described, and looking beyond in a north-westerly direction, the eye falls on a temple about sixty feet in height situated one hundred and fifty yards distant from the mosque. This is Ad-Bisheshwar, that is, the first or original temple of Bisheshwar. The natives in the neighbourhood all regard this shrine as of an epoch anterior to that of the old Bisheshwar, the ruins of which, as already narrated, form a constituent portion of Aurungzebe's mosque. Hence the name attached to it. This temple is surmounted by a large dome, the decaying condition of which is visible in the gaps on its outer surface caused by the falling away of broad thick flakes of cement of which it is composed. The temple below, however, which is faced with slabs of stone as far as the base of the dome, has been lately extensively repaired by a tobacconist in the neighbourhood, named Ganpat, who has embellished its interior with paintings traced on the walls, making them look fresh and modern. There is really nothing in this temple of an ancient character, but on the eastern side of the enclosure the ground becomes considerably elevated, and upon it stands a

mosque built of very old materials, the pillars of which date as far back as the Gupta period, and possibly earlier. May not these old stones and pillars be remains of the original Bisheshwar? Formerly a communication was open between the enclosure of Ad-Bisheshwar and the courtyard of Aurungzebe's mosque already described, but it is now closed.

Kāshi Karwat, a sacred well of some repute, is situated a short distance to the east of Ad-Bisheshwar. Besides the vertical opening, there is a passage leading down to the water, which formerly was traversed daily by religious Hindus desirous of approaching the holiest part of the well. A few years ago a fanatic offered himself in sacrifice to Shiva, the god of the well, when the authorities caused the passage to be closed, but on the priests representing that their revenues would greatly suffer, were it to be kept permanently shut, permission was given for it to be opened once a week, namely, every Monday.

This neighbourhood is exceedingly rich in temples of most elaborate workmanship. Some of them from the summit to the base are one mass of curious and intricate carving. Not that the designs represented on them, although in some cases elegant, display any remarkable reach of thought; yet the execution of them is a marvellous feat of chiselling. On the south side of Bisheshwar stands one such temple. The gateways leading into the courtyard and into the fane itself, are both extensively carved, and, in addition, the latter is crowded with figures intermingled with a multitude of short gilded spires.

Proceeding a little beyond these temples, we come to a small shrine dedicated to Sanichar, or the planet Saturn. The deity within, representing the planet, exhibits a silver head, beneath which depends an apron, or what has the appearance of such. The truth is, the idol is bodiless, and the apron conceals the want. A garland of flowers hangs from either ear, falling below the chin; while above the figure a canopy is spread, designed, we imagine, to illustrate the majesty of the god. It is said of this deity that for seven years and a half he troubles the life of every man, but that he exempts his own worshippers from the trials and disasters which for this period he brings on the rest of mankind.

A few steps further on is Anpoorna, a goddess of great repute in Benares, inasmuch as, under the express orders of Bisheshwar, she is supposed to feed all its inhabitants and to take care that none suffer from hunger. The people have a tradition, that when Benares was first inhabited, Anpoorna found that the task of feeding so many persons was too heavy for her. Filled with anxiety she knew not what step to take. The

goddess of the Ganges or Gunga, generously came to her relief, and told her that if she would give a handful of *gram* to every applicant, she herself would give a *lotah* of water. Anpoorna was comforted with the suggestion, in which she acquiesced; and the arrangement thus made produced the most satisfactory results. In honour of Anpoorna, the nourisher of the people, a custom prevails among all classes, by which hundreds and even thousands of the poor are daily supplied with food. It is this. Those persons that can afford it put aside a quantity of *gram* and moisten it over night, and in the morning give it away in handfuls to the poor. Only one handful is given to each person, but as he and all the members of his family can each procure a handful, after collecting a supply from a number of donors, they are able by the middle of the day to obtain in the aggregate a goodly quantity, which they first dry, and then either cook for the relief of their mutual wants, or sell in the bazar. We have been told that the great consumption in this way of this particular kind of grain, is one reason why its price is so high in Benares.

On the ground in front of the entrance to the temple of Anpoorna, beggars are seated during most of the day, some of whom have cups in their hands into which the worshippers, as they go in and out of the temple, throw minute quantities of grain or rice. Passing through the doorway into the quadrangle, a similar system of almsgiving and almstaking displays itself. The priests of the temple, too, receive offerings for the poor, in addition to the presents appropriated to themselves. In one corner of the enclosure is a stone box, which is the common treasury for the reception of the gifts intended for this object. In it may be seen a singular medley of rice, grain, water, flowers, milk, &c., which, though perhaps not distressing to a Hindu's stomach, would upset a European's. Not that the whole of this medley is eaten, but the rice and grain and other edible substances are separated from the rest and distributed among the applicants.

The temple of Anpoorna was erected 150 years ago by the Rajah of Poona. It possesses a tower, and also a dome which is carved and ornamented after the Hindu fashion. The dome is sustained by pillars, between which a bell is suspended, which is kept almost constantly sounding, for, as soon as one worshipper leaves it, another, having performed his devotions, takes his place in beating it. The bells in this and other Hindu temples are not rung, but are beaten with the clapper or tongue depending from within. The carved portions of this temple were once partially or entirely painted, and the painting in the interstices is still

visible. The goddess within the temple is regarded by the natives as a handsome creature. She exhibits the weakness of her sex in her fondness for ornaments, for, in addition to her necklace of jewels and silver eyes, she occasionally wears a mask of gold or burnished copper, and thus endeavours to increase her charms and fascinate her beholders. The temple occupies a large portion of the quadrangle, and stands in its centre. In one corner of this quadrangle is a small shrine dedicated to the sun. The idol representing the sun is seated in a chariot drawn by seven horses, and is surrounded by a glory indicative of the rays of light which he emits from his person in all directions. In a second corner is another shrine, in which is an image of Gouri Shankar and the stone box or receptacle before alluded to. In a third is a large figure of Hanumán, the monkey god, in bas-relief; and in a fourth a figure of Ganesh, with the head of an elephant and the body of a man.

Not far from the temple of Anpoorna is the temple of Sháki Binaik, or the "witness-bearing Binaik." Pilgrims on completing the journey of the Panch-kosi road must pay a visit to this shrine in order that the fact of their pilgrimage may be verified. Should they neglect to do this, all their pilgrimage would be without merit and profit. The temple is in a square, and was erected by a Mahratta about 100 years ago. On the road between these two temples is a red glaring figure of the god Ganesh, with silver hands, trunk, feet, ears, and poll, squatting down on the floor which is raised a little above the pathway. The oddity of this painted monster would excite one's laughter, were the mind not distressed at the thought that it received divine honours.

Near the temple of Bisheshwar and to the south of Sanichar is a small shrine dedicated to the planet Venus or Shukreshwar, which is visited by persons desirous of becoming the parents of handsome sons. It is said that this god will bestow a fine son on his worshippers, even though fate should not have conferred one on them; and so long as he lives in Benares he will pass his time happily, and at death will depart to Shiva.

The temple of Bhaironath is situated upwards of a mile to the north of the temple of Bisheshwar. The god of this shrine, as already described, is in public estimation the deified kotwal or chief magistrate of Benares and its suburbs as far as the Panch-kosi road, within the circuit of which, under the orders of his royal master Bisheshwar, he exercises divine authority over both gods and men. He is bound to keep the city free from evil spirits and evil persons; and should he find any such within its sacred precincts, to expel them forthwith. As it is through his

care and energy that its inhabitants and all others who may conceive the pious design of ending their days in this hallowed spot, eventually, it is supposed, obtain salvation, it is of the utmost importance that he perform the functions of his high office wisely and well. It is a natural result, therefore, of his possessing such vast authority, that for the execution of his orders he should have deemed it right to arm himself with a big stick. This stick is no figment of the imagination, but a veritable cudgel of enormous thickness, not indeed of wood, but, what is more terrible, of stone. It is called Dandpán, from *danda* a stick, and in common belief is nothing less than divine. Whether from a desire to enjoy as much tranquillity as possible, or from the universal Hindu custom to shift anxiety and trouble from one shoulder to another, we cannot say, but Bhairo has considerably issued his commands to it, to beat any person who may be found working mischief; and having done so, has resigned himself to a life of ease. So that in fact this intelligent stick is *de facto* the divine magistrate of the city. It is strange, however, that the temple in which Dandpán is deposited is not that of Bhaironath, but is another situated at a short distance off. The stone representing this singular deity is about four feet in height, and is specially worshipped every Tuesday and Sunday by a great many people. It is set up on end, the upper extremity receiving occasionally the adjunct of a silver mask or face, but when our wondering eyes beheld it, there was only the bare stone visible with a garland depending from the upper extremity. In front of the stick three bells were hanging, and on one side a priest sat with a rod in his hands made of peacock's feathers, with which in the name of Dandpán he gently tapped the worshippers, and thereby professedly inflicted punishment upon them for the offences of which they were guilty. In this temple are other remarkable objects, which will be presently referred to. The worship of Dandpán, and the functions attributed to this extraordinary divinity, constitute a climax of absurdity. But the Hindu is as solemn in the presence of the divine stick administering, as he imagines, divine justice, as though it were the chief judge of the Sudder Adawlut, and is totally unconscious of the ludicrous position he occupies.

But to return to Bhaironath. The wall on either side of the door leading into the enclosure is decorated with paintings. On the right is a large figure of Bhaironath or Bhairo (for he possesses both titles) himself, depicted in a deep blue colour approaching to black; and behind him is the figure of a dog intended for him to ride on. This animal is called Váhan, and in the neighbourhood of the temple the sweetmeat-seller makes small

images of a dog in sugar, which the worshippers purchase and present to Bhaironath as an offering. On the left side of the doorway is a larger figure of a dog ; and above it are ten small paintings representing the ten incarnations of Vishnu. The door itself is carved and embellished not inelegantly. On passing through into the quadrangle, one is struck with the confined position of the temple, which fills up a large portion of the entire area, so that from the quadrangle itself it is impossible to gain more than a very limited view of its upper part. The base of the tower is on three sides built of plain stone terminating in a castellated parapet, from within which the beautifully carved steeple rises to a considerable height. The shaft is surrounded by an immense number of tiny domes ascending in successive series up to the apex, which consists of a gilded dome.

The entrance to the temple is on the north side. In front of the shrine occupied by the idol is the porch, or more properly the belfry, in which four bells are suspended. This porch rests upon pillars, and is painted and decorated according to Hindu taste and after the most approved models. A devotee is seated to the right and left of the porch with a rod of peacock's feathers by his side, with which he performs mesmeric passes over children, women, and other people, and thereby it is believed wards off from them imps and evil spirits, who may wish to do them harm. He also keeps in a prominent position a cup made from a cocoanut shell into which he expects a proper amount of pice to be thrown to pay for the mysterious operation. The threshold of the shrine is guarded by two idols called severally Dwárpáleshwar, which stand in niches one on either side of the doorway. The trident, too, with prongs painted red, symbol of Bhaironath's authority, stands upright by the wall. The interior of the shrine consists of a small room, and on one side of it is a diminutive shrine made entirely of copper, which is the habitation of the god Bhaironath. The idol is of stone, but his face is of silver. He possesses four hands, and stands in a grotesque posture. His head is encinctured with garlands, which hang down in front ; and a small oil lamp is kept burning near by. A priest sits close by and applies *kundee*, a kind of dun-coloured powder, to the temples of the worshippers. The shrine is surmounted by a dome, which is also of copper, and a bell is suspended in front. As both the god and his priests have a liking for ardent spirits, this is one of the offerings presented to him. Dogs are permitted to enter the interior of his temple, which is owing doubtless to the circumstance of his having selected the dog as his Váhan ; but they are not permitted to enter other temples.

* This building was erected upwards of forty years ago by Bajee Rao of Poonah, on the site of the old temple, a small edifice which was thrown down to make room for the new one. Outside the quadrangle on the south side is a small shrine remarkable for the evident antiquity of some of the idols in it. One of these is a figure of Bhaironath himself, now much defaced from the wear and tear of time. It is not improbable that this is the original Bhaironath, which was discarded on account of its mutilated appearance and in order to make room for the modernized deity. There are other images in this temple, among them Mahadeo, Ganesh, and Surajnarain or the Sun.

On the west side of the quadrangle, a few paces up a narrow court, is a shrine dedicated to Sítála, or the goddess of small-pox. In it are seven figures in bas-relief representing seven sisters—for this dreaded goddess is in reality a seven-fold deity. She has four temples devoted to her worship in Benares.

A short distance east of Bhaironath, and between it and Dandpán, is a temple sacred to Naugrah, or the Sun, Moon, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Venus, Saturn, Ráhu, and Ketú. The first seven bear in Hindi the names of the seven days of the week beginning with Sunday. The Naugrah in popular estimation is a very formidable collection of deities. It is customary for the Hindus to commence every important religious ceremony, as, for instance, that of marriage, with the worship of them, for unless they be propitiated they may vitiate the entire ceremony. The idols are placed in the temple in three rows, three being in each row. The temple remains closed all the day long, but is opened every morning, when a priest comes and performs *puja*, that is, worships the idols and presents the necessary offerings. This is the only temple dedicated to Naugrah in Benares.

Proceeding down this narrow street and passing under an archway to the left, you come to the temple of Dandpán, already partially described. Here is also a famous well, called Kál-kúp, or the Well of Death. Over the trellis-work of the outer wall of the building is a square hole, which is so situated in relation to the sun, that at twelve o'clock in the day, its rays passing through the hole, impinge upon the water in the well below. At this hour of the day the well is visited by persons wishing to search into the secrets of the future; and woe be to the man who is unable to trace the shadow of himself in the fatal water, for his doom is certainly and irrevocably fixed, and within six months from that instant he will inevitably die. The general ignorance respecting the explanation of this daily phenomenon, does not speak much for the scientific knowledge

of the Hindus or even for their common sense. Under the same roof is an image of Mahá-Kál, or Great Death. This god virtually bestows salvation on his worshippers, for on their departure from the world, he spreads over them the ægis of his protection, and prohibits Kál or Death from conveying them to the regions of hell. Here likewise are the figures of the five brothers, or Páuch Pandua, whose names are celebrated in the Mahábharat.

No lover of the marvellous should pass through Benares without paying a visit to Mankarnika, the famous well of Hindu mythology. It is the first place sought after by the thousands of pilgrims flocking yearly to the holy city, who are drawn towards it by a mysterious and irresistible fascination. Its fetid water is regarded as a healing balm, which will infallibly wash away all the sins of the soul and make it pure and holy. There is no sin so heinous or abominable, which in popular estimation it cannot instantly efface. Even for the crime of murder it can, it is said, procure forgiveness. No wonder, therefore, that conscience-stricken sinners should rush to this well from all quarters, and deluding themselves by its reputed sanctity, should, by the easy process of washing in its foulness, seek to atone in one minute for the crimes and sins of a life-time. Yet it is appalling to think that the human soul, thus conscious of its guilt, and perhaps in many instances, in agony respecting it, and anxious for pardon and for reconciliation with God, should be so cruelly mocked and deceived. Of all places of pilgrimage throughout Hindostan, this well is held by many to be the most, or among the most, efficacious for bestowing salvation. Yet the story connected with its origin is wild enough. The author of Káshi Khand, not in jest, as some might suppose, but gravely and soberly, furnishes the following account of the matter:—

“The god Vishnu,” he says, “dug this well with his discus, and in the place of water filled it with the perspiration from this own body, and gave it the name of chakr-pushkarni. He then proceeded to its north side and began to practise asceticism. In the meantime the god Mahadeo arrived, and looking into the well beheld in it the beauty of a hundred millions of suns, with which he was so enraptured, that he at once broke out into loud praises of Vishnu, and in his joy declared that whatever gift he might ask of him he would grant. Gratified at the offer, Vishnu replied that his request was that Mahadeo should always reside with him. Mahadeo hearing this, felt greatly flattered by it, and his body shook with delight. From the violence of the motion

"an earring called Mankarnik fell from his ear into the well. "From this circumstance Mahadeo gave the well the name of "Mankarnika and endowed it with two properties, the first "Muktshetr, that of bestowing salvation on its worshippers, and "the second Puransubhakarni, that of granting accomplishment "to every good work ; and commanded that it should be the "chief and most efficacious of pilgrimages."

Such is the tale as found in Káshi Khand ; but there is another version current among the people, which is just as likely to be correct. It is reported that Mahadeo and his wife Párbati were one day seated by the well, when accidentally a jewel fell from the ear of Párbati into the water, on account of which circumstance Mahadeo named the well Mankarnika. Mr. Prinsep, in his "Views of Benares," makes the following remarks on this subject :—" After Káshi had been created by the united will of "Iswur and Párbati, the two incorporated energies of the formless and qualityless Bruhm, the active pair determined to give "their paradise the benefit of an inhabitant, and Poorooshotama " (the supreme male, Vishnoo,) became manifest. Shiva gave "him instructions how to behave himself, and left him to his "own meditations ; whereupon, as a first exploit, with his chakra "or discus, he dug the tank denominated from its origin the "chakr-pushkarni. He then engaged in the usual course of "austerity, at the sight of which Shiva shook his head in astonishment, and one of his earrings fell ; whence the name of the "ghat Manikarnika (jewel of the ear). Vishnoo upon this spot "also obtained as a boon from Mahadeo the privilege, which "Káshi enjoys, of giving *mookti*, or emancipation to all objects, "especially those who bestow gifts, erect *lingas*, and do not "commit suicide within the holy precincts."

A series of stone steps on each of the four sides of the well leads down to the water. The seven lowermost steps are said to be without a join, and to belong to the original well as built by divine hands, and although the singular fact of several joins being visible, is to the uninitiated a slight difficulty in the way of such an assertion, yet the Hindus, brushing aside such a trivial circumstance, readily swallow the explanation given by the Brahmins, that the joins are only superficial and do not penetrate through the stones. Upon the stairs, in a niche on the north side, is a figure of Vishnu ; and at the mouth of the well on the west side, is a row of sixteen diminutive altars on which pilgrims present offerings to their ancestors. The water of the well is very shallow, being not more than two or three feet in depth. It is insufferably foul, and the effluvia from it impregnate the air for some distance around. The wor-

shipper descending into the water, laves his head and body with the vile liquid, and at the same time utters certain phrases appointed for the ceremony.

Directly in front of Mankarnika and between it and the Ganges, is the temple of Tárakeshwar, or the god of salvation. When a Hindu dies and this god is propitiated, he breathes into his ear, they say, a charm or *mantra* of such efficacy, that it delivers him from the misery of the future and secures for him happiness and joy. The idol is in a kind of cistern, which is kept filled with water offered in sacrifice ; and consequently is invisible. In the rainy season the swollen river flows beyond this temple, which for several months stands imbedded in the stream. Its foundations are thereby undermined, and the blocks of stone of which it is composed are prone to separate from one another. The upper part of the tower has been entirely removed, in order to lessen the weight resting upon the base of the building.

Upon the Mankarnika Ghaut, on higher ground than that occupied by the Tárakeshwar temple, is a large round slab called charan-páduka projecting slightly from the pavement, and in the middle of it stands a stone pedestal, the top of which is inlaid with marble. In the centre of the marble are two small flat objects representing the two feet of Vishnu. The tradition is, that this deity selected this exact spot for the performance of ascetic rites and the worship of Mahadeo. It is consequently held in great veneration by the natives, and receives divine honours. In the month Kartik, multitudes of people flock to Vishnu's feet, imagining that all who worship them are guaranteed a sure introduction to heaven. Mr. Prinsep observes, that " the charan-páduka (impression of Vishnu's feet,) is said to mark the spot on which he alighted. It is distinguished by the figure of two feet, cut in white marble, in the centre of a round slab, probably intended to represent the *chakra* " or discus ; but as the *churan* is generally thought to be peculiar " to Buddha and Jain places of worship, the emblem is probably of " modern and spurious introduction where it is here set up. There " is another *páduka* near the mouth of the Burna Nála."

The Mankarnika Ghaut, while the most sacred of all the ghauts in Benares, is also the middle point between them all, so that, were the city divided into two portions at this place, they would be nearly equal in extent. Ascending the second flight of stairs we come to a temple of ancient reputation, but probably of modern construction, occupied by Sibh-binaik, or Ganesh. Imagine a figure painted red, having three eyes, a silver-plated scalp ornamented with a garland of flowers, and

an elephant's trunk, this last member being hidden behind a cloth which conceals a large portion of the idol, and in front is so tucked in as to resemble the cloth which a barber wraps about a man previous to shaving him. At the feet of the god is the figure of a rat, the animal on which he is supposed to ride, and also a miniature fountain. On either side of the inner shrine is a statue of a woman, one being called Sidhy, and the other Budhy.

Near to Mankarnika Ghaut is Sindhia Ghaut, which is remarkable not only for the massiveness of its masonry, but also for the circumstance that the entire structure has sunk several feet into the earth since its erection, and is still gradually and slowly sinking. The ghaut consists of three rows of towers or turrets. The uppermost row possesses two turrets, one at each extremity, which are the largest of the whole and are exceedingly heavy. The second, lower down, has six turrets, and the third, five. These turrets are called *murrees* by the natives, and are used by them for sitting upon, in the cool of the day, or for retiring to, after bathing in the Ganges. They are of stone, and are connected together by walls and stairs of the same material. Before the ghaut could be completed the masonry began to sink; and on one occasion so violent was the motion, that a loud report like the discharge of cannon was heard. A temple to the left of the south turret is rent from the summit to the base, and the entire building is so dilapidated, that it looks as if it had been shaken by an earthquake. The ghaut itself, and also the stairs leading up to the top of the huge breastwork uniting the two largest turrets, exhibit an immense rent which is carried down to the very base of the ghaut. The breastwork likewise, together with the turrets, is out of its perpendicular, and has a remarkable appearance. In some places the stones are more than two feet apart. The people residing in the neighbourhood say that the ghaut has sunk some ten or twelve feet in all, and that inasmuch as stair after stair continually though slowly vanishes, they know that the subsidence is still going on. This ghaut was built by Baija Bai, the same lady who erected the colonnade round the well Gyán Bápee—but it is not yet completed, and there is no hope that it ever will be.

The temple of Bridhkál, situated on the northern side of the city, is interesting both for its antiquity and extent, as well as for the singular legends connected with its primitive history. It formerly possessed twelve separate courts or quadrangles, but now only seven are in existence, and several of these are fast falling into ruin. Indeed, the aspect of the entire building is

that of decay. The site of the other five courts and of the gardens once attached to the temple, is occupied by dwelling houses. When this shrine was in its glory its must have been a place of some magnificence. The pile of buildings now standing has a hoary appearance, the effect of which is greatly increased by its ruinous condition. The tradition respecting the origin of the temple is, that in the Satjug, an old Rajah in ill-health visited Benares, and there diligently performed ascetic rites and religious ceremonies. The god Mahadeo was so gratified with the piety of the old man, that he not only dispelled his sickness, but also caused him to become young again. In honour of this deity, therefore, the Rajah erected the present temple, and gave it the name of Bridhkál, which is a compound of two words 'bridh' or more properly 'vridhh' and 'kál,' the former meaning *old*, and the latter *time*. Mahadeo endowed it with two remarkable properties, the one, that of healing disease, and the other, that of prolonging life. The temple is one of the oldest in the city, and stands on the boundary of Benares proper, indisputably the most ancient portion of the city, where it unites itself with Káshi, a less ancient portion.

On ascending the steps and traversing the passage running from the doorway to the inner part of the edifice, we are met by a red figure of Mahábír standing within a shrine at the corner of a court into which the passage leads. Close by, to the right, is a small temple dedicated to the goddess Kálee—a small black deity cut out of stone dressed in a red garment with a garland of flowers hanging from the neck. In front of her is a hollow space in the form of a square, for the residence of Mahadeo; and outside of it, a bull for the god to ride on.

To right of Kálee, leaning upon the wall, are figures of Ganesh and Párbati, and to the left of the latter are images representing Bhairó, the Sun, Hauumán and Lachminarain or Vishnu, and his wife Lachmi. Immediately opposite to the temple of Kálee are two wells. The first is shallow, and contains putrid water, whose disgusting odour fills the entire court. Into this well, sick persons and those wishing for long life plunge their bodies. The former also take various medicines and resort to other useful means for regaining their health, and should they recover, the fetid well gets the credit of their restoration. Should the disease however be of an inveterate character, such as leprosy or elephantiasis, they must constantly bathe in the well for a period of twelve years. Instead of showing us a man who had been cured, they brought a leper who had strongly defined marks of leprosy on his legs. He was trying the efficacy

of the bath, and said he was better than when he had first arrived. The water of the well is reported to be impregnated with sulphur, in which case it would doubtless be very serviceable in some diseases, especially those affecting the skin. In conjunction with washing in this well, it is necessary also to drink of the water of the second well, which, unlike the other, contains sweet water and has a raised parapet round its mouth. Near the wall of the court is a collection of stone deities, all representing the lingam. They are nine in number, of which several are apparently very old. Two stone figures of *suttees* have also been placed here in commemoration of the self-immolation of widows on this spot in former times.

To the right of the court is a small square with a temple in the middle dedicated to Mahadeo. A serpent is entwined about the chief idol, which is called Nāgेश्वar, or the serpent-god. The central deity is surrounded by others of smaller stature. Passing beyond this square we come to another, in which two peepul trees and one neem tree are growing. This quadrangle has no temple in it, but is used as a residence for devotees. Close by is another quadrangle, the residence of the deity Bridhkál. The shrine within contains two compartments, one of which Bridhkál occupies. He sits in a cistern, while over his head hangs a small brass vessel filled with water which drops through a hole upon him without intermission. Though only a plain stone or lingam, he is regarded as a very sacred object. In a niche in the verandah is an antique image of the elephant-headed god Ganesh. There is another shrine in the area of this quadrangle, flat-roofed, and containing an image of Hanumán.

Returning to the court in which the wells are situated, and passing through a corridor to the north, we come to a small enclosure, the walls of which are in a dilapidated condition. Here are two shrines of considerable interest on account of the singular legends associated with them. That on the right is called Markandeshwar. Markande was a rishi whom Mahadeo, it is said, for his piety endowed with immortality, and who, in acknowledgment of the honour, dedicated this temple to Mahadeo. That on the left is called Daksheshwar, the legend respecting whom fills several pages of Káshi Khand. The tale as revealing some strange events connected with the domestic life of the ruling god of Benares, is worth knowing. Rajah Daksh, one of the heroes of the story, is still famous in Benares, and was no doubt a real personage.

The wife of Shiva, it seems, although a goddess, dies like common mortals; but unlike them, shortly after her death is

born again into the world, and assuming another name, on arriving at maturity is always married to the same husband, namely, Mahadeo or Shiva. On one occasion, the story goes, Mahadeo assembled for some purpose all the gods of heaven and earth. His wife Suttée was also there, and likewise her father, Rajah Dakhsh. It appears that Mahadeo neglected to pay proper respect to his father-in-law in the presence of the deities; and, consequently, on departing, the Rajah relieved his feelings by showering upon him the following abuse:—"You have "neither caste nor habitation, and yet have taken to yourself a "wife. You are naked, and wear long hair, and lie down on a "tiger's skin. You never had father or mother. Your body is "covered with ashes, and at the end of the world you will destroy "everybody. I have committed a great mistake in giving you "my daughter to wife." After this mental relief the Rajah went home and prepared a great religious festival, to which he invited all the gods and rajahs, with the exception of Mahadeo and his wife. These latter did not know what was occurring, but Nárada Muni came to them and told them all about it. On hearing of the circumstance Suttée requested permission to go to her father's house and see for herself what was the real state of the case. But Mahadeo urged that she had not been invited to the feast, and therefore declined to permit her to go. At last he yielded to her importunity, and she went. On arriving, only her mother paid her the slightest deference—all the rest of her family treating her with marked indifference. When the feast was served she received her portion, but her husband's share, which ought in his absence to have been given to her, was withheld. At this neglect Suttée became exceedingly angry, and beat her head upon the ground in passionate frenzy. Moreover, the heavens themselves sent down a shower of blood in token of their sympathy with her. Several of the gods, too, of the party, disapproving of Rajah Dakhsh's proceeding, rose and left. On their departure, Suttée becoming still more excited sought out the hole in which the sacrifice was being consumed, and throwing herself into it, was burnt to ashes. When Nárada Muni brought news of this sad catastrophe to Mahadeo, his wrath rose to fierceness, and, creating an army of demons, he placed it under the command of Bîrbhadra, a demon of giant strength, and sent it against the Rajah, with orders to kill him and to vitiate his sacrificial ceremony. On the way Bîrbhadra plucked up forests and mountains and carried them along in his hands. Having reached the Rajah's palace the demons flew upon the people, slaughtered right and left, and devoured the viands provided for the sacred feast. The

invincible Bīrbhadra sought out the Rajah, and on finding him seized him with his hands, and crying out, "why did you blaspheme the god Mahadeo?" cut off his head.

This bloody work being finished, Bramhá, the first of the three deities, placed at the head of the Hindu pantheon, proceeded in great consternation to Mahadeo, with whom he reasoned and expostulated respecting the awful calamity which had just occurred, and prevailed on him to accompany him to the scene of the recent carnage. On reaching the place Mahadeo's heart was smitten with compassion for the slain; and he gave orders that all the gods, rishis, and rajahs, should be again gathered together, as well the living as the dead. The heads, arms, legs, and other members, which had been lopped off the killed and wounded during the conflict, were also collected, and were severally joined afresh to the bodies to which they belonged. Thus Mahadeo healed all the wounded, and restored to life all the slain. But in the search for the lopped-off members, Rajah Dakhsh's head could nowhere be found. The god, however, commanded that a goat should be brought to him, the head of which being cut off, was stuck upon the trunk of the Rajah's body, which became forthwith reanimated with its former life. After this, the sacrifice which had been so violently interrupted was completed. Mahadeo then left with all his demons for his residence on the Keilás mountain. The rest of the deities also left with the exception of Bramhá, who remained behind in order to talk with Rajah Dakhsh, to whom he represented in its true colours the heinous sin he had committed in blaspheming Mahadeo, and in utterly spoiling the sacred festival, the sacrifice at which could not possibly be performed without the presence of that deity. He concluded by recommending the Rajah to visit Benares, and there to dedicate an idol to Mahadeo, and thus seek for forgiveness from him. In accordance with this advice the Rajah forsook his throne and his dominions, and proceeded to Benares, where he dedicated an idol to Mahadeo, and applied himself to the performance of ascetic and other religious rites. There he remained for many years. In the meantime, Suttee, the wife of Mahadeo, who had perished in the sacrificial fire, was born again among mortals under the name of Párbati, her father this time being Rajah Hewanchal Gir; and on arriving at womanhood she was again married to her former husband, Mahadeo. The happy couple travelled to Benares for the purpose of spending their honeymoon, and while there, what was their surprise to see old goat-headed Rajah Dakhsh, who was still absorbed in his religious exercises. He too was doubtless equally astonished to see Mahadeo, whom of

course he recognized, although his mental eyes were closed in regard to Párbati, whom he did not imagine to be his own daughter Suttac. The Rajah pleaded with Mahadeo for the forgiveness of his sin. The god heard his petition, and granted it. And the old man filled with joy, dedicated a shrine to Mahadeo, called Daksheshwar, which is said to be that situated in the interior of the temple of Bridhkál. This tale is as entertaining as many of the legends connected with the Black Forest, the only difference, though an essential one, being, that they are designed for amusement and fun, whereas this, strangely enough, is intended for the promotion of religion.

Leaving this temple and proceeding along the street by its southern wall, we come to a shrine standing at its south-western angle and forming part of the Bridhkál edifice. Its name is Alapmriteshwar, from the god to whom it is dedicated, who, it is reported, is endowed with the miraculous power of prolonging the lives of persons apparently just about to die. The fame of this shrine is considerable; and it is the resort of a large number of worshippers who seek for themselves and their friends an escape from sickness and death. In the streets leading to the Bridhkál temple, a *mela* or fair is held every Sunday, and once a year in the month Sáwan, one on a large scale is held which lasts for several days. These *melas* are partly of a religious, and partly of a secular character, but their primary intention is the worship of some celebrated deity.

In a street leading to Bridhkál, a small temple obstructs the thoroughfare, called Rattaneshwar, from 'ratan,' a jewel, and 'Ishwar,' the Divine Being. The shrine is referred to in Hindu writings. A curious circumstance is connected with its modern history. Upwards of thirty years ago, a European magistrate of Benares, while making improvements in the city, determined that this temple should be levelled with the ground. The natives say that one night the god Mahadeo appeared to the sahib in a dream, and, representing to him the great sin he was intending to commit, ordered him to forbear from the execution of such an evil design. On awaking, the sahib in obedience to the divine admonition laid aside his levelling project. It is reported also, and commonly believed, that while digging at the foundations of the temple on this occasion, a jewel was discovered beneath it, but the natives themselves express considerable doubt about its genuineness.

At the distance of a mile from the Fort of Rámnagar, the residence of the Maharajah of Benares, is a handsome temple situated on the eastern side of a capacious tank. Its founda-

tions were laid, and the finest portion of its tower was erected about one hundred years ago by Rajah Chiet Singh, but it was completed by the present Rajah. The temple, including the platform on which it rests, is fully one hundred feet high. Each of its four sides form the base to a height of thirty-five or forty feet, is crowded with elaborately carved figures in bas-relief. These are in some places broken, but generally speaking, are in a good state of preservation. They are in five rows, six being in a row, so that each side of the tower contains thirty figures, and the four sides one hundred and twenty. As no expense has been spared in the execution of this prodigious work, it may be regarded as fairly representing what Hindu genius in modern times can accomplish in the art of sculpture, and should be visited and studied as such. The lowermost row is filled with elephants, and the next in succession with lions, each of which stands on two small elephants. The lions have very spare bodies, and in this and other respects, are grotesquely made, showing that the sculptors had no living model before them and drew powerfully upon their own imaginations. The three upper rows exhibit diverse figures of deities, incarnations, and other sacred objects. The three goddesses of the Ganges, the Jumua and the Saraswati, have each a separate niche. Krishna too has his place, but he is not alone, for two of his favourite gopis or milk-maids are close by. Indra, the king of the gods, Bramhá, Vishnu, and Mahadeo or Shiva, the three deities of the Hindu trinity, Kuver, the treasurer of Indra, Bhairo, the divine magistrate of Benares, the god Ram and his wife Sita, Hanumán, the monkey-god, Ganesh, the elephant-headed god, Baldeo, brother of Krishna, the Sawkadik, or four brothers of Brahmá, are each honoured with a statue. Here too is Vayu, or the Wind, Suraj, or the Sun, Agni, or Fire, and Chandarmá, or the Moon, the latter having rays of glory darting from her head and being seated in a carriage drawn by two deers. A number of sacred personages or rishis also are represented, such as Jumbur, Nárad, and Gajendra Moksh, and likewise a terrible demon with a thousand hands called Sahasr Báhu, whom Parastrám fought and killed. In the centre of the uppermost row on the south side is a figure of the goddess Durga, wife of Mahadeo; and in a similar position on the east side, is a figure of the bloody goddess Mahá-Kálee, who thirsts continually for human victims. In a niche on the north side a strange feat of Krishna is depicted. This humorous deity, it is said, on one occasion, diverted the homage and adoration due to Indra to himself, at which Indra became exceedingly indignant, and determined to punish the worshippers of Krishna who had so

dishonoured him and had defrauded him of his rights. Gathering together the clouds of heaven, he commenced pouring down upon the earth a prodigious flood of water, with the object of drowning the people, but Krishna lifting up the mountain Gobardhan, held it over the country like an umbrella balanced on his little finger, so that for the space of one hundred and sixty miles no rain fell, and the people were preserved in safety. In the sculpture Krishna is seen standing with his hand held up supporting the mountain on the extremity of his little finger, while cattle are grazing in perfect security below.

On each of the four sides of the tower are two gilded faces surrounded by a halo one above the other, emblematic of the sun ; and on the apex of the tower is a *chatr* or round, flat, gilded object, intended to serve the purpose of a glory to the head of Durga in the shrine below. On the platform facing three of the entrances to the temple are three figures in marble, one of which, namely, that opposite to the south door, consists of a Nandi, or bull designed for the service of Mahadeo. A second is opposite the north door, and is a Garur, a being in the form of a man with wings behind the shoulders. The countenance is pleasing, and has been executed with much delicacy of taste. The statue is surrounded by an iron palisade tipped with small brass knobs.

In front of the main entrance is the third figure, which is that of a lion, intended as the Vāhan or riding-animal of Durga. Over the entrance itself are peacocks in bas-relief standing with their heads towards each other. The door is not large, but is ribbed and massive, and is covered with brass, so that viewing it from the front, it has the appearance of being made entirely of that metal.

The interior of the temple is like most Hindu shrines, confined and gloomy. Directly opposite the door stands the goddess Durga. Her body is of marble covered with gold, and is arrayed in a yellow dress partially concealed by a scarf. The image is in a small shrine, in front of which is a table on which lie various vessels used at the hour of sacrifice. It is over this table and before the face of the idol that the sacred fire is waved. To the left is another table of smaller dimensions, which, when we saw it, was completely covered with white blossoms of flowers ; and near by, in a niche in the wall, are two idols representing Krishna and his wife Rādhā. To the right of Durga is her five-headed husband Shiva.

The tank and a garden in the neighbourhood were also the work of Rajah Cheit Singh. The former is surrounded by a spacious ghaut, the stairs of which are built of stone. On occa-

sion of the natives of Benares proceeding on pilgrimage to this spot, they are accustomed to bathe in the tank, and at one and the same time large crowds may be seen assembled on the stairs; but so extensive are the ghauts, that hundreds of persons might dress and undress upon them without incommoding one another. The tank is a square, at each corner of which is a temple. The pilgrims who come to bathe, therefore, pass and repass at least one temple.

The object of the pilgrimage to Rámnagar is somewhat amusing. It said that Veda Vyás, the compiler of the Vedas, once paid a visit to Rámnagar, intending to proceed to Benares, but on reaching this place and beholding the city in the distance, his soul was so ravished with delight, that he did not desire to enter the city itself. Remaining at Rámnagar he commemorated his visit by the institution of a pilgrimage, which should conduce to the welfare of its inhabitants and of all others placed in their circumstances. The sanctity of Rámnagar, it appears, was never equal to that of Benares, and while all persons who died in the latter place necessarily obtained after death happiness and heaven, all those, on the contrary, who died in the former, had the misfortune to enter upon another life in the degraded and miserable condition of an ass. It was consequently the custom, report says, in the age of Veda Vyás, and is still, for persons residing on the Rámnagar side of the river, which is called *magah*, when taken seriously ill to repair to the Benares side, in order if death should come, to die there, and so escape the asinine existence of the next birth. Veda Vyás, however, taking pity on the *magah* land, established at Rámnagar a *tírath*, or pilgrimage, to be observed in the month Māgh (January-February,) promising that whoever attended it should be delivered from the danger of becoming an ass after death. Not only do the people of Rámnagar perform this pilgrimage, but great multitudes from Benares likewise resort thither, that they may make their own deliverance from assdom doubly sure. Pilgrims continually arrive during the whole of the month, but Mondays and Fridays are days especially preferred, and on which the assemblages are greatest.

There is a temple dedicated to Veda Vyás in the Rajah's fort at Rámnagar. It is situated above the parapet overlooking the river. The approach to it is by the main stairs or ghaut leading up from the Ganges into the fort. Upon the stairs, to the left, in a small shrine, is a richly-dressed figure of Gunga, or the goddess of the Ganges in white marble, seated on a crocodile, and having a crown on her head. She has four hands, one of which hangs down, a second is uplifted, a third grasps a lotus,

and a fourth a *lota*, or brass vessel. Proceeding to the top, of the stairs and turning to the left, you enter a court bounded on one side by the parapet of the fort, and open to the sky. Here are several shrines. In the first Mahadeo resides. Another rests against the trunk of the Asokh Biro tree, and contains various small deities. Near to this shrine is a platform, and upon it a temple bearing the name of Veda Vyás. There is, however, no image of him inside, and the object of worship is the emblem of Shiva. On the floor of the platform is a carved disk representing the sun, and a short distance off a figure of Ganesh.

Allusion has been already made to the Panch-kosi road which encompasses Benares. This famous road forms the boundary of the sacred enclosure, on the extreme east of which the city stands. Its length is about fifty miles. Commencing at the river Ganges and quitting the city at its southern extremity, it pursues its sinuous course far into the country, though never at any time being more distant from Benares than *pánch kos*. that is, five cos, or ten miles. It is reputed to be a very ancient road, but that it is so we have grave doubts, the reasons for which we shall presently bring forward. The celebrated lady, Ranee Bhawani, who erected the Durga temple and tank, repaired also the Panch-kosi and restored some of its temples which had been destroyed by the Mahomedans ; and since her time the road has been kept in order. There are now hundreds of shrines scattered along the road, so that the pilgrim as he pursues his journey is constantly reminded of his religious duties. The deities inhabiting these shrines are supposed to perform an important part in preserving the stability, the purity, and the peace of Benares and of the entire enclosure. They are in fact watchmen appointed by the ruling monarch Bisheshwar, to keep the boundary of Benares, and to defend it against all spiritual adversaries.

The Panch-kosi is regarded as an exceedingly sacred road. While even a foot or an inch beyond it the ground is devoid of any special virtue, yet every inch of soil within the boundary is in the Hindu's imagination hallowed. It would seem, too, that every object, animate and inanimate, existing within the enclosed space, participates in the general and all-pervading sanctity. The entire area is called Benares, and the religious privileges of the city are extended to every portion of it. Whoever dies in any spot of this enclosure is, the natives think, sure of happiness after death ; and so wide is the application of this privilege, that it embraces, they say, even Europeans and Mahomedans, even Pariahs and other out-castes : even liars, murder-

ers and thieves. That no soul can perish in Benares, is the optimist creed of the blind, infatuated idolater.

To perform the pilgrimage of the Panch-kosi is accounted a very meritorious act. It is necessary that every good Hindu residing in the city of Benares, should once a year accomplish this pilgrimage, in order that the impurity which the soul and body have contracted during the year may be obliterated ; for it is held to be impossible to reside even in such a holy city as Benares without contracting some defilement. Not only the inhabitants of Benares, but also multitudes of persons from various parts of India traverse the road, and seek to obtain the blessing which they are told such a pious act ensures. It is customary for a large number of pilgrims to travel together on this journey. Before setting out each morning they must bathe in a tank or stream, and on terminating their march each day must perform the same rite. They do not permit themselves the luxury of shoes, nor do they relieve the fatigue of the journey by the assistance of either horse or ass or camel or elephant, or of any carriage or cart or vehicle whatever. Anxious to secure a full measure of merit, they cannot afford that it should be lessened by the tricks and arts of civilized life. All, therefore, men, women and children, rich and poor, princes and peasants, travel on foot : and the only exception to this stringent rule is in the case of the sick and infirm, and it is questionable if even they will obtain such a full meed of merit as the rest. On the way the pilgrims must not eat *pān*, of which all natives are passionately fond, and must take great care that the Benares side of the road is not defiled. They must not quarrel or give one another bad language, must not receive any present, and must not give any food or water or anything else even to a friend, or take any such things from him. This last requirement has been dictated by a spirit of selfishness, for the pilgrim is so intent on the acquisition of merit, that he cannot bring himself to share it with any one, no, not even with his dearest friend. He will render no assistance to his neighbour to enter the gates of heaven unless he can do so without loss to himself. While striving to enter within the sacred gates himself, he will suffer his fainting, foot-sore brother to die upon the road. Such is the hard selfishness of Hinduism. Indeed, selfishness is the very root of Hinduism, is its sap and life, is its branches, and blossoms, and fruit.

Starting from the Mankarnika Ghaut, the pilgrim keeps along the banks of the Ganges until he arrives at Assi Sangam or Assi Ghaut, where a tiny stream flows into the great rivers. From this spot he proceeds to a temple of Juggernath close by,

and thence on to the village of Kandhawa, where he stays for the remainder of the day, having performed a journey of six miles. The second day's march is to the village of Dhupchandy, ten miles further on, where he worships the tutelary goddess of this name. On the third day he arrives at Rameshwar after a long walk of fourteen miles. The fourth day brings him to Shivapore, where he visits the famous shrine of the Panch Pandua, or five brothers, who were all married to one woman.

On this day he travels eight miles, and on the fifth day six more, namely, to the village of Kapil-dhara where he worships the god Mahadeo. The sixth and last stage is from Kapil-dhara to Burna Sangam, and thence to Mankarnika Ghaut, from which he first set out, which is also six miles in length. He has thus completed in six days a march of nearly fifty miles, upwards of seven of which, namely, the space between Burna Sangam and Assi Sangam, the two extremities of Benares, were on the banks of the Ganges. All the way from Kapil-dhara to Mankarnika Ghaut, the pilgrim scatters grains of barley on the ground, which he carries in a bag made for the purpose. This curious custom is in honour of Shiva. On reaching the ghaut he bathes in the river, makes his offering of money to the priests in attendance, and then goes to the temple of Sakhi-binaik, or the witness-bearing Ganesh, in order that the fact of his pilgrimage may be duly attested by that deity, and thence to his home. A few grains of barley are reserved for sacrifice to the idol Jau-binaik or barley-Ganesh, who resides immediately above the Mankarnika Ghaut.

With the exception of the temple of Kardameshwar at Kandhawa, which is of considerable antiquity and is the finest specimen of ancient Hindu architecture in this part of India, no temple along the road can, in our opinion, date farther back than two hundred and fifty years. There may be a few of about this age, but we should say that more than five hundred out of the six hundred temples which we have reckoned to be now standing, have been erected since the English came into possession of India. There are various remains of old sculptures to be found upon it and in its vicinity, but they are few in number. It is exceedingly remarkable that the traces of its antiquity, so far as the buildings upon it are concerned, are so slender, especially when we remember that the Hindus believe it to be of high antiquity.

Moreover, the road is for the most part, throughout its whole extent, ornamented by a double row of trees, one on either side. Many of them have massive trunks and have a noble appearance. Some of the trunks measure from twelve to seventeen feet in

*girth. Most of the trees are mango, and many of those of large size are of this kind. Undoubtedly such trees may fairly be regarded as not of recent planting, nevertheless we do not see that they can lay claim to a greater age than that of the earliest built temples found on the road, excepting of course the temple of Kardameshwar, namely, two hundred and fifty years. But it is not improbable that many of the trees were planted by the Hindu lady before mentioned, who repaired the Panch-kosi road on the decline of the Mahomedan power.

None of the five tanks and dharmśālas on this road exhibit any signs of antiquity. It is said that a tank at Bhimchandi has somewhere about it an inscription written upwards of 400 years ago, but if this be true, of which we are very sceptical, it would be only good testimony that this individual tank was of that age, but taken simply by itself, would afford no proof of the antiquity of the road. On the northern division of the road towards Kapil Dhâra, certain indisputable marks and signs of age are apparent, but these we hold are not connected with the Panch-kosi road, but rather with Sârnâth and other Buddhist sites in this neighbourhood.

Again, roads which have been trodden for many centuries, not to say, for thousands of years, are commonly much worn, and occasionally sink far below the adjacent soil. The limestone soil of Benares and the surrounding country is no exception to this rule. The old Ghazee-pore road which crosses the Panch-kosi to the west of Kapil Dhâra, is in one place several feet below the fields on either side, which circumstance is valid proof of its being, to say the least, somewhat ancient. But the Panch-kosi is throughout on a level with the lands through which it winds its way, or nearly so. If the road were only traversed by a few persons yearly, this argument would not be very strong, but seeing that many thousands of pilgrims pass along it in the course of the year, it is, in our opinion, almost physically impossible that it should be of ancient date. Upon the whole, we are inclined to the belief that previous to the repair of the road by Rance Bhawâni, there was a narrow path only, which the Hindus, dreading the vengeance of the Mahomedans, occasionally traversed in small numbers, but for how long this path had been a pilgrim's walk, it is impossible to conjecture. From the very great scarcity of old remains, however, it is our firm belief that it can lay no claim whatever to antiquity, properly so called; and the probability is, that it was originated by some zealous devotee, who conceived the novel idea of honouring the sacred city by describing an immense circle round it, which he first of all trod himself, and which

doubtless to his surprise, was afterwards trodden by other persons, until gradually the custom was established—an idea no more novel and strange than Hindus every day put in practice.

It ought to be remembered with gratitude by the Hindus of Benares and Northern India generally, that the British Government of India instead of pursuing the destructive and prohibitive policy of the Mahomedan rulers, has taken the Panch-kosi road under its own charge, and in a spirit of beneficence, deserving the highest praise, defrays the expenses of its annual repairs. It would be a happy circumstance if Benares itself received the same proportion of attention as this road around it. Threaded with narrow streets, above which rise the many-storied palaces for which the city is famous, it is, without doubt, a problem of considerable difficulty, how to preserve the health of its teeming population. But when we reflect on the four wells and tanks in some parts of the city, whose water is of deadly influence, and the vapour from which fills the air with fever-breeding and cholera-breeding miasma; when we consider the loathsome and disgusting state of the popular temples owing to the rapid decomposition of the offerings through the intense heat of the sun; when we call to mind the filthy condition of nearly all the bye-streets from stagnant cesspools, and accumulated refuse, and dead bodies of animals; and when in addition we remember how utterly regardless of these matters, and incompetent to correct them, is the police force scattered over the city, we feel overwhelmed at the vastness of the difficulty before us. The importance, however, of cleansing the city cannot be over-estimated. And it is because it is at once so immensely important as well as difficult, that the undertaking should not be left in the hands of one man, though he should be the cleverest and most energetic in all India. The Magistrate of Benares and his Assistants, have a multitude of duties to perform, besides watching over the interests of the city, and therefore they are totally unable, and we believe must feel themselves so, to originate and carry out all those schemes of utility which are required. What is needed in Benares is, the establishment of a Municipal corporation similar to that which exists in various other cities in India. Such a body would accomplish great results in promoting, in various ways, the social welfare of the people. We are satisfied that there is no city in the country where such a corporation is more necessary, and where its establishment would be more beneficial. In other respects, too, besides those mentioned, we regard the present time as peculiarly favourable

for carrying out this project. The *matériel* of the Government authorities in Benares just now is well adapted for aiding in the promotion of the objects of a municipality. Men of industry and enterprise, as some of them are, would find ample scope for their talents. Europeans of ability, unconnected with the Government, and also natives of influence fitted to render useful assistance, might be readily found. With men like the Maharajah of Vizianagram, Rajah Deo Narain Singh, late member of the Legislative Council of India, and other natives of this stamp, united with well-selected Europeans, men of observation, and capable of deviating, if need be, from old stereotyped forms and beaten tracks, and striking out a path for themselves, the institution of wholesome sanitary reforms, the completion of effectual drainage, the opening out and widening of thoroughfares for the free admission of air, and the purification of the religious edifices, should be a labour undertaken heartily and prosecuted with enthusiasm. Under the auspices of a corporation thus constituted, we should soon see a thorough transformation in the city; but, at the same time, we are perfectly sure that it is only by such a body that the radical changes so imperatively demanded in this region of palaces and filth, in this hot-bed of periodical disease, can be effected. It is our earnest hope that in these days of progress the time-honoured city of which we have been writing will not be left in the rear, as in some respects it now undoubtedly is; but will soon be ranked amongst the foremost cities in the land in regard to all measures tending to advance the prosperity and happiness of the native community.

PHASES OF HINDUISM.

1. *La Religion Pimitive des Indo-Européens ; par Eugene Flotard.* 8vo. Paris, 1864.
2. *The Rig-Veda Sanhita, Liber Primus,* 1 vol. 4to. London, Oriental Translation Fund, Allen and Co., 1836.
3. *The Chandogya Upanishad of the Sama Veda ; with Extracts from the Commentaries of Sankara Acharya. Translated from the original Sanskrit,* by Rajendra Lal Mitra. Calcutta : Baptist Mission Press, 1862.
4. *Sankara Bejoy,* by Anunda Giri. MSS.
5. *Chaitanaya Charita Mrita, or Life of Chaitanaya.* Bengali, 1 vol. 4to.
6. *Discourses, read at the Meetings of the Hindu Theophilanthropic Society,* vol. 1. Calcutta : by P. S. D'Rozario and Co., 1844.
7. *The Tattwa Bhodini Potrika.*
8. *The Brahmo Somaj Vindicated, being the Substance of a Lecture delivered ex-tempore at the Calcutta Brahmo Somaj Hall, on Saturday, 18th April 1863,* Calcutta : Savielle and Collier, Cossitollah, 1863.

THE Hindu religion represents a composite faith. It was gradually moulded into the double form of an exoteric and esoteric creed, separating the practical and popular worship from the speculative and philosophical doctrines. While the great mass of the people addressed their fears, their wishes, and their aspirations to images carved out of wood, stone and metal, some few of cultivated minds and comprehensive intellect, pondered on the profundities of man and nature, and followed a philosophical creed. But the votaries of Vishnu and Shiva, Doorga and Kali, in the almost endless variety of forms in which these deities are worshipped, profess that their mode of worship, though immediately springing from the Poorans, is based on the Vedas.

The professors of the esoteric creed, while maintaining that its essence is the doctrine of the unity of God, permit and even inculcate idolatry, as suited to those who are, by reason of their limited understanding, incapacitated from realizing and worshipping the one true God.

Ignorance is the foundation of superstition. It has

been for a long time a moot question to theologians and philosophers whether theism or idolatry is of more ancient origin. There are some who suppose that theism is in accordance with the intuitions and first suggestions of the human mind, and by no means incompatible with an infantine state of society, but that idolatry is the result of a variety of conclusions arrived at by different men, differently circumstanced, in a long course of ages; while others advocate the priority of idolatry, and maintain that theism presupposes a very high degree of mental and moral cultivation. Idolatry certainly arises from the partial and distorted ideas to which the faculties of man are limited when they are uncultivated, and theism generally is the result of philosophical generalization. As long as men look upon isolated facts, they cannot divest themselves of narrow and false views of the universe and its creator. Considering the phenomena of the universe as unconnected with each other, and attributing them to different agencies, they are led to recognise an Agni as the principle of the organic world and an Indra as the governor of the firmament, but the simple and sublime idea of one director over all, implies a capacity to appreciate the phenomena of both the natural and moral worlds as parts of one system and subserving to one end. It is grounded on the recognition of two grand principles, *viz.*, that every thing created must have a creator, and that a combination of means, however seemingly opposed to each other, conspiring to one end, implies one supreme intelligence. We are, however, prepared to confess that the history of the religion of the Hindus specially favours neither the former nor the latter view, but partially supports both. Hinduism commenced in Sabeism or elemental worship, progressed to theism, and culminated in a debasing and demoralizing idolatry. It is therefore not always safe to assert that those are the most ancient religions which are the most gross and absurd in their superstitions, and those the most recent, which are the simplest in their belief. The history of Hinduism is not one of steady and unbroken progression in the true sense of the word. But, on the other hand, it has not stood still, but passed through many stages of development.

In tracing the history of Hinduism, it must be remembered that the features of the external world, or what Buckle calls the physical aspects of nature, have in India, exercised a great influence in moulding the religion of the country. While in England external nature is smaller and feeble, in India she is great and terrific. This difference has naturally moulded the minds of the two races, and produced corresponding differences in their mental constitutions. The Englishman has been encouraged

and taught to subordinate his imagination to his understanding. The Hindu has been intimidated, his imagination aroused, and his understanding dwarfed. The former has learnt to conquer nature, the latter has succumbed to her. In the vastness and power which are predicated of Agni and Indra, Vayu and Mitra, in the Vedic era, and of Shiva and Krishna, Doorga and Kali, in the Pooranic period, we see how the appalling aspects of the external world have filled the minds of the Hindus with the ideas of the terrible and the marvellous. In no country in Asia are the force and majesty of nature so powerfully exhibited as in India. Her impassable forests, her luxuriant vegetation, abounding in gigantic creepers and stupendous *ficuses*, her vast rivers traversing the length and breadth of the country, and her cloud-capped mountains, the fabled abode of Rishis and Devatas, have from time immemorial excited in the Hindu mind ideas of the vague and uncontrollable, the undefined and the undefinable, the marvellous and the miraculous. Contrasting himself with these features of the external world, the diminutive Hindu is oppressed and bewildered by their majestic and imposing grandeur on the one hand, and his own insignificance and inferiority on the other. His mind instead of enquiring into and analyzing the appearances and phenomena of nature, refers them to supernatural causes. Unable to generalize those phenomena, and looking only on isolated facts, he became first a worshipper of the elements, and then of heroes. We therefore believe that the Hindu superstition has arisen from a timid and torpid state of mind, which is naturally induced by the appalling appearances of nature. The imagination having been aroused, the understanding was proportionately weakened; human power having failed, superhuman power was invoked.

But notwithstanding the unfavorable influence exercised by the aspects of nature on the Hindu mind, it has always had a peculiar aptitude for contemplation, it has delighted from time immemorial in subtle and metaphysical disquisitions on the nature of God, of life, and the universe, its conjectures were gradually matured into dogmas, and the dogmas ripened into systems.

The Vedas are the earliest and sublimest machinery set in motion by the Hindu intellect.

They portray the first yearning of the Aryan mind in India to rise from the creation to the Creator, and give us an insight into the great schism which divided the Hindu from the Iranian Aryan. Working upon them, Monsieur Flotard has traced with great tact and ingenuity the primitive idea of the God-head, and the celestial hierarchy which the Aryans entertained

before their migration to India and Persia. It is not our object in this article to enter into the history of the Aryan religion as it is developed in pre-Vedic times; we must refer those who take an interest in the subject to the researches of the learned author, the name of whose work heads this article.

The Vedas are, as is well known to our Oriental readers, divided into the Mantras or the devotional parts, and the Brahmanas or the ceremonial parts. Attached to the latter are the *Upanishadas* containing the expositions of the authors' minds—these are the quintessence of the Vedas, and replete with lofty speculations.

The Vedas are supposed to have been breathed out by Brahma. They are said to have been perpetuated by tradition (and hence called *Śruti*), until they were arranged into their present order by that mythic personage, Krishna Dwaipāyana Vyāsa. Being the first essays of the Hindus in the department of religious and philosophical literature, it is no wonder that they should be received by them as a divine revelation.

The hymns of the Rig-Veda, professing to come from eternity, were seen by the Vedic Rishis and numbered 1,028; the three other Vedas, the Yajush, Sāma, and Atharva, are a recast of the Rig, the bulk of their contents being taken in their entirety from the latter. The Yajush-Veda only prescribes a ritual, and is a collation of liturgical formulæ; the invocations to the divinities are mostly borrowed from the Rig, while the few original ones refer to the purification of the paraphernalia of sacrificial rites. The Sāma Veda is another edition of the Rig,—the hymnic portion is the same, and is only arranged in a different order. The Atharva is a more recent production than the other Vedas, and does not command so much veneration as these. The Tri-Vidya, or the three-fold wisdom of the ancient Hindu, refers to the three Vedas,—Rig, Yajush, and Sāma, and not to the Atharva. The hymnic and Brahmanic parts of the Vedas relate the production of the universe, the nature and attributes of the Supreme Being, and the nature of the soul.

The Rig-Veda is the substratum of the Hindu religion. It is unquestionably the most ancient record of the institutions to which that religion gave rise. Its Mantras, which are poetical, refer only incidentally to the performance of the *yajna* and to pious and ritual acts as far as these are connected with contemporaneous events. They were not expressly compiled for any eucharistic performances, and describe other matters than religious sacrifices, such, for instance, as the magnificence of the phenomena of nature, and the strength of the passions unregulated by reason

and judgment. They reflect the growth and development of the national life of Hindustan. They show how the Northern Aryans were settling and consolidating into a civilized and prosperous nation. But the Yajush and Sáma Veda, though a reflex of the Rig, are better adapted to religious performance than their original. The verses of the former were repeated at the sacrifices performed with the *samalatá beer*, or the fermented liquor of the *soma* plant. They corresponded, in fact, to the elaborate ceremonial connected with the Soma sacrifices. The verses of the Yajush Veda were likewise suited to ceremonies and intoned by priests on those occasions. These ceremonies were elaborate, and lasted for weeks and months. Their performance required an army, of priests, songsters, ladle-holders, and sacrificers. They constituted the national religion, and took such possession of the national mind, as to blind it to the sanctity of the Rig-Veda, which was soon outstripped by that of the Yajush and Sáma—especially the former. The great Vedic commentator of Sayaná says, that the Yajush Veda is a wall, the other two are like a painting (on it.)

The hymns of the Rig-Veda are addressed mostly to Agni and Indra, the personifications of fire and firmament. The very first *Súkta* (hymn) declares "I glorify Agni, the high priest of the sacrifice, the divine, the ministrant, who presents the oblation (to the gods), and is the possessor of great wealth." Agni is invoked as the *Agra* or first of the gods, as the *Agrat* or leader of the heavenly host, and as the *Prathama Devata* or the first of the gods.

Indra is thus invoked, "Day by day we invoke the doer of good works for our protection, as a good milch cow for the milking, (is called by the milker) 'Drinker of the Soma juice, come to our (daily) rites, and drink of the libations, the satisfaction of (thee who art) the bestower of riches, is verily (the cause of) the gift of cattle." Hymns are also addressed to *Váyu*, the Maruts or the winds, and the twin Aswini Coomars.

The sun is invoked as the celestial representative of fire, and is hymned under the different names of Mitra, Púshan, Bhaga, Vishnu, Súrya, and Sabitri.

But Agni is the chief divinity of the Vedas. He is acknowledged as the principle of animal life, and the vivifying source of vegetation.

Thus we see the Vedic pantheon to be different from the Pooranic. It recognizes no Krishna Shiva, Doorgá or Kali. It is not based, like the later one, on the Trimúrtti or combination of Brahmá the Creator, Vishnu the Preserver, and Shiva the Destroyer. There was no place in it for the incarnations of

those divinities. The worship represented by the hymns of the Vedas was not a deification of heroes, but the personification of the elements. It was the worship of the powers of nature, which revealed themselves to the ancient Hindu as most potent and marvellous, but it did not embody the divine into human figures. It was domestic and patriarchal, and necessitated, as we have already said, the employment of a large number of Hotris, or officiating priests. It comprised besides the invocations, the ceremony of Homa or of libation of ghee and *soma* juice poured on fire. The ceremony of Ashwamedha, or the sacrifice of the horse, was also performed. The objects of prayer and praise, offered to the divinities, were chiefly benefits of a temporal nature, such as wealth, cattle, health, offspring, protection against enemies and evil spirits. Moral benefactions are also demanded, as expiation from sin and extrication from its effects.

This physical religion or elementalism, as it might be called, developed into the monotheism of the Vedas, which inculcated the existence of one supreme intelligence before all. "In the beginning," it is said, "this all (this universe) was in darkness." "He (the supreme) was alone, without a second. He reflected 'I am one, I will become many.'"

Again the Aitaréya Aranya of the Rig-Véda says originally, "this (universe) was indeed Soul only ; nothing else whatsoever existed, active (or inactive.) He thought, 'I will create worlds,' thus He created these (various) worlds ; water, light, mortal (beings), and waters."

The elements came to be regarded as types and emblems of the Great Power, ruling the universe, and ceased to be considered and worshipped as independent divinities.

Hindu society was thus built upon the Vedic dispensation ; the institution of caste was established, and the division of labour was recognized as one of the first principles of the Aryan confederation on the banks of the Sutlege. The Brahmans, as the expounders of the Vedas, were vested with the functions of legislation and administration. It was their business to interpret the Scriptures, to pronounce their decisions on cases, and to regulate, by their wisdom and learning, the machinery of government. Though they exercised unlimited authority as legislators, judges, and priests, yet they did not assume the functions of royalty.

The Kshetriyas, or second class, were appointed to defend and govern the country, but the Kshetriyas abused their powers and violated the Vedas, and oppressed the people. The Brahmans, the Vaishyas and the Shudras, smarting under their tyranny rose

against the governing class. They found a bold and intrepid leader in Parshurama, who declared it was his mission to exterminate the tyrants. They waged a terrible crusade against the Kshetriyas, and almost rooted them out of the lands, in conformity with the resolution of their leader. The effect of this revolution was to cement the power of the Brahmans. But to keep it within proper bounds, it was resolved that the Brahmans should exercise only the legislative authority, and be debarred from taking any active share in the political and fiscal administration of the State. Thus freed from the cares and anxieties of office, and saved from the turmoils of the contest for riches and power, the sages of the sacerdotal class devoted themselves, in the seclusion of their *ashramas*, to the pursuits of philosophy and religion. Living in honourable poverty, but freely mixing with all classes and commanding their profound respect, they enjoyed ample opportunities of knowing the wants and wishes of the people. This knowledge was of infinite value to them in framing laws for the good government of the country. Central and local legislatures were established, and distinguished Brahmans, like Bhṛigu and Yajñavalkya, were appointed to preside over their deliberations.

The separation of the legislative from the executive functions was attended with most beneficial results. The country under this system made rapid progress in literature and philosophy as well as in the useful arts of life. This result was achieved at a time when the greater portion of the world was buried in darkness. India thus became the seat of the earliest civilization.

The efficient administration of the country, produced accumulation of national wealth; this led to leisure, and leisure to the acquisition of knowledge by other than the privileged classes. The inevitable consequence of the diffusion of knowledge was that the Vedic doctrines and institutions, which had so long marked and moulded the character of the people, were subjected to severe scrutiny. Liberties in thought and speech were assumed in broad day light which would have scandalized the Rishis of the Muntras and the Hotris of the Somayagna. Men began to entertain serious doubts as to the Vedas being inspired guides, and summoned them before the bar of reason. Agitated by conflicting views on moral and religious questions, they drifted into scepticism, and scepticism,—which has been justly described as the parent of all scientific knowledge,—landed them in philosophy, the growth of a mature and not infantile state of society. As the development of Hindu philosophy is intimately connected with the development of Hindu religion, the history of the latter cannot be well understood without especial reference to the former.

* The Naya Dursun, evidently written during this transition-state, plainly indicated the new direction which Hindu thought had taken. It was the first fruit of the emancipation of the Hindu intellect from the dogmata of the Vedic verses. It was soon followed by the Sankhya, which intensified the agitation against the ancient creed. Both these Dursuns, while professing to uphold the Vedas (in the same manner that Strauss and Renan, Parker and Goldstücker uphold the Bible) inculcate doctrines subversive of their fundamental tenets. They reject the ritual of the Vedas, and maintain that true religion consists not in the performance of unmeaning ceremonies, but in the attainment of a knowledge of the nature and attributes of the Creator through the creation. They gave the first impulse to the free-thinkers of India, and led to an open renunciation of the Vedic way of interpreting nature.

The Nyaya aims at *Nishreyas*, or final beatitude and excellence, to be attained through a thorough knowledge of the principles which it teaches. It enumerates sixteen topics, among which *Pramana* or evidence, and that which is to be proved, are the principal, and the rest are subsidiary and calculated to elicit the truth.

The Nyaya was supplemented by the Vaisesika, developing the atomic theory enunciated by the former. Kanada accounts for the origin of the world by the combination of atoms in the same manner as Epicurus. He maintains the eternity of atoms, and even considers soul as a substance and the substratum of qualities. *Dharma* and *Adharma*, or virtue and vice, are the qualities of the soul. They are respectively the result of performing what is enjoined or what is forbidden in the Shastras. Virtue is the peculiar cause of pleasure and vice of pain—a doctrine which foreshadows the Benthamite principle of the former, being the maximization of pleasures and the minimization of pain, and *vice versa*.

Sankhya, usually signifying numeral, must be here understood as reasoning or deliberation. The system has therefore been characterised as the discovery of soul by means of right discrimination. It aims, like the Vedas, at the attainment of *Mukti* or eternal beatitude, consisting of a freedom from all ills. Its grand object is exemption from metempsychosis, but, unlike the Vedas, it insists that true knowledge alone can secure "entire and perfect deliverance from evil. It declares that temporal means for exciting pleasure or relieving mental or bodily suffering are insufficient to that end, and the spiritual resources of practical religion are imperfect, since sacrifice, the most efficacious of observances, is attended with the slaughter of animals and consequently is not innocent and pure, and the

"heavenly meed of pious acts is transitory." The cardinal doctrine of Sankhya, that beatitude can only be attained by acquisition of perfect knowledge, strikes at the root of the Vedic doctrine of the attainment of celestial bliss by celebration of sacrifices. According to Kapila, the reputed author of Sankhya and his followers, "absolute prevention of all sorts of pain is the highest purpose of the soul." The evils here indicated emanate from the internal and the external world, and also from the divine causes. The first is either physical or mental disease of various kinds, or the passions when unregulated by knowledge.

Auxiliary to the system of Kapila is that of Patanjala. It is usually denominated *Yoga Shastra*, and is divided into four chapters, or *pada*, namely, on contemplation, on the means of attaining it, on the exercise of transcendent power, and on abstraction or spiritual insulation.

The tenets of these two schools of Sankhya are indetical, except on a most important point, namely, the proof of the existence of a Supreme Being. While Patanjala recognises God, Kapila recognises only beings superior to men, but like them, liable to metempsychosis. Hence the system of the former is called *Seshewara* Sankhya, and that of the latter *Nirishwara* Sankhya. According to the *Yoga Shastra*, "Ishwara, the supreme ruler, is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls; unaffected by the ills with which they are beset, unconcerned with good or bad deeds and their consequences, and with fancies or passing thoughts. In Him is the utmost omniscience. He is the instructor of the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of mythologies); Himself infinite, unlimited by time." But the Sankhya denies the existence of a supreme ruler of the world, maintaining that there is no proof of it.

In this state of excitement and change Sakya Muni appeared as a religious reformer. Of royal parentage, he had been nursed in the lap of luxury; but convinced of the vanity of worldly grandeur and sensual pleasures, he renounced the world and embraced the life of an ascetic. Having been trained in the Brahmanical creed, he first preached its doctrines, but he soon developed a form of faith antagonistic to it. That form was Buddhism, which soon rose up by the side of Hinduism, and attained such gigantic proportions as to overshadow its ancient rival. It denied the inspirations of the Vedas and denounced caste as a monstrous evil. It was popular in its form, and addressed itself to all classes. It was an outburst of religious enthusiasm which carried everything along with it in its irresistible course. This revolution

was accelerated by the love of proselytizing, which stimulated the followers of the new creed. It was remarkable for its peacefulness and disinterestedness. It spread like wild fire. Based on the doctrine of the unity of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, Buddhism pointed out as its end *Nirvāna* or the attainment of perfection in the absorption of the soul into the essence of the divinity. It makes salvation dependent not upon the utterance of Mantras, or performance of ceremonies, but on the practice of active virtues, of temperance and prudence, humility and self-denial.

This pure and elevated code of morality addressed itself to the best feelings of the Hindus, and soon enlisted them on behalf of the creed inculcating it. It is therefore small wonder that Buddhism, originating in Central India, soon traversed the length and breadth of the continent. It penetrated into Bengal as far as the mouth of the Ganges, and extended to the uttermost limits of China and Ceylon.

It was at Buddha Gya that the founder of Buddhism rested under a peepul tree, and devoted six years to profound meditation on the mysteries of God, of life, and of nature. It was here that he is said to have successfully battled with Māra (the genius of sensualism, and the Satan of Buddhism) and accomplished wealth.

Buddha Gya was considered as the holiest place on the earth, and was studded with temples and monasteries, which were resorted to by hosts of pilgrims.

In the third century before Christ, Buddhism became the State religion. King Asoka was a zealous follower of its doctrines, and sent Missionaries to Ceylon to propagate them. Fa Hian saw, A. D. 400 to 412, numerous works of Buddhist art. He also found the kingdoms and principalities into which India was divided professing Buddhism.

While Buddhism was working its way silently and cautiously it was noticed but little ; but when it conflicted with Brahminism it became the subject of a violent attack and persecution. This accounts for the toleration and even favourable consideration it first met with from the Brahmins. Though its founder rejected the doctrines of the Vedas, yet he was elevated to the Hindoo pantheon, and worshipped as an *avatar* or incarnation of the deity. But when the two religious parties were brought into collision, and it was found necessary to make a reference to cardinal principles, it could not be long before the Brahmins, learned in the lore of their country, would seek to assail the Buddhists. They found their mouthpiece in *Jaimini*, who imposed on himself the task of reviving and vindicating the

authority of the Vedas. The object of his Purva or prior Mimansa, is the interpretation of the original scriptures, which the Aryans had brought with them to the holy land of Aryavata. Its purpose, as observed by one of his annotators, is "to determine the sense of revelation." It is called practical or *Karma Mimansha* as contradistinguished from the theological or the *Brahma Mimansha*. It is not like the Nyaya or Sankhya, a system of philosophy, but teaches only duty. But unfortunately the duties propounded by Jaimini are not the religious or the moral or the social duties we owe to our Maker, our fellow-beings and ourselves; but they imply the performances of the sacrifices and other rites enjoined by the *Vedas*. He premises, "now then the study of duty is to be commenced. Duty is a purpose which is inculcated by a command. Its reason must be enjoined."

The *Mimansha* maintains the eternity of the Vedas and endeavours to prove its divine origin by arguing that no human author is remembered—an argument which is of little validity, inasmuch as any other work of human brain or human hands, of which the origin and preparation could not be testified to by contemporaneous authorities, might with equal reason be considered as coeval with creation.

Kumarila Bhatta zealously and successfully carried out the work commenced by Jaimini. He not only expounded the Purva Mimansha and upheld the authority of the Vedas, but practically accomplished the object for which the former work had been put forth. He proved the most determined and formidable antagonist to the Buddhists. He showed them no mercy, and gave them no quarter, but waged an exterminating crusade against them.

Vyasa, the reputed compiler of the Vedas, came forward with the *Uttara Mimansha* or the *Vedanta*, reproducing and illustrating the monotheistic doctrines of the Upanishads.

The *Vedanta* literally signifies the conclusion of the Vedas and, coupled with the Purva Mimansha, constitutes a complete system of an interpretation of the Vedic precepts and ordinances. Like the Purva the Uttara Mimansha opens by declaring its object. "Next, therefore, the enquiry is concerning God." The existence of a Supreme Being, the Creator and Director of the universe is the distinctive and all-pervading idea developed in the Vedanta. "(He is that) whence are the birth and continuance and dissolution of (this world). (He is) the source of (revelation or) holy writ." God is described as the omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe. He is *Anandamaya*, or essentially happy. "He is the ethereal element from which all things proceed, and to which all return."

"He is the *prana* or breath in which all things merge, into which they all rise." "He is the *jyotish* or light which shines in "heaven and in all places, high and low, everywhere throughout "the world and within the human person."

The Vedanta not only inculcates the existence of God, but also His unity. It declares that God is one and without a second, and also that God alone is entitled to worship. Again: "it is 'found in the Vedas that none but the Supreme Being is to "be worshipped, nothing excepting Him should be adored by a "wise man."

It also teaches the immutability and spirituality of God. God is never material. He is therefore described in the Vedas, as being without any of the qualities appertaining to created being. The Vedas describe the Deity as being only spirit. The *Smriti Brahmana* declares him "not separate from "the embodied soul. He is soul, and the soul is he."

"As milk changes to curd, and water to ice, so is *Brahmā* variously transformed and diversified without aid of tools or exterior means of any sort. In like manner the spider spins his web out "of his own substance, spirits assume various shapes; cranes "*(valaca)* propagate without the male, and the lotus proceeds "from pond to pond without organ of locomotion. That *Brahma* "is entire, without parts, is no objection; he is not wholly transformed into worldly appearances. Various changes are present- "ed to the same dreaming soul. Divers illusory shapes and dis- "guises are assumed by the same spirit."

The soul is an emanation from the Deity. It is "a portion "of the supreme ruler as a spark of fire. The relation is not "that of master and servant, ruler and ruled, but as that of whole "and part." The soul is also compared to the waves of the ocean, and the soul of nature to the ocean itself.

Individual souls are also likened to so many reflections of the sun exhibited by vessels filled with water. This identity of the human soul with the divine spirit has been often misconstrued into Pantheism. What the Vedant means to teach is that the Deity pervades and animates all bodies. "He framed bodies, "biped and quadruped, and becoming a bird, he passed into "those bodies, filling them as their informing spirit."

Again, the Vedant distinctly declares that "nature is not the "creator of the world, not being represented so by the Vedas, for "they expressly say, God has by His sight created the universe. "Nature is an insensible being, she is void of sight or intention, "and consequently unable to create the regular world." The universe is not *Brahma*, but "it springs from him, merges in him, "breathes in him."

In the following instance, delivered by Angiras to Mahasala, it is not nature nor an embodied soul, but the Supreme Being who is the invisible (*adrisya*) and incomprehensible author of all created being. "Him invisible, the wise contemplate as "the source (or cause) of being; as the spider puts forth and "draws in his thread, as plants spring from the earth and return "to it, as the hair of the head and body from the living man, "so does the universe come of the unalterable." This does not show that the Vedanta system approaches to a confusion of the Creator and the created, or speak at all as if there were any matter co-existent with Him from eternity.

To return to Buddhism, which, itself a schism from Brahmanism, underwent several organic changes after the death of its illustrious founder; it degenerated in some quarters into blind asceticism, whilst in others it sank into downright atheism. The truth is, that the standard of moral excellence prescribed in the *Tripitaka* or Buddhistic scriptures, was too elevated for poor weak humanity. The self-abnegation it enforced few could practise. The spirit was willing, but the flesh was weak. The tests for attainment of *Nirvan* were too severe. They consisted in the "most perfect faith, most perfect virtue, and most perfect knowledge." It was not enough for the Buddhists to profess a speculative belief in the *Buddha Dharma* and *Sangha*, equivalent to the God, the law, and the prophets of the Bible. It was only by retiring from the world and contemplating God in the solitude of the cloisters, by exercising abstinence and chastity, and undergoing penances, that *Nirvan* could be attained. These conditions implied the necessity of enlisting in the church and receiving the tonsure. The consequence was that the number of clergy became immense. The accumulation of priests led, as might be expected, to gross abuses and brought the creed into disrepute. Many of them, though professing to lead austere lives, fell off in practice from the rigorous system enjoined and merged into the laity. Hwan Thsang, the Chinese traveller, found them in this state at Patna in the sixth century, and describes them as "living with the heretics and no better than they."

Again Buddhism addressed itself more to the head than to the heart; it appealed more to the intellect than to the feelings. It in fact glorified and even deified the intellect; denominating the deity as Supreme Intelligence. But its actual tendency was to dwarf the intellect and cramp the understanding. While Hinduism produced a galaxy of metaphysicians and philosophers, theologians and moralists, Buddhism favoured the growth neither of literature nor philosophy.

* Buddhism branched off into numerous sects ; one of which, the Nikiantho or heterodox ecclesiastics, were predestinarians, and maintained that virtues and vices, moral good and evil resulted from destiny, and everything being pre-ordained, the practice of the doctrine could not save any one from his fate. Their motto was "what is written must be accomplished." There was another sect who believed in a first principle, and its appearance in the form of an egg, which divided into two parts developed into the sky and earth. A third class did not admit of a first cause, but asserted that every thing was fortuitous. One sect believed in space as the principle of things, while another maintained Vayu, or ether, to be that principle. It was considered meritorious by several sects to undergo severe penance, such as subjecting themselves to hunger and thirst, plunging into cold streams, having the body cauterised, living on herbs, and residing in Shashá-nas, or burning-places. This diversity of sentiments produced great disorders and impaired the veneration of the people for the creed and its professors.

In this stage of scepticism and corruption, Hinduism, having revived in the form of Shaivaism, struck a mortal blow at Buddhism.

While Buddhism was decaying, the religion which had been brought by the Brahmuns from without had undergone great changes. The old gods of the Vedas had been superseded by the new gods of the Purans. Agni and Indra had been replaced by Shiva and Krishna. The worship of the *tri-múrtti* had been substituted for that of the unpersonified elements. Káma had been dethroned by Shakti ; the celebration of the Basanta, or the vernal season festival, had been changed into that of Dole Jatra. The introduction of new divinities had led to the formation of new sects, each professing the exclusive adoration and maintaining the unapproachable superiority of its own *devatá*. Being enlisted in the side of different and (as they supposed) antagonistic divinities, they cherished feelings of animosity towards each other. While the *Bhagavat* asserts that those who profess the worship of *Bhava* (*Shiva*) and those who follow their doctrines, are heretics and enemies of the sacred Shastras ; the Pudma Purana declares—"from even looking at Vishnu, the wrath of Shiva is kindled, and "from his wrath we fall assuredly into a horrible hell, let not "therefore the name of Vishnu even be pronounced." Idolatry thus begat bigotry, and bigotry hostility ; while in the heat and turmoil of these sectarian conflicts the simple and innocent Vedic worship was forgotten.

The Sháivas and Vaishnavas constitute the principal sects. The Sháiva faith was inaugurated at Benares—the Oxford of

India—by Paramátmá Kalanola, who assumed the distinctive marks peculiar to it. The Vaishnava worship was instituted at Kanchi by Lakshmana Acharya. It is a modified worship of Vishnu in the character of Krishna. The Shaivas are subdivided into numerous sub-sects, of whom the Shaivas proper wore the impression of the Linga on both arms, the Bhaktas on the forehead; while the Trisula, or trident, stamped on the forehead, was the distinctive mark of the Rudras; these sub-sects subsequently merged into the Shaivas. Their doctrines are embodied in the Shivagita.

How far the worship of the Linga is authorized by the Hindu scriptures is difficult to determine. Whether the Rudra of the Vedas is identical with the Shiva of the Puranas is more than doubtful; but the transcendental superiority and exclusive worship of Shiva, in the form of the Phallus, is inculcated in several of the Puranas. There is no doubt that it is the most ancient object of adoration of the post-Vedic era. It became the most prevalent and popular form of worship during the decadence of Buddhism. Manu invokes Shiva as Swayambhú and the chief of divinities.

The great majority of the Vedantics whilst practising the rites enjoined by their scriptures accepted Shiva as their Ishtadeva or tutelary divinity; and judging by the number of shrines dedicated to him in ancient times at Salset, Elephanta, and Ellora, and the veneration they excited, his worship must have extended far and wide.

A new impetus was given to Shaivaism by Shankaracharya who flourished in the eighth century, and who in fact remodelled the whole system of Hinduism. He commenced his labours as a religious reformer in Malabar, the place of his birth; but he was a great traveller, and roamed from place to place, invading the strongholds of Buddhism and other heterodox creeds and carrying them by storm. Shankara was not only a controversialist but a commentator and philosopher. What he contended for by word of mouth, he maintained by his writings. What he preached, he supported by the authority of the Vedas. His commentaries on the Sûtras of Vyasa and the Bhágavatgita contributed in no small degree to increase and perpetuate the influence exercised by him in person. They also did much to revive the veneration of the Hindus for their scriptures.

Shankara was gifted with a happy diction. Whether he spoke or wrote, whether he thundered against heterodoxy or expounded the Vaidic doctrines, there seemed to flow from him the very words which were most suitable. He possessed the faculty of drawing men along with him. He was

eminently persuasive, and his arguments had strength to bring men to his new doctrines. His was a masculine mind, which by its mere impact conquered all opposition. He largely mixes with the history of Hinduism. His pen and tongue were real engines of power, and influenced important events in its annals.

The system he taught was substantially the Vedantic system ; to which his followers, the Dandis, subsequently superadded the doctrines of Pátánjali in reference to *yoga* ; but Shankara was not an uncompromising reformer. While he himself believed in "a Sole Cause and Supreme Ruler of the Universe" and proclaimed to his chosen disciples the doctrine of the unity of God, he considered the worship of Shiva and Vishnu as not incompatible with such doctrines. He permitted, nay inculcated, the worship of images to those whose limited understandings rendered them incapable of comprehending and adoring the Invisible Supreme Being. That Shankara himself was a theist, admits not of a moment's question, as one of his last sayings was "O Lord, pardon me the three sins committed by me—I have, "by contemplation, clothed thee with a shape who art shapeless ; "I have, in praise, described thee who art indescribable, and "I have ignored thine omnipresence by visting the Tirthas." Educated as he was, in a mystical and elaborate system of Hinduism, we cannot wonder at his toleration of idolatry. To overturn that system would have probably been too much for him. Remodel it he might. In moulding and fashioning it, therefore, according to his own ideas, he accomplished the good he sought to effect, and stamped the tenets he promulgated with the notes of antiquity and sanctity. The account of his labours contained in the *Shankara Vijaya*, written by his spiritual disciple, Ananda Giri, displays a philanthropy not often met with in this cold and calculating age. He devoted his energies, his learning, his life, to the promulgation of what he believed to be the truth and to the extermination of what he believed to be error.

The successful polemical warfare which the Shaivas waged with the Buddhists culminated in a sanguinary strife resulting in the expulsion of the latter. They, for the most part, emigrated to more congenial clims, and those that remained became absorbed into Hinduism.

The Rámáyuna and Mahábharata—the two great epic poems of the Hindus—speak of this religious contest. The very existence of those works show the cessation of Buddhism at a very early date, and the consequent revival of the moral, social, and political influence of Hinduism.

But the Shaivas after having overthrown Buddhism, were nearly

overthrown by the Vaishnavas. Hinduism having triumphed over foreign foes, and regained its ascendancy, was impaired by internal divisions. The Vaishnavas invaded Benares, the head-quarters of Shaivism and demolished the temple of Visheshwara. So violent became the dispute between these two rival sects, that the king of Chola, *viz.*, Ranganata Krimikonda Chola, being a Shaiva, issued an edict commanding all the Brahmanas in his Raj to sign an Ekrár, acknowledging the unlimited and exclusive supremacy of Shiva. He tempted some and coerced others into acquiescence. But Rámáunjee was neither to be bribed nor to be terrified. He was a devout worshipper of Vishnu. He had been brought up in that faith, and had written treatises in support of its doctrines. He was a travelled man and accustomed to polemical warfare. He had visited several parts of India and carried on successful controversies with the followers of Shaivism and other creeds. He had even dispossessed Shaivas of several Mandirs or shrines and pressed them into the service of Vishnu.

Now this veteran Vaishnava refused point blank to acknowledge the supremacy of Shiva. The wrath of the king knew no bounds. He gave orders to seize and throw him into a dungeon. But Rámáunjee escaped the persecution, and took refuge in Mysore, whither his fame had already preceded him. The Raja, Velata Roy, accorded him a warm reception, listened patiently to the doctrines of the refugee, and became a convert, assuming the title of Vishnubardhana.

Rámáunjee resided twelve years in Mysore ; but on the death of Krimikonda he returned to Chola. He inculcated the worship of Vishnu and his consort Lakshmi, and their incarnations, Rama and Sita, Krishna and Rukini. He taught that Vishnu was Brahma and the great first cause. He denied the Vedantic doctrine—that the deity is without form or quality and maintained that he was endowed with all good qualities and possessed a two-fold form ; Paramata, the supreme spirit, and the gross one—the effect, the universe or matter. Rámáunjee founded seven hundred *mutts* or monasteries, and established seventeen Gorooships amongst his disciples. He died as the head of the most ancient and respectable sect of Vaishnavas, by name *Sri Sampradya*, with the rise of which originated the custom of erecting *Thakurgurus* in the upper stories of private dwelling houses, and setting up there the Shalagram stones, and stone and metal images of Krishna and Radha.

In the beginning of the fifteenth century Ramanund, a member of the Rámáunjee or Srisampradya sect, seceded from

it, and founded another sect called after his name. The cause of his secession was an indignity to which he had been subjected by his brethren. He had travelled in various parts of India and been brought into familiar contact with different castes. When he returned to the *Mat*, or residence of his Gooroo, his fellow-sectarians declared their conviction that, as in the course of his travels, he must have partaken of food with other people, and thereby violated one of the fundamental tenets of their creed, he had become a *mlecha*, and must be therefore excommunicated. Deeply wounded by this social ostracism, he retired from the *Sampradya*, and founded a sect of his own at Benares. This fact shows how moral and religious reforms are sometimes, owing to the individual unhappiness, regret, and disappointments of this man or the other, what battles are waged with superstition, victories won over prejudice, elevated thoughts given utterance to in stirring words, and work of every sort performed, by the pang of sorrow, the sense of unmerited disgrace, and the sickness of disappointment. The principles of Ramanund were more liberal than those of Rāmāunjee. He declared his mission was to emancipate his followers from the shackles of caste. In special reference to it he gave his followers the denomination of an *Avadhada*, or *emancipated*. The Ramanundees accordingly observe no particular restriction regarding eating and drinking, and the clergy and even many lay members of the sects eat and drink together without regard to tribe and caste.

The Buddhists were the first to ignore the distinctions of castes and proclaim the equality of all men. Ramanund revived the anti-caste movement which had died out, and maintained that the restraints of regimen and ablution were no part of true religion.

Rāmāunjee had preached for Brahmins and written for Brahmins. Ramanund addressed himself to men of all castes and invited them to enter his fold. He taught there was no difference between Bhagwan and Bhukta, the deity and his devout worshipper. He explained that as Bhagwan had appeared as a *Muthso Avatar* and a *Barohow Avatar*, so the Bhukta may be born a Chamar or a Moochee. We accordingly find among his celebrated spiritual disciples Kubeer the weaver, Racda the Chamar, Dhona the Jat, and Sena the barber. These tenets are a vigorous encroachment on orthodox Hinduism, and it is not to be wondered at that the expositions of his system by his followers should be written not in the Sanskrit, intelligible to the learned few, but in the provincial vernacular, level to the understanding of the many.

The Ramanundeas can boast of several powerful writers, such as Toolsheedass, Joydeva, and Nabhagi, the author of *Bhaktamalla* and a *Dôme* by caste. The stanzas of Toolsheedass are very telling, and have exercised a more powerful influence on the Hindoo mind than many a pretentious Sanskrit work. The mellifluous style of Gita Govind shows Joydeva to be a writer of more than ordinary powers. The *Bhaktamalla* contains an elaborate exposition of the doctrines of the Ramanundeas.

The reform inaugurated by Ramanund received fresh impulse from Kubeer, his most celebrated disciple. Kubeer had passed his life under the guidance of Ramanund. To have been in the close presence of that remarkable man, to have toiled at the same *Shamaj*, and to have engaged in religious labours under his auspices ; all this had enabled him to earn a wealth of experience by which he well knew how to benefit. With a moral courage rarely to be met with among Hindoo Reformers, he denounced the whole system of Hindoo idolatry. He repudiated the doctrines of the *Shastras* and set Brahmanical authority at naught. He assailed not only the creed of his countrymen, but the Koran of his conquerors. His preachings and writings were addressed not only to the Hindoos but Mahomedans, and produced electric effect. He exposed with merciless but impartial severity the pretensions of the Brahmins and the Mollahs. He spoke with luminous force, and produced a profound impression. He had a large following. His disciples loved him as a father while living, and fenced him round with divine honours when dead. Kubeer is supposed to be an incarnate deity. He was born of a virgin and drowned in a tank ; he was found floating (like another Moses) by Nema, the wife of a Tantee or weaver, who took up and nursed the child.

The Kubeer-Punthees, or the followers of Kubeer, do not profess to pay exclusive adoration to any divinity, or to observe the superstitious rites and usages prevalent around them. The lay members of the fraternity conform only outwardly to some of those rites, but the clergy abstain from them and pay their homage to the invisible Kubeer. They use no mantras, but chant hymns in praise of the object of their worship. They believe in one God, the creator of the world, but unlike the Vedantist they clothe him with a form. They maintain that this shape is composed of five elements of matter, and that his mental attributes are omnipotence and perfect purity. Their moral code enjoins humanity and truth as the cardinal virtues.

The following extract from *Vijick*, the text book of the Kubeer-Punthees, shows the theistical and anti-ascetical character of their doctrine :—

“ To *Ali* and *Rama* we owe our existence, and should, therefore, show similar tenderness to all that live ; of what avail is it to shave your head, prostrate yourself on the ground, or immerse your body in the stream, whilst you shed blood, you call yourself pure, and boast of virtues that you never display : of what benefit is cleaning your mouth, counting your beads, performing ablution, and bowing yourself in temples, when, whilst you mutter your prayers, or journey to *Mecca* and *Medina*, deceitfulness is in your heart. The Hindu fasts every eleventh day, the Mussulman during the Ramazan. Who formed the remaining months and days, that you should venerate but one ? If the Creator dwell in tabernacles, whose residence is the universe ? Who has beheld *Rama* seated amongst images, or found him at the shrine to which the pilgrim has directed his steps ? The city of *Hari* is to the east ; that of *Ali* to the west ; but explore your own heart, for there are both *Rama* and *Karim*. Who talks of the lies of the *Veds* and *Tefs* ? those who understand not their essence. Behold, but one in all things, it is the second that leads you astray. Every man and woman that has ever been born is of the same nature with yourself. *He*, whose is the world, and whose are the children of *Ali* and *Rama*, he is my *Guru*, he is my *Pir*.

Kubeer-Punthism was very widely diffused. Its direct and indirect effects were very powerful. It gave rise to the Punjabee faith, of which the founder Nanuck borrowed the doctrines of Kubeer and adopted them as the substratum of his teaching.

The spirit of innovation was at last caught in Bengal. At the beginning of the sixteenth century there rose at Nuddeah—the Benares of lower India—a Brahmin to preach a new doctrine. That doctrine was the efficacy of *Bhakti*, or faith, as contradistinguishing from works. It was an innovation on the Vedic system which inculcates specific religious duties, the performance of ceremonies and practice of acts of self-denial, but the fervent and absorbing devotion of Krishna dispensed according to Chaitana with the necessity of all duties, ceremonies, and acts. This Bengalee reformer taught that all men are capable of participating in the sentiments of faith and devotion, and that the members of all *jats* or castes become pure by such sentiments. He maintained the pre-eminence of faith over caste. The mercy of God was boundless, and not circumscribed by the restrictions of tribe and family. He declares that “ Krishna was Paramattra or the Supreme Spirit prior to all world, and both the cause and substance of creation : in his capacity of Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer, he is Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, and in the endless visions of his substance or energy he is all that ever was

“or ever will be : besides these manifestations of himself, he has. “for various purposes assumed specific shapes as Avataras or “descents.”

He preached that “the *Chandala*, whose impurity is consumed “by the chastening fire of holy faith, is to be revered by the “wise, and not the unfeeling expounder of the *Veda*.” Again, “the “teacher of the four Vedas is not my disciple. The faithful *Chan-* “*dala* enjoys my friendship, to him be given and from him be re- “ceived ; let him be revered even as I am revered.” Throughout his career he taught, what another and a far greater religious reformer had taught, that not “that which goeth into “the mouth defileth a man, but that which cometh out of the “mouth this defileth a man.” The text-book from which he delivered his precepts and which, in fact, moulded his destiny was the *Sreemut Bhagbut*. It was his Bible ; but he interpreted it differently from the bulk of Vaishnavics. He viewed the flirtations of *Krishna* with the *Gopceences* in a Platonic light, and in fact, founded his doctrine of *Bhakti* on them. The god of Chaitanya was nominally the sable Krishna of Brindabun, but really a higher being than that confirmed sensualist.

The union of *Krishna* with *Radha* was in his eyes like the mystical union of Christ with the church. The relation between man and God is compared to the relation between husband and wife, the carnal element being subtracted and ignored. “There “are five stages of faith. The first and lowest is simply con- “templative, like that of the Rishis Sanaka and Yogendro. The “second is *servile*, like that of men generally. The third is “*friendly*, like the feeling with which Sreedama and the Papdavas “regarded Krishna. The fourth is *maternal*, *paternal*, or *filial*, “like that of Yashoda, Devaki, &c. The fifth and highest is “*amorous* or loving, like that of Radha.”

The reformatory efforts of Chaitanya were at first directed against the worship of Sakti and its concomitant ceremonies as inculcated in the *Tantras*. They were, so to speak, a reaction against this degenerate and abominable creed, which had culminated in the worst form of libertinism. The orgies celebrated under its cloak were worse than Bacchanalian. These *Tantras* purported to have emanated from *Shiva*, but were forged by some clever Pundits of Nuddea.

Vaishnaism was thus arrayed against Bhobanism. Chaitanya commenced his labours by holding meetings of his immediate friends and followers at the house of Sree Bhasha in the evening. In these meetings he used to expound the life and acts of *Krishna*, and sing compositions in honour of that divinity. The Tantricks, enraged at this schism, endeavoured to put it

down. One of them, Gopaul Chapaula, sent some Java flowers (*Hibiscus cocinea*) and other articles sacred to Bhobance to the house of Sree Bhāsha, while Chaitanya and his friends were assembled there. The meeting ordered a *mehter* to remove the articles as emblems of impure rites. Gopaul, says the tradition, became a leper on the third day after he had insulted Krishna. He appeared before Chaitanya in his disease-stricken condition and repented of his offence. He was forgiven, renounced his former faith and embraced that of Chaitanya. His new faith made him whole. Chaitanya, having obtained the sympathies and support of a large class of men, now openly declared it was his mission to exterminate the *Tantrick* worship and establish the true Vaishnaism. He preached his doctrines in the streets and villages of Nuddea, and was accompanied by processions of *Kirtunwallahs*. While one of these processions was perambulating the bazaars and hāts, a band of *Tantricks*, headed by *Jogai* and *Madhai*, attacked and dispersed it. But *Jogai* and *Madhai* were soon struck with remorse, and from having been bitter enemies, became devoted followers of Chaitanya.

In 1509 Chaitanya or Nemye, as he was then called, formally renounced the world and embraced the life of an ascetic. Though of a very affectionate nature and devotedly attached to his mother, he did not hesitate to respond to the voice of his conscience which called him away from home and all that was dear and near to him. As a *sannyasi* he shook off the obligations of society and was resolved that his energies, his time, his life, should be devoted to the fulfilment of his mission. He spent the next six years in making several pilgrimages to Brindabun and Pooree, the respective head-quarters of Krishna and Juggarnath. In the course of his perigrination he disseminated his doctrines and made numerous converts. He proceeded to *Gour*, which was then the capital of Bengal, and preached to its citizens as often as possible. He held forth on the virtues of *Hari*; insisting on faith in *Hari* as the one thing needful to salvation; he invited men of all persuasions and castes, Hindoos and Mahomedans, Brahmins and Chandals, to enter his fold. On one of these occasions there were among his audience two Mahomedan brothers present, *viz.*, Dabir and Kashash, both high functionaries on the staff of Syud Hoosein, the reigning Viceroy. On them the preaching of Chaitanya made a profound impression. At midnight they repaired to his lodgings, declared their deep conviction of the truths of Vaishnaism, and begged to be enlisted in its ranks. Chaitanya welcomed them, granted their prayer and said, "Vishnu will save you, henceforth you shall be known to the world under

"the names of Rupa and Sonatun." In taking these converts from Mahomedanism, Chaitanya evinced a moral courage unparalleled in the annals of Hinduism. Ramanundo and Kubir had taken low caste men before him, but they were heresiarchs. Here was a couple of *mlecchas* welcomed to orthodox Vaishnaism. Rupa and Sonatun proved eminent members of the faith they had embraced at great personal sacrifice. Their works, entitled *Nalata Mathuba* and *Hari Bhaktivilasa*, are the most esteemed by the Vyragees. Chaitanya also admitted among his followers five Pathans who had encountered him on his way to Brindabun and intended to attack and plunder him, but struck by his sanctity they desisted from carrying out their hostile intentions, and were converted by his arguments.

At the end of his six years' travel, he appointed Adwata Acharya and Nitanundo, superiors of the *Vaishnoblhas* in Bengal, and Rupa and Sonatun as the heads of the Somaj at Brindabun, and he himself settled at Nilchalla, where he remained twelve years, worshipping Juggurnath with all the intensity of his nature. Besides the *Provoos* and superiors above mentioned, the Vaishnavas acknowledge Gosains as their original and chief teachers. Those Gosains are the founders of the families now existing in Bengal and Brindabun, and preying and fattening on the loaves and fishes of their followers.

Among the original Gosains was Vallabha Acharya, who was the founder of a separate order of *Vaishnavas*, professing to worship Krishna as the infant Gopala. It numbers among its followers the opulent mahajuns of Bombay and other places.

The system propounded by Chaitanya is a system of asceticism. It appeals not to the intellectual but to the emotional part of our nature. Knowledge of God is to be attained not through the process of meditation as maintained by the Vedas, or by a process of philosophising on His nature and attributes as taught by the *Dursuns*, but through the exercise of veneration and love and devotion. The heart is all in all in the Code of Chaitanya. He preached among all classes and castes that salvation was possible without a belief in books, and must be attained through *Bhakti*. With the development of this idea the name of Chaitanya must be always associated. His doctrines are an effective protest against the exclusiveness of Hinduism as the dominant and national religion. He maintained the pre-eminence of faith over caste, and taught that the mercy of God regards neither tribe nor family. He scouted, like Kubir, the distinctions of caste as violations of the laws of God, who intended all men should be equal and entitled to enter his kingdom. In insist-

ing on purity of thought and action he is the counterpart of the ancient Rishis who depended on meditation alone. He regarded God as essentially love, because as Goethe said, of a greater reformer, "love was the essence of his own fair inward being."

The anti-caste movement thus inaugurated by Chaitanya in Bengal, has continued with unabated vigour. It was a natural and fitting extension of the religious education of the Hindus. About sixty years ago Ramsharun Paul, of Ghoseparra, near Hooghly, founded the sect of *Kartavajas*, or worshippers of the Creator. They do not acknowledge the distinctions of caste, especially when engaged in their religious ceremonies. They consist of men and women of all castes who eat together in private twice a year. The following is their *Muntra* :—

"Oh ! sinless Lord—Oh ! great Lord, at Thy pleasure, I go and "return ; not a moment am I without Thee, I am even with Thee ; " save, Oh ! great Lord."

We have now arrived at a period which was to witness a re-awakening of the national mind from its torpor, not by the isolated and fitful efforts of religious enthusiasts, but by the systematic and well regulated agency of education.

In the year 1815, a few earnest friends, among whom were David Hare and William Adams, met at the garden-house of Rammohun Roy at Manicktolla to discuss the most feasible means of improving and elevating the Hindu mind. David Hare proposed the establishment of a College for imparting a sound and liberal education in English to the Hindu youths ; Rammohun Roy, while fully recognising the importance of such an education, contended for some special agency for giving moral and religious instruction to his countrymen. He therefore suggested the establishment of religious meetings for the purpose of teaching the monotheistic tenets of the Vedas and undermining the idolatrous creed of the masses. Both these schemes were carried into effect

The *Mahabidyalya*, or great seat of learning as the Hindu College was originally called, was inaugurated in 1816. Fostered by the Government it became a mighty instrument for improving and elevating the Hindus. The first batch of students it produced proved a band of energetic youthful reformers. They had read and reflected, acquired knowledge, accumulated and compared facts, and practised generalization. They had risen above the prejudices of the nursery. They had imbibed new ideas. The truths of history and geography had taught them the falsity of the faith in which they had been brought up. They therefore rose to summon Hinduism at the bar of reason. They knew and felt that what was morally wrong could not be

theologically right. The foundations of the fabric thus opened and examined, and its outworks thus sapped, it seemed to be tottering to its fall.

Such was the state of things in 1830 when Rammohun Roy established the Brahmo Sabha. Gifted with rare powers of application and generalization, and animated by a sincere desire to know and proclaim the truth, he had studied the Bible, the Koran, and the Vedas. He had arrived at the conclusion that the Vedas inculcated pure monotheism, and that the idolatry practised by his countrymen was a corruption of the ancient faith. He had publicly renounced that idolatry, and declared his mission to destroy it and to resuscitate the primitive and rational religion of the Vedas. This story was carried to the Boitukhanas of the Baboos and the shops of the moodies, and it was soon known to people in the mofussil. Hindu Calcutta was in a ferment. Each orthodox Hindu who heard of the apostacy of Rammohun Roy, trembled at the thought of the imminent danger it threatened to his religion. His following had been at first very small. But he had persevered with characteristic zeal and single-heartedness. He had translated several of the Upanishads into elegant Bengalee. He had published a Bengala pamphlet in the same language against Hindu idolatry in the name of one of his followers. He had held discussions on religious subjects with erudite Pandits. He had converted to his faith Mr. William Adams and a few other European and Native friends. These friends used to meet at first at the Library of the *Bengal Hurkaru* Press on Sundays, when Mr. Adams officiated as minister. But Rammohun Roy now thought that the time was come for establishing a society or association as a present rallying point for his fellow-religionists, and a nucleus of a future grand national church. The Brahmo Somaj was intended by its founder to be a place of meeting open to men of all castes and persuasions. Its object is declared in unmistakable language in the Trust Deed of the premises in which it was inaugurated, as the following extract from that document will show :—

“ The said message or building, land, tenements, hereditaments, and premises with their appurtenances to be used, occupied, enjoyed, applied, and appropriated as and for a place of public meeting of all sects and descriptions of people without distinction as shall behave and conduct themselves in an orderly sober, religious, and devout manner for the worship and adoration of the eternal, unsearchable, and immutable Being, who is the Author and Preserver of the universe, but not under or by any other name, designation, or title peculiarly used for and

“ applied to any particular being or beings by any man or set of men whatsoever, and that no graven image, statue, or sculpture, carving, painting, picture, portrait, or the likeness of any thing, shall be admitted within the said messuage, building, land, tenements, hereditaments, and premises, * * that in conducting the said worship and adoration no object, animate or inanimate, that has been, or is, or shall hereafter become or be recognised as an object of worship by any man or set of men, shall be reviled or slightingly or contemptuously spoken of, or alluded to, either in preaching, praying, or in the hymns or other mode of worship that may be delivered or used in the said messuage or building, and that no sermon, preaching, discourse, prayer, or hymn be delivered, made, or used in such worship, but such as have a tendency to the promotion of charity, morality, piety, benevolence, virtue, and the strengthening the bonds of union between men of all religious persuasions and creeds.”

The Brahmo Somaj, like Hinduism itself, has undergone changes. Its history may be divided into two distinct periods. During the first the Vedas constituted the basis of its faith. They were regarded as the revelation—the divine and infallible guide in matters of religion. The monotheistic doctrines inculcated in the Upanishads and the Vedant were the fountain head of Brahmoism. They were expounded every Wednesday evening in the hall of the Sobha. Treatises illustrating them in the popular vernacular were written and circulated.

A year after the establishment of the Sobha, its founder departed for England, where he died in the following year. After the death of Rammohun Roy, the proceedings of the Sobha were conducted for eight years according to the forms laid down by him by Ramchunder Vidyabagish. During this period however, the Sobha languished, because the noble zeal which Rammohun Roy had brought to bear on it was wanting. Ramchunder Vidyabagish was a very respectable and erudite Pandit. His scholastic attainments were indeed of a high order. His translations of the Upanishads are models of classical Bengalee, but he was not original, and drew his inspiration from Rammohun Roy, whose intellect and breadth of view he lacked.

In 1839 the cause of the Brahmos acquired fresh impulse from the adhesion of Baboo Debendronauth Tagore. Though cradled in luxury and destined by his father to occupy a high position both as a zemindar and a merchant, he felt that there was that in man which the things of this world could not altogether satisfy, which longed after eternity and after Him who was the author of time and eternity. He accordingly

resolved to follow in the footsteps of Rammohun Roy. On the 6th October 1839, the Tutwabodhiny Sobha was established in the house of Baboo Dwarkanauth Tagore "by a select body "of ten friends," of whom Baboo Debendronauth was the animating spirit. The avowed object of the Sobha was "to sustain the "labours of the late Raja Rammohun Roy by introducing gradually among the natives that monotheistical system of divine "worship which is to be found inculcated in their original sacred "writings in contradistinction to the multifarious preversions "which they have undergone in course of time." The means employed for attaining this object was the establishment of a Press and Periodical as well as of Schools and Patshallas. The Tutwabodhiny Sobha sent four Pandits to Benares, to be indoctrinated in the Vedas, and thereby enabled to expound them to the Brahmos. The *Patrica* was not set on foot till 1843. As the acknowledged organ of the Sobha the *Tutwabodhiny Patrica* came out month after month with elaborate expositions of the creed of the Brahmos, and also vindicated it from the attacks of missionaries. These expository and vindicatory articles were written in elegant Bengalee, and both the manner and matter of the editor, Baboo Ukhoycoomar Dutt, attracted great attention and ensured for the periodical a wide circulation. Whatever may be the difference of opinion in regard to the *Tutwabodhiny Patrica* as a theological organ, there can be none as to the valuable services rendered by it to vernacular literature. It has contributed, in no inconsiderable degree, to the improvement of the Bengalee language. It has fashioned and moulded it, and adapted it as a medium for the expression of noble and elevated ideas. Both in the columns of the *Patrica* and at the meetings of the Brahmos the doctrines preached were those of the Vedas. As late as 1845 the *Patrica* declared that "the Vedas were the sole foundation of their belief," and that the truths of all other Shasters must be judged of according to their agreement with them. In the following year Baboo Dabendronath Tagore, as president of the Tutwabodhiny Sobha, thus wrote to the *Englishman*: "We consider the Vedas and the Vedas alone as the standard of our faith."

Here ends the first period of the history of the Brahmo movement. Before proceeding with the second, we desire to make a few remarks in explanation of its Vedantic character and tendency, but we would have it distinctly understood, that in what we now say we are not the apologists but the exponents of the Brahmos.

Whether Rammohun Roy believed in the Vedas as revelation is very doubtful. We are inclined to think he was an

'eclectic philosopher and a theo-philanthropist. He believed in a Great and Living God and in His power, wisdom, and goodness, and what he believed he found, or thought he found, in the Vedas. He endeavoured to engraft on them a kind of universal unitarianism. He laboured to destroy the idolatry of the Poorans and to revive the monotheistic doctrines of the Vedas.

The followers of Rammohun Roy, comprising the members of the Brahmo and Tutwabodhiny Sobhas, have been reproached with Pantheism and Atheism. They have been denounced as disbelievers in a personal God. Those who prefer this charge declare that the Vedas confound the Creator with the creation, and that the Brahmos by believing according to their so-called scriptures that the universe is of the same substance with God, and the soul is identical with the Supreme Being, evidently exalt the world, and grossly degrade and absolutely sink the divinity in it. But we maintain the contrary. Though fully aware of the weak points of the Vedas and Upanishads, yet we are convinced the system inculcated in them is neither Pantheism nor Materialism. It neither degrades God nor elevates the Universe. Stripped of cosmogonic purilities which do not affect its fundamental doctrines, it teaches not that there is no personal God, but that the human mind however cultivated is incapable of understanding Him and realising His attributes.

Vedantism does not oppose the Creator to the creation, but makes him the unity, the only substance. Spinozism, which closely resembles Vedantism, has been subjected to a similar charge, and what the author and vindicator of it say, is applicable to our point. "Our happiness and freedom consist in constant and eternal love of God * * * * * the more man comprehends the nature of God and loves God, the less he is under the influence of evil passions, and the less he fears death." Referring to this passage, Hegel in his Philosophy of History observes :—"Spinoza demands to this end that man should acquire the true mode of comprehension; he wants him to view every thing *sub specie æterni*, in absolutely adequate notions, *viz.*, in God. Thus Spinozism is "Akosmism. There are no morals more elevated than those expounded by Spinoza : for he wants human action to be regulated "merely by divine truth." According to the Vedant "Brahma is "incomprehensible and beyond thought." The Vedas would fain describe the overwhelming greatness and all-pervading goodness of God, but that they oppress and bewilder the human intellect. And is it not really so? Can the finite understand

the infinite? Can the limited faculties of man grasp what is illimitable and inconceivable? The epithets of *Nirakar* or formless, and *Nirgoon* or void of qualities, predicated by the Vedant of the Supreme Being, do not mean that He is a nonentity, but that human speech is utterly inadequate to a conception and expression of the divine nature. He is "pure entity, pure thought, and pure felicity," when defined by a negative. Brahmo is incorporeal, immaterial, invisible, unborn, uncreated, without beginning or end; he is illimitable, inscrutable, inappreciable by the senses, inapprehensible by the understanding, at least until that is freed from the film of mortal blindness; he is devoid of all attributes, or has that only of perfect purity; he is unaffected by emotions; he is perfect tranquillity, and is susceptible therefore of no interest in the acts of man or the administration of the affairs of the universe. That this description of the deity falls short of the reality and conveys only vague, but far from approximate ideas, is repeatedly acknowledged by the Vedant, for its author declares that the knowledge of the Supreme Being is not within the boundary of comprehension, that what and who he is cannot be explained. It is not therefore not the faults of the Brahmos nor of the Vedas that they have not achieved a moral impossibility. The Vedant describes the Supreme Being not only by negatives, but asserts his positive attributes "God is a Spirit," the Supreme Spirit; "he is knowledge; he is purity, he is happiness; he sees all, he hears all, he moves whithersoever he will, he takes whatsoever he will, although he has neither eyes, nor ears, nor feet, nor hands, he is omniscient, omnipresent, almighty; he is the maker of all things, and the director and governor of the world, not, however, in his own person, but through the instrumentality of agents, whom he has created for the purpose." It is therefore manifest that the Brahmos during this phase of their faith believed in a personal God and in his attributes. The grand mistake they made was in setting up the Vedas as revelation. This mistake was, however, confined to their circle. Outside that circle it was recognized as palpable and egregious. In 1843—the same year which witnessed the issue of the *Tutwabadhiny Patrica*—a religious Society—was established on a wider basis. The *Hindu Theophilanthropic Society* was inaugurated on the 10th February 1843, by a few friends assembled for the purpose of considering the best means for promoting the moral and religious elevation of their countrymen. In the preface to the discourses read at the meetings of this Society, its object is thus enunciated; "The Society aims at the extermination of Hindu idolatry, and the dissemination of sound and enlightened views of

"the Supreme Being—of the unseen and future world—of truth, of happiness, and final beatitude. It proposes to teach the Hindus to worship God in *spirit* and in truth, and to enforce those moral and most sacred duties which they owe to their Maker, to their fellow-beings, and to themselves." The Society held monthly meetings, at which discourses in English and Bengalee were delivered. The subjects embraced by the discourses related to the nature and attributes of the deity and to general principles in morals and religion. The other means adopted by the Society for the attainment of its object, were the preparation and publication of Bengalee tracts on moral and religious subjects, and the reprinting of Sanscrit and Bengalee works illustrating the same. The monthly meetings were attended and addressed by earnest and representative men of different classes, such as Dr. Duff, the Rev. K. M. Banerjee, Baboo Ukhoycoomar Dutt, Baboo Ramgopaul Ghose, Baboo Peary Chund Mitter, and the late Baboo Isser Chunder Goopto. The nature and aims of the institution are thus explained at length in the inaugural discourse of the Founder; "The Society aims at the extermination of Hindu idolatry and the dissemination of sound and elevated views of God, Futurity, Truth, and Happiness. Though it is established for the purpose of promoting moral and religious culture irrespective of any revealed form, and only by the study of the duties and destinies of man as *revealed* by his constitution and of the power, wisdom, and goodness of God as manifested in nature, still its basis is broad and unexceptionable enough to admit the cordial co-operation of every good man, no matter to what creed he may belong. The pious and benevolent of every religion cannot but be deeply interested in its success. At present its members act according to the light which they possess. If new light breaks in upon them, they must of course be prepared to follow it.

"The existence of God is the first dogma of the Hindu Theophilanthropist, and the immortality of the soul is the second. The dogmas of the Hindu Theophilanthropist are those upon which all sects, Christian, Hindu, Mahomedan, Chinese, are agreed, and the name they have taken expresses the double end of all religionists, that of leading, namely, to love towards God and men.

We return to the Brahmo Sabha, which has now arrived at the second period of its history. We have before had occasion to mention of four Pandits being sent to Benares by the *Tutwabadhiny Sabha*, to be thoroughly initiated, in the doctrines of the Vedas, in order that they might disseminate them here. The

Pandits most conscientiously fulfilled the first part of their mission. They ransacked the Vedic manuscripts and held discussions with the Vedantists of Benares. The result of these investigations as might reasonably be expected was fatal to the divine origin of the Vedas. They were followed by fresh investigations by Baboo Debendronath Tagore which led to the same result. The conclusion at which the President of the *Sobha* arrived, after this honest and searching enquiry into the infallibility of the Vedas was, that they were not what they professed to be, and should be renounced as an unerring guide in religious matters. The Brahmos accepted this conclusion and rested their faith on the truths of Natural Religion. Hear how this part of their history is told by their chief preacher, Baboo Kesub Chunder Sen :—

“The return of the Pandits and his, (Debendronath Tagore’s) subsequent investigations with their aid, quite convinced him “ of the errors of the Vedic system. There was a terrible “ strife—the strife of conscience against associations of mind “ and place ; duty against prepossessions ; truth against cherished convictions. But conscience triumphed over all ; the “ Veds were thrown overboard by Baboo Debendronath Tagore ; “ and the Brahmo Somaj bade farewell to Vedantism. Gentle- “ men, would you call this fluctuation ? or would you not “ rather say, that this indeed is a triumph of conscience, “ and conscience alone—a victory over error and darkness “ effected by candid inquiry and a love of truth. Would “ you tauntingly speak of it as the waverings of an *un- “ principled* man ? Would you point at it the finger of ridicule ? “ Would you not rather admire the honesty and sincerity of “ the Somaj for *conscientiously* changing its opinion ? What “ is there to laugh at in this plain truth : the Brahmos at one “ time believed in the Vedas as their infallible, unerring guide in “ religious matters, and now, having found out their mistake, “ believe in nothing but the truths of Natural Religion ? Gentle- “ men, I would have satisfied myself with a few passing remarks “ only on this untenable charge of fluctuation did I not think it “ proper to lay bare what the Lecturer would fain wish were per- “ mitted to lie underneath the surface ;—I mean the motive which “ brought about the change in the basis of the creed of the Somaj, “ and the progressive character of that change. Gentlemen, I have “ shown clearly, I hope, that, it was conscience that sent the “ Brahmo Somaj one further step up the hill of progress. Ve- “ dantic Brahmoism was a conscientious renunciation of Pu- “ ranic idolatry, and intuitional Brahmoism, a conscientious “ overthrow of the infallible authority of the Vedas. In the

“ history of the Brahmo Somaj you thus behold Progress and Principle. You will also admit, I hope, from what I have said in regard to the circumstances which brought about the fall of Vedantism, that this change was due more to the closer study of the Veds themselves by Baboo Debendronath Tagore than to the influences of the anti-Christian works of occidental Deists, as has been said ; for though the Veds were no longer regarded as the basis of Brahmoism, and their errors and absurdities were abjured, the good things in the superstructure were retained and continue to this day : and the *Brahma Dharma* book of the present day, contains the truth of the Vedanta “ with natural reason for their basis.”

In regard to the philosophy of intuition, the present basis of the Brahmo faith, Baboo Kessub Chunder Sen thus expounds the views of his co-religionists :—

“ This much I desire to assert, that in some form, under some name, and to some extent, intuition has been admitted to be a fact of consciousness by almost all distinguished thinkers. Different names have been given to it, such as spontaneous reason, practical reason, *a priori* cognitions, common sense, first truths, corresponding with the particular characteristics of intuition specially recognised by the philosophers who gave those names, such as spontaneity, catholicity, originality. &c. But such differences of opinion in regard to name are immaterial so long as the existence of intuition is admitted. Nor would it at all affect the argument to say, that those whose testimonies we cite were Christians, and cannot be supposed to have said anything in support of our religion. Again: The doctrine of common sense is therefore not only the true philosophy but catholic philosophy ; it is not the doctrine of a peculiar sect but the unity of philosophic truths, a code of universal beliefs supported by the testimony of consciousness, * * *. To say that our Church rests upon intuition is to say that it rests upon an immoveable rock which the wind of opinion cannot check, the blast of controversy cannot demolish.”

We do not deprecate this organic change in the faith of the Brahmos as an irrational fluctuation, but hail it as an auspicious omen of good things to come. We admire the honesty and sincerity of the Sobha “ for conscientiously changing its opinion.” Who shall blame the Brahmos for acting according to the light which they possess? If new light breaks in upon them, they would we believe be prepared to follow it.

The transition from Vedantism to natural religion took place, in 1850, and gave new life to the Tutwabodhiny Sobha, articles of faith being drawn up, and persons subscribing to them enrolled

among Brahmos. From this period date the organisation of the Brahmo community and their efforts to consummate the social reformation of their country.

In 1860 the Tutwabodhiny Sobha was amalgamated with the Brahmo Sabha. By this arrangement the reformatory efforts of the two cognate bodies were concentrated and utilized. The Somaj since this amalgamation has made considerable progress. A new Brahmo School has been established. The system of delivering lectures in English has been inaugurated. Reformed ceremonies on marriage and other important events of social and domestic life have been enjoined. Branch Somajes have been established in several parts of Bengal, in Allahabad, Lahore, Bareilly, Lucknow, and Madras. Their number at present is upwards of forty. The aggregate number of members on the roll of the parent and the branch Somajes, is nearly two thousand. The funds of the body are in a healthy condition. The receipts amounted last year to Rupees 9,208, and the disbursements to Rs. 8,900.

It is not our province to discuss the truth or falsity of the doctrines held by the Brahmos. It is only necessary to indicate them. Brahmos recognise no special or book revelation. They hold a record of religious truth revealed by God to man to be a moral impossibility. They fall back for such truth on the book of nature. They believe that the evidence of the existence and attributes of the Deity are written in the material as well as the moral world, and in characters as legible as those of a native tongue. They regard the intuitions of the human mind as the special source of religious knowledge.

Religion is certainly coeval with the human race, and emanates from an eternal and deep-seated principal in us. It is a necessity of human nature, and not the result of an abnormal condition of life. Impressed deeply with the sense of the power and wisdom and goodness of God, the Brahmos believe that human beings are among the instruments with which He operates to work out ends befitting his nature. They deny Original Sin or Depravity, Redemption, Resurrection, and Incarnation. Though they recognise no inspired mediator or saviour, yet they believe that whenever a person with such claims has appeared, his inspiration has been the result of the beneficent impulse communicated by the Great Beneficence in proportion as the lessons He has inculcated have been wise and effective. The holders of Brahmoism believe that the great business of their faith is to rest on the greatness and goodness of God. They also believe that the great First Cause of the universe is a wholly good, just, and beneficent Being, free and

distinct from his works. They believe him to be altogether beautiful, and altogether great, and altogether good. They do not think it possible for finite creatures to form an adequate conception of the infinite, but "inasmuch as they are his handiwork and made after his image, they may feel conscious of him in their hearts in the direction at which his infinitude borders on humanity." The doctrines thus evolved from a careful observation of eternal and internal nature constitute a pure and elevated creed according to which the Brahmos believe God "is our Creator and only Dispenser of salvation." "It is from Him and Him alone we hope to receive the spiritual blessings we stand in need of. To him who is the God of love, of truth, of salvation, Brahmoism teaches us to pray humbly and earnestly." Prayer is emphatically characterized as the very pedestal on which Brahmoism rests. It "is a Brahmo's only hope; his only guide in the world." To assist the Brahmos in this duty, "the Theist's prayer book has been recently published containing prayers suited to different times and emergencies."

The Somaj meets every Wednesday evening for public worship, and the congregation assembled at the well-lighted and well-furnished hall on the Upper Chitpore road, must be an interesting spectacle to all who care for the highest welfare of the Hindus. The liturgy is very simple. The ministers seated on a marble dais read the prayers. Discourses on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God are then delivered much in the same spirit as the Bridgewater Treatises and Paley's Natural Theology. They are generally well written and well spoken. They avoid debatable grounds and confine themselves to an exposition of the subjects they embrace. Whenever they refer to Christianity, either allusively or directly, they do so not rudely and flippantly, but courteously and reverentially. The service concludes with the singing of hymns composed chiefly by Rammohun Roy and Debendronath Tagore.

Whether Brahmoism is suited to the mass of the people and affords every motive to faith and practice, may well admit of question, but there can be but one opinion, that it is an immense stride beyond the prevailing Hinduism. We accept it as a great advance on the popular creed. The Brahmo Somaj now numbers many educated and enlightened natives, and has grown into a great power in the Hindu society. Its ranks are recruited by the alumni of our colleges and schools, whose intellectual and moral training has landed them in that position of protest against idolatry, which Brahmoism takes as its foundation.

There are hundreds and even thousands who have ceased to

believe in Shiva and Doorga, Krishna and Radha. In the last Report on Public Instruction, Mr. Woodrow mentions the remarkable fact, "that numerous Hindus feel now so ashamed of the religion of their country, as to adopt in large numbers varying forms of Brahmoism, Vedantism, Theism, Pantheism, &c. One student, by race a Hindu, entered himself as a Universalist." Out of the 1,114 candidates of this year, 104 young Hindus repudiated their ancestral creed, and entered themselves under "one or other of the above phases of faith." This surely is a sign of the times. It disproves the charge preferred against the system of Government education, that it takes no account of the spiritual element in man. We emphatically deny that it is calculated to make only secularists. It has brought to those who have come within the range of its influence, inestimable moral and religious benefits. It has taught them great truths not only respecting men, their histories, their politics, their inventions and their discoveries, but respecting God, His attributes and His moral government. It has revealed to them the laws which the Almighty Mechanician has impressed on the world of mind as well as on the world of matter. Let us not be told that the expansion of the mind and thought which is going on around us is not accompanied by an expansion of the heart—the development of the moral and religious feelings? Nothing can be more unfair than to characterise the Government system of education, as it is characterised by certain parties, as an irreligious or a non-religious system. No system can be such which leads us through nature up to nature's God. The elements of morality and religion may be conveyed independently of any system of dogmatic theology. It is impossible to study the great writers of English without being inoculated with the pure moral precepts and the elevated ideas pervading their pages. These must touch the religious instinct in man and awaken his religious sympathies. But of the hundreds who have embraced Brahmoism, how few have evinced moral courage to exterminate social evils which are eating into the vitals of Native society. True, the Somaj in all its stages has denounced idolatry and caste, but we scarcely expected to find that its members, with few honorable exceptions, are in point of fact wedded to the antiquated customs of their country. It is useless for them to plead that the country is not yet ripe for social reforms; standing as they do on the vantage ground of intellectual superiority, they must be fully aware of the darkness of ignorance and superstition around them, and should undertake the task of pioneers of the national elevation.

The survey that we have taken of Hinduism, though necessarily brief and not traced with chronological precision, will

show that it has not been so immutable as is generally supposed. It does not bear any thing of that unalterable character that is ascribed to it. It has, on the contrary, undergone like other religions great and organic changes, until it presents an aspect radically different from what it originally wore. These changes have been exhibited in the rise and progress of the several sects of which we have endeavoured to give a sketch. Of the primitive system of Vedic faith as embodied in the Rig-Veda, no other trace remains than the *Homayoga* and the purificatory ceremonies performed at the birth, marriage, and cremation. We have seen how prayer and invocation to the elements gave place to the philosophical appreciation of the divine nature. We have also seen how latitude of speculation was checked by *Bhakti*, and how the latter degenerated into a demoralizing worship. We have seen in short how the philosophical labours of the Hindus successively resulted in mysticism and idealism, and scepticism and sensualism, the sole actors, as justly observed by M. Cousin, in that intellectual arena where in all ages and amongst all nations they are in turn in the position of combatants and of sovereigns. But amidst all these mutations several influential sects, both in ancient and modern times, have inculcated pure theism, rising above the atmosphere of bigotry and superstition, and developing new lines of thought. Vyas and Sunkeracharjea, Ramanundo and Kubir, have stood forth in advance of their age, and have left on it a mark which is ineffaceable. The impress they imparted on their times has endured for centuries. The impetus which Rammohun Roy has recently given to the national mind is bearing it onward. Let us devoutly trust that with the spread of education, the spirit of enquiry into religious truth will become more universal and ere long better directed. When we consider what was the state of the Hindu mind a few years ago, and contrast it with what we now see, when we remember the once dead level of ignorance and its first breaking up—how the entire national mind was dwarfed by superstition and fettered by prejudices—how it has since begun to throw off those fetters—has risen above Brahminical domination and asserted its independence—we do not despair of the cause of moral and religious reform, but feel there is ample grounds for thankfulness to the Almighty Dispenser of events.

JOUNPORE.

1. *Jounporendmah*, by FUQUEER KHAIROODDEEN MAHOMED ; Allahabadi ; Persian M.S.

2. *Ferishta's History of Kings of Jounpore*, translated by BRIGGS.

WERE a new arrival in India plunged into a Mofussil station without a preliminary stewing to indifference in Calcutta, he would wonder much to see how everybody "doesn't know." Fresh from a country where every hamlet has its topographical history, and every church its guide-book, where the difficulty is not how to get some local guidance so much as how to avoid being nauseated with it, he cannot quite make out how his cousin—a boyish antiquarian who was great on lychnoscopes and hunted long and short work by scent—should care nothing for the date or the builder of the noble mosque, sole ornament of the evil-smelling town, or the tombs or ruined palace which break the drear level of the neighbouring plain. Yet if his lot be cast in one of the few stations distinguished by having a history, he is not much better off. Still everybody "doesn't know," but has heard that all events connected with the place are recorded in some manuscript nobody has ever seen. The sporting ground and the doings of the penultimate magistrate are subjects on which all are eloquent ; the local history is a sealed book if a man be not content with the vaguenesses of the half educated court moonshees. Patient enquiry discovers the owner of the wished-for volume, and though he makes no difficulty in lending it, the cup of knowledge is still hard to drain ; it is a cento of Persian historians aggregated without criticism, on a plan which by incessant repetition wearies our student, till he throws the study by in despair, or translates, collates, digests, and rearranges, till he looks proudly on what may lead another to build on his foundation, a real history of the favoured city.

Such is the service we would now do to Jounpore, a city interesting from its noble remains, fortunate in being unblest with a mythical antiquity, and in having been already favoured with a native historian. Khairooddeen Mahomed was descended from a family which had migrated from Allahabad to Benares. Having been appointed the second chief magistrate of Benares, he became known to Mr. Welland, and, having at his instigation written the *Bulwuntnameh*, accompanied him, just appointed to the new magistracy of Jounpore, to his new station. Whether our chronicler was indebted for his education to the schools of

Jounpore is not clear, but as soon as his patron's intelligent curiosity led to enquiries touching the noble remains of his new charge, Fuqueer Mahommed volunteered such an account as should set curiosity at rest. The fruit of his labour was the work which forms the backbone—so to say—of the present article.

Although more than one edition of his chronicle exist, they are alike in a point of contrast with other native books,—the absence of all parade of learning. Indeed, it is not easy to guess the authors on whom he probably depends. He names but two works, Miratool Asrar and Towareekh Moomyimi, and those in a way suggesting that their use was exceptional; he was apparently without access to Ferishtah, as several facts mentioned even in that early edition which Colonel Briggs translated are not found in our chronicle; while on the other hand, so many particulars are given of the foundation of the different buildings, and of their history down to the middle of the sixteenth century, that one cannot but suspect him to have had at hand a guide book of some antiquity. In the following pages, however, we have preferred building our history on Ferishta, partly as accessible, through the labour of Colonel Briggs,* to the ordinary reader, and partly because his acknowledged authority may make the tale more acceptable.

Enough has been said as preface. Nor shall we loiter long over the pre-historic ages. Though consideration of the legends, and the present distribution of clans might give matter for a theory as to the importance and direction, of each wave of the conquest which by degrees swept the aborigines from the land, yet it would be but a theory, and the so long desired work of Sir Henry Elliott, which is now said to be passing through the press, makes such an attempt a folly. Thus much, however, may be written boldly, that in the earliest times the region of Jounpore was held by the Bhurs, that aboriginal people of whose civilization we catch glimpses by no means suiting our idea of them as derived from the sight of their outcast descendants. Yet what trace they have left of their long occupation it is hard to say. Along Burna bank are the sites of large cities, destroyed by fire, perhaps when Brahminism won its final victories; on Goomti bank stood vast temples which perished in the first inroad of the Mussulman; but what founders, and what antiquity these cities and temples boasted, none can now say.

Yet a local legend gives a hint of one stage of the great conflict, when the aborigines were falling, yet not wholly subdued.

* It will be convenient in a note at this point to explain somewhat more fully the shape in which our chief authority, the Jounporenamah, is found.

"When the great Ramchunder ruled in Ajooddhia, there dwelt in the nook of Goomti where now Jounpore stands, the giant demon Kerar. * And, whereas the highways were unsafe by reason of his violence, Ramchunder in person marched against him, and having vanquished him in single combat, left the giant's trunk lying as a memorial and a warning, but flung his limbs and head to the corners of heaven. Yet over the trunk the demon's followers built a temple, there paying divine honours to their lost lord." Thus the legend; but we, translating it, suspect the truth to be that in some battle here, the Bhur hero fell before the might of the invader, and the honour his sorrowing clansmen paid to his remains in time so impressed his enemies, that they, giving a different reason, in time paid the same worship.

According to the original plan this work was to have been in four parts, the first being a history of the rulers of Jounpore, and the second of the buildings, while the third was to give the names, areas, and population of the Mobullas, with the names of their founders, and the fourth was merely to be a distance table. With this fourth part we have never met; the third is not part of that early edition which seems really to have been presented to Mr. Welland, and is of no value; it may, however, be noted therefrom that the chronicler calculates the population of the city by allowing five head to each house. Of the remaining two parts are two editions, the earlier that presented to Mr. Welland, containing certain particulars about works near the town and certain proposals touching the restoration of existing remains which are wanting in the later; and the later, to which only the contributor to Thornton's Gazetteer seems to have had access. To copy of the latter which we have used is appended a kind of notebook of information which doubtless would have been absorbed in a later edition; several authors are quoted as well as some facts which the chronicler might have learnt from eye-witnesses. The Bulwuntnameh should have told much of the state of Jounpore in the latter half of last century; it is little more fertile than the early Regulations.

* Feroz found here a temple dedicated to Kerarbeer within the lands of Mouzah Kerara. The Hindoos named the new fort Kerarkot, and the ground adjoining to the north is still known as Mohulla Kerara. An equally probable interpretation of the myth is that Kerar names, not a single hero, but a clan of Bhurs. Elliott names Kerar as a still existing Bhur state. Kerakut, the eastern pergunnah of Jounpore, may be by some thought to derive its name (*quasi* Kerarkot) from the same clan. Still under the southern wall of the fort is the shrine of Kerarbeer, partly covered by the stones of the fallen wall, but still the scene of worship whose offerings are supposed to be some Rs. 20 or Rs. 25 a month, a sum probably doubled for a few days after the failure of the first mine which was to blow up that corner of the fort, for, somewhat to the annoyance of the engineer, the natives said that Kerar was stronger than the English powder. The object worshipped is a large stone bearing a rude resemblance to the upper part of a human trunk, smeared thickly with turmeric and the like, so that it is impossible to say what kind of stone it may be.

Then for ages we have not even the light of a myth. Mr. Ommaney, indeed, found in Bundelcund an inscription which spoke of a Yavanapura on the Goomti, and this he identified with Jounpore. In this he was certainly wrong, for there can have been no town of any size here when Salar Masaud Ghazi destroyed the temples of that ancient town to which, three centuries later, was given the new name of Zuffrabad ; but as the ancient name of the (Ratagurh) fort only of that city has been preserved, the inscription may refer to it. Buddhism seems to have been strong here, for the temples remaining even to the Mussulman period were undoubtedly Buddhist, and of sufficient magnificence not only to furnish materials for the conquerors' mosques, but supply models even for the details of their decoration. For miles in the southern corner of the district, between the brooks Bussohie and Burna, are found the sites of cities destroyed by fire, of whose former grandeur the peasant will tell, though now but scant traces, yet those Buddhists are left of them. But as the dawn of our present history draws on, we find the country subject to the princes of Benares, as in mythic times it seems to have been to those of Ajooddhia ; and with Benares it fell finally under the sceptre of the Mussulman when Shahabuddin defeated Jyechundra. Not that Shahabuddin was probably the first general of his faith who had triumphed so far to the eastward. Of the terrible Mahmud, indeed, no march farther east than Kalinjer is recorded, and we may be sure that, had he taken Benares, history would not have been silent, and Shahabuddin's 4,000 camel loads of spoil would have graced an earlier triumph. But the fame of such a city cannot but have reached the great iconoclast's ears, and nothing is more probable than that he would send forth such a force as he could spare to lay waste the lands of the idolaters. Therefore we yield ready credence to the tale of those historians whom our chronicle follows, and say that Salar Masaud Ghazi, sister's son to Mahmood, starting from Kunouj, overran much of the country north of Ganges, carrying his ravages to the gates of Benares, and destroying the temples of Zuffrabad, before meeting his death, in the prime of youth, in battle with the infidel at Behraich.

But we are travelling beyond the record. Salar Masaud Ghazi is a personage little more historical than Ramchunder himself, and the temples of Zuffrabad may have been among the thousand Shahabuddin boasted he had overthrown. But whatever the date of their overthrow, that probably is the date of the first foundation of Jounpore. The prince who dwelt in Ratagurh, sickened with the desolation round his walls, built

for himself a palace and temples a few miles to the west, on a spot somewhat more secluded, on the north bank of Goomti and near the old temple of Kerarbeer. In the two centuries and a half which elapsed between the conquest by Shahabuddin and the accession of Feroz Shah, many fine buildings had risen in the new city, untroubled by wars, or by the Mussulman occupants of the mother city, which by degrees was passing wholly into the hands of the invaders. In the reign of Alauddin, about the beginning of the fourteenth century of our era, and the seventh of the Mussulman, one Sheikh Booddhun converted * into a mosque, still standing, the only temple former ravagers had spared; and, but few years later here died, and here was buried the local "Light of Hindostan," whose still extant tomb was built by Zufur Khan, the new founder of Zuffrabad, and apparently the first Governor of Jounpore.

As there was frequent intercourse between the Delhi court and the semi-independent princes of Lukhnowty, and as the main road, crossing the Ganges at some ford not far west of the present city of Furruckabad, ran through Zuffrabad and Benares, many armed and many peaceful parties of Mussulmans had visited the place between the plundering foray of Shahabuddin, and that long halt of Feroz in which was founded the present city of Joun-

* As Fergusson seems convinced that nowhere have the Mussulmans appropriated a Buddhist building without reconstruction, it seems somewhat bold to assert that a building which he possibly visited is an exception. But, when treating of the Atala Musjid, he gives, as the sole reason for his thinking that reconstructed, that certain conspicuous parts are undoubtedly Saracemi. But at Zuffrabad there are no such parts. The roof is flat, and the interior is a hall eighteen feet high, nine bays deep (from east to west), and seven broad (from north to south). The outer ranges of columns are double, and plain walls close the spaces between the outmost. The square pillars are somewhat irregularly placed towards the western sides; the aisle running from the door to qibleh is eight feet six inches broad, the others six feet six inches; the greater breadth of this centre aisle is the only thing about the place suggestive of Mussulman interference in its construction for the arch which once finished the front may have been, and probably was, added even after the Jounpore mosques were built. The real date of Sheikh Boddhun's interference cannot be told with accuracy; the stone on which his dedication was carved fell from the front and is lost, but the inscription is said to have given a verse from which certain words were picked to give the date A. H. 651, but Alauddin Khilji, is said to have been named as the then ruler, and his accession dates half a century later; Syhruff Jehangir, a foreign saint who died here in the autumn of 1397, had lodged in this mosque. The Zufur Khan mentioned below was probably Zufur Khan Farsy, who, coming from Sonargam in Bengal two years before that inroad in which Jounpore was founded, was made Naib Wuzeer, and twenty years later Wuzeer; he betrayed his master and disappears suddenly. But Ferishta names several others and gets confused among them.

pore. Indeed, that was, perhaps, not a first visit even to Feroz, for when in 1355 he marched against Haji Elias of Lukhnowty, who had extended his kingdom westward even to the gates of Benares : he probably passed through Zuffrabad, at least on his homeward march. But when (*A. D. 1359) he was moving against the successor of his old rival, he was overtaken by the rains in Zuffrabad, and there halted till autumn. Something is recorded of the business which occupied the king at this place. First, he despatched an embassy to the prince against whom he was marching, but, though the envoy sent, in return brought rich presents, among which are mentioned five elephants, an offering which the custom of those and later times seems to have considered a confession of inferiority, the weather only delayed the king's march. Next, he received a second embassy from the Khalif of Egypt ; the ambassador chosen was a strange one, for he was an old rival, and his banishment was almost the first act of Feroz, when he felt himself firmly seated on the throne ; the former offences, however, of the subject were cloaked by the dignity of the ambassador, and Sheikzada Bostanny was graciously received and honoured with the title of Azimoolmoolk. Further in the camp was prince Futteh Khan, then a child of seven, that eldest and best beloved son, whose death fifteen years later plunged Feroz into such uncontrollable grief, and the empire into so severe troubles. At this time the father was thinking much of his son's training, and though, in the next season's march, his fondness conferred on the child the ensigns of royalty, his care at the same time appointed proper tutors for his education.

The idea of founding a city in the neighbourhood, which might form a proper basis of operation for future campaigns, was probably conceived at this time ; for though his march wa

* Though there can be no real doubt as to the chronology, it is not wholly undisputed. The chronicle first speaks vaguely, but as assuming the place to have been founded by Feroz about A. H. 760 (A. D. 1359) ; in another place he gives the date plainly as A. H. 772, but says it is recorded by *Abjad* in the words Shuhur Jounpore, which give the year 770. Ferishta speaks of the halt at Zuffrabad on the eastward march in 760, and at "Zuffrabad and Jounpore" on the return in 761 ; the "Jehanara" says that Feroz founded the city on his eastward march, the chronicler and Tareekh Mahommedi (the latter giving the date A. H. 775) on his return. But for this direct assertion one would have inclined to give the work to the eastward march ; the "Fehanara," says the king, had marched by Beraich, perhaps confusing his two attacks on Bengal, for in the former he received the homage of the Zemindars of Gorukpore. Jyechund seems to have been dispossessed of Ratagurh in 1359, so the claims of the two years 1359 and 1360 are pretty equally balanced. The plan may have been adopted in the former, and carried out in the latter.

almost unopposed, and Sikundur Shah lost no time in making terms, Feroz, marching back to Zuffrábad, deliberately halted for another season. Leaving the widespread ruins of the old city, he found at a little distance to the west, but on the other bank of the Goomti, a thriving town built by those who had left their ancient homes, and brought their gods to a more sheltered spot. This city he determined to enlarge and name after himself, and though some dream, it is said, made his predecessor Mullik Jooná, who had reigned as Mahomed Toghluk, the epodnymic hero of Jounpore, Feroz did not change his other plans of giving to the new city all that could make it pleasant or famous.

One morning, then, in April 1360, Feroz rode over from Zuffrabad, attended perhaps by Jyechund, a Rajpoot prince, who seems to have been at that time dispossessed of Ratagurh, the fort of Zuffrabad, and compelled to take up his residence in his father's palace in Jounpore. At the end of his journey he found a thriving town, extending for some miles along the northern bank of the Goomti, and boasting four large temples, two at least conspicuous both for size and costliness, a palace, and a tank of cut stone, the main body of which was a quarter of a milesquare. The two chief temples first attracted the king's notice, but, though the people looked on and worked patiently while he threw down the temple of Kerarbeer, cast up a mound on its site, and built on it, and round it, a fort with stones fetched from the ruined temples of Zuffrabad, an attempt to desecrate the temple of Atal Devi met with so fierce a resistance that, after much bloodshed, Feroz was compelled to make a compromise, and gave a written undertaking that the other temples should be left untouched and Hindoo worship tolerated, stipulating only, that the temple of Atal Devi be left unrestored, and, perhaps, unused. The return of the cold season brought other labours to Feroz, and appointing Zufur Khan to the charge of the frontier provinces, he left the city of Jounpore for the first and last time. Still, we are told he bore his child in fond remembrance, and took care to settle here men both of learning and wealth. But few particulars can be recorded; Zufur Khan is remembered solely as having, in this very year, built the tomb of the local saint, a plain Pathan tomb, with squat pillars supporting a square dome; and is we add that, when in 1376, Governors were appointed to divers provinces, "Jounpore and Zuffrabad" fell to Mullik Behroz, we have told all that concerns Jounpore before. On 23rd October 1388, died Foroz, her founder, a prince who, with Shere Shah, her most famous *alumnus*, contests with Akber, the founder of the city, whose

growth was her destruction, the glory of being the greatest prince on the roll of Indian kings.

The short and troubled reigns which fill the space between the death of Feroz and the accession of Muhmood Toghluk on the 5th April 1394, contain nothing to interest the historian of Jounpore, but the tale of the gradual rise of Khwaja Jehan, the first independent prince of Jounpore. This noble, by name Mullik Surwur, was an eunuch, given by Salar Rujub to his grandson Mahomed; in the household of this prince he rose to be Khwaja Sara (chief eunuch), and comptroller of the elephant stables, and following his master's fortunes through all his troubles, was, on his temporary success in A. D. 1389, rewarded with the title of Khwaja Jehan and the office of Wuzeer. The ability of a rival, in the following year, having given Mahomed a stronger hold on the throne, the prince rewarded his new supporter with Khwaja Jehan's office; but on the fall of the new wuzeer in the course of the next year, Khwaja Jehan, on whose head his rival's blood is thought to rest, regained his office, and retained it till, in March 1394, he was sent by Muhmood Toghluk, with the title of Mullik oos Shirq, to govern the frontier provinces of the East. Years before his notice had been attracted by the childish beauty of Mullik Wasil,* the son of Kerunful, a slave and water-bearer of Feroz; and having adopted and carefully educated the child, he took him, now in the prime of life, with all his brothers, to his new government.

The charge of the Mullik oos Shirq was far more important, as his title was higher, than that of former Governor. Mullik Behroz had "Jounpore and Zuffrabad" with such provinces to the eastward as were held neither by petty chiefs nor the lords of Lukhnawty; to this were added the lower Doab, and the provinces on the left bank of Ganges which, at the earlier appointment, had been assigned to other hands. There was no question of the success of his administration. Forts which had fallen into the hands of the infidel, provinces which had revolted, again owned the supremacy of Delhi; and Khwaja Jehan, amid his peaceful labours in Bijaychund's palace in Jounpore, was perpetually cheered by news of the triumphs of his adopted son,

* Ferishtah and Abulfazl agree that Kerunfool was the name of the child not of his father. There is perhaps no good reason for following the Tareekh-i-Mahomed, as we have done in the text; but the author of the last named work gives details instead of letting the adopted son appear only when the throne was vacant. It is worth while to mention here that, in the very few lines Abulfazl gives to the reign of Ibrahim, he mentions the defeat and punishment of the rebellion of one Kerunfool, possibly the father of Ibrahim, and so nearer of kin to the former prince.

triumphs the fruit of which he fully enjoyed when, Timour having driven the Toghluks from Delhi, he felt able to proclaim his independence, and to reign with undisputed sovereignty over the rich provinces which lie between the Himalayan Terai and the Jumna, from Koel and Rabiri even to Tirhoot and Behar. It cannot, of course, be said that his authority was as powerful in the half conquered Goruckpore or the distant Tirhoot as at his palace gates in Jounpore; the power of a native prince varies inversely as the distance from which it is exercised, and the Hindoo Rays, who from the huge fort of Etawah, looked down on the ravines of Jumna, may well have been like the Percies of the Scottish marches. Yet when the kings of Lukhnowty, who had faced Feroz, and had exchanged embassies and made treaties with the kings of Delhi, paid the tribute due to Delhi to the new prince at Jounpore, we may be sure that his titles of "Sooltan oos Shirq Atabook Azim" were no empty vaunts, and that his successor found the power he had helped to raise no sceptre of reed. Khwaja Jehan had made his adopted son his deputy with the title of Mullik oos Shirq, and he, again, had given the command of the fort and city to his brother Ibrahim. So, whether or not the heir was present in Jounpore, in the former half of 1400, when Khwaja Jehan died, or was absent on such an expedition as that which, in the spring of 1396, had made the princes of Bengal pay tribute, his interests were well looked after, and his succession was undisputed. But the stupor of exhaustion which had followed Timour's departure from Delhi was by this time passing away, and Mulloo Yekbal Khan, who was ruling in Delhi under cover of Muhmood Toghluks name, felt strong enough to resent the boldness of the new prince in assuming the regal canopy, coining money, and being publicly prayed for as "Mobarik Shah Shurkey." But first, in the winter of 1400-01, Mulloo Yekbal subdued Shumsh Khan of Byana and levied contributions in Kutehir, and afterwards, apparently late in the hot season, marched from Delhi, supported by the forces of Shumsh Khan and Mobarik Mewatty, against Mobarik. At Putiali the allies were vainly opposed by the Ray of Mynpoorie, but Mobarik seems not to have crossed Ganges, and to have borne the loss of Kunouj without resistance. The swollen river was probably the cause of this patience, and the same obstacle kept the two armies facing one another on opposite banks for two months, neither daring, or being able, to force a passage, till want of supplies compelled both to retreat. But Muhmood Toghluks at this time returning from Goozrat, Mulloo Yekbal resolved to try whether the presence of the Emperor would do more than his name, and Mobarik taking up his old

position on the left bank of Ganges, died there in the autumn of the same year, while waiting for his enemies to appear.

The vacant throne was at once filled by Mobarik's younger brother Ibrahim, with the title of Shamsuddin Ibrahim Shah Shurkey, a prince of varied talents, whose long reign is the most glorious in the short annals of Jounpore. As soon as the great news of his brother's death reached him, he hurried to the army on the Ganges, where an event soon occurred which tried all his skill in kingcraft. Muhmood Toghluk had showed no ability in the years before Timour's invasion when he was, at least in name, supreme, and his hurried flight to the court and contemptuous hospitality of the Governor of Goozrat had not raised his reputation. When weary of this retirement, he returned to Delhi, at the invitation, or by the permission, of Yekbal Khan, to be the puppet and pensioner of a man ruling in his name; and when now brought face to face with the army of Jounpore, to try whether the magic of his name and ancestry would shake its allegiance, and make easy his tyrant's victory, he conceived the vain hope that, were he once within the lines of the enemy, the new prince might abdicate in his favour, or, at all events, free him from his bondage to Yekbal. But, though Ibrahim was young both in years and in power, he was far too able to be a pawn in any man's game; and when Muhmood took advantage of a hunting party to escape from Yekbal's hands, he was received with great reserve by the Shurkey prince, being even, according to some writers, denied fire and water. Covered with disgrace he returned to the Delhi army, but was suffered to take possession of Kunouj and administer it himself; the more readily, no doubt, that it was debatable ground, for, even when wresting it from Mobarik, Yekbal had been compelled to leave the government to the person appointed by Mobarik's predecessor. Leaving Muhmood in quiet possession, the two armies moved to their respective head-quarters, and so ended the first war between Delhi and Jounpore.

Yekbal Khan fell, on 18th November 1405, in an attack made in conjunction with Briram Khan, another Governor and quondam slave of Feroz, on Khizr Khan, Timour's deputy in the Punjab; and the officers left in command at Delhi invited Muhmood to return. He went with a small retinue to take possession, but speedily returned to Kunouj. In the autumn of the following year Ibrahim marched to recover the place, and the armies took up their accustomed stations on the opposite banks; but after long halting and slight skirmishing, Ibrahim marched back to Jounpore. The slothful Muhmood, too, presently retired to Delhi, greatly to the disgust of his army which either

deserted him or was disbanded. As soon as this news reached his rival, he again put his army in motion, took Konouj after a siege of four months, and having halted there for the rainy season of 1407, and then being joined by many of Muhmood's nobles, made inroads on the territories of Delhi. Of Birun he made Mullik Meer Zeea Governor, and Tartar Khan of Sumbhul, but when he had already reached the banks of the Jumna and was about to attack Delhi itself, he heard that Mozuffer Shah of Goozrat, having subdued Hoshung Shah of Malwa, was marching to the support of Muhmood, or to attack Jounpore. To secure his capital, therefore, he retreated, and straightway (April 1408) Muhmood captured Birun by assault, killing Ibrahim's Governor, drove Tartar Khan of Sumbhul to Konouj, and appointed Asud Khan Governor of Sumbhul on his own part. Konouj remained the frontier town of Jounpore till the death of Muhmood, in February 1412, ended the line of Feroz.

After the death of Muhmood, Ibrahim conceived the idea of making himself master of Delhi, and made a few marches thitherwards, but speedily returning, enjoyed near fifteen years of unbroken peace. His court was a haven of rest for the many learned men driven from less favoured places by the endless contests of the times, and their fame and the noble buildings which still adorn his capital are the enduring glories of his reign. The mosque, pavilions, and baths of the Fort are memorials of his boyish employment as his brother's deputy, but the great Atala Musjid was finished and dedicated in December 1418, and about the same time, probably, those which his nobles built on the sites of the two other great temples named and spared by Feroz. To this long rest, too, may probably be assigned his plan of building a bridge opposite his palace, an idea which none of his successors worked out, and of a second large mosque the building of which was the glory of Hossein's reign, as its dedication was the consolation of his fall. As famous in their time, though nearly forgotten now, were the doctors of his court, to whom doubtless was chiefly due that fame for learning which Jounpore has hardly yet lost, though, through the decay of native learning and waning prosperity of the town, the twenty partly endowed schools which existed even in Mahomed Shah's reign have few traces left. Foremost among them, and founder of the most famous school, was Cazi Shahabeddin, "one of the most renowned names," says Abul Fazl, "for wisdom and learning." Driven from Delhi, with his master Mollana Khojahgee, by the irruption of Timour, he was honourably received by Ibrahim, who loaded him with honours, and to whom he dedicated several works. A rival of the philosopher was the

saint Budeeooddeen Shahmudar, who died in January or December of 1433 (four years before his successful rival), and was laid in a great tomb built for him by Ibrahim at Mukunpore, his general dwelling-place, between Cawnpore and Furruckabad.

The march of Ibrahim towards Delhi, in the winter of 1413, (A. H. 816) had been provoked by the vain desire of Doulut Khan, who for a time filled the throne of Delhi after Muhmood's death, to compel Ibrahim to raise the siege of Calpi, and the speedy countermarch was probably caused by news that Khizr Khan, with his northern levies, had compelled Doulut Khan, after a siege of three months, to abdicate, and had settled himself quietly in the vacant throne. Although the Syud princes were feudal superiors rather than despots like the Moguls, and levied their revenue rather by forays, and as reliefs, than by organized taxation, their power was steadily growing, and *Ibrahim did not care to force matters to extremity when opposed to Syud Mobarik in 831.

In that year he was marching against Calpi, when suddenly appeared in his camp Mahommed Khan, the rebel prince of Byana, who, leaving his fort with Syud Mobarik's forces before its walls, had hurried to get help from Ibrahim. Aroused by expresses from Kadir Khan the vassal ruler of Calpi, and doubtless also warned of the movements of Mahommed Khan, Syud Mobarik marched in person against Ibrahim. The division which Ibrahim had detached, under his brother Mookhlis Khan, to reduce Etawah, was driven back by a force sent from Atraoli; but when the two armies marched in parallel lines from Atraoli and Boorhanabad, Ibrahim reached the Jumna * at a

* Several points need notice in this narrative. Ferishta, after telling of the points at which the two armies struck the river, says that the Delhi army crossed it, and *then* lay for three weeks before the final battle. After the battle Syud Mobarik marched to Gwalior, and the necessary passage of the Jumna has been wrongly said to precede the battle. For neither party had any thing to gain by being on the right bank that he should have attempted so dangerous an operation in the face of a powerful enemy. Each by crossing would expose his capital, but would be no better off for advancing to Calpi or to Byana, even though the nature of the country between the Chumbul and Jumna had not made movement almost impossible. For these reasons we have departed from the text of Ferishta. Another point to be noticed is the name of the brother of Ibrahim who commanded the force against Etawah. He was "Mookhlis Khan," Mullik Khalis and Mullik Mookhlis are named by other authors as nobles of Jounpore in high office, and as *chelas* of Feroz; they, too, were the builders of the plainest, and probably the oldest, of the mosques in the Jounpore style; there seems little risk in identifying Mullik Mookhlis with the general Mookhlis Khan. Lastly, it is necessary to say a few words of the result of the battle. Under Delhi, Ferishta says Ibrahim retreated, leaving the honours of the field to Mobarik; under Jounpore he says that a treaty was first concluded. That Mobarik's

point west of Etawah, and so must have been able to make himself master of that important fort.* On Jumna bank the two armies lay face to face, but a few miles apart, for three weeks, till, weary of indecisive skirmishes, on 21st March Shurky prince offered battle. The challenge was accepted, and from noon till darkness separated the combatants, the battle raged with fury. Both armies lay on the field that night, but the next day, possibly after negotiating a hollow peace and sealing it by a royal marriage, Ibrahim returned to Jounpore.

Another expedition against Calpi was the last active operation of Ibrahim's reign.* In the autumn of 1435 he and Hoshung of Malwa conceived, apparently much at the same time, the plan of occupying Calpi; but when the two armies were facing each other near the place, and a battle was hourly expected, news reached Ibrahim that Syud Mobarik too had heard of his march from Jounpore, and was preparing to attack that city. Unwilling to face the forces of the two kingdoms at once, Ibrahim retreated, and left Hoshung to make himself master of Calpi. His two rivals died in no long time, but Ibrahim never again attempted Calpi, spending the few years left him at home, and dying in the winter of 1440 full of years and honour. "He was an active and good prince," says Abul Fazl, "equally beloved in life, as he was regretted by all his subjects," says Ferishta, but we should surely except his Hindoo subjects. Able, liberal, a bigoted Mussulman, and a steady, if not a bloody, persecutor, he was a successful ruler and a patron of learning; and though we may agree with Akbar that his

daughter was in consequence married to the heir of Jounpore, is a conjecture based on the terms in which Behlol often addressed Beebee Rajey, the wife of Mahmood; but it must be confessed that among the laudations of this able princess, no distinct mention is ever made of her parentage.

* The date of this expedition is a pretty puzzle. Under Jounpore Ferishta fixes it as A. H. 839, under Malwah as 835. Under Delhi he says that Syud Mobarik founded Mobarikabad on 17th Rubbee ool awul 839 (10th Oct. 1435,) and not long after heard of the double attack on Calpi; he had formed his camp before Delhi in readiness to march against Ibrahim, when he was assassinated on 9th Rujub of the same year (28th Jan. 1436). The accounts of Jounpore and Delhi seem simple and consistent, and irrefutably to fix the date as the late autumn of 1435. But on the other hand, there is as much particularity under Malwah. After reducing Kalpi, Hoshung marched against some marauders, then halted for the rains at his new city of Hoshungabad, and being attacked by a fatal disease there, died a few miles off, on his march to Mandoo his capital, on 9th Zeehuj 835 (7th Sept. 1432). The comparison of lunar and solar years gives no help, and it is impossible to deny that the Malwah narrative is consistent. We have taken the Delhi date, as the affairs of Malwah concern us too little to cause any confusion. Yet we may note that by Abjud the inscription of Hoshung's tomb should fix his death for 837.

dynasty might have built more bridges and fewer mosques we are certainly not disposed to blame the munificence which erected the Atala Musjid.

Mahmood, eldest son of Ibrahim, succeeded without opposition, and reigned as prosperously as his father for nearly twenty years. Two years after his accession, complaining to the king of Malwa that his vassal of Calpi was neglectful of the laws of Islam, he obtained permission to attack that place; but when he had seized and plundered it, was less attentive to the remonstrances of the suzerain, who was pretty well busied in other quarters. The king of Malwa then moving to restore his vassal A. H. 848, the armies met and skirmished near Eerich; but an attack on Jounpore itself being threatened, Mahmood agreed to a peace, negotiated by a doctor of high repute, (variously recorded as Sheikh Jumalooddeen Sudda and Sheikh Janida,) whereby Calpi and its neighbourhood was, after a short delay, restored to Nusseer, son and successor of, Kadir the former ruler. The forces so set free Mahmood employed in extending his power in other quarters, first reducing Chunar and its neighbourhood, afterwards apparently the last possession of his house, and then laying waste and plundering Orissa in a holy war.

Before narrating the events of that attack on Delhi which was Mahmood's first movement after a six year's rest, it is necessary briefly to narrate the rise of the new antagonist and future conqueror of Jounpore. The eventful action between Khizr Khan and the Toghluks was determined in favour of the former by the valour of Mullik Sooltan, an Affghan chief who slew Mullik Yekbal with his own hand. The gratitude of Khizr Khan changed the name of his champion to Islam Khan, and, conferring on him an important government, gave him opportunities of providing for his many brothers. On his father's death in battle, Behlol joined his uncle Islam Khan, with whom he obtained such distinction as to be wedded to his cousin, adopted, and, to the exclusion of legitimate sons, declared his uncle's heir; and after considerable opposition, even Kootub Khan, Islam Khan's son, made his submission, and by his constant fidelity was the chief support of Behlol's power. Profiting by the growing weakness of Syud Mahommed, Behlol, Ibrahim Shah Shurky, and Mahmood Khiljy of Malwa annexed more and more of the Delhi territory; but when, in the year of Ibrahim's death, the Khiljy marched to the gates of Delhi, Syud Mahommed implored Behlol's help, and though, in spite of a treaty concluded between the two emperors, Behlol plundered the retreating Khiljy, Syud Mahommed could not punish his disobedience,

but was compelled publicly to adopt him as a son. On the accession of Allahooddeen, Behlol abstained from taking the oath of allegiance, but followed the imperial standard in an attack on Byana in 850, whence the weak emperor retreated in haste on the mere rumour of the Shurky prince's planning a march on Delhi. The fancy Allahooddeen now took for the retirement of Budaon favoured Behlol's designs on Delhi, and accordingly, after two attacks, he captured and established himself in that city, A. H. 854, with the full consent of Allahooddeen who, "by reason" of the adoption of Syud Mahommed, regarded Behlol as a brother, and only asked to be left quiet in Budaon. Two years later in the spring of 1452, when Bayezid was in command at Delhi, his father Behlol being absent warring in the Punjab, Mahmood Shah Shurky, aided by Duria Khan Lody, governor of Sumbhul, laid siege to Delhi, but the hurried return of Behlol from the northward, and the questionable fidelity of Duria Khan, made the invader plan a retreat. This, however, was delayed so long, that something like a pitched battle occurred between the forces of Behlol and a strong division of Mahmood's army under Futteh Khan, a native of Herat. An elephant belonging to the latter being wounded by an arrow of Kootub Khan then apparently, as often afterwards, commanding for his cousin Behlol, the line was broken, and Kootub Khan, finding opportunity to reproach Duria Khan, the latter deserted his new allegiance, and Mahmood's forces were utterly defeated with the loss of seven war elephants, much baggage, and of Futteh Khan. Again a few years of peace occurred, till, A. H. 861, in the winter of 1456-7 Behlol marched against Etawah, and Mahmood, at the instigation of Joona Khan, who had been made governor of Shumshabad on deserting Behlol, hastened to oppose him. After lying face to face for a short time, the princes made terms and respectively retreated; the country was to be divided as in Syud Mobarik's time, Futteh Khan's elephants were to be given up, and Joona Khan expelled from the territories of Jounpore. But after the treaty was concluded, and both armies had marched away, Behlol became too impatient to wait till the autumn should make him peacefully master of Shumshabad, he surprised and occupied it; and Mahmood, hurrying back in wrath, was taken ill, and died in his camp near Shumshabad, the very morning after a night attack on his camp wherein Kootub Khan, cousin and brother-in-law of Behlol, and commandant of the attacking column, was taken prisoner.

The only remaining work of the reign of Mahmood Shah Shurky in the mosque, called Lall Durwaza, built by Beebee Rajey, his queen, as a dependency of her palace without the walls and en-

dowed as a school. Of the palace from whose "high gate painted with vermillion," the present name of the mosque is derived, no trace is left; it was destroyed by Sicunder in his rage at the ingratitude of Hossein. This same Beebee Rajey, who was perhaps a daughter of Syud Mobarik of Delhi, seems to have been a woman of energy and ability, and in the short reign of her son are found many proofs of her influence. For to begin with, though Ferishta speaks of Bheekun Khan, Mahmood's successor under the name of Mahommed, as the eldest son of the deceased, allusions by the chronicler seem to show that his right to the throne was questioned. Still he was in camp with his father, and Beebee Rajey managed to seat him on the throne and then negotiated with Behlol, who had drawn up his army in battle array before news of Mahmood's death reached him, a treaty in the same terms as that of the preceding summer. The two princes then marched homeward, Mahommed Shah with his prisoner Kootub Khan, to disgust all at Jounpore by his cruelty and irritable temper, wherefrom the dowager queen was the heaviest sufferer, and Behlol to find the gates of Delhi shut in his face, and to receive a message from Shumsh Khatoon, his wife that, if he meant to sit at home while her brother was a captive, he had better sit in the Zenana while she led his army. Stung by this scornful message he retraced his steps, but Mahommed Shah had been so much more rapid in his movements, that Behlol found Raikurun his governor expelled from Shumshabad, and his enemy Joona Khan reinstalled by Mahommed Shah. In camp with the Shurky prince were his younger brothers Hossein and Julal; but Hussun, the elder and his rival, had stayed behind in Jounpore (whereof, perhaps, he had been Governor while Mahommed was in the field with their father), and sorely troubled the king's mind with fear of treachery. In vain were orders sent that both the prince Hussun and the prisoner Kootub Khan should be put to death; the kotwal replied that Beebee Rajey guarded them too carefully; and so, by inviting his mother to camp to consult about an appanage for Hussun, Mahommed cleared the way for his jealousy and his own fall. Before Beebee Rajey had arrived at Kunowj, news of her son's murder reached her; and while she stayed mourning at that city, her other sons took alarm, and Hossein managed to be detached with a strong force to intercept a pretended attack of Behlol. Before Behlol's forces Hossein retreated quickly to Kunowj to be received with open arms by his mother. Julal Khan attempting to join Hossein was captured by Behlol. Mahommed Shah alarmed at these defections, also retreated on, Kunowj, to find that Hossein had assumed the ensigns of royalty

and had all his army drawn up to oppose his brother.* Deserted by all his officers the unfortunate Mahommed had to fly, but the same valour which had made Purtap Singh of Mynpoorie think it safer to face Behlol than Mahommed Shah would have made him a dangerous foe, but that Beebee Rajey bribed his armour-bearer to break off the points of his arrows, so that he fell by treachery in an orchard after a short reign of five months.

After punishing those officers who had seemed unfavourable to his cause, Hossein marched against Behlol; but a truce for four years, ratified by the exchange of Kootub Khan for prince Julal, was agreed on, each party keeping his own possessions; and to this truce we may probably assign that marriage of Hossein to Beebee Khonza, † daughter of Allahooddeen, ex-king of Delhi, and still king of Budaon, which had consequences so fatal for the eastern kingdom. The four years' truce gave time for an expedition to Orissa which greatly increased Hossein's wealth and fame. Mobarik Khan, of Boorhanabad, fearing the power with Behlol of his rival Duria Khan, long Governor of Sumbhal, and one of the most powerful vassals of Delhi, took refuge with Hossein. The vassal princes of the Central Doab, always wavering, were so far favourable to Hossein as to throw no obstacles in his way when after exacting tribute from the Ray of Gwalior, in the winter of 1470-1, he advanced on Delhi. Behlol hurried back from the Punjab, and leaving Delhi in the charge of his faithful cousin, met Hossein's army on the Jumna not far east of Agra. After a week's skir-

* The chronicler gives a very different account. After recording Mahommed's attempt on his brother's life, but saying nothing of its success, he tells how Mahommed Shah's son Julal was taken prisoner in battle by Behlol, that in great distress Mahommed fled in disguise leaving his camp to the conqueror, and that in wrath at his cowardice Beebee Rajey had him pursued and slain. Ferishta's account is as probable and more circumstantial. It is worth noting that from this point the dates given under Jounpore and Delhi cannot be reconciled, those under Jounpore being five years earlier than those under Delhi; the events of Mahommed's reign certainly seem to have come in quick succession and may well have occurred in the five months Ferishta assigns, but the "Ahwalat Jounpore wuh Sultan Hindustan" gives five years as the period.

† Other writers give the name of Hossein's consort as Mulika Jehan and make her the daughter of Syud Mobarik, and so aunt of Allahooddeen. The difference of names causes no difficulty at all, but Ferishta's statement of her relationship to Allahooddeen is far the more probable. Hossein must have been a very young man at this time, for he died forty-three years later; a daughter of a man who had died twenty-three years before would hardly have been thought a fit bride. Whoever she was, she was a very fire-brand, always pining for the magnificence of Delhi, known to her only by hearsay, and dangling before her husband's eyes the glory of being sole lord of Hindoostan.

mishing a three year's truce was made ; and at the end of that time Hossein besieged and took the fort of Etawah, and gaining over the border vassals (he of Biana even using Hossein's name in the public prayers) marched on Delhi, but after some indecisive skirmishes made a new truce and retired, only to indulge himself in the same amusement a few months later.

The last named futile expedition must have taken place about the end of 1474, and was the last which left Jounpore still a worthy rival of Delhi. For the short peace which now ensued was the last. In the autumn of 1477, Beebee Rajey died at Etawah, and Kootub Khan of Raberi, coming with the Rajah of Gwalior on a visit of condolence, by way of making his court to Hossein, spoke disparagingly of Behlol and volunteered to support his host's claims to Delhi ; but, having taken leave, he hurried to Delhi with stories, Hossein's designs, and his own secret flight. From this moment both sides prepared for war. In the summer of the next year the ex-king Alaooddeen died at Budaon, and Hossein, after performing the funeral ceremonies also seized the territory to the prejudice of his brothers-in-law. Marching thence he occupied Sumbhul, imprisoning Mobarik Khan, who had returned to his former allegiance and succeeded his rival Duria Khan in the government of that province, and marched on to Delhi. Again Behlol hurried back from Sirhind, and, after Hossein had had the better of several skirmishes, a treaty was negotiated through Kootub Khan, Behlol's cousin, whereby the Upper Doab was assigned to Behlol, but all lands east of Ganges to Hossein. But as the latter was marching homewards, Behlol attacked his rear, killed great numbers of his men, captured many officers of rank with some treasure and equipage, and occupied the pergunnahs from Coel to Shumshabad. Hossein at once gave battle, and after an indecisive combat, a peace was again patched up, Dopamow being made the common boundary. But Hossein could not forgive Behlol's perfidy, and again waged war, now with continued ill success. Defeated in an obstinate battle with the loss of his baggage, he retired on Raperi ; driven thence he moved to Gwalior, and having been anew furnished with money and stores by the Raja, marched on Calpi. Meantime Behlol had compelled Hossein's brother Ibrahim to surrender Etawah, and moved to meet his enemy at Calpi. After some time he discovered a ford, crossed the Jumna and defeated Hossein, and after one last battle near Kunowj, Hossein had to fly on foot, even his seraglio falling into the hands of the victor. After recruiting his army, Behlol advanced without

further check to Jounpore, so that the kingdom fell in the same year which had seen it attain its greatest extent.

Although the advances Behlol had made on different occasions, professing his attachment to the dynasty he had supplanted, with which Hossein was connected by marriage if not by descent, or asking only to be let alone, were probably such artifices as he had found successful in gaining him the throne, he was no ungenerous victor. He allowed Hossein to reside at Jounpore and finish the great mosque, and to retain possession of a tract of country, probably round Chunar, yielding five * lacs a year. Having appointed Mobarik Khan Lohany governor of Jounpore, and stationed his faithful cousin Kootub Khan at Bisowli, near Budaon, as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, Behlol halted for a time at Budaon. The value of Kootub Khan's fidelity was now strikingly manifested, for, on his death at this time, his many friends prepared for revolt. Among them was Mobarik Khan, and Hossein vainly hoped in the confusion to recover his old kingdom; but Behlol without delay marched to Jounpore, made his eldest surviving son, Barbik viceroy, and drove Hossein away, yet still charged Barbik not to interfere with him in his estates. In no long time, the growing infirmities of his great age made Behlol anxious finally to settle his affairs. Declaring Nizam his successor, and conferring on him the government of Delhi and the Upper Doab, he took pains to secure his favourite from the hostility of his grandson Azim Humayoon and his son Barbik (either of whom, according to any European law of succession, had a better claim to the throne,) separating their governments by others assigned to his most trusted officers, and after no long time died in camp in the Central Doab in the summer of 1489.

Having, by following the advice of Kootloogh Khan, the captive ex-wuzeer of Hossein, escaped the dangers which threatened him personally, Nizam ascended the throne under the name of Secunder, and, after subduing nearer and less dangerous rivals, marched against Barbik, who formally refused to do homage, or to read Secunder's name in the public prayers. The Governor of Baraitch, cousin of the two rivals, commanded a division of Barbik's army, but being taken in the beginning of the first battle, and received in a flattering manner by Secunder, changed sides with the common facility of the time, and, charging his old friends, made all fear treachery and fly. Barbik's valour could not restore the day, and he fled westward, his son being taken prisoner; but on his surrender, he was reinstated in his govern-

* The author of *Mirat ool Alum* makes the revenue of these lands five crores of dams, a sum equal to twelve and a half lacs.

ment of Jounpore as a check on Hossein, who was still in force in Behar. But Barbik was too weak for his work, and in the spring of 1492 Secunder had scarcely reached Delhi, after long and successful campaigns, when he received news of a dangerous revolt in the old kingdom of Jounpore. Barbik had fled to Baraitch, Mobarik Khan of Kurrah had been taken prisoner, and his brother, who also held a government of some importance, killed. But the march of Secunder soon caused the release of Mobarik Khan and the return of Barbik ; and, the rebels having been defeated at Katgur, Barbik was again reinstalled. But even the near neighbourhood of the emperor could not ensure Barbik's good conduct, or make his subjects bear his tyranny ; for in less than a month, while Secunder was still marching about, there was another outbreak, and then Barbik was committed to safe custody, and his government entrusted to Jumal Khan, the first patron of Shere Shah. In the winter of the same year the emperor made a reconnoissance of Chunar, still in the possession of Hossein ; but, though he repulsed a sally of the garrison, he doubted his power to capture so strong a place, and marched along the right bank of the Ganges, receiving on his way the submission of the Guhurwar Raja of Kuntit. In the winter of 1494-5 he again marched to the south and east, but being overtaken by the rains fell back on Jounpore for supplies, after losing, from natural causes, most of his cavalry. Hereupon Nursing Roy of Kuntit sent word to Hossein in Behar of the crippled state of his enemy ; but Secunder had no sooner heard of Hossein's movement than he hurried to meet him, and defeated him in a great battle some two marches from Benares, on the right bank of the Ganges. Hossein fled to the court of Gour, was there courteously received, and died in obscurity just five years later.

Having subdued Behar, and exacted tribute from the Raja of Tirhoot, Secunder returned to Jounpore, determined to leave no sign or trace that the hated family of Hossein had ever existed. The great palace on the banks of Goomti, that of Beebee Rajey without the walls, the dower-house and burial-place under the shadow of the great mosque, were all razed to the ground ; and the utmost influence of the doctors of the law could scarcely save the mosques from utter destruction. The nobles of the court were encouraged to use these palaces as quarries, and the prolonged residence of Secunder, who seems to have made this place his head-quarters till after the death of Hossein, was as little favourable to the place as the notion* of his son Julal, the new governor, that it was less

* This notion may have been in part the consequence of the famine and earthquake wherewith the city is said to have been visited about this time.

healthy than another site which took his fancy some eight miles to the south-east, on the right bank of the Sie, where he and his nobles built palaces of which no trace is left, and the first of the three fine bridges which are still glories of Jounpore.

Secunder died on December 14th, 1517, and the liberality of his eldest son and successor Ibrahim soon so disgusted his nobles that they conspired against him with Julal. The latter was at Calpi, which also was under his charge, but he had not reached Jaunpore, where he was to be enthroned, when the conspirators changed their minds, and determined to stand by Ibrahim. But Julal thought himself too far committed, and though his friends fell off from him daily, he placed his family in safety at Calpi and marched on Agra. Here the Governor amused him with negotiations till Calpi had fallen, and Ibrahim in person was at hand. Julal then fled to Gwalior, but after divers escapes was captured and murdered. His government of Jounpore was entrusted to Duria Khan Lohany, who died shortly before Baber's invasion. His son and successor Bahadoor was chosen leader, and under the title of Sooltan Mahomed proclaimed king, by the Affghans after Ibrahim's defeat and the capture of Agra; and so for a short time again Jounpore was capital of a kingdom which extended from Oude to Behar. But when Humayoon, dry-nursed by Feroz and Mahmood Khan, both old servants of the Lodi house, led the chief part of the Mogul, army against the confederates, the latter retired slowly first on Jounpore, then on Behar, and by the end of 1525 Jounpore had for ever ceased to be independent. His short stay in Jounpore Humayoon spent in endeavours to renew its prosperity and ancient glories, even restoring, in some part with the old materials, the buildings which had been quarries for the Julal's new palaces at Julalpore; and when recalled to command in the great war of the next spring, he appointed Jooneid Birlas, Governor, with his own two advisers and Kazee Abdool Jubbur as a sort of council of regency. Three years later Babur himself must have visited the place when on his march against Mahmood Khan, king of Behar, but after repulsing that prince he contented himself with a charge to Jooneid to continue the war in conjunction with Julal, ex-king of Jounpore,† and returning to Agra, died there on Christmas Eve A.D. 1530.

* This "Julalooddeen Noosrut Shah Shurky, ex-king of Jounpore," is about as puzzling a personage as it is easy to find; and, but for the necessity of speaking of the pretended descendants of the ancient princes who still dwell at Jounpore, one would have been tempted to leave out all mention of one who really plays so small a part on our stage. He prepared "a royal entertainment at Kuirah" for Baber on his eastward march in the winter of 1528-29, "and was honoured with an audience." He can therefore hardly be

As the great and successful rival of Humayoon was closely connected with Jounpore by many ties, it is necessary briefly to sketch his rise. He was the eldest legitimate son of Hussun

that son of Behlol who was so mature at his father's death forty years before as already to be Governor of Calpi; besides no connection of that prince with Jounpore is recorded. Nor can he be Julal, the son of Secunder, who did assume the title of king at Jounpore; for it is distinctly recorded that he was put to death by his brother Ibrahim; and even though he had escaped, and had somehow acquired estates and Government in his old appanage of Calpi, he would not have marched in Baber's train against his brother and clansmen in Behar. If we could account for his presence in Kurrah, we should say this ex-king was probably Julal Khan, son of the Affghan pretender, Mahomed Shah Lohany, set up at Jounpore after Baber's defeat of Ibrahim Lody: when driven out of Jounpore the same family ruled in Behar, and shortly before the present march, Shere Shah had supplanted this prince, his former pupil, and driven him to Bengal.

But, unfortunately, we have not exhausted the subject, for the chronicler, who has more interest in minutiae, does not, with Ferishta, make the Shurky dynasty extinct in Hossein, for he gives him a son Jelalooddeen, married to the only child of Nuseeb Shah, king of Gor, whom he succeeded, apparently in Hossein's lifetime, for he sent Hossein's corpse to Jounpore. Now Hossein certainly is buried at Jounpore, and though Secunder was more employed in the west in the later years of his reign, yet turbulent as his nobles were, large bribes must have been offered before any Governor of Jounpore would have let his master's special enemy be solemnly laid in his ancestral tomb, in the house Secunder with such pains had destroyed; the more probable solution would be that at some later time, possibly when the Affghans were strengthening their hands against Baber, Hossein's bones were exhumed and reinterred. But to fit the chronicler's genealogy in at all with Ferishta's, it is necessary to rely much on possible changes of name; Nuseeb Shah must be identified with Allahooddeen Hossein Shah, the king of Gor, with whom Hossein took refuge, who reigned from 1498 to 1521, and was succeeded successively by his sons Nusrat Shah and Mahmud; and these two must be supposed to prove adoptions of his son-in-law Julal and his grandson. So credible as this may seem, Jounpore was the chief part of the bribe said by the chronicler, to have been offered to Mahmud Shah of Gor by Humayoon as the price of support against Shir Shah; from Ferishta one would rather have thought Mahmood would have been as much surprised as pleased to recover by his ally's help possession of his late kingdom of Gor. The chronicler adds, that Mahmood fell in the great battle wherein Shir Shah overthrew Humayoon, but was supported in his last moments by his generous enemy, who laid him with his fathers in Jounpore, and enriched and protected his family. The heir of the dead man, then a child, was known as Sooltan Hossein, *alias* Oomur Khap; he used his wealth to restore, in part, the dower house and to decorate and improve the capital of the ancestors. His descendants retained more or less of dignity, but the chronicler gets confused about them about the time of Alungir. There is no doubt the now occupants of the old house are representatives of Mahmood Shah Poorby; the steps by which the Shurky dynasty became blended with the Poorby are less clear.

The house so often called the dower house is separated but by a lane from the northern cloister of the Juma Musjid. Secunder broke down to the level of the court all the buildings but the cloister in the grave yard; Oomut Khan's repairs made habitable part of the adjoining court. The basement

Khan, an Affghan favourite of Jumal Khan, the successor of Barbik in the government of Jounpore. But Hussun so neglected his wife and her sons, that Fureed, leaving his father's house at Sasseram, took service under Jumal Khan, refusing to return home on the ground that at the capital he had more opportunities for acquiring learning : and he is said greatly to have profited by these opportunities. When Hussun, three years later, came to Jounpore, Fureed was reconciled to his father, who, wishing to live at Jounpore, made over charge of the jaghir to his son. The father afterwards promised to make Sooliman, a younger son by a concubine, his heir ; but on Hussun's death, Fureed obtained the patent from the king, and Sooliman took refuge with Mahomed Khan Soor, a distant relative, governor of the district (not the province) of Jounpore. This noble, failing in an attempt to make Fureed share the administration as well as the property with this brother, became his bitter enemy, and was planning his ruin when Baber's invasion threw everything into confusion. Fureed at once joined the Affghan pretender who was set up at Jounpore, was by him made tutor of his son Julal, and, on an act of conspicuous valour, honoured with the title of Shere Khan. But his old enemy managed to turn the Affghan prince's mind against Shere Khan, who was at last compelled to take refuge with Jooneid Birlas, already governing Kurra, and with his help recovered his old jaghir with other districts, all of which he held of the Moguls. But he had no foolish prejudices for loyalty, and, finding an opportunity, returned to nominal allegiance to Mahomed Shah Lohani, now ruling only Behar, whose son and successor Julal he in no long time supplanted, partly in self-defence. But when Mahomed Lody, son of Secunder Shah, fled before Humayoon from Chittoor to Patna, and was there chosen king of Behar by the Affghan chiefs, Shere Khan had to submit, obtaining only his old jaghir and a written promise that, on recovery of Jounpore, Mahomed would yield Behar to his vassal ally. Hereupon forces marched against the Moguls, who evacuated the whole province of Jounpore. Humayoon was engaged in the siege of Kalinjur, but marched to the support of his deputy. Shere Khan thought himself slighted in the distribution of commands in the Affghan army, and wrote to Ameer Hindu Beg (who had probably already governed the city of Jounpore), promising not to oppose the Mogul ; and his defection in the battle of the next day was the chief cause of the defeat of the Affghans. But, not long after

was left uninjured ; to this, as to other buildings, older edifices furnished materials ; it is an oblong of some 190 feet by 140, having at the corners foundations of round turrets.

Jooneid Birlas had been re-instated at Jounpore, Humayoon sent Ameer Hindoo Beg to demand of Shere Khan the surrender of Chunar, and though more urgent affairs distracted his attention while Shere Khan's power was growing, yet the sudden outbreak of the Affghans, on the death of Jooneid Birlas, compelled Humayoon to march to Jounpore in the summer of 1536, and his great success there and in Bengal was the proximate cause of his ruin. For, while he was loitering in the East, his brother Hindal Mirza revolted; and after his terrible defeat near Buxar in 1539, Humayoon lost for the time his hold on Eastern India. Jounpore, indeed, held out for a short time under Ameer Hindoo Beg and his son Bababeg Julayoon, but before his great victory on 17th May 1540, Shir Shah was undisputed sovereign of all India east of Agra, and Adil Khan his son, was his viceroy in Jounpore. In the troubles which preceded the return of Humayoon, Jounpore, with the other Eastern provinces, changed masters a dozen times; but its fort was no longer the chief place of strength, for the possessor of Chunar, strengthened as a treasure house by Shir Shah, was of necessity supreme. Nor does it play a conspicuous part in the early part of Akber's reign, at least till the rebellion of Ali Kooli Khan, Khan Zuman. This noble, an ally of Behram Khan, had been made Governor of Sumbhul by Humayoon, and, in the year 1558, he was made also Governor of Jounpore and "Punjhuzari." In no long time he expelled the Affghan governors from the adjoining districts, and when, three years later, the Affghans of Bengal attempted to recover the frontier provinces, he, and his brother Bahadur Khan, utterly defeated them. Yet this success nearly effected Khan Zuman's ruin at court, for he withheld the customary offering till Akber had led a strong army as far eastward as Kurrah. The clemency which left this insolence unpunished was but ill repaid; for in 1563 began the troubles with Ali Kooli Khan which only ended with his death in battle on 6th June 1567, and the execution of some of his Oozbuk allies, taken at the same time, who were trampled to death by elephants at Jounpore, almost as part of the ceremonial which attended the installation of Khan Khanan Moomyim Khan in this rich and important Government. During these years Akber's head-quarters seem to have been alternately at Jounpore and Chunar, and the province may not have been formally entrusted to any one till Moomyim Khan received it after Khan Zuman's death; for more than once it was restored to the traitor on his pretended and temporary submission. But any detail of the operations seems to pertain rather to general history than to the special history of Jounpore. One event, however, must be noted; for when the mother of Khan Zuman

was confined in the Fort of Jounpore, under the charge on Ushruff Khan the Governor, her other son Bahadur Khan, in the summer of 1566, with a strong force, surprised the fort, burnt its gates, broke down its chambers, imprisoned its Governor, rescued his mother, and, after plundering the city, retired on Benares when he heard of Akber's advance, breaking down two arches of the Julalpore bridge to prevent pursuit. It is scarcely credible that, even after this revolt, Khan Zuman was reinstated in his government, and that not till he was actually killed did Akber finally appoint his successor, conferring the government, as we have said, on Khan Khanan Moomyim Khan, the last viceroy who resided in Jounpore; for eight years after his death a new city and fort was built at the confluence of Ganges and Jumna, to be head-quarters for the viceroy of the East; and though the province of Jounpore was conferred on Khan Khanan Abdoolrahim Khan in 1592, in lieu of Goozrat, he never seems to have visited his government, though he made or found his grandson, Masoom Khan, Nazim; and from that time the great man of Jounpore was either the Nazim, or else the Governor of the Fort, who drew pay for himself and the garrison from certain small dependent pergunnahs, and whose post was so little valued, that in 1558 Jumal Khan was near breaking into open rebellion when invited to yield, for this, the government of the stronger fort of Chunar.

To Moomyim Khan Jounpore owes its most useful, if not most beautiful, building, the great bridge. Yet if we here follow the chronicler, whose narrative is in much local detail and is supported by metrical dates, we must suppose that Ferishta's information is faulty in a period when it should be best, or that the restoration of Ali Kooli Khan to favour meant restoration of his estates not of his governments, for our chronicler would have Moomyim Khan to be Governor A. H. 972, and in that year to have founded the bridge. Let us leave the riddle unsolved, and merely say that the bridge seems to have been begun A. H. 972 and finished A. H. 976. It is curious that it should have owed its foundation to the humanity of Akber, and not to the magnificence of Hossein, who, throughout his reign, was contented to use a bridge of boats for his gorgeous processions to the Eedgah he had built on the south bank. For Akber, who was very fond of boating, saw during his excursion one night, a poor widow lamenting loudly that she could not get ferried across, and the emperor, having taken her over, stationed boats at the ghât for like purposes for the future, but also remarked to Moomyim Khan on the advantages of building a bridge there, somewhat disparaging the former

kings for their preference of mosques. Further reference was made to the subject in next day's durbar, and Moomyim Khan came forth from the presence pledged, both in his own opinion and the emperor's, to building a great bridge in the very place of the evening's adventure. A story is told to illustrate his obstinate determination: a workman who had vainly contrasted the bottomless gulf in which at this point a pier would have to be built with the ford which, two miles further up, had suggested to Ibrahim to build a bridge there in front of his palace, at last said that if, next evening, the Khan Khanan would go with a boat-load of money to the worst part of the passage, he would show how only there could be hope. So when next evening all were gathered together, the workman flung one bag of money over saying that money must be spent with at least equal lavishness; Moomyim Khan ordered the boat to be scuttled, and declared he would build on boat loads of gold rather than not build. Hereon the work was begun in earnest, and a bridge of five arches having been built on the southern bank and a new channel dug, a very strong bund was thrown across the true course to turn the water into its new bed. Beginning again from the south, the building of the piers went on well till the famous hole was reached, in which had to be laid the foundations for the piers of at least the northern pair of arches. On this all labour seemed thrown away, till the superintendent tried, simultaneously, abundant praying and improved engineering. Of the form of the former and its effects we can of course say nothing; the latter is sufficiently curious to deserve detail. On stout rafts were built rows of strong pillars, of stone clamped with lead, and these rafts were scuttled as foundations for the piers, their descent being regulated by the many anchors to which they were made fast, and farther by metal guide rods fixed on each boat; when at last the tops of the pillars appeared above the water, every pair was connected by a beam of mixed metal, secured with iron and lead, and on these beams was laid the stone foundation of the pier. The true bridge measures some 330 feet within the inner faces of the abutments, but as each pier averages fourteen feet in thickness, the gross water way is less than 200 feet. The middle group of four arches are of perceptibly larger span than the others, and the kiosques, which, as usual with Indian bridges, were added as a decoration, adorn the northern centre arch; a late magistrate enclosed these also as shops, completing the purposeless disfigurement of the bridge which Mr. Deane began. Fuheem Khan, who was governor of the fort, and manager under Moomyim Khan, appointed as his deputy Khajeh Dost, an Affghan jaghirdar of Ghiswa, who

brought from his own estate the chief masons. Of course the real cost cannot be even approximately guessed ; it is said to have * reached thirty lacs, half that of the Britannia Bridge, and three-fifths of that of London Bridge ; but a vague expression makes one suspect that this round sum, if one could believe it to be anything more than a roughness, would include all the monies laid out on the fort and other buildings, and Khajeh Dost took credit to himself for saving materials enough to build a bridge and a mansion where the road to Ghiswa and Allahabad crosses the river Sie.

The bridge was not however the only work of Moomyim Khan. He built, besides several mosques, a palace for the governor in a walled garden adjoining the bridge on the northern bank ; an outer gate of stone, adorned with coloured tiles, and an outer court for the Fort, and several hot baths in different parts of the city which also he endowed that the citizens might use them without charge.

The connected history of Jounpore ceases with the foundation of Allahabad ; thenceforward it only appears at intervals like any other country town, and nothing remains of this branch of our subject but rambling mention of different incidents in its steady decay. Aurungzebe visited the place, and but for court intrigues would have restored at all events the mosques to their former beauty. Near relations of Ahmud Khan Bungush lived here, and one of the first acts of his administration was to confer the government on them ; that they ever succeeded in wresting it from the Nuwab Wuzer is not so clear, though Sahib Zuman Khan laid the country waste and partly destroyed the

*Another account makes the cost fourteen lacs, an estimate which does not contradict the suggestion of the text, that the thirty lacs included the whole cost of public works. Of course the whole is said to have been paid by Moomyim Khan. The bridge Poolgoozur, said to have been built from the leavings of the great bridge, about eight miles west of Jounpore, and finished A. H. 977 (1569-70), (twenty-five years later than Mr. Ommaney makes out), carries the Allahabad road over the Sie, at a height of twenty-five feet above the winter water level, and the embankment of approach extends a long way on each side. Originally it consisted of eight fifteen-feet arches, with piers of somewhat greater breadth ; one or two arches had more than once been blown up by floods and repaired ; but when a pier was again broken down in the rains of 1847, arrangements were made for remodelling the whole. A detailed account is given in part XII. of North-West selections. Two arches were in each case thrown into one, to the great increase of beauty of the bridge, and improvement in every way. Had the work been executed by free labour, the cost would have exceeded Rs. 21,200, yet no foundations had to be laid, and only 510 voussoir stones procured. Mr. Ommaney says it was built of the materials of a temple whose site is still traceable : this is *a priori* improbable, and any traces of a former building are probably those of the mansion erected by Khajeh Dost.

fort. Both Abool Mansoor Khan and Saadut Ali made long halts here, occupying the old palace of Moomyim Khan; but when the farm of the four Sircars was conferred on Bulwunt Singh, the fort was still retained by the Nuwab, and his little garrison repaired so much of the palace as was wanted for their own occupation. When, however, this district passed into the hands of the English, though Chunar was garrisoned, the fort of Jounpore was left to Cheyte Singh. Warren Hastings may have visited this city, Sir Eyre Coote certainly did, while Duncan's visit is recorded in those volumes of proceedings which are mouldering unnoticed on the record shelves of the Commissioner and the Collector of Benares. A brief sketch of his operations will not be out of place. He had gone from Benares to Ghazipore, and marching thence, arrived at Jounpore on 9th March 1788, leaving it for Mirzapore on 25th March. His first business was to instal Moofli Kurum Oollah as Judge and Magistrate; this was done with great form, in the presence of Raja Mehipnarain. The palace in the Fort was fitted up for his cutcherry, and in part perhaps as his dwelling house; yet he had property in the city and neighbourhood, for Hastings had restored it. Then orders were passed for the dismantling of the Fort, the guns being broken up into weights for the bazar. Bazar taxes were remitted, to the satisfaction doubtless of the shopkeepers, but to the injury of the place, for these formed the endowment of more than one charitable institution. Then kotwally fees were abolished, which, under twenty heads, with great harassment to the residents, brought in but Rupees 1,400 a year. Then he ordered the new Magistrate to lay out Rs. 2,000 on the repairs of the bridge, and obtained from Lord Cornwallis an annual grant of Rs. 1,000 for the same work; like orders for the repair of the other bridges in the district are said to have borne less fruit, for Sheolall Doobey, the revenue farmer, pocketed as much as he could of the money granted. He writes, too, favourably of the site, and laments the decay of the town, telling how that once it was, "the seat and resort of Mahommedan science, and the residence of many of their learned men, in so much that it was known by the appellation of the Shiraz of India." And with this tribute to the past fame of the city at the hand of the distinguished man who was the first European personally concerned in the administration of the city or province, the *history* of Jounpore may well close.

Yet it would be hardly proper to pass on without saying something of the extent and revenue of the ancient kingdom. But, if such an estimate be difficult for the mediæval kingdoms of Europe, it is far more difficult here, where gradations of de-

pendence were at least as numerous, and were the national tendency to make all offices hereditary, renders the distinction between an appointed governor, and a petty prince, scarcely traceable. Still, while we bear in mind that the extent of the territory, and number of the vassals, of each prince varied directly with his power, and that the submission of the lord of Byana to Hossein can have been at best but nominal, it is possible to mark sharp lines bounding the ancient kingdom save within the Doab. Thus in the west, Budaon was only subject to Jounpore in the feverish month which intervened between the death of Allaooddeen and the fall of Hossein. The inhospitable Terai extended further south three centuries back, yet Baraitch and Goruckpore must have been subject to Jounpore, for both were visited by, and paid tribute to, Feroz, and are next mentioned when, in distributing the spoils of his victory, Behlol allotted the province of Baraitch to his nephew best known as Kala-Pahar. On the east, all Behar must have been subject to Jounpore, for at least the early princes of the Shurkey dynasty were able to exact tribute even from the king of Lukhnowty; and if the growing rivalry of Delhi should seem to have too far weakened their successors, it must be remembered that those successors successfully invaded even Orissa; and at the worst the relations of the Ray of Patna to the kings of Lukhnowty and Jounpore cannot have been more favourable than he of Etawah bore to the kings of Jounpore and Delhi. On the south Chunar, with which doubtless fell the fertile tract between the Vindhya and the Ganges, was first conquered by Mahmood Shah, and Calpi was governed by a vassal prince, to the last, apparently, hostile to Jounpore. In the Doab the Ray of Mynpoorie Bhowgaon was generally an obedient vassal, and the lords of Rabiri and Allyghur seemed as ready to follow the standard of Jounpore as that of Delhi. We are, therefore, certainly not overestimating the extent of the kingdom proper, *i. e.*, of the provinces entrusted to governors, not ruled by vassal princes, if, making the Gogra from Fyzabad and the Jumna from Calpi its boundaries on the east and south, we take those on the other sides to be imaginary lines drawn from Bareilly to Calpi and Fyzabad; if we have slightly exaggerated in naming Bareilly for want of any well known city further down the Ram-gunga, we have as certainly allowed too little on other sides. The area of the provinces included within these boundaries is upwards of 29,000 square miles, and they pay now a revenue of near two millions sterling, against one to Akber of eighty-one lacs, excluding the revenue of rent-free lands which cannot have been less than four lacs. Even if we allow

that the land revenue had doubled under the able administration of Akber, we still find that the king of Jounpore drew from his hereditary dominions a revenue four times as that of any contemporary king of England, and to this rich provision must be added the benevolences levied from time to time on the border barons of Etawah and such like places, and the spoil of some profitable Holy War.

Vague as is our knowledge of the revenue of the kingdom of Jounpore, we have not material even for a guess as to the expenditure. Vast sums doubtless were lavished on jewels and shows after the ordinary fashion of native courts; wars waged by armies, even of feudal militia, are costly; yet if we go beyond such generalities we can only repeat tales of the schools founded, or run through the roll of noble buildings built by the kings of Jounpore. And though now no trace be left of these schools but the story of their past fame, we have better ground than Mr. Duncan's saying to hold that this city was the Shiraz, or the mediæval Paris, of India. Feroz determined to make it a seat of learning worthy of his cousin's fame. Each of the princes of Jounpore prided himself on patronizing science, and the troubles which, in the early part of the fourteenth century, scattered the doctors of the ancient imperial city, were eminently favourable to the rise of a school of learning in the peaceful and secure Jounpore. Shahabooddin and his master in Ibrahim's time, and the dozen holy men who must have been more than mad beggars, if we may judge by the respect and attention they received from that able prince, these were the first professors of Jounpore. Nearly at the same time with Baba Nanuk, flourished Syud Mahomed Jounpoori, founder of the Mehdy sect which, teaching severe asceticism, and justifying its members in preventing breaches of sacred law even by slaying the offender, had to be put down with a little sharp persecution by Selim Shan Soor. So great was the influence of Shah Kootooddeen, a blind devotee of Hossein's time, that he was able to depute a disciple to act for him as Kazi in Bhudohee. Even in Mahommed Shah's time existed in Jounpore twenty famous schools, of which now but the names are known, the founder of one having died in the middle of the fifteenth, of another in the middle of the seventeenth century. Nor was only scholastic learning cultivated; Hossein is described as "a clever and luxurious prince, skilled in music, a connoisseur and "a composer," and verses set to music of his composition are said still to exist. Shir Shah did not want to study only the commentaries of Mahommedan doctors, or the tenets of Syud Mahomed, when he refused to leave Jounpore for his father's

hall at Sasseram. Of the successful cultivation of other arts let the noble mosques of Ibrahim and Hossein bear witness.

But before speaking in detail of these splendid buildings, now sole memorials of the wealth of the powerful princes of Jounpore as also the sole evidences of their taste and culture, let us clear the ground by speaking briefly of those less important buildings which bear not at all, or less conspicuously, the marks of the dominant style. Not indeed that we are prepared to catalogue the many tombs of more or less pretension which from the time of Feroz to the present day, have been built over former dwellers in Jounpore. Not that we are prepared to trace the fort Ibrahim built at Roy Bareilly, or give a plan of the kunkur-built palace, erected by Bijaichund and appropriated by the new dynasty, the remains of whose courts and halls are the core of a lovely woodclad knoll overhanging the Goomti some two miles west of the bridge. But not even the unrivalled attractions of those later mosques will permit us to leave without further notice the fort of Feroz, or the mosque and halls with which it was decorated by Ibrahim.

The Fort is an irregular quadrangle on the north bank of the Goomti, formed by a stone wall built round an artificial earthen mound. Externally the walls are of considerable height, but, as the mound fills only the eastern half, their height from the level of the fort within is not uniform. Without, too, the higher ground on the side next the town, made the northern wall always the most favourable to an escalading party. Besides a sally-port on the south-eastern face, approached from within only by a steep passage barely wide enough for an elephant, cut through the artificial mound, which might have been easily closed by pouring in a few cart loads of earth, the only entrance was by a gateway on the east, unprotected by any outwork unless the walls of the city, which doubtless existed though they have left no trace, be regarded in that light. The fort had more than once been carried by bold assailants burning the gate, before Khan Khanan Moomyim Khan built an outer court of brick with a fine gateway of stone adorned with Kasi work, whose chamber were never finished. Feroz used, and herein he was largely imitated by later princes, the ruined temples of an earlier creed as quarries whence to fetch materials for his new works; to what an extent Feroz drew on the ruins would hardly be believed by one who saw only the smooth walls still standing, but when the towers were blown up in 1859, the inner face of nearly every stone bore carvings which had, apparently, made part of an ornamental band; in the remaining walls such carved blocks are not rare, the carving being shown in general by accident,

yet sometimes worked in as an ornament, just as in the gateway the niches, which relieve the eastern face, are ornamented with such bands, in one of which, not twelve feet long, may be counted seven distinct patterns.

Within the walls all is desolation, and despite the lovely view, rich in the charm of wood and water, unrivalled in the plains of India, a visit to it gives little pleasure to one who knew the place even few years back. The destruction of the towers on the southern face, and of that pretty building on the south-west, the last habitable of Ibrahim's works, is to be lamented indeed, chiefly as ruining the external beauty ; but within, no traces are left of Mr. Martin's garden, and the rank jungle grass and that shrub, whose lustrous copper-coloured leaves seem always evidences of long and utter neglect, suggest a strong wish that, if the rich local funds of the city can do nothing for the Fort to which it, and they, owed their greatness, the despairing proposal of the chronicler might be approved, and the area be made over to market gardeners, whose cultivation would at all events keep it clean. Not less conspicuous for the surrounding desolation are Ibrahim's spacious baths, still apparently capable of easy repair, and the mosque which served as a cathedral till the completion of the noble Atala. Within, this mosque measures about thirty-seven paces by five, and is divided into three chambers of equal length. The plastered vaults and shallow ornamentation of the middle chamber raise a suspicion that it is not as its founder left it ; in the wings, there is no room for such a doubt. They are each two aisles deep and of five bays, having in front for ornament a range of slightly carved square pillars, while the low roof, not nine feet high, rests on three ranges of pillars of different shapes. The western range of pillars is closed by a plastered brick wall with niches. The pillars have certainly—the flat roofs probably—been taken from some Buddhist temple, possibly from those of Zuffrabad which supplied most of the materials for the Fort.

About twenty feet in front of the middle of the southern wing stands the lat, or pillar, the inscription on which is held to assign the mosque to Ibrahim, apparently wholly unaltered from the date of its erection. Its octagonal base rises in five steps to the height of some four feet six inches ; the upper face of this base gives little room for anything but the pillar, which, first square, then octagonal, then round, rises, with its upper capital, some forty feet from the terrace of the mosque on which it stands. The inscription named above runs in six lines round the upper half of the octagonal stage ; the date it gives and the titles it uses, give for its erection—and presumptively for the erection of the

mosque—the date of the months Zeekada, A.H. 801, corresponding to July 1399, but a few months before the death of the first prince, and the accession of his adopted son, Ibrahim's brother. This month Zeekada, by the way, seems to have been a favourite with Ibrahim, for he has recorded with care that the dedication of the Atala Musjid too, took place in the same month.

But this earliest building is not to be reckoned among the chief attractions of Jounpore, those noble mosques unique in style, and unrivalled in beauty by any which depend for their beauty only on elegance of design and elaboration of a simple material, and not on the barbarous and facile glory of rare marbles and bright enamels.

An extract from Fergusson's description of one mosque will give an idea of the general features of the style. 'It consists of a courtyard **, on the western side of which is situated a range of buildings, the central one covered by a dome, **, in front of which stands a gate-pyramid or *propylon*, of almost Egyptian mass and outline. ** This gate-pyramid, by its elevation, supplied the place of a minaret which none of these mosques possess. The three sides of the courtyard were surrounded by * colonnades ***; on each face was a handsome gateway.

'These Jounpore examples are well worthy of illustration, and in themselves possess a simplicity and grandeur not often met with in this style. An appearance of strength, moreover, is imparted to them by their sloping walls***.'

This extract will show that the special characteristic of the Jounpore style is the lofty propylon with sloping walls hiding a single dome; and it would be well to have some idea of the causes which led at this place to the adoption of this plan, so original, so quickly perfected, and never imitated elsewhere. Did we know—as we can never hope to know—which was called for first, the dome or the propylon, we should be able to guess the object each was to answer. For, while the dome is undoubtedly the most imposing covering for a single chamber, it seems, at least when seen from without, to overpower a room whose walls are not proportionably lofty; and it is hard to fancy how the effect of any building could be pleasing where a dome covered the centre of a simple oblong. The ordinary reproach of the ugly building of 1862—'Fowke's Dish Covers'—will serve as an illustration, though every one knows well that the so-called domes had not one of the common beauties of a dome. If, then, for the sake of an imposing internal roof to a central chamber, the founder wished to build a dome, and if with his desire to utilize material existing in abundance at hand, he was somewhat

cramped in his choice of the height of his building, no great ingenuity would be wanted to make him think of proportions ally elevating the central portion of his facade, turning himinarets—if he had planned any—into abutments, and filling the intervening arch with a rich screen which should hide the dome. This seems the true theory. For the idea of the dome must surely have come first. The bold facade standing alone can have been satisfactory only when viewed from directly in front ; from every other point it would have seemed purposeless, from behind worse than purposeless. Yet, though it had been possible to view it only in the most advantageous way, from the direct front, no one would dream of building a facade eighty feet high through which might be access to a chamber less than forty feet high and scarcely forty square. And so we would claim for the Pathan architects of Jounpore the honour of being the first in India to plan domes of any size, and also of being the first in India to make domes, and their adjuncts, an imposing part of a range of buildings.

The plan of the Atala Musjid confirms this theory. Here the architect has thought the western wings wanted elevation, and has therefore placed on them small domes half way between the centre dome and the cloisters ; but, though these domes are certainly not so large as to seem to crush the substructure, he has hidden each behind a proportionate *propylon*. But certainly the Zuffrabad mosque, which seems to be a Buddhist temple with the pillars *in situ*, the form of worship alone being altered, seems at first sight to make against the theory ; for, while it certainly never had a dome, it certainly has had a large arch between two piers giving a facade as lofty as that of the Atala. But we are not prepared to admit that the cases are at all similar. First of all the arch at Zuffrabad seems to have been a later addition ; the substructure is stone to above the level of the roof, and the arch has been of stone, but the upper half of the piers is of brick. Again, the facade of the Jounpore style has the arch closed with pierced screen ; the little remains of the spring of the Zuffrabad arch do not seem to have any traces of the inner or recessed arch which framed the screen ; if it ever had this inner arch and screen, this alone of all has lost it. Once more : the top of the piers is reached by a very steep stair running across the back of each, whereas had there been a screen, one would have expected a plan followed like that of the upper part of the Juma Musjid, which, carrying the stair across the screen, makes the ascent far easier and safer.

Imposing as this style is, it has one weak point. An arch to be stable must be equally loaded ; the haunches will force out

the crown, or the crown the haunches, if the weight on either of these points be excessive. And, out of the five examples of this style which are built, the true arches of two, and those two the most elaborate, have fallen; the recessed, or inner arch can hardly be called an arch, as its stones are supported really on the pierced wall which forms the screen, a fact evident enough on inspection of the Jinjri Musjid, where the voussoirs are loose and would fall, but that they rest on the screen. It was doubtless difficult to calculate the exact depth of stonework which would sufficiently weight the crown and yet not look too heavy: in the case of two mosques of the first age, and those, as we have said, the richest, the architect failed, and by over weighting the haunches has forced out the crowns: the third of that age, perhaps the oldest, is plain almost to ugliness, and here no difficulty could be felt: at the fourth in point of time, the Lall Durwaza, the arch is carried up somewhat in an ogree shape, so that the arch does not seem to end till there is already a considerable weight on the crown. Before the foundation of the fifth and last, the proper proportion seems to have been discovered, for the arch stands firmly without seeming heavily loaded, and there is no apparent artifice to conceal the depth of stonework above. Fergusson notes the further peculiarity that the sides of these *propyla* slope. Though this may not be noticed on a first and cursory glance, it is easily seen when the attention is once called; for at the Atala Musjid the slope is one in fifteen, at the Juma Musjid one in twelve. Such proportions evidently impart to the whole pier much of the character of a buttress, though there is no thrust requiring such precautions.

The construction of the domes deserves note. Where the hall to be covered is somewhat oblong, it is reduced to a square above by boldly projecting cornices; but whether resting on pillars, on walls directly, or on such cornices, the octagonal story consists of eight uniform, deep, depressed straight sided, pointed arches above which, as the immediate support of the circular base of the dome, comes a like uniform range of sixteen arches or rather niches. To the uninstructed eye these arched pendentives are certainly the most pleasing; the manner in which they obtain and afford support can be understood at once, and their massiveness prevents the suspicion of a destructive thrust.

First in order comes the Atala Musjid, one of the earliest specimens of the true Jounpore style, and once unrivalled; now the fall of the outer arch has reduced the square and noble facade to a rich screen flanked by two ragged pinnacles. It was built on the site of a temple said to have been erected, but more probably only further appropriated, 1416 Sumbul (A. D. 1859) by Raja

Jeichund of Zuffrabad for the reception of his favourite image, and how largely it is indebted to its predecessor may be judged from the extract from Fergusson given below. This temple soon caught Feroz's eye when he was building his fort, but his attempt to destroy it was so violently opposed by the heathens of the neighbourhood that, after much bloodshed, he was compelled to enter into a written compact, which bound him and his successors to leave other temples untouched, and not further to injure this, though closing it to heathen rites. To this compact produced before him, Ibrahim paid small attention, filling those who had trusted to it with consternation, by a very plain statement that the propriety of making agreements, and the propriety of keeping them when made, varied with the power of the parties. Yet he is said to have spared the gate of Atala Devi, only hewing away the idolatrous carvings : there is now no trace of such a building.

Brief as Fergusson's description is, we shall do well to quote it as a text. "Of the three mosques remaining at Jounpore, the "Atala Musjid is the most ornate and most beautiful. The "colonnades surrounding its court are four aisles in depth, the "outer columns of which are double square pillars, as are also those "adjoining the interior of the court. The three intermediate rows "are single square columns. This is, altogether, so like an Indian arrangement, that I at one time was half inclined to agree "with Baron Hugel, and fancy that this was really an old Buddhist monastery. Its gateways, however, which are purely "Saracenic, are the principal ornaments of the outer court, and "the western face is adorned by three propylons similar to that "of the Lall Durwaza, but richer and more beautiful, while "its interior domes and roofs are superior to any other specimen "of Mahometan art I am acquainted with of so early an age."

Passing over the inaccurate statement of the number of the colonnade aisles, (for there are five instead of four,) we find raised in this passage the most interesting of the questions concerning the antiquities of Jounpore, *viz.*, how much of this building is really Ibrahim's work. On the strength of the Saracenic gates, and the true mosque, Mr. Fergusson assigns all to that prince, while he understands Baron Hugel to assign, on the strength of the plan of the colonnades, all to the older rulers of the subject country. But we have historical evidence that a demolition and desecration begun by Feroz was carried much further by Ibrahim, and therefore the *whole* of the existing building is certainly not Buddhist work. Indeed, there is no evidence that they ever built domes anywhere, and the abundant use of Buddhist ornament may be accounted for by the fact, that the

materials of older buildings were largely used, that the workmen employed were doubtless natives of the country, and that the new comers, possessing no national style of ornament, would naturally accept, and follow the rich ornament they found. But, on the other hand, there was no reason why Ibrahim should throw down more than either had been defiled by the rites he was supplanting, or stood in the way of any new decoration. And Buddhist architecture lends itself freely to any partial demolitions and reconstructions. Made up of isolated portions using no arches, (which, if the most beautiful are also the most destructive of all, architectural expedients,) it allows of the fall, without risk to other portions, of any piece of roofing or even of any single pillar Ibrahim could therefore demolish any side, or part of a side, of the court, and join his new work on to the old without fear of any destructive set. So that we hold a theory intermediate between that of Fergusson and Hugel, *viz.* that a large part of the Buddhist cloisters were left untouched by Ibrahim, when he replaced the *cella* by his splendid mosque, and built the gateways which now so much ornament the formerly bare enclosure.

The mosque stands on the western side of a court about fifty-one paces deep by fifty-five broad. It is surrounded by a colonnade in two stories, the upper story being open in its whole breadth, while, of the lower, three aisles in depth lie open to the court, the fourth being chambers closed to the court but opening, through the fifth, as a verandah on the street. The under-croft is very low, barely six feet in height; the upper is more airy, for to the stone beams—which are about nine inches deep—measures seven feet nine inches. The roofs of these colonnades have in two places fallen in, but the repairs commenced under the superintendence, and through the exertions of Mr. Girdlestone, are likely to prevent all further injury. It may be doubted whether the restoring the parapets with new stone was necessary or advisable; if not necessary it is certainly objectionable on account of the contrast of colour. The upper story of the cloisters is forty-one feet six inches broad, and is reached by stairs in the piers of the gates.

Access to the court from without is gained by a gate on each face but the west. In outline these gateways closely resemble the propylon of the mosque, but they are of no great elevation. The chronicler having forcibly lamented the violence of Secunder, and specially his destruction of the eastern gate of every mosque, one feels some surprise at seeing it here injured only by time. Over every gate is a large slab which has borne an inscription; the bars round the different lines may be traced, but the inscriptions can be scarce legible; one preserved, how-

ever, in the "Ahwalat Jounpore wuh Sooltan Hindoostan," and thence extracted in the chronicler's note book, gives the date of the completion of the mosque, Zeekada A. H. 821, but mentions among Ibrahim's titles his youthful office of Naib Atabook Azim. Internally, the north and south gates are domed, and so the pillars being arranged to support the dome, form a round or octagonal vestibule about thirty-five feet in diameter, and as of course the upper pillars rest immediately on the lower without an intervening floor, the height to the base of the dome must be some sixteen feet. The roof of the vestibule of the eastern gate is flat, and the main passage but nine feet broad, little more than the ordinary space between pillars in that colonnade. The pillars are about a foot square in the lower story; the upper are partly round: the resemblance between those in each story shows that each group must have been part of one original design, though they are not precisely alike; they have probably been wrought from notes of measurements taken down by different persons orally, not from a model.

To turn to the mosque. This occupies the whole of the western side, the northern and southern corners, to the breadth of the cloisters, having apparently been assigned to women, for the upper stories, adorned with carved pillars and ceiling, are screened with elaborate stone lattices, and are reached from the street by stair-cases leading to elegant doorways in the northern and southern corners, sheltered by the projecting walls of the cloisters, than which these chambers are about a fourth narrower. The front of the mosque to the court is divided into three portions of about equal length, the centre one being the propylon and front of the great hall of the mosque, the other's wings standing back sixteen feet from the pier face, and each relieved by a smaller propylon masking a proportionate dome.

The piers of the chief propylon are thirty feet apart, the inner walls of course vertical; the batter on the outer is plainly perceptible, commencing above the foundation course which rises square some nineteen inches above ground. The facade stands back nine feet six inches from the base of the piers, but the arch which supported the square ridge of the propylon has long since fallen, and the remaining facade consists of the doorways, with a rich screen above supporting a plain stone arch as frame. The line which divides this facade, on a level with the roof of the cloisters, Fergusson calls, after the fashion of Gour, the Badshah ki Tukht; that term does not seem used here. The winding stair-cases in these piers are complete as far as the piers are, and so we reach the roof of the cloisters, and the aisle which, on a level therewith runs below the base of the dome on all sides but the west.

Within, the mosque is richly but not inordinately decorated by the carved mebrabs, and the belts which run, like frames, round all arches. It measures thirty-nine feet six inches north to south, and twenty-nine feet five inches east to west; and the oblong is reduced to a square, as the first step to reaching a round base for the dome, by a projecting bracket or cornice carved below. The octagonal stage is of low arches, slightly ogee, some eighteen inches broad, floriated internally with lotus buds; above is the story of sixteen sides, of niches similar to the arches below, but shallow and closed; its corbels are round, nearly flat below, and worked with the full blown lotus which adorns all spandrels wanting relief; and on this story rests the round substructure of the dome. This, again, is relieved by projecting ribs of darker stone, worked with like shallow bas reliefs, running up from the angles of the polygon, till more than half way up they branch into hexagons, whose upper angles are filled by the pentagons of whose bases is composed the circle, a yard in diameter, crowning the dome. The only internal furniture of the mosque is the pulpit of eleven steps, perfectly plain but for a band of shallow carving running along near the ground and round the opening under the pulpit, and a plain bracket for a light about half way up.

The plan of the domes in the wings is precisely similar, save only that they rest on columns instead of on walls. The wings are but of three aisles, and of course have no upper story, the pillars of the roof standing, as at the gates, immediately on the lower pillars. The outer range of pillars is double; the aisles are eight feet four inches broad, and the pillars sixteen inches square.

A work of the same reign, and probably a few years earlier, is still undamaged, save by the loss of any cloisters or gate it may have boasted. This is the mosque Duriba, Khalis Mookhlis, or "Char unguli," built on the site of a favourite temple of Bijai-chund by Mullik Khalis and Mullik Mookhlis, governors of Jounpore under Sooltan Ibrahim, and described in one place as his chief nobles, in another as "chelas" of Feroz, but of whom one was at all events a namesake of the only one of Ibrahim's brothers, of whom a separate and important command is recorded. Bijaichund is said to have prefaced his devotions in this temple, erected by himself, by bathing in the "Khas Houj," an enormous stone tank, three quarters of a mile from his palace, and still to be traced north of the great mosque, proceeding thence on foot to the temple. The mosque was erected for the convenience of Syud Oosman, a reputed saint born at Shiraz, driven from Delhi by the irruption of Timour; his descendants still are said to dwell

near the mosque, which was rescued by Mr. Welland from the desecrating occupancy of the neighbouring Koeries. It consists of a domed hall and two wings, the dome masked by a low facade of the character peculiar to Jounpore, but there is not any ornament to break or relieve the sombre massiveness of the building. The name by which it is most commonly known is "Char unguli," given it by reason of a stone in the south pier, bearing a line three inches long which should measure four fingers whosoever be the hand measuring; much poojah is done by Hindoos to this miraculous stone, and it is immensely revered by Mussulmans even if they do not daub it with oil or pay any such outward respect.

Of the remaining building of this age, nothing is left but the great piers, flanking a screen of such beauty as to show that the completed building could have been inferior in size only even to the famous Atala, the work of the same founder, and doubtless designed by the same architect. Wishing to build a mosque in honour of one Huzrut Syud Sudder Jehan Ujmulî, Ibrahim demolished the temple which Jaichund had built at Mookoot Ghât, and on its site erected this building, occupying part of the west side of a large court. Part of the court walls were knocked down by Secunder, and the stones appropriated for other public and private buildings, and conspicuously for the great bridge. Floods in the ravine which it overhangs, and in the close adjoining Goomtie, long since destroyed its vaults, and the brick enclosing wall and low poor roof are the work of the last generation. Still, though it is kept clean and in order, the little court is more used for drying grain than as a place of prayer; for, though within the Sipah Mohullah, it is a quarter of a mile from the city, and its nearest neighbours are the dead Pathans whose tombs are in Chachukpore. It is commonly known as the "Jinjiri Musjid," and though very little known is well worthy of a visit, both on account of its past beauty, and as showing now completely what in the Jounpore style seems an inner true arch is merely a part of the screen; for its voussoirs here (all carved with a long raised Arabic inscription, the only instance in Jounpore of such a decoration) are all loose, and, but for the support of the pierced screen, would fall.

The sole remaining work of Mahmood's reign is the mosque known as the Lall Durwaza, so called in memory of the "high" gate painted with vermilion of the palace which Beebee Rajey built at the same time close by. How it escaped untouched when Secunder destroyed the palace, it is hard to say; but both mosque, gates, and cloisters, are still in good preservation, the few stones, which have fallen in the lapse of time only sufficing to show

that the stones of this, like *all* the other mosques of Jounpore, had before been used in some Buddhist building. Churchwardens are the same all the world over, and though at the hours of prayer few stragglers push open the heavy gate to enter and pay their devotions, the mellowed stone work of the mosque was not long since treated to a liberal coat of white-wash, though the courtyard and cloister roofs were not freed from the rank jungle grass. There is nothing very peculiar about the plan; three gates give access to a large court, with a cloister of one story only running round, on the west side of which stands the mosque, the wings double the height of the cloister, the dome of the central hall masked as usual by a propylon. The illustration given by Fergusson is imperfect as not showing the dome, which, from the point of view chosen, would be distinctly seen behind the propylon. The pendentives of the dome and the flat roof of the wings rest immediately on slender pillars, and there is nothing resembling an upper floor any where, save that on each side of the central hall is a raised gallery, apparently for women, approached by a stair through the piers of the propylon. The date of erection, or any allusion to the founder, is nowhere inscribed, though in two places within are passages from the Koran, and high on the screen without is a black stone bearing the Mussulman confession of faith. On the whole this is the least interesting, though most perfect, of the præ-Mogul buildings of Jounpore.

Last among the buildings which require detailed notice is the splendid mosque of Hossein. Of the proximate cause of its foundation divers accounts are given. Some attribute the design to Ibrahim, who wished to save an old saint, Huzrut Khajeh Eesah, the voluntary labour of walking barefoot from his dwelling hard by, to the Musjid Khalis Mookhlis, a mile distant, for the Friday prayers. Others say that when, in a seven years' famine, Hossein found his agents diverting to their own use the funds and supplies he had granted for distressed persons, he devised a labour test, directing that only those who laboured in casting up the mound which is now the courtyard of the mosque, should receive anything. There is possibly truth in both stories. No one attributes any part of the building to Ibrahim, yet some such design may well have occurred to him, for all his family lie in a cloistered court of a building close adjoining the north side of the mosque, probably round the grave of this Khajeh Eesah, who was certainly buried where he had lived; the sanctity which made him a tempting grave-mate was enough to suggest the building a mosque in his honour. The famine, however, may have been invented to account for the

raised courtyard which surely needed no such explanation. Yet, be all this as it may, the work must have occupied many years of Hossein's reign, though it was not ready for dedication till after his fall. We may wonder that Behlol allowed his fallen foe to complete and reap the credit of so magnificent a structure, and indeed even that Secunder, in his rage at Hossein's persistent treachery, was content with throwing down the eastern gate, and somewhat damaging the cloisters, after vowing that not a stone should be left to record the existence of his rival.

On a site sloping slightly to the southward is raised a terrace, some sixteen feet high on the south side, where the face is composed of a series of little chambers. The west side of the terrace is of course occupied by the mosque, and on the middle of each of the other sides is a domed gateway, approached by a steep flight of steps. These gateways give access to a flagged quadrangle about seventy yards square, surrounded by a colonnade in two stories, whereof the eastern face was destroyed with the dome of the gateway by Secunder's order, and the southern range is less injured than the northern. They never, however, rivalled the cloisters of the Atala Musjid, for they were but two aisles broad. The trees, which make so pleasant a shade in the quadrangle, so obscure the front of the mosque, that it is not possible to get a very satisfactory view even of the superb screen.

The *propylon*, eighty-six feet in height, decreasing from seventy-seven feet in breadth at the base to little more than seventy at the top, projects ten feet eight inches from the general line of the front, and six feet six inches from the inner arch which frames and rests on the screen. The piers, here as elsewhere, are relieved by shallow niches, in outline Mahomedan, in ornament, Buddhist. The span of the inner arch is thirty-six feet nine inches, and the lower part of the screen is occupied by the three doorways, square headed but for their brackets, which give access to the central chamber. The true screen, which, treating the whole as a gigantic doorway, might be called the *tympanum*, is made up of tiers of pointed openings, framing stone latticework, and divided by bands of horizontal ornament. Suffice it to say, that scarce a stone seems undecorated, and that no two bands seem, on a cursory view, to be of the same pattern.

Within, a dome forty feet in diameter, roofs a chamber so exactly resembling that of the Atala mosque, that the only point of difference to be noted is the absence here of raised ribs relieving the interior of the dome. The passage above the level of the doorways runs here all round the dome, so completely

connecting the upper chambers which seem to have been the prayer place of the women, and which here, thus immediately adjoining the central chamber, instead of being as at the Atala in the extreme corners, look down, through varied lattices, on the pulpit and the prayer place of the men. Neither of these chambers is lofty, for while the lower storey is but fourteen feet in height, the upper is not twelve. And, of necessity, they are gloomy in the extreme, for there is little opening even on the east side; on the north and south light can be only borrowed from the mosque and the vaulted chamber, and the pillars supporting the heavy ceiling are many and massive. Several bays of the ceilings in the upper storey are carved in low relief, but those below are quite plain. Access to these upper stories, as to the roof of the mosque and the top of the *propylon*, is gained by a winding stair in the piers, entered from within the chambers; this could be reached without passing through the quadrangle, for on the north-west side are the remains of a stair from which a door has once led into the lower floor of the northern chambers.

Beyond these chambers "on each side is an apartment forty feet by fifty, covered by a bold pointed vault with ribs, and so constructed that its upper surface forms the external roof of the building, which in Gothic vaults is scarcely ever the case." To this description by Fergusson scarcely anything need be added. Almost the only ornaments are the three *giblahs* facing the three doorways and the few openings for light in the north and south gables. The ribs strengthening the vaults, and the vaults themselves are perfectly plain. Yet it is necessary to correct an assertion which he makes just below, that the double-storied cloisters and the eastern gate were thrown down by Englishmen to mend the station roads; they were certainly demolished by Secunder, and though it is far from impossible that use has thus been made of materials lying ready to hand, the mosques of Jounpore have certainly nothing but reason to rejoice in the consequences of English rule. Indeed, we have even interposed to save them from their friends, and to restrain the Mussulman improver from defiling the time-mellowed stone, and defacing the elaborate carvings with his much-prized white-wash.

Enough has been said of the Juma Musjid. Yet this is now much the same as saying that our self-chosen task is done. For it will not be desired that we even catalogue remaining mosques, from the spacious flat-roofed one called after Mirza Meeruk who repaired it, or that vaulted one built by Khan Khanan Moomyim Khan as the spot where prayed the fuqueers, who got the credit of the dry weather and the resource of the architect; or that other, built by the Khan Khanna

for Soliman Shekoh on the old south bank of the river, facing the little hummam which gave place to the mystic image discovered by Mr. Deane ; or the long wall built by Hossein for an Eedgah, with the terrace and baths and gateway of Moomyim Khan, for which, even but seventy years back, Sheolall Dooby, the tehsildar, had to furnish canopies and carpets. Still less will it be expected that we tell of the endowed hummams which once made Jounpore a paradise ; (for, what says the chronicler ? “ The “ proverb is true that no place is worth living in which has not a “ just judge, a good doctor, and an old humam ” ;) the buildings have long since perished, though they survived their endowments, and their sites are only known by local names, or even by the narrative of the chronicler. Yet once more it is necessary to express somewhat of wonder at the noble buildings on which the Mussulman invader drew so largely, and whose beauty formed his style. Though we had not the frank acknowledgments of the chronicler, and his account how Ibrahim thought it consecration enough to knock off the head of any image and build it, face inwards, in a wall, the carved ornament discovered where any stone has fallen, whether in the wall of the dower-house, the Juma Musjid, the Lall Durwaza, or the Fort, would tell plainly enough the double use of the materials. If the Atala show less of these than other buildings, the reason probably is that there but little of the ancient building was destroyed. Yet there, and every where, all the ornament, in gross and in detail, is purely Buddhist ; the construction, the arches and domes only, betray the influence of other taste. The arches are floriated with lotus buds, the spandrels relieved with full blown lotus flowers, the bands of ornament are largely made up of lotus blossoms, in every stage, and lotus leaves from every point of view, more or less conventionalized, and even the name of God in the qiblehs is inscribed on the Buddhist bell.

If in a visit to Jounpore there be melancholy, yet is that melancholy free from pain. You stand amid ruins, but ruins defiled by no painful memories. Not here does each building recall centuries of blood and lust and crime ; not here at every turn do we see a stone where was exposed the outraged body of some fair woman of our own race and creed. From the pinnacles of the Juma Musjid you look down on the ghost of a noble city, trees growing green where once stood the palaces of princes. From the mound of the Fort—now so desolate—you look down on the fair valley bright with the meanderings of the Goomti, adorned with trees and the thick set tombs of men, many, doubtless, heroic men, though their deeds be forgotten *quia carent vate sacro*. As you look from the upper chambers into

the central hall of the Juma Musjid, when, as the evening draws on, the deepening gloom and the dimmer distance make you feel as standing in a noble shrine of a more famillar faith, the voice of some worshipper below, echoing through the vaults, carries you back to a time when, through the same lattice, some queen looked down on king and nobles, gleaming, in the light of pendant lamps, with the gold and jewels of an eastern court, as they listened to the words of some saintly philosopher seated on that very pulpit. Yet not one of these scenes recalls a crime famous in the foul annals of this word's history, and the saddest spot in the fallen city is that little cloistered court where, amid rank grass and straggling *serifa* trees, plain blocks of stone cover the resting places of the able Mahmood and his noble wife, at the foot of the marble sepulchre of their son the king, traitor, and exile, Hossein.

SIR HUGH ROSE.

1. *Parliamentary Papers relating to the War in the Crimea, &c. &c.*
2. *General Rose and Stuart's Indian Campaigns.* Lowe.
3. *General Orders by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief,*
1860—65.

WE seldom realise, during our own lives, the extent to which posterity will interest itself regarding the careers of those who have contributed to render illustrious the period through which we are passing. Notwithstanding that this is essentially a scribbling age, we fail to perceive that it is at all more fruitful than its predecessors in that careful biography, which lays before us, as they actually were, as they really lived and moved, those who have but lately occupied, or who are now occupying, a prominent place in the historic scene. In fact, the scribbling of the present day is of too desultory a character to be of real or permanent use. Men write, not with a view to enrich the national annals or to advance the cause of historic truth, but, too generally, to gain for themselves a fleeting renown, or to gratify a spurious sort of vanity. Not only do our library tables groan under the weight of three volumed novels,—too numerous to read, and most of them too heavy to digest,—but we have likewise philosophical reflections and paradoxical essays,—many of them displaying, no doubt, an immense deal of ingenuity,—but wanting, almost always, in soundness, in depth, and in common sense. As we examine the majority of these “brain-sick fancies,” we try in vain to realise to ourselves the cast of mind which could conceive that man is sent into this world to act the part of the casuist and the visionary, to spend his entire life in a vain attempt to unravel problems, which it was never intended he should know, and which, if unravelled, would benefit him neither in this world nor the next. If, indeed, worldly wisdom be the only result aimed at, and a man be self-opinionated enough to attempt to acquire that wisdom from books,—why, a single play of Shakspeare is worth more than all the divinations of the modern school of philosophers. On the other hand if the student, before entering the world himself, should wish to see a distinguished man exactly as he lived amongst his contemporaries,—he must seek out a record of his acts, his conversation, his letters, he must

pry, if possible, through his writings, into his very thoughts. To do this is always difficult, often impossible. The man himself has disappeared from the scene, and his writings are too frequently so dispersed, that they can come under the cognizance of but a few. One by one, his contemporaries, those who stood face to face with him in life, follow him to the silent tomb, and the traces of his inner life become more and more obliterated. But it may be said, that at this point the biographer,—the mole of literature,—steps in. His is no path strewn with garlands. No easy honours are showered upon his progress. No present triumph stimulates his vanity or supports him under the long moments of weary labour. He has to dig and delve into forgotten documents ; to search out the links of some story, all the particulars of which have ceased to be remembered ; to reconcile the conflicting statements of men who are no more ; to give to the dry bones of antiquated memoirs a living vitality. It is too often, in fine, a labour, which, like the wheel of *Sisyphus*, seems ever to recur ;—a work, which, always accumulating under newly found materials, seems to defy industry, and to impose a limit even upon perseverance. The result, too, is seldom satisfactory. We have presented to us, an image certainly, the form and fashion of a man who might have lived,—but too often, the resemblance to the actual sitter for the portrait is scarcely discernible, and the peculiarities by which he was distinguished in his lifetime, are not seldom, in the picture, “conspicuous by their absence.” Not so, however, with the writer who attempts to portray a living man. This is a real representation. The artist and the sitter have lived in the same age, have associated with the same people, have taken parts,—though often very different parts,—in the same drama. The atmosphere has been alike to both, and thus, if the portrait be drawn with spirit and truth, with a sincere desire to show things as they were, it must be invested with a reality, in which the portraits of those who have lived in a distant age are necessarily deficient.

There have been few more eventful periods of general history,—none, certainly, of Indian history,—than that through which we have passed during the last seven years. In that interval many great and noble characters have risen to the surface, but what do we know of them? It is true that we have been presented with a likeness of *Havelock*—that pioneer of victory. It is understood also that a life of *Sir Henry Lawrence* is now being undertaken by the eminent soldier-political who is best qualified to write it. But what do we know of *Nicholson*, that real Genius of War? So far as we are aware, not even a magazine article has been devoted to his brilliant

career. Is the story of that career to die? He had friends, admirers, relations. Is there no one to come forward to give that heroic character to the world, before the eyes of those who have seen him on the scene of his exploits and who could tell of his deeds, have been closed by death? Is the career of one who was the greatest ornament, the proudest boast of the Indian Army,—who was at once its hero and its model,—is that career to be allowed to pass out of sight unrecorded? Cannot those who have given to the world the "*copia verborum*" of their own exploits, cannot they spare a few half hours to write their reminiscences of the man to whom all are so much indebted? We never met an Indian Officer who had seen him who did not acknowledge in Nicholson the foremost man of the Indian Army. They owe it, then, to his memory, that his name should not be left to wander up and down the dull pages of some dogmatic history, but that a literary habitation should be found for it, not unworthy of the hero.

But, whilst according to Nicholson all the honour which his character and his great achievements demand we must not forget, that, in another part of this country, there were occurring about the same time events of equal moment,—events fraught with the fate of Western and Central India, and upon the result of which, too, the action to be taken by the princes of Southern India, in all probability, depended. We will not here anticipate the story we propose to tell in this article, of some of those events. We will confine ourselves to the remark, that there was a peculiarity in the character of the General who reconquered Central India, which asserted itself on every occasion, and which materially influenced the fortunes of the campaign. This peculiarity evinced itself in a firm determination to succeed at all hazards; to recognise no such obstacle as 'impossibility;' to be foiled neither by deficiencies in his own camp, nor by superiority of numbers in the camp of the enemy; to regard even disease itself, though attacking his own person, as something to be trampled upon and disregarded. It showed itself likewise in greater things than these. The General who reconquered Central India had gained, either from reading, from experience, or from intuitive perception,—or perhaps from a combination of all three,—so complete a knowledge of the 'morale' of an Asiatic foe, that, at a time when the pre-revolution tactics of Austrian army were in fashion in this country, he never lost an opportunity of seeking his enemy where he was to be found, of beating him when he found him, and of following him up to utter destruction when he had beaten him. More than any other Commander of modern days did this General

realise the eloquent description, given by Sir William Napier, of the battle of Napoléon ;—that it was “ the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood poured onwards, covering all things.” When we recall to mind that this is the General who has commanded the Indian Army during the past five years,—five years of such momentous changes that they might correctly be termed years of silent revolution,—we think we shall be performing a service, not only to the military world of India, but to the military world of Europe, if we lay before the readers of this Review, in a rapid and continuous outline, the main facts of a career which is not only full of interest, but which offers also so much that is worthy of study as does the career of Sir Hugh Rose.

Sir Hugh Rose entered the Army in the year 1820, as an Ensign in the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders. He obtained his commission at a very early age, and,—his father being at the time envoy at the Court of Berlin,—leave was given to him to complete his military education in,—as it was then considered,—that great military capital of Europe. He here enjoyed the advantage of the best instruction which that age was capable of affording. He was subsequently appointed to the 19th Regiment, and, in consequence of the special recommendation of its Commanding Officer, was given an unattached majority by purchase after only a little more than six years' service. Whilst still serving in the 19th, Lieutenant Rose's name was mentioned in division orders by the Major-General Commanding the district for the great gallantry he displayed in completely beating off, with only eight men, overwhelming numbers of the peasantry in the country of Leitrim, who endeavoured to take from him the gauger, still, and prisoners whom he was escorting.

Soon after obtaining his majority, Major Rose was appointed to the 92nd Gordon Highlanders, and served with them eleven years. The Regiment was much employed in Ireland, chiefly in suppressing disturbances in that then distrusted country. On Major Rose devolved the duty of putting down Tithe and Mounster meetings in Tipperary and the adjacent counties. Such was the opinion then entertained of the young Field Officer by Lord Vivian, Commander of the Forces, that he authorised him to collect troops from the several stations, and gave him discretionary powers as to the manner in which he should act so as to repress and put down these illegal assemblages. Major Rose accomplished this very rapidly and very effectively. He acted on this occasion, as in his after career, on the well known, though practically little accepted, principle, that he

gives twice who gives quickly. He moved his troops by long marches with such celerity from one meeting to another, that the dispersion of the rioters was complete, and a few weeks saw not only Tipperary, but the neighbouring counties, freed from those vast gatherings, which had caused so much alarm in England as well as in the sister island. For his services on this occasion Major Rose received flattering acknowledgments from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the Marquess of Anglesey; from the Commander of the Forces, Lord Vivian; and from Sir George Bingham, Commanding the Cork District. But his conduct received even a higher recognition. The present Earl of Derby, then Mr. Stanley, and Secretary for Ireland, addressed Major Rose a letter, conveying entire approval of his conduct, and conferring upon him the Commission of the Peace. This was not only a compliment, but it served greatly to strengthen Major Rose's hands in the difficult duties which devolved upon him as commanding the detachments in the county of Tipperary.

Nothing occurred to break the ordinary routine of duty till the year 1840, when Her Majesty's Government determined to detach several officers of the army of Syria, to act, in conjunction with a naval force, in assisting to restore that country, made over by French influence to Egyptian rule under Mahomed Ali, to the Porte. Major Rose having applied to be employed on this service, was sent to Syria with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and Deputy Adjutant-General. Several other officers accompanied him,—all being under the supreme direction of Brigadier-General Michel, R. A., C. B., an officer of considerable reputation. Soon after their arrival in Syria, it happened that an Egyptian Bey attempted, at the head of a well accoutred force of cavalry, to surprise the camp of Omar Pasha at Mejdal in Palestine. Colonel Rose, who had wandered accidentally in the direction of the Egyptian outposts, noticed the movement, and, hastily collecting a few ill-armed Bedouins, who happened to be close by, he charged down upon the Egyptian horse. In the hand-to-hand encounter that followed Colonel Rose received two or three slight wounds, but he succeeded in completely routing the enemy, killing several of them. He himself, with his own hand, wounded and captured the leader. For this "dashing and gallant conduct," as it was described by Sir Robert Stopford and General Michel, Colonel Rose was rewarded with the Turkish order of the "Nishan Iftihar" in diamonds; he received also a sabre of honour from the Sultan; and for this and other services in Lebanon, his Sovereign bestowed upon him the military Companionship of the Bath.

But a time was fast approaching when an opportunity would be afforded to Colonel Rose of showing that, dashing and gallant though he was, he possessed other qualifications for employment in the public service. Not long after the termination of the war in the Levant, General Michel died ; Colonel Bridgeman, the previous second in command, had gone before him ; and upon Colonel Rose devolved the command of the British staff officers and detachments in Syria. Their presence in that country, however, had long been looked upon with disfavour by the foreign embassies at Constantinople, and it had already been resolved that they should be recalled. But the services of Colonel Rose had been so valuable, and they had been so highly appreciated by the then Secretary for foreign affairs, Viscount Palmerston, that it was resolved that he should be retained. On the withdrawal of the other officers, therefore, Colonel Rose received the special appointment of Consul-General in Syria. This appointment conferred upon him diplomatic powers of a very extensive nature. Its duties were naturally new to him, but the qualities he had already displayed had produced in the mind of Lord Palmerston the conviction, that Colonel Rose was admirably suited to the difficult task of upholding the Turkish and British, against French and Egyptian policy in that quarter of the globe, and the result proved that he judged correctly.

The situation was by no means an easy one. To manage it, indeed, required essentially a light and steady hand, a discriminating judgment, a quick eye, and an invincible firmness. The complications, foreign as well as domestic, were endless. Neither the French nor Egyptians could forget that Syria was lost to their policy. As little could the Roman Catholic Maronites, and the half Pagan, half Mahomedan, Druses, cease to remember their hereditary feuds. To maintain an equal balance between these contending parties, to preserve Syria to Turkey, to see through and baffle the intrigues of the rival powers, were the duties that devolved upon the British Consul-General, and they were duties which demanded the most incessant watchfulness. No doubt, a well devised double-administration under the Suzerainty of the Porte would have preserved peace between the Maronites and Druses, had it been possible for France to have ceased her intrigues, and for Turkey, on such a question, to have acted with good faith. But that was not possible. Colonel Rose, however, succeeded in confining within verbal limits the feuds between these rival factions. He was particularly careful to impress upon the Maronites, whose fanaticism had been raised to a high pitch by the promise of support

from France, that though the whole moral influence of that great Catholic power might be employed to better the position of her co-religionists in the East, she would never, in the face of defiant England, send a single soldier to improve that position by force. It was fit, indeed, that an official with a strong purpose should be on the spot, for a storm was brewing, and the hopes of the contending parties rose and fell with each point of the electric needle.

Colonel Rose's exertions in this difficult position were so well appreciated by the English Government, that Lord Palmerston took the first opportunity of bringing him into the regular diplomatic service, by appointing him secretary to the Embassy at the Porte. On the ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, going on leave, Colonel Rose succeeded him as Charge d'Affaires of the embassy at Constantinople. In this post, Colonel Rose enjoyed many opportunities of acquainting himself with those secret springs of action, which, far more than open and avowed pressure, constitute the moving power in an Eastern Government. His quick eye soon discerned that Russia was preparing a secret blow which should render her the real mistress of Constantinople. It was by secret missions, covered though they might be by the pomp and circumstance attending splendid embassies, that Russia had always worked her way at Constantinople. During the period when Lord Ponsonby filled the post of ambassador at the Sublime Porte, the constant intrigues of Russia had demanded the incessant vigilance of that nobleman, and had proved the most powerful enemy of his repose. Yet, notwithstanding his unremitting watchfulness, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had been concluded without his privity. By this treaty Constantinople had been placed in such a position, that it seemed that Russia had but to give the word to take formal possession of it. And in 1853-4 every indication was given that, in the opinion of the Emperor Nicholas, the time for giving that word had arrived. A great and special embassy was despatched from St. Petersburg, headed by Prince Menschikoff, a personal favourite of the Czar, and a man of an overbearing and even insolent demeanour. Such a man was well calculated to overawe the ministers of the Sultan and to carry out the real object of Russia's secret policy,—her assumption of the protectorate of all the subjects of the Porte of the Greek persuasion,—constituting, in European Turkey, a great majority of those who owed allegiance to the Sultan. Now, as in addition to their being the majority, these Greeks are likewise the most intelligent and the most powerful of the subjects of the Porte, the policy of Prince Menschikoff was

simply the assertion of the supremacy of Russia over the larger portion of the European subjects of the Sultan,—the first and surest step to ultimate sovereignty over the whole.

More like a sovereign prince than the servant of an ally, Prince Menschikoff commenced his mission by a demand for the dismissal of Fuad Effendi,—a minister whom he regarded as belonging to the anti-Russian interest. This demand, insolently put forward,—made, in fact, with the sole view of displaying the greatness of Russia to the startled people of Europe,—was at once complied with. The obnoxious minister was dismissed, and then, Prince Menschikoff, deeming the ball at his foot, developed, perhaps rather too incautiously, the secret object of his mission. We have used the term “rather too incautiously,” because it is quite probable that the Russian ambassador traded on the absence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe from his post. He possibly thought that the fact that this determined enemy of Russian aggression was in England, afforded him the best opportunity of pressing his master’s demands upon the Turkish Government. But, if he argued in that way, he deceived himself. Not even Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, skilled as he was in foiling Russian manœuvres,—not even Lord Stratford could have watched with a keener or more penetrating glance the movements of Prince Menschikoff than did Colonel Rose. So far as the manœuvres of the insolent agent of the Czar could be fairly met, he met them. In open warfare, he was the undaunted representative of British interests. In secret manœuvring, indeed, an Englishman always feels less at home than a semi-Asiatic; but in watchfulness, in promptitude, in decision,—in all the requirements, in fact, which depend upon the action of a manly mind, Colonel Rose could not have been surpassed.

But a crisis that would test all these qualities was fast approaching. Prince Menschikoff, finding that his previous demonstrations had not produced their intended effect, and seeing that the time had arrived, when, if he did not wish to be baffled, he must take a decisive step, made those demands upon the Sultan, which, if complied with, would have rendered him absolutely subservient to the Russian power, and have involved, in addition, a complete infraction of the quadruple treaty of 1841, of which England was one of the guarantees. In this difficulty, the ministers of the Sultan, who had already had ample experience of the firmness and good faith of the English Charge d’Affaires, informed Colonel Rose, that they would be compelled to give way to Prince Menschikoff, and that Russian policy must triumph, unless some positive and material guarantee were given them that England would support them in

opposing the Russian demands. On Colonel Rose endeavouring to ascertain more definitely the nature of the guarantee they required, it came out, that they would be satisfied with nothing short of a material pledge, and they suggested that Colonel Rose should call up the British fleet from Malta to the mouth of the Dardanelles, or to the neighbouring waters.

This was surely a position to try a man,—to test the stuff that was in him. It should be remembered that Colonel Rose was not the appointed representative of England at the Ottoman Porte; he was acting in the absence of his Chief. That Chief too, was a man of widespread European reputation, of great influence at Constantinople, where for years he had succeeded in making his will respected. The acting for such a man doubled the responsibility of the acting officer, in that a false step on his part, made during a few month's tenure of office, would be more prominently noticed by the public, when contrasted with a career that for seven years had been marked by uniform success. On the decision arrived at in this crisis depended too, the issues of peace or war. Had Colonel Rose, for instance, informed the Ministers of the Sultan, that, with the best will in the world, he could not take upon himself the responsibility of ordering up the fleet from Malta, the Porte would have succumbed, Russian policy would have triumphed, but there would have been no war. To order up the fleet, was to pledge England to action. It was to assure Turkey of material aid in resisting Russian aggression. For any official, especially for one only acting in his post, this was a very grave consideration, a very weighty responsibility,—a responsibility which would certainly have made the nights of many sleepless, and their very lives a burden.

Colonel Rose however never hesitated. The only responsibility he regarded was that strict performance, without fear of consequences, of that which he conceived to be his duty. With the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi before his eyes, and knowing that Russia was now demanding something more even than was conceded by that fatal arrangement, he felt that the time had arrived when, if ever, a check must be given to the encroachments of that Power. He informed the Porte, therefore, that if they would refuse to assent to the illegal demands of the Russian ambassador, he would ask the British Admiral to assume a position with regard to Constantinople which would leave no doubt that Great Britain would not consent to the enforcement of the Russian demands. This was sufficient. The Porte appreciating the advantage of the move, and seeing that it was a checkmate to the Russian ambassador, delayed a reply to his

demands, but at the same time, made no secret that they had asked for, and that the representative of the British Government had consented to, the appearance of the British fleet somewhat nearer Constantinople.

We may pause for a moment to consider all the circumstances attending this line of action. The importance of the crisis cannot be exaggerated. Prince Menschikoff was at Constantinople, with his grasp on the throat of the Sultan, and endeavouring to force from him his consent to an arrangement which would have been the death-warrant of the Turkish Empire. The Sultan himself appeared inclined to yield. He did not place much dependence upon England. The English ministry had indeed all along failed to perceive the importance of the crisis, or the proper mode of meeting it. They believed that the moral influence of England, exerted on behalf of Turkey, would be sufficient to induce the Czar to recede, and they feared that the smallest physical demonstration on our part would be regarded as an insult to the dignity, the honour, the unblemished good faith, which they publicly attributed, and privately denied, to the Russian Emperor. They dreaded moreover lest the Czar should seize upon any display of force as a pretext for accomplishing the great object of his ambition. It was fortunate that Colonel Rose was quite free from the delusions which paralysed the action of the British Ministry. The last movement of Prince Menschikoff had convinced him that it was absolutely necessary to satisfy Turkey, by something stronger than words, that England would not allow her to fall undefended. He felt, in fact, that it was necessary not only to act, but to act on the moment,—to strike a counter-blow to this stroke of Prince Menschikoff, to commit England, as far as he could commit her, to something more than a protest against this arbitrary infraction of the common law of nations. He therefore unhesitatingly sent a requisition to Admiral Deans Dundas, then Commanding the British fleet at Malta, to proceed at once to Besika Bay.

Admiral Dundas, bound to comply with the requisition of an Ambassador but not of a Charge d'Affaires, declined to leave Malta. His refusal, however, was of no great consequence. It was the refusal of one of the machines, and not of one of the motive powers, of the English Government. The fact that Colonel Rose had sent for the fleet gave to the Turkish Government a feeling of confidence which enabled them to reply in no submissive tone, to the arrogant demand of Prince Menschikoff. The certainty they now possessed of the support of England inspired the Turkish Ministers with a spirit to which they had long been strangers. None knew better than they that there were ten

divisions of picked Russian troops always ready at Sebastopol for immediate operations, and they were well aware that they had nothing to oppose the disembarkation of such a force at the mouths of the Danube, or under the walls of Constantinople. Their non-compliance with his demands came, as a surprise, to Prince Menschikoff. It announced to him not only the failure of his great *coup*,—the certain success of which he had already heralded to his master,—but it discovered to him also that his attack had recoiled upon himself. This attack had indeed provoked the assurance of that material support from one at least of the great Western Powers, the possibility of which Prince Menschikoff had constantly derided. Too careless in his arrogance to look closely into matters, he had believed that the English had thrown away their last trump-card when they permitted Lord Stratford to proceed to England. His mortification, then, may be imagined, when, on leading the ace of his strong suit, he found that it was trumped by Colonel Rose.

We have stated that Admiral Deans Dundas declined to comply with Colonel Rose's requisition. In this conduct he was supported by the British ministry, but not by the British public. With a true instinct, the people of England discerned that Colonel Rose had done the right thing at the right time, and it was the common belief that the admiral's refusal to act would only the more firmly rivet in the mind of the Czar the conviction he had entertained from the outset, that the English ministry were prepared to go to any lengths to defend Turkey, except to commit England to war. Whether, at that period, the Czar had proceeded too far in his violent courses to retreat with dignity, may be doubtful; but had his judgment been sufficiently cool at that epoch to view matters in their natural light, it cannot be doubted but that the prompt carrying out by the British Government of the statesmanlike and decisive measure initiated by Colonel Rose, would have contributed more than anything to change his opinion. When, a little later, the continued aggressive conduct of the Czar opened the eyes of the members of the Aberdeen cabinet to the policy and wisdom of Colonel Rose's conduct, and they ordered the fleet to the Turkish waters, the fatal "too late" stepped in between the order and the result they hoped for. The Czar had, in the meanwhile, pledged himself too deeply to his ambitious projects in the face of Europe, and he could no longer withdraw from them without the loss of that prestige which he valued more than power.

But we are not writing an account of the diplomatic errors of that memorable period. Sir Hugh Rose, at all events, can

look back to the part he played in those struggles with a pardonable pride. Soon after the occurrence to which we have referred Lord Stratford returned to his post, and almost his first act, after making himself master of the events which had occurred during his absence, and after taking in the actual state of affairs, was to stamp with the approval of his vigorous intellect the acts of his *locum tenens*. Every one knows what followed his return. When at last the scales dropped from the eyes of the Czar, and he saw that the English were prepared to fight if he did not yield; when he realised the fact that the astute Emperor of the French, apparently, and only apparently, following their lead, was resolved to support them, he had committed himself too far to retreat, and war was inevitable.

War followed. Colonel Rose, released from his purely diplomatic functions, was appointed Queen's Commissioner at the Head-Quarters of the French Army. In this capacity, he and two other officers appointed at the same time,—Colonel Claremont, and Major the Hon'ble St. George Foley,—were the organs of communication between the British and French head quarters. They were consulted by the French Generals in all matters relating to Lord Raglan's army, and were present in all the battles and operations before the enemy, being entrusted with the delicate, and often difficult and dangerous duty, of conveying the communications between the French Marshal and the British Commander-in-Chief. To narrate each individual action in which Colonel Rose was engaged would be to narrate the history of the Crimean war. It will be sufficient to state that Colonel,—then promoted to Brigadier-General,—Rose was recommended for the cross of the Legion of Honour after the battle of the Alma; that he was constantly mentioned in the Despatches, published in the *London Gazette*, for distinguished conduct in the French trenches and at the battle of Inkermann, where he had two horses shot under him. It deserves to be added, that Marshal Canrobert, then Commanding the French Army, recommended General Rose for the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on three different occasions, and that the claim was not preferred, solely because General Officers were expressly excluded from this decoration. For his services in this war, General Rose received the Turkish Order of the Medjidie, was made a Knight Companion of the Bath, and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General, "for distinguished conduct in the field."

But a short time elapsed before the reputation gained in the Crimea was tested in a far different field. The Indian mutiny caused a demand upon England for generals of the highest

promise, and, amongst others, Sir. Hugh Rose was directed to repair to the scene of warfare. He was sent to Bombay, and very soon after his arrival there, in the autumn of 1857, he was ordered to proceed in the direction of Mhow, to assume command of the force acting in Malwa, and which was afterwards termed the Central India Field force. One division of this force under General Woodburn had marched from Bombay in June in the direction of Mhow. On arriving at Aurungabad, however, its destination seemed so uncertain to Colonel Durand, the Governor-General's Agent for Central India, and who had been driven from Indore by the mutinous troops of Holkar, that that able officer hastened to the South, in order, by his personal influence, to direct its movements. Colonel Durand met this force at Asseergurh, and so impressed his strong character on the direction of its movements, that not only was the rebellious fort of Dhar taken, but Neemuch was very seasonably relieved after two actions fought at Mundisore. These victories not only broke the spirit of Holkar's mutinous soldiers, but cowed them so completely that at Indore they ignominiously laid down their arms before the man whose life, only a few weeks earlier, they had treacherously attempted. We would willingly pause to dilate upon this little episode of the mutiny. It is an episode which is but little known, and which the unassuming reticence of the chief actor in it has kept hidden from the outer world. It is, however, foreign to our present subject. We will only say of it here, that there are few passages in any history which tell of more unselfish devotion, more firm wrestling with adverse fortune, more prompt and ready action in difficult circumstances, than were evidenced, from the time of the outbreak at Indore on the 1st July, to that of the battle of Mundisore in the last week of November 1857, by Colonel Durand.

It was after this battle of Mundisore and the relief of Neemuch, which followed it immediately, that the force proceeded to Indore, and here, on the 16th December, it was joined by Sir Hugh Rose. The first instructions which Sir Hugh had received were to detach one of his brigades along the grand trunk road to Gwalior, whilst he himself should march the other brigade into Bundelkund, viâ Saugor, relieving that place on its way. These two brigades were to unite at Calpee on the Jumna. Subsequently, however, it was decided that a Madras column under Sir George Whitelock should march to the relief of Saugor and for the pacification of Bundelkund, co-operating for that purpose with the little army under Sir Hugh Rose.

The force under Sir Hugh's immediate orders at this time consisted of one troop of horse artillery, one light field battery, two

eight pounder guns, two eight inch mortars, two five and a half inch mortars, one eight inch howitzer : of Cavalry, a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, and a troop of cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent : of infantry, one European regiment, one Bombay native regiment, one regiment of the Hyderabad Contingent. The same Contingent also furnished two six-pounder guns, and detachments from two other infantry regiments. Attached to the force also were some Bombay and Madras Sappers and Miners.

Sir Hugh stayed a short time at Indore to organise his force, and to arrange so as to co-operate with Sir George Whitelock, but, finding that this latter officer could not be so early in the field as had been hoped, and learning that the necessities of the invested officers at Saugor were very great, he resolved to diverge from the plan of the campaign, and march himself to the relief of Saugor. On the 8th of January, therefore, he quitted Indore, and passing through Bhopal, where he was warmly welcomed by the Begum and assisted by supplies and a contingent 800 strong, he arrived before Rathgurrh on the morning of the 24th."

This fort, "said to be larger and as strong as that of Mooltan, and which had resisted a very large force of Scindia for five months, is situated near the high road from Indore to Saugor, and commands the neighbouring country. It is distant but thirty miles from Saugor, and it had been occupied in force by the rebels, as the best mode of hindering the relief of that place. It is described as being very strong,— "the east and south "faces almost perpendicular—the rock scarped and strengthened "by a deep rapid river running close beneath from east to west ; "the north face looked along the densely jungled hill, and was "strengthened by a deep ditch some twenty feet wide ; the west "face overlooked the town and Saugor road, in this face was the "gateway flanked by several square and round bastions. "The wall to the north side was strengthened by an outwork "looking like a second wall. Along each face were strong bas- "tions commanding various points, and also in the four angles. "Approach from the east and south was next to impossible ; "approach from the west or town side almost as difficult." *

Sir Hugh arrived before this place on the 24th January, and found the enemy posted in some strength on the banks of the river. Having attacked and dispersed these, he at once invested the fort, and selected sites for his breaching batteries. These were ready for opening fire on the night of the 26th, and all that night, the whole of the following day, and on the 28th, a brisk fire

was kept up. On the 28th, however, the Rajah of Banpore moved forward with a force of revolted sepoys and Villaities to relieve Ratgurrh. He advanced on the rear of the investing force with standards flying and with an apparent confidence seldom manifested by the rebels. The approach of this force was seen by the garrison, and their fire on the investing army redoubled. Sir Hugh, however, without for a moment relaxing his fire on the fort, detached some troops, consisting mainly of cavalry, to drive back this new enemy. The appearance of these troopers was sufficient; the rebels did not wait to be charged, but throwing away their arms and ammunition made off into the jungles. The garrison of Ratgurrh, disheartened by the ill success of their allies, silently evacuated the fort during the night, escaping by a path, the precipitous nature of which would ordinarily be considered sufficient to deter men from using it. Their escape, regrettable in one sense, was not perhaps on the whole to be lamented, for the fort itself was so strong, that a few resolute defenders could have held it for a long time against very superior numbers.

After taking Ratgurrh, Sir Hugh marched with a portion of his force to Barodia, fifteen miles distant, to complete the discomfiture of the Rajah of Banpore. He found the enemy posted on the banks of the river Bina, determined to resist his passage. But Sir Hugh, at once attacking him, drove him from all his positions, and inflicted upon him a loss of four or five hundred men. There was considerable bush-skirmishing, and the enemy fought unusually well. We lost two officers killed, and six wounded. The enemy's defeat, however, was complete, and the Rajah, wounded, was compelled to flee on foot through the jungles. The immediate consequence of these operations was the relief of Saugor. This was effected on the 3rd February, after the place had been invested nearly eight months.

Thus had the first object of the campaign been effected. The next was the recapture of Jhânsie, and the infliction of punishment for the barbarous and cold-blooded slaughter of our countrymen and countrywomen in that place.

Jhânsie lies about a hundred and twenty-five miles north of Saugor. But before any movement could be made in that direction, it was necessary to capture Gurrakotta, a strong fort about five and twenty miles to the east of Saugor, garrisoned by the rebel sepoys of the 51st and 52nd Native Infantry, and amply stored with provisions of all sorts. The fort itself stood upon "an elevated angle of ground, the wide river Sonar washing the east face,—a tributary stream,—the Gidaree nullah

"with precipitous banks,—flowing round the west and north faces; to the south, a strong gateway flanked by bastions, and "a ditch about twenty feet deep, and thirty wide. This ditch "ran round the west face also." So thick were its parapets, that when the place was attacked by Brigadier Watson in 1818 with a force of 11,000 men, and twenty-eight siege guns, he was unable, in three weeks, to make a breach in them, and the garrison were allowed to evacuate the fort with all the honours of war!

Against this place Sir Hugh Rose marched, and surprising and cutting up a rebel picquet on his way, came before it on the evening of the 11th February. He found the enemy in some force in the village in front of the fort. He therefore, late as it was, at once took measures to dislodge them by a brisk fire of artillery. The rebel sepoys immediately formed up, and advanced at the double on our guns; but they were repulsed. Making a second attempt, however, they came close up to the guns before they were broken, but then discomfiture was complete. Next morning the breaching batteries were erected, and a fire was kept up on the fort all day. That evening it was evacuated. The enemy, however, were pursued by the Hyderabad Cavalry, and were cut up in great numbers.

Gurrakotta taken no obstacle remained to the march upon Jhansie. About forty miles to the north of Saugor was the strongly fortified pass of Maltoun, and through this it was supposed the British force must march. But there was another pass,—that of Mudanpore,—very strong and very narrow,—by which it was equally possible for the troops to advance. Between these passes and Saugor was a little hill fort also called Barodia, held by the rebels. In this direction the Central India force marched on the morning of the 27th. Barodia was taken on the following day, and on the 3rd March, the little army found itself in front of the passes. Finding that of Maltoun very strongly fortified and guarded in force, Sir Hugh resolved to make a feigned attack upon it, whilst he should direct his real attack upon the less strongly occupied pass of Mudanpore.

Crowning the heights with the 3rd Europeans and the Hyderabad infantry, and bringing the main body along the road, the artillery in advance, Sir Hugh soon felt the enemy in front. The skirmishers first engaged on the heights and in the jungle, but as those of the enemy were driven back, a strong fire of artillery opened from a commanding position at the other end of the pass. Our advance was for the moment checked, so hot was the fire; Sir Hugh himself had a horse shot under him, and the artillery-men took shelter behind their guns. The halt was however only tem-

porary. The guns of the Hyderabad Contingent opened upon the enemy with shell, and, under cover of this fire, the infantry, reforming, dashed at them. Asiatics can stand everything but a charge of Europeans. They had here a splendid position and a large force to hold it ; but the sight of the charging red-coats was too much for them. Men, who were brave, who certainly did not fear death, who hated us bitterly, shrunk from the hand-to-hand encounter which our men offered them. They fled, and the pass was stormed. The effect of this success was very great. It so daunted the enemy, that they gave up, without a blow, the pass of Maltoun, the fort of Narut in its rear, the little fort of Serai, the strong fort of Marowra on the road to Jhansie, the fortified castle of Banpore, the residence of the Raja of Banpore, the almost impregnable fort of Tal Behul on the heights over the lake of that name : they abandoned also the line of the Bina and Betwa, with the exception of the fort of Chandaree on the left bank of the latter river.

After this engagement, and the formal annexation of the district, which, in consequence, came into the permanent possession of the British, Sir Hugh continued his march towards Jhansie. To the fall of this place great importance was attached by Lord Canning, Lord Clyde, and Lord Elphinstone. It was regarded as the stronghold of the rebel power in Central India, and as a place the very holding of which by the Rance was not only a defiance to the British, but constituted the main strength of the rebels on the right bank of Jumna. It was a place, too, in which the slaughter of our countrymen and countrywomen had been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and where the hate to the English name had been shown by acts of the most wanton cruelty. Nevertheless, anxious as were Lord Canning and the Commander-in-Chief that Jhansie should fall and fall speedily, they were both so impressed with its strength, and the inadequacy of the force at the disposal of Sir Hugh, that they wrote to him and offered him the option of proceeding instead towards Banda. The original strength of Sir Hugh Rose's force when he joined it at Indore, we have already seen. His first brigade commanded by Brigadier Stuart was of about similar strength. Jhansie, on the other hand, was extremely capable of being defended. The city was surrounded by a granite wall, twenty-five feet high, loopholed and bastioned. On the walls large guns were mounted, commanding every approach. But the fortress was far stronger. On its south and east faces were strong towers, the guns of which were so laid as to enfilade one another, and batteries had been thrown up outside the fort, commanding every approach to it. The Saugor road had been

specially cared for, and the fortress, strong naturally,—built on a high granite rock,—had been rendered to all appearances impregnable. It was garrisoned by 11,000 men, composed of rebel sepoys, Valaitees, and Bundeelas, and governed by a woman, who wanted only a good cause to be a heroine.

As if to add to the difficulties of the situation, Sir Hugh Rose learned that Tantia Topee had raised and organised a considerable force,—which he had dignified with the title of the army of the Peshwa ; that he had taken the fort of Chirkaree in Bundelkhund, and that he was moving towards Jhansie with the intention of driving the English force from its walls.

With all these difficulties in his path, Sir Hugh did not hesitate for an instant. To many a man, the responsibility, kindly meant as it was, placed upon him ; the offer to him to move elsewhere with his force, because Jhansie was too strong for him, would have caused terrible anxiety and hesitation. But superior men revel in responsibility. They delight in being allowed to play their own game. Far, then, from availing himself of the option of transferring his force to a less dangerous scene, Sir Hugh prepared himself, with the greater determination, to attack the rebels in their own chosen and well-fortified position. On his march to that place, and with a view to secure his left rear, Sir Hugh despatched General Stewart, commanding his first Brigade to attack the fort of Chandaree on the river Betwa. This fort was stormed on the 17th March, after a desperate resistance on the part of the garrison, and with a loss on our side of five officers and twenty-five men, killed and wounded. ●

Meanwhile Sir Hugh himself marched on Jhansie, and arriving before it on the 21st March, at once invested it. To invest such a place as Jhansie, four and a half miles in circumference, with the force at the disposal of the English General, was certainly a very bold measure. But boldness is often synonymous with prudence, and, in determining to adopt this mode of attack, Sir Hugh showed how well he had mastered the leading features of the Asiatic character. Investment diminishes certainly the numbers of the attacking force, but, on the other hand, it diminishes to a far greater extent, the confidence of an impressionable enemy, for it displays to him your own. It is a common remark that the English do not, and never will, understand the native character. This may be true in some of its aspects. It is not less true, however, that there are some points of the English character which the natives can never comprehend. The Dantonian motto, *l'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace*, contains within itself a principle which an English General can always

successfully employ against an Asiatic foe ;—a principle which the natives of India have never yet been able to understand. Nothing paralyzes them so much as boldness. The smallest hesitation on the other hand gives them courage. In the presence of a native army, then, a General can always risk manœuvres which he would not dare to dream of before an European enemy.

The complete investment of Jhansie, therefore, by the small force under Sir Hugh Rose, was prudent, because it was bold. The garrison within its walls read in that act the determination of the English General to take not only the place but the garrison with it. Nevertheless, they were resolved to sell their lives dearly. The capabilities of defence were as great, as the difficulties of the attack were many ; and the Ranee was at the same time aware that Tantia Topce, at the head of 20,000 men with twenty guns, was marching to her relief.

The difficulties of the attack were indeed many. The fort of Jhansie, on the high granite rock,—with its three lines of works, its flanking fire, and its walls of solid masonry, presented a most formidable aspect. It was soon ascertained, too, that it would be necessary to take the city prior to attacking the fort as the latter could not be breached. This involved a double labour, and a double danger.

Jhansie was invested on the 22nd, and the same evening the necessary operations were effected for erecting batteries to breach the city wall. Four of these were ready on the evening of the 24th, and opened fire on the 25th. On that day, the first brigade, under Brigadier Stuart, joined from Chandaree. It was at once moved to the south of the fort, and constituted the left attack. The siege was now begun in real earnest. Our troops, however, were terribly overworked. For seventeen days they never took off their clothes, nor were the horses unbridled except to water. From the two attacks shot and shell were continually poured into the city, whilst from the whole line of wall the enemy's guns never ceased to thunder a reply. Advanced positions were taken up near the wall to enable our riflemen to fire upon the enemy's gunners. On both sides the exertions were unceasing. Women and children were seen assisting in repairing the defences of the walls, and carrying water and food to the troops on duty, whilst the Ranee, herself constantly visited the troops and animated them to enthusiasm by her presence and her words.

For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to spare only two eighteen-pounder guns, the remainder of the artillery being used so as to employ the enemy incessantly, and to damage the buildings inside the walls. The progress made by these

two guns was, owing to the great strength of the walls, extremely slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the fort bastion were torn down from the left attack, and on the 30th and 31st further damage was made on their defences. Still, no breach had been effected; the vigilance of the enemy was unabated; their determination to resist as strong as ever; when, on the evening of the last mentioned day, intelligence reached the General that a new enemy was advancing in great force from the North.

This was the army of Tantia Topee,—an army, which, collected from the materials of the force which had attacked General Windham in his entrenchments at Cawnpore, and was subsequently beaten by Sir Colin Campbell,—had been organised under the title of Army of the Peshwa by Tantia Topee at Nowgong, and which, taking Chirkaree *en route*, was now marching to the relief of Jhansie. This army crossed the Bettwa the same night, and encamped close to the English force.

The position of Sir Hugh Rose was full of peril. Before him was an unconquered fortress, garrisoned by 11,000 warriors; behind him and close to him, an army of 20,000 men headed by a sworn enemy of the British name,—one who had revelled in the slaughters of Cawnpore. It was thus a position which required in a special degree a clear head, a cool judgment, and a firm will,—a position in which a single false step would have ruined us. But Sir Hugh was equal to the occasion. Rightly judging that to withdraw the investing troops for the purpose of meeting Tantia Topee would give to the besieged a moral as well as a material advantage, Sir Hugh determined to continue to press the siege with energy and vigour, whilst he should march in person, at the head of such troops as could be spared from the actual duties of the siege, against the new enemy. His plan was to attack the enemy at day break with about 1,000 men of the second brigade, and a less number of the first.

Learning in the night, however, that Tantia had detached a division of his army to relieve Jhansie on the northern side, Sir Hugh directed the first brigade to move against that body, whilst he himself should attack the enemy at dawn. But Tantia Topee did not wait for the dawn. Whilst it was yet dark, he moved his first line towards the British encampment, and drove in the vedettes. But, no sooner had the retreat of these cleared the line, then the British guns commenced a brisk fire on the advancing body. But the fire of a few guns was powerless to stop the onward movement of a line which extended considerably beyond the British on both flanks. The enemy had only to move straight on to come with their overlapping wings upon the

investing party, who would thus be placed, literally, between two fires. Sir Hugh comprehended this in an instant. Massing then his horse artillery on his left, and accompanying it with a squadron of cavalry, he directed it against the right flank of the enemy. Simultaneously, another squadron under the General in person charged his left flank. Terrified at being thus attacked on both flanks, the enemy halted, and his troops became huddled together in disordered masses. At this moment our infantry received orders to advance. Pouring in a volley, they dashed forward at the charge. The result was magical. The enemy's line at once broke and fled, in complete disorder, toward the second line, abandoning several of their guns.

Meanwhile General Stuart had been equally successful against the other division of the enemy. The two routed parties were being thus simultaneously driven on the third division, which, under the personal command of Tantia Topee, still stood its ground. The line of pursuit, however, led Sir Hugh Rose against the front of Tantia's array, whilst it drew General Stuart on to his right flank. Seeing himself thus in danger of being attacked simultaneously in front and flank, and encumbered by the crowds of panic-stricken fugitives, the rebel commander resolved to retreat across the Betwa. To check the advance of the English he caused the jungle in front of him to be set on fire, and then, under cover of the smoke and flame, moved rapidly towards the river. He effected his passage under cover of his guns, which were remarkably well served, but he did not find himself the safer. He was closely followed by our horse artillery and cavalry, which had dashed at a gallop through the flaming jungle, and the pursuit was continued until every gun in his possession had been captured. Tantia himself fled to Calpee. He had lost in this action, fifteen hundred men, and his force had been completely dispersed. Never was a victory more complete.

Fatigued and exhausted, but with their *morale* increased as much as that of the enemy had been depressed by the events of the day, the victorious little army returned to their position before Jhansie, on the evening of the 1st. Sir Hugh was determined to take prompt advantage of the discouragement which the defeat of the great army of the Peshwa had produced among the garrison. He therefore continued to pour in a heavy fire all that night and the day following,—when, deeming the breach in the city wall just practicable, though only just practicable, he resolved to attempt the storm of the place the next morning. He made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to make a false attack on the west wall, with a small detachment. On the sound of their guns being heard, the main

storming party was to issue forth and attack the breach, whilst on the right and left attempts should be made to enter the city by escalading.

At 3 A. M. on the morning of the 3rd April, the storming parties moved to the positions marked out for them to wait for the signal from the western side. No sooner was it given than the main storming party, consisting of the 86th Foot and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, dashed at the breach, covered by a strong fire from the artillery. The resistance here was but trifling, and the breach was entered with but small loss. The right attack however was not so successful. Consisting of the 3rd Europeans, some Hyderabad infantry, and Madras and Bombay sappers,—the ladders on the shoulders of the latter,—they marched forward at the signal, but on debouching into the plain in front of the city wall, they were met by a heavy fire from artillery, and the discharge of rockets, stinkpots, stones, blocks of wood, and other missiles. Moving straight on, however, they planted their ladders against the wall, but some of these were too short, some broke down under the weight of the stormers, and the officers who succeeded in gaining the wall on the others, were cut to pieces before they could receive assistance. Still our men pushed on, and very opportunely the shout from the main column, showing that the breach had been stormed, came to assist them. The opposition in their front then slackened, and the rampart was gained. The attempt at escalading on the left had been successful, and the three columns, uniting, poured into the town. But resistance was not yet over. Covered by the fire from the fort, the enemy showed a determined front, and each house and street were contested with a fierce obstinacy. Colonel Turnbull, commanding our artillery, was shot in this street battle.

Nevertheless our troops pressing steadily onwards made way and drove the enemy into the palace,—the place he had fixed upon for his most resolute resistance. Here the conflict was desperate. Every room was defended with the most determined fury. But it was of no avail. From room to room were the rebels driven with great slaughter, until at last the palace was our own. Even then, the contest was not over. The Ranee's body-guard, some fifty in number, still held the stables. Rushing into the stable-yard to attack them, exposed as it was to the fire of the fort guns, several of our men were in the first instance cut down. The rebel troopers, after firing their carbines from behind their horses, mounted, and charged sword in hand. Some of their comrades at the same time fired the stables. A terrible confusion followed. The glare and heat of the flames

the fury of the excited combatants, the fire of the fort plunging amid friends and foes, the small space for the contest, all combined to make a scene such as has been seldom witnessed. It was not till every man of that Body Guard had been cut down that order was in some degree restored.

All that night, and throughout the following day, desultory fighting continued,—the enemy being either slaughtered, or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. On the night of the 4th, the Ranees, despairing of further resistance, evacuated the fort with all her remaining followers. Sir Hugh occupied it early on the following morning, and detached a party in pursuit of the enemy. Of these two hundred were cut up. Our loss in the storming of Jhansie and the action of the Bettwa amounted to 343 killed and wounded, of whom thirty-six were officers; that of the enemy was about 5,000.

Sir Hugh's object now was to march on Calpee. This was the main arsenal of the rebels, and it was well provided with artillery and other warlike stores. Its distance from Jhansie is one hundred and two miles in a north-easterly direction. The capture of this place would enable Sir Hugh to co-operate with the left rear of Lord Clyde's army, and, coupled with the fall of Jhansie, it would set the seal to the extinction of the rebellion in Central India.

Having rested and re-organised the force, wearied with seventeen days' incessant labour, during which few of them were allowed the luxury of a change of clothes, and having placed a sufficient garrison in Jhansie, Sir Hugh prepared to carry out his plans on Calpee. The appearance, however, of the rebel garrison of Kotah in the neighbourhood compelled him to send a detachment after that enemy, and he awaited its return before he moved. He had meanwhile been joined by a weak wing of the 71st Foot, but this reinforcement did not fill up the gaps which had been caused by casualties, and by the necessity which existed for leaving a garrison in Jhansie. At last, on the 25th April, having previously detached a flying column under Colonel Orr, to clear away the remnants of the rebels, who might otherwise imperil the communications between his own force and General Whitelock's, and then to co-operate with him against Koonch, Sir Hugh marched in the direction of Calpee. Meanwhile the Ranees of Jhansie, the dispossessed Raja of Banpore and Tantia Topee had united their followers, and, impressed with the necessity of saving Calpee, had resolved to do battle for that place at Koonch, about forty miles south-west of Calpee on the Jhansie road. The heat of the weather, unusually great, had made them determine to harass the Europeans as much

as possible in the day time. Leaving then but a few troops in Calpee, they marched with the remainder to Koonch, where they drew up under cover of the fort, and threw up entrenchments and cut ditches across the road in their front. They also occupied the small fort of Loharee, which, so long as they were allowed to hold it, would play upon the flank of an advancing enemy.

Against this position, Sir Hugh Rose moved on the 6th of May. The heat was terrific, but the whole district being studded with forts, it was necessary to advance with great caution. It was long past sunrise, therefore, when Sir Hugh, having mastered the enemy's position, arrived so near it as to be able to direct Major Gall to proceed with a detachment to storm the fort of Loharee. This service was gallantly executed with a loss on our side of four officers and nineteen men, on that of the rebels, of all their number. This impediment to an advance removed, Sir Hugh directed the first brigade,—co-operating with Colonel Orr on the other side of the Bettwa,—to make a feigned attack on the enemy's position, whilst he himself, with the second brigade should make a flank march round their left, and attack them. The enemy did not wait for the full execution of this manœuvre. Alarmed by the presence of the first brigade in their front, and the movement of the second brigade round their flank, threatening to cut them off from Calpee, they gave way, after firing a few rounds, and retreated. Koonch at once fell into our hands, and troops were at once sent in pursuit of the enemy. They were followed up for sixteen miles, and pursuit only ceased when they had lost all their guns.

Although the resistance made by the rebels on this occasion was feeble on the field of battle,—a result owing probably to the fear entertained by their leaders of being cut off from Calpee,—yet in the execution of their retiring movement the gallant bearing of the infantry,—consisting of some regiments of the Gwalior Contingent,—called forth the admiration of the English officers. This retreat was covered by a line of skirmishers two miles in length, resting upon supports of masses of thirty or forty men at stated intervals. These skirmishers retired for a long time in perfect order, keeping up a brisk fire, and it was only when they were taken in flank by our cavalry and artillery that they were compelled to double up and give way.

Our troops suffered on this occasion far more from the sun than from the enemy. The thermometer showed 120° in the shade. The force had been marching from daybreak, and the pursuit was not over till nine o'clock at night. Twelve men of the 71st Foot were struck dead by the sun. Sir Hugh himself was struck down three times, and, Dr. Lowe informs us, "while

"the action was going on, dhooly after dhooly was brought into the field hospital with officers and men suffering from sunstroke, some dead, others prostrated, laughing and sobbing in weak delirium. The sufferings from fatigue, thirst, and exposure were terrible. To all, however, the General showed an example which inspired his soldiers; thrice struck down, he each time forced himself to rally; he personally directed the attack and pursuit; he exposed himself as much as the meanest soldier; and the privations he endured were not less than those to which all ranks were subjected.

Pressing on, as soon as possible, after this successful action, Sir Hugh established himself with the second brigade at Golowlee, on the right bank of the Jumna, seven miles from Calpee, on the 15th. Golowlee is not on the direct road from Koonch to Calpee, but Sir Hugh, having been informed that that road had been strongly fortified, made a flank march across country to his right, leaving the 1st Brigade to make a feint upon the direct road. By this means Sir Hugh was able to open the communications with Colonel G. V. Maxwell, who, with the 88th Foot, some Sikhs, and the camel corps, was on the left bank of the Jumna,—and also to threaten Calpee in an unexpected quarter. Unfortunately the exposure suffered by the troops told upon them with terrible effect, and the deaths and admissions into hospital increased at an alarming rate. The condition of our troops in this respect was well known to the enemy. Indeed, a General Order issued by the rebel commander on the subject was, about this time, intercepted. This order stated that "as the European infidels either died or had to go into hospital from fighting in the sun, they were never to be attacked before ten o'clock in the day, in order that they might feel its force." To add to his anxieties, information reached Sir Hugh at this time that the Nawab of Banda, who had recently been defeated by Sir George Whitelock, had joined the rebels at Calpee with a large force of very efficient cavalry,—the remnants of our mutinous regiments,—and with some infantry and artillery as well.

On the 16th, 17th and 18th May there was constant skirmishing between the two armies, in which the enemy were invariably driven back. On the night of the 19th, Sir Hugh concentrated both brigades at Golowlee, and receiving on the following day from Colonel G. V. Maxwell a reinforcement of two companies of the 88th, the camel corps, and 120 Sikhs, he prepared for a general attack upon Calpee.

The attack presented great difficulties. Calpee is situated on a high rock rising from the Jumna, and is surrounded by miles

of deep ravines,—forming in themselves not only strong natural obstacles to an attacking party, but offering to an enemy well acquainted with the country means of making sudden attacks, and of cutting off small detachments. These difficulties, however, only inspired the General with a determination to overcome them. His plan was, that while Colonel Maxwell should shell Calpee, in reverse, from the left bank of the Jumna, he should clear the ravines himself, and then attack the left face of the fort.

In pursuance of their plan to attack our men in the heat of the day only, the enemy had come down in force on the 20th, and attacked our right flank. To save his men for the grand assault he was meditating, Sir Hugh had contented himself with merely repulsing this attack. Next day Colonel Maxwell opened on the town and fort, and shelled them without intermission. On the following morning, information was brought to Sir Hugh that the rebels had resolved to attack him with all their force on the 23rd; that their plan was to make a feint on his left, whilst, stealing up the ravines with their main attack, they should suddenly burst upon his right, which they calculated would be weakened to support the left. The plan was a good one, and in a military point of view, well deserved to succeed.

It will be understood that our force lay in the ground between the road from Calpee to Banda and the Jumna,—the left nearly touching the Banda road, and the right resting on the ravines near the river. In pursuance of their plan, then, to compel us to weaken our right, the rebels marched out in masses about ten o'clock along the Banda road, and commenced an attack upon our left. This attack, headed by the Nawab of Banda, and Rao Sahib, nephew of the Nana, though intended only as a feint, soon made itself felt, and the left was heavily engaged. Still Sir Hugh, confident in his information as to the real object of the enemy, did not move a man from his right. The attack on the left continued, the feigned attack became a very real one, but Sir Hugh still kept his right in position. It was well he did so. Suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass of fire; guns opened and the enemy's infantry climbing up from below poured in a musketry fire upon the right of our line. The suddenness of the attack, the numbers of the enemy, and the terrible heat of the day gave them a great advantage. Another point, too, was in their favour. Many of our Enfield rifles had become affected by constant use, and the men, after the first dis-

charge, found it impossible to ram down their cartridges. Numbers of them likewise were struck down by the sun and many more disabled by its force. When, therefore, the rebels, starting up in great numbers from the ravines, poured in volleys, which our man could but feebly reply to ; when they saw that each discharge from our line became weaker than the former, they began to gain confidence. Moving on with loud yells, and finding less and less opposition as they advanced, seeing in fact that our men rather gave way, they at last came on with great determination, and driving all before them, came charging towards our guns. General Stuart, seeing the infantry driven back, dismounted from his horse, and drawing his sword bade the gunners defend their guns with their lives. Still the rebels advanced with frantic cries, and it seemed as though, from their very numbers, they must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom information of the desperate nature of affairs on his right had been conveyed, brought up the camel corps at their best pace, then, dismounting them and leading them forward at the double, without a moment's hesitation, charged the advancing foe,—who were then within thirty yards of our guns,—his men cheering as they did so. For a moment the enemy stood, but only for a moment. To waver, to turn, to flee back into the ravines, followed almost naturally. Not only was the attack on the right thus repulsed, but the victory was virtually gained. For the left charged the enemy at the same time with so much vigour and determination, that they broke and fled with precipitation. Those readers who have followed the career of Sir Hugh Rose thus far with attention, will not have failed to notice that he was never content with merely gaining a victory, but that he always improved it so as to disperse and damage his enemy to the utmost. So it was on this occasion. Not satisfied with driving the rebels from the field, he followed them up so closely, that he cut off a great number of them from Calpee. The same night the enemy evacuated that fort. They were pursued, however, by our horse artillery and cavalry, until they lost their formation, and dispersed. All their guns, stores, and baggage were taken from them. Even the Ranee of Jhansie, who fled with them, was compelled, for want of a tent, to sleep under trees.

Calpee was entered on the morning of the Queen's birthday. It was found to contain warlike stores in great abundance ; cases of English rifles and swords unopened ; shot, shell, and every description of ordnance.

Dr. Lowe thus describes the condition of some of the heads of Departments when they entered Calpee. From it an idea may be formed of the manner in which the officers and soldiers of

the force generally were suffering : " The General," he says, " was " very ill : his chief of the staff, Colonel Wetherall, C. B., was in a " raging fever ; his quartermaster-general, Captain Macdonald " worn out ; the chaplain of the force had lost his reason, and " was apparently sinking fast." Truly the men who composed this force, who fought so nobly, and who suffered so severely, deserved the best gratitude of their country !

The taking of Calpee completed the plan of the campaign which the Government of India had drawn out for the Central India force. Marching from Mhow in November, that force, in five months, had traversed Central India ; from the banks of the Seepree and Kala Sind it had marched to the Jumna, and had there effected a junction with the troops under the orders of Lord Clyde. It had been compelled, it is true, to contest the whole country which it traversed ; it had been its lot to encounter, on several occasions, armies vastly superior in number, and led by men whose rancour against the British name incited them to the most determined efforts for our destruction ; it had undertaken sieges, the success of which alone would have made the reputation of a general. These deeds had been accomplished, too, during a season, the terrible heat of which far surpassed the heat of corresponding seasons, and under a sun which proved more deadly even than the enemy. Yet, moving steadily onwards, regarding difficulties as " obstacles to be overcome," letting nothing beat him showing himself equal to every emergency, Sir Hugh Rose had marched his force to the destined goal. Every impediment to his advance had been swept away or struck down. Careless of himself, knowing that to him the representative of his Sovereign, and that Sovereign herself, looked for the successful issue of the campaign, Sir Hugh had shown himself foremost wherever there was danger, kind, sympathising, and attentive wherever there was suffering. His care of his soldiers has never been exceeded. To look after their comforts, to see that after a hard-fought action, the wounded were attended to, and after a long and tedious march, that provisions and water were abundant, was with him a sacred duty. The kind word, the sympathising enquiry were never wanting to the weary, the wounded, the suffering. If, on the battle-field, he demanded all their energies, all their capabilities ; if, for seventeen days before Jhansie, he required them to give every faculty of mind and body to the carrying out of a great end, and even to forego every comfort,—at least, when the necessity passed away, he did for them all that it was in the power of a man in his situation to do. No man could have done more. The same sun that struck down the soldier did not spare the Commander ; the same dangers that

they encountered he dared likewise ; if they did not spare themselves, neither did he ; and yet, with all the cares of the command upon him, with despatches to write, reports to listen to, sketches of the country to examine, he managed to find time to attend to their concerns. The great interest taken in the soldier during his tenure of the office of Commander-in-Chief has not always been regarded in an appreciatory spirit. Yet that interest will not be regarded as extraordinary by those who have had practical experience of the splendid fighting qualities of our men, and who have learned from experience on the field and by the sick bed, that however much it may suit the conscientious pharisaism of some writers to place them on a level with the brute creation, it is yet possible by kind and judicious treatment to kindle within their breasts a strong yearning after that which is good and elevating and pure. Without sympathy on the part of a commander, soldiers may indeed be led, but they will never show that enthusiasm which is so great an incentive to gallant actions. It was doubtless an element in the success of the Central India Force that this sympathy was evinced in an eminent degree by Sir Hugh Rose.

The campaign was now virtually over. The junction was effected. Rajpootana, Bundelkhund, Jhansie, had been relieved from the presence of the rebels, and Sir Hugh, worn out with fatigue, was preparing to return to Bombay. He had issued a farewell order to his troops, when suddenly the intelligence reached him that the rebel army under Tantia Topce and other chiefs, amongst whom was the Raneé of Jhansie, had attacked Sindia at Bahadurpore, nine miles from Gwalior ; that Sindia's whole army, with the exception of his Body Guard, had deserted in mass to the enemy ; that Sindia had fled to Agra, and that the rebels had instantly taken possession of the fort of Gwalior, containing artillery and munitions of war in abundance.

Sir Hugh Rose had previously detached a portion of his force under Brigadier Stuart in the direction of Gwalior, with a view to overawe the rebels ; and, immediately on the receipt of this intelligence, he followed with the remainder. Setting out on the 6th June,—the thermometer 130° in the shade,—he moved by forced marches towards his destination, and overtaking Brigadier Stuart at Indoorkee, on the 16th reached Bahadurpore, the scene of Sindia's defeat. The same day having been reinforced by Brigadier-General Napier and Brigadier Smith, he marched with General Napier's brigade and some of his own men upon the Morar Cantonments, five miles distant, occupied in force by the rebels, and drove them out after an action which lasted two hours. As a part of the same movement, Brigadier

Smith advanced from the east upon Kotah-ka-serai, about seven miles from Gwalior, a point at which communications could be opened with Sir Hugh Rose. The brigadier succeeded in occupying that position, but as the enemy threatened him in considerable force, he deemed it right to attack them. An action ensued, which resulted in the retirement of the enemy, and in the taking up by the brigadier of a position not unassailable by the enemy, but sufficiently strong. The most important occurrence of the action, however, was the death of the Ranee of Jhansie, who fell fighting at the head of her troopers, whilst endeavouring to repel a gallant charge of the 8th Hussars. "Although a lady," writes Sir Hugh in his despatch, "she was "the bravest and best military leader of the rebels." At the same time that these movements were taking place, Major Orr advanced upon the Seepree road to the direct south of Gwalior, whilst Colonel Riddell was moved so as to complete the investment on its west side.

Sir Hugh now prepared for the final stroke. His plan was, having completed the investment, to attack Gwalior on its weakest side, that by which Brigadier Smith had advanced, leaving therefore Major Orr and Colonel Riddell to guard the outlets on the south and west, and directing General Napier to remain at Morar, Sir Hugh himself marched with the bulk of his forces, on the morning of the 18th June, to join Brigadier Smith at Kotah-ka-serai. The distance was twenty miles, and the march was extremely harassing. The heat of the sun was intense. More than a hundred men of the 86th alone were compelled to fall out, although it may be added that these gallant soldiers were not deterred by sickness from joining on the following day in the assault. Sir Hugh found Brigadier Smith, who had advanced nearer Gwalior, in a very cramped position, in a pass between two ridges of hills, one of which, on the left of our force, had been occupied by the enemy, another body of whom were also in force in the gorge about two miles in rear of our position. In front of him was a very deep canal cut out of the rock. Sir Hugh conceived the idea of cutting off both these bodies from Gwalior. The only obstacle to such a manœuvre lay in the difficulties presented by the canal. These however could be overcome. By sunset or a little later a bridge or dam could have been constructed, and over this Sir Hugh might have marched a force which should interpose between Gwalior and the rebels, whilst another brigade should occupy them in front. The movements of the enemy, however, compelled Sir Hugh to abandon this project. Fresh troops poured out of Gwalior and made a serious attack on our left flank,

resting on the canal, the point where we were weakest. To meet this attack, Sir Hugh detached Brigadier Stuart's brigade with orders to cross the canal, and crowning the heights on the otherside of it, to attack the enemy on their left, whilst at the same time Brigadier Smith should advance obliquely, under cover of the ground, against their left front. This attack on their left at once had the effect of making the enemy desist on his right, and no sooner did they find that their left was turned by the movement, then they fell back in haste, abandoning their guns. They were pressed hard by our troops, and driven into the city, and our line advancing at the same time took possession of the highest range of heights above Gwalior. From these heights "the slopes descended gradually towards the town; the lowest one commanding the grand parade of the 'Lushker,' which was "almost out of fire of the fort and afforded an entrance into "the city."*

Gazing from this position on Gwalior, thus lying at his feet, seeing the enemy's infantry and cavalry debouching from the city, but apparently without the resolution to attack him, Sir Hugh Rose resolved to strike at the moment, and endeavour to gain possession of the place that same day. Having formed his battle array, accordingly, he gave the order to advance. The 1st Bombay Lancers, under Colonel Owen, had been ordered to descend the hills and occupy the road which led to the grand parade of the Lushker. This they did in gallant style, not only clearing the parade, but pursuing the enemy into the very streets of Gwalior. They were then withdrawn, and the infantry, taking their place, marched right up to Sindia's palace without meeting much opposition,—the enemy retreating through the town with great rapidity. Brigadier Smith, who had been detached in pursuit, succeeded however in cutting up great numbers of them, in the face of a fierce resistance offered by their artillery. The remainder fell into the hands of General Napier at Morar, who killed between three and four hundred of them.

The old and new cities thus fell into our hands; but the fort was still unsubdued; indeed, throughout these operations, it had maintained a constant, though not very effective, fire upon our troops. On the morning of the 19th, however, at an early hour, Lieutenant Rose, of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Waller, with a party of the 25th and some police, crept up the rock, burst open the main gateway of the fort, and, taking the enemy by surprise, forced an entrance through an archway connected by a narrow street with

* Sir Hugh Rose's Despatch.

the interior defences. Here they had to maintain a fierce hand-to-hand encounter with the garrison, urged to desperation by the knowledge that they had no retreat. The gallantry of Lieutenant Rose and his companions prevailed however over the fury of these desperate men ; they were all either shot down or cut to pieces, and the fort was ours, though in gaining it Lieutenant Rose sacrificed his own life.

Thus ended the Gwalior episode of the Central Indian campaign. Forming no part of the original project, it was yet forced upon the General by the unexpected rebellion of the troops of our ally. Taken by itself it would have been regarded as a brilliant feat of arms, but looked upon as an unexpected call upon strength and resources which had undergone no mean trial, it may well be regarded as an achievement of no common character. The service was one of the last importance. The promptness, the suddenness of the blow,—a striking characteristic of all Sir Hugh Rose's movements,—alone prevented Gwalior from becoming a second Delhi,—a rallying point for all the parties of rebels who were scattered all over India. Of the conduct of our soldiers their commander was the best judge, and thus he speaks of it. "As Commander of the troops engaged," wrote Sir Hugh in his despatch, "it is my duty to say, that though a most arduous campaign had impaired the health and strength of every man of my force, their discipline, devotion, and strength remained unvarying and unshaken, enabling them to make a very rapid march in summer heat to Gwalior, fight and gain two actions on the road, one at Morar cantonments, the other at Kotah-ka-serai ; arrive at their posts, from great distances and by bad roads, before Gwalior before the day appointed, the 19th June ; and, on that same day, carry by assault all the enemy's positions on strong heights and in most difficult ground, taking one battery after another, twenty-seven pieces of artillery in the action ; twenty-five in the pursuit ; besides the guns in the fort ; the old city ; the new city ; and finally the rock of Gwalior held to be one of the most important and strongest fortresses in India."

Sir Hugh made over command of his force to General Napier on the 29th June and proceeded to Bombay.

We now approach that which may be termed the third division of Sir Hugh Rose's career. Appointed Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, he was transferred, on the departure of Lord Clyde from India, to the higher appointment in Bengal. This appointment he took up in the month of June 1860, and he held it till the end of March of the present year,—a period of nearly five years." We do not propose to follow step by step each

act of Sir Hugh Rose as Commander-in-Chief. In such an appointment the value of an officer's services is to be tested, not by any one particular measure, but by the tendency and result of the line of policy he may pursue. If that line of policy be based upon sound principles, if the measures he attempt to carry into effect be just and fair to all whose interests are touched by them, then the result must be advantageous. Yet it must by no means be imagined that all that a Commander-in-Chief has to do is to wish to act well; that he has only to carve out a policy to himself, and adhere to it. On the contrary, there is probably no appointment emanating from the Crown of England, in which the hands of the holder are so tightly bound as that of the Commander-in-Chief in India. Nominally an independent appointment, it is really an appointment the independent action of which is jealously watched and carefully restricted. Formerly, indeed, the powers which might, under certain circumstances, devolve upon a Commander-in-Chief were not very accurately defined: but from the day when the Marquis of Dalhousie snubbed Sir Charles Napier into the resignation of his command for presuming to crush mutiny in the bud, without consulting the Marquis who was at sea, or the Council which was at Calcutta, the relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Government have become, practically, somewhat clearer than they were before. The decision of the Home Government and of the Duke of Wellington upon that important question announced, not the predominance of the Civil Power,—for not even Sir Charles Napier ever questioned that,—but, that not so great a peril as the prospect of a mutiny would justify even the temporary assumption by the Commander-in-Chief of any portion of that power which was vested in the Government alone. From this some idea may be drawn of the very delicate and difficult position which a Commander-in-Chief would occupy, who, full of zeal and energy, revolving plans of reform and improvement, should find himself in the presence of a superior power by whom all his intentions might be frustrated and all his reforms nipped in the bud. We do not intend to assert that a dead lock of this nature is even within the bounds of probability. We only allude to the subject, in order to show, that even should a long tenure of the office of Commander-in-Chief produce no results, it is not necessarily to be attributed to indifference on the part of the head of the army.

We have written to little purpose if we have failed to impress upon the minds of our readers that Sir Hugh Rose was a man of deep convictions, strong will, and great tenacity of purpose. Yet in the diplomatic training he had enjoyed in

Syria and in Constantinople, he had had many opportunities of observing that the most common solution of even the weightiest affairs was a compromise. With all his strong convictions he was far too clear headed, he had mixed too much with the world, to imagine, that he could expect every other man to agree with him on every subject. He knew well that, in his new position, he would have to encounter men of different and differing schools,—men who looked at affairs from a point of view widely diverse from his own,—and he had associated too much with the world to think that these men would give in to his opinions, simply because he held them. Whilst therefore, perhaps, no man ever occupied the office of Commander-in-Chief more strongly satisfied of the soundness of his own ideas, of the necessity for putting them in practice, and more determined to hold to and carry out those views, if it were possible to do so, no one perhaps was at the same time more impressed with the sense of the delicate and difficult nature of his position, and of the wisdom of accepting a part if he were unable to gain the whole.

The state of the army when Sir Hugh Rose assumed command of it was peculiar. The European portion of it was just reposing after the triumphs of the mutiny. They were reposing, however, in buildings which had been intended for half their number and the wretched state of existence which had always made the life of a soldier in India proverbial, had been rendered even more wretched by the crowded state of the barracks, and the deficiencies of the hospital accommodation. The men of a section of that European force too,—that section which, formerly under the Company, had been transferred to the Crown without being made over to the Horse Guards, were known to consider themselves aggrieved, because the option of bounty or discharge had not been offered to them on the occasion of their transfer. As for the Native army it was in a state of chaos. Of the seventy-four Native regiments of which the Bengal army consisted before the mutiny, but eight or ten existed. There were officers without regiments scattered all over the country. There were police corps, irregular corps, local corps, doing military duty in various districts and stations, raised no one knew how, and subject one scarcely knew to whom. There were hosts of claimants for appointments, men who had lost all in the mutiny, who had no regiment to go to, and who were conversant only with the military duties to which they had been brought up. The mutiny had annihilated all the old regulations, and none had come to replace them. The officers of the old Company's army, deprived of their old employments, looked anxiously to the future. Each man knew that something was coming, yet no one knew

what to expect. At this time the Home Government, in opposition to the written opinions of Lord Clyde, Sir Hugh Rose, Sir William Mansfield, and other high authorities, had determined to maintain the Indian army as a separate army, subject to the Secretary of State and not to the Horse Guards, but as to the manner in which it would be reorganised or officered, not a syllable had transpired.

The objects then which Sir Hugh just proposed to himself on taking the command of the Indian army, were these. He wished, first, to improve the condition of the European soldier ; to see that he was not only properly lodged, well tended in hospital, and well fed, but likewise that he should be provided with that which all previous reformers had failed to secure for him,—occupation during the long and weary hours of the day. Few men had had better opportunities than Sir Hugh of seeing what the European soldier could do if he were only, we will not say encouraged, but allowed to do it. In that terrible Jhansie campaign the soldier had always been ready to do more than his mere duty ; he was not then fanciful about his rations, nor did he disdain the hard earth for his bed. The Commander-in-Chief had witnessed his exertions, his privations, his devotion then, and he was resolved that, now that the fight was over, those comforts and those opportunities for profitable employment should be given to the European soldier, which no one more than he had nobly earned.

At the same time discipline was to be maintained, and though discipline had not been openly violated, there were symptoms even then that the pressure of a firm hand might be required, and that a lesson might be needed. To those signs of the times Sir Hugh was fully alive ; though it was still hoped, that by a cautious and prudent line of conduct, the danger might be averted.

Then, again, there was the condition of the Native army. The question of the reorganisation of this army generally was a matter for the consideration of the Home authorities, but there was a point connected with it which did come within the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, and that was, to raise the tone of those numberless officers, who, having lost their regiments, were either absolutely without employment, or were reduced to that most painful of all positions to men who once had a regiment and a home,—that of doing general duty in some large station.

This last task was that first undertaken by the new Commander-in-Chief. The course he adopted was somewhat carped at at the time, but experience has testified to its wisdom. To ascer-

tain among a crowd of applicants who are the fittest for military employment is for a new Commander-in-Chief a very difficult matter. It may be said that he can trust to his staff. But that is the rock upon which the reputation for fair and just dealing of so many previous Commanders-in-Chief has been wrecked. The statement made before the Committee of the House of Commons by an Adjutant-General, whose patronage had been extremely advantageous to his own personal friends, to the effect that those officers whom he had not selected for employment were the "refuse" of the army, has not yet been forgotten. In the dark and weary days of the mutiny, those who composed this "refuse" had fought at least as well as their more favoured comrades. In some cases, indeed, the *élite* had not altogether come up to public expectation. For a new Commander-in-Chief then, to go back to the old ways, to rely for the selection of men on whose conduct would mainly depend the efficient carrying out of his own views, on the reports of the Adjutant-General, was not a plan likely to find favour with one whose views of discipline were so rigid, and whose sense of responsibility was so marked as was the case with Sir Hugh Rose. To his mind it appeared that one great public test was far better than all the private recommendations. And though this test might not operate quite evenly, though it might exclude deserving officers, yet, being open, it was a test the fairness of which, all, he thought, would be ready to acknowledge, and which even those who suffered from it would declare to be preferable to the secret system which had, by its unjust action, soured many a noble spirit. Acting upon this principle, Sir Hugh Rose officially declared, as soon as possible after his assumption of the office of Commander-in-Chief, that the staff appointments in his gift would be bestowed, without favour or affection, upon those officers whose services in the field and whose general good conduct, testified to by those under whom they had served, gave them the greatest claim upon the country. This was a test, open, clear, and incapable of being misunderstood. It was liable certainly to act hardly upon officers who had not seen service; but it was nevertheless the best test that could be devised. In all stations of life there are inequalities. Fortune showers her favours with bounteous hands on some, she withholds them, in a niggard spirit, from others. To these, who perhaps hardly seek for them, she gives frequent opportunities; to those, who would walk bare-footed from one end of India to another for one single chance, she often rigidly denies that chance. We see this in every career, in every station of life. If then, this rule bore hardly upon those who, from no

fault of their own, had not fleshed their maiden swords, it was, after all, one of the chances of existence. It had upon them, besides, this other effect, that shut out from military employment, these men were induced to turn their energies to the performance of those departmental duties under the Government of India for which military service was never considered a necessary qualification.

We have said that this new test proposed by Sir Hugh Rose was rather carped at when it appeared. But it was carped at simply, because very few believed that it would be strictly and rigidly adhered to. Declarations of the same sort had been made by others; yet, with the exception of Sir Charles Napier and General Anson, they had seldom been adhered to. Practically, the officer who had no interest, had had but a slender chance. The Indian public, therefore, were slow to believe that any change in the system which had effectually provided for the relations and friends of the staff of the army would follow even the emphatic declarations of the new Commander-in-Chief.

Yet, at the close of a five years' tenure of office by Sir Hugh Rose, we find that he never swerved from that declaration. It is now an admitted axiom, that public service is the test for promotion. Sir Hugh has impressed that principle on the military administration. Loud, doubtless, have been the lamentations over the "the good old times." But what a few private individuals have lost the public has gained. The tone of the officers is far higher than it was before. Men have ceased to care about letters of introduction or relationship to officials. A system has been introduced which has made every man, who has done good service, feel that his claim upon his country will be satisfied. It is our conviction that Sir Hugh never gave away an appointment to any one who was not, in his opinion, the best qualified amongst those unemployed, to fill it. He, like his predecessors, has no doubt had his temptations. People, "with a certain influence," are always upon the *qui vive* to obtain something good for Charlie or Frank. Yes, it was the great merit of Sir Hugh Rose, and that which has stamped his administration, that if Charlie and Frank had been his own sons, he would have given them nothing, if he believed that other men had a prior and a better claim.

The increase to the allowances of Commandants, and of seconds in command; the appointment of wing officers and of paid doing duty officers,—measures recommended by the Government of India and sanctioned by the Secretary of State, —gave to Sir Hugh Rose many opportunities of providing for

deserving officers. It is quite possible that the critic may point to this or that officer, and say that the appointment was not a good one; that a better might have been made. Even, admitting this for the sake of argument, it was at least recognised that that man was appointed who, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, had, from public services, the best claim. No one has ever dreamt of asserting that private interest ever influenced the decisions of Sir Hugh Rose in this respect. Conflicting claims must be balanced by one man. The great thing is, to feel confidence in the impartiality of the adjudicator, and, though men may have differed from Sir Hugh in his estimate of the value of services, every one will admit that his decision invariably gave the actual conclusion at which his mind had arrived.

With respect to the European soldier, Sir Hugh had a more difficult task. In a very few months after his arrival in Calcutta the discontent which was even then lurking in the minds of the European soldiers of the Indian army culminated in acts of open mutiny. In dealing with this mutiny Sir Hugh displayed that tact and decision which had characterised his campaigns. He was prompt to strike, severe to punish the ringleaders, but merciful to the many who had blindly followed the few. This danger averted,—the snake not only “scotched” but killed, Sir Hugh was soon after summoned to Calcutta to take part in introducing the great measure which was the consequence of that mutiny,—the amalgamation of the two armies.

It was whilst this measure was being discussed, that Sir Hugh found time to introduce one of his great remedial measures, for the improvement of the condition of the soldier;—the establishment of the soldiers’ workshops. In these the soldier was encouraged to develop the knowledge he had acquired in his early youth by working at the trade to which he had been brought up. Every facility was afforded him. A workshop, tools, and materials were supplied, and the soldier was permitted to dispose of the results of his industry. Men of Mr. Kaye’s stamp, who believe only in the drinking faculties of the European soldier, men who regarded him as a mere brute to be lashed into obedience, laughed at the simplicity which could devise so inoperative a measure. We are bound to add, however, that by the Indian Press, it was warmly received and applauded. Its greatest opponents were the officers of the old school, wedded to the ideas of their boyhood. But Sir Hugh had great confidence in the experiment. He put it in force, and the result has been the redemption of the well disposed men in the barracks; it has proved a death-blow to that listless idleness which has been the greatest enemy of the European soldier;

it has enabled men to save money, which they have invested not in "drink," but in the education of their children ; and it has, in many places, given a stimulus to local trade such as its supporters never anticipated.

Similarly with soldiers' gardens. These, nominally existing before, have been improved and increased during the last four years. The vegetables supplied to regiments are in many cases grown by the soldiers themselves, and the European residents in stations are often indebted to those gardens for their supplies.

It was quite impossible that a man of Sir Hugh Rose's strong convictions and determination to do what he believed to be right without respect of persons, could avoid coming in contact with some of the many Departments of Army administration which abound in this country. We cannot be surprised to find, therefore, that his endeavours to improve the rations of the soldier brought him into collision with the Department which is entrusted with the supply of food to the army. It must be admitted that in the course of the correspondence on this subject charges were brought against the Department which could not afterwards be sustained before the Commission appointed by Government to enquire into the subject. It is always the fate, however, of an ardent reformer, who occupies a high position, to find his sentiments and opinions exaggerated by some of those about him, and certainly many of the charges against the Commissariat were very extravagant. That Department has always been one of the best arranged and best organised in the Indian Service. And if it may be said that it is liable sometimes to become too much of a bureaucracy—to be a service within a service, the appointment as its head, of an officer untrammelled by its traditions, and unfettered by its precedents,—a course which has lately been adopted by the Government,—will always tend to remedy that evil.

It was the opinion of the late Commander-in-Chief that the Commissariat Department should be placed under his orders, instead of being a Department under the Government of India. But we think the Indian Government acted very wisely in adhering to a system which under every exigency and under seemingly insuperable difficulties, has always worked well. The Government of India would be mad if they were not as anxious as the Commander-in-Chief for the lives and health of the European soldiers serving in India ; they would be culpably negligent, if they were not to enforce upon their agents, charged with the supply of food to the soldier, the necessity of seeing that those supplies were of the very best quality. We cannot

refrain from expressing our opinion that in this branch of Commissariat arrangement of the Government of India has nobly done its duty. No reasonable expense is spared to make the supplies for the European troops equal to the best procurable in the market. The officers of the Commissariat Department are equally interested in seeing that the wishes of Government in this respect are carried out. We believe that it happens far more often that the men reject what is good from an over-fastidiousness than that the Commissariat officer sympathises with the contractor in the tender of an inferior article. A curious incident bearing upon this subject, happened in the cold weather of 1856-57 in Lucknow when that city was visited by General Anson. On the morning of the General's arrival, the 52nd Foot had rejected the bread tendered by the contractor. The same bread was accepted, as usual, by the messes. Dining at one of these the same evening, General Anson remarked on the excellence of the bread, and he then learned to his surprise that it was the very bread which the men of the 52nd. and a Committee of their officers, had that morning rejected.

It is in our opinion a positive advantage that the Commissariat should be under the Civil Power. In the first place, it assimilates in that respect to the English system. Then, again, as a disbursing department, it is properly placed under the control of the Government. But we believe, it is advantageous in the more executive arrangement of the Department, and in the interest of the troops themselves. A Commander-in-Chief could not get more out of the Commissariat officers than do the Government now. He could not hang them by reason of the badness of the supplies,—though Sir Harry Smith after Bud-diwāl, in buffoon-like parody on the Duke of Wellington, threatened to do so. He could not only turn them out of their appointments, and he would find it then difficult to supply their places with superior men. But, so long as the Commissariat is under the Supreme Government, the Commander-in-Chief possesses a power in reality far greater and more effectual. We allude to the power of reporting an officer to the Supreme Government. To be turned out by the Commander-in-Chief would not be nearly so great a punishment to an officer, as to be turned out by the Supreme Government on the report of the Commander-in-Chief. In the one case the Commander-in-Chief is the accuser and the judge, and the moral effect of a sentence against the accused would, in that case, be comparatively small. In the other, the tribunal is absolutely unbiassed, and an adverse decision would be disgrace or ruin.

Nevertheless the course adopted in this respect by Sir Hugh Rose was prompted by a pure and sincere desire to benefit the soldier. He had no private interests to serve. He fought, solely that the men who had fought for us might not only be well fed, but that they might be fed as well as the country could feed them. And he succeeded. It is true the Government did not adopt his views, yet he did not the less, though by other means, obtain the result at which he was aiming. The constant stirring of this question called constant attention to the subject. It became the first interest of the Commissariat officers that the supplies should be of a character such as none could object to ; and though objections were occasionally made,—for it is the nature of Englishmen to grumble and object,—yet they were generally pronounced frivolous. The main result however was, that during the command of Sir Hugh Rose, the rations attained a variety and an excellence such as had never been before equalled ; and this, as we understand it, was the practical result at which he aimed, when he first agitated the subject.

Similarly with respect to punkahs and tatties for barracks, to soldiers' cots, and to every other article on which the soldier's comfort depends. No toil was too great, no hours were considered thrown away, which were devoted to improvements on these matters. On some of them, as on the question of soldiers' cots, Sir Hugh showed himself far in advance of those even who were considered specially qualified to report on them. There was this also about Sir Hugh, that he was by no means wedded to his own theories ; he was always ready to receive suggestions, no matter whence they came. When satisfied that a man was in earnest, he at once was attracted towards him. Confident in the purity of his intentions, he cared as little for hollow hearted ridicule as for foolish applause. He worked straight to an end, and allowed no considerations to deter him from carrying out that end to the extent of his power. His regulations for cholera camps, and his rules for the efficient sanitary care of the various cantonments were excellent. He was especially anxious to see that officers attended to their men during times of epidemic sickness. No remissness in his opinion was equal to that which kept officers from the hospital at a time when their men were struck down by hundreds, from a mere fear of catching the disorder. He would have disrated his own brother, had he found him guilty of a dereliction of duty of this nature. Many officers, no doubt, needed no stimulus to induce them to pay proper attention to their men at such seasons. We believe, indeed, that sickness especially calls into active operation the

sympathies of brave men. Yet it is equally possible that the knowledge, that the Commander-in-Chief regarded backwardness on such occasions as second only to backwardness on the field of battle, was not without its effect on some.

We have now glanced hastily at the effect of Sir Hugh Rose's administration on the position of two classes,—the European officers and the European soldiers. With respect to the native soldier little remained to be done, except to regulate the conditions of good service pay, and to invent for him a dress more suited to him, and to the climate of the country of his birth, than that worn by the old Pandy regiments. The first, in concert with the Supreme Government, was accomplished; the second Sir Hugh Rose attempted. We believe he had a dress made up somewhat in the style of the dresses worn by the Turcos and Zouaves, and submitted it to the Government of India. Whether it was accepted we are not informed. It certainly is not worn at the present time. Those, however, who have seen the Turcos on guard at the Tuileries, with their clean neat cloth dresses, well adapted for any work, and who have contrasted them with the ill-fitting, slovenly, dirty looking uniform worn by our Indian sepoy, will not fail to hope that the suggestions of our late Commander-in-Chief in this respect will yet be carried out.

It may not be out of place to allude here to those other qualities by which the character of Sir Hugh Rose was marked. We have spoken in the earlier part of this article of his own personal bravery, and of his conduct on the field of battle. It may be said that, on those occasions, it was necessary that he should not spare himself. Yet, when the necessity did absolutely exist, he spared himself as little. To make himself master of the topography of the Punjab frontier, he rode sixty and seventy and eighty miles a day, and thought nothing of it. To acquaint himself with the nature of that frontier was, in his idea, as much an act of duty, as it was to inspect the condition of the troops, and he therefore did it. Small wits have sneeringly alluded to his dandy-like appearance,—and there can be no doubt but that Sir Hugh Rose felt a pride in appearing on every occasion as a gentleman and a soldier,—but those witslings would have felt extremely uncomfortable if they had been challenged to accompany the dandy Commander-in-Chief on one of his frontier rides. He possessed, indeed, an energy and a pluck which enabled him to defy fatigue.

Sir Hugh Rose loved a brave man. Words cannot describe the absolute contempt he felt for a coward. His hospitality was unbounded. He was totally devoid of pretentious vanity

He strove, as he said in his farewell speech in Calcutta, "to do his duty." His manners were distinguished by a refined courtesy to all. For real, earnest men, whatever their rank or station, he always testified a special regard. That he had faults is perfectly true. What they were the readers of this article will doubtless discover for themselves.

In addition to the European mutiny, the amalgamation of the two armies, and the Commissariat arraignment, Sir Hugh Rose's career was marked by two other significant occurrences. The first of these was the Crawley Court Martial; the second the episode which is known as the Priestly case.

The Crawley Court Martial is a striking instance of the tenacity of opinion and of the moral courage of Sir Hugh Rose. That the decision arrived at by the Court Martial, and that the views promulgated by the Commander-in-Chief in his remarks on that Court Martial, were correct, was very much doubted at the time. The death of Sergeant Major Lilley, his piteous story, the assertions of Lieutenant Fitzsimons and of Pay Master Smales, changed those doubts into an absolute opinion that Sir Hugh Rose had been wrong. Every paper of influence in England seized upon Sergeant Major Lilley's story, condemned Colonel Crawley before he had been heard, and condemned almost equally both Sir William Mansfield and Sir Hugh Rose. From the newspapers the story travelled to the House of Commons. There it was received with a genuine satisfaction by that liberal party, the members of which are never so happy as when they can run a tilt at a Colonel or a General. The Radical member for Brighton, Mr. Coningham, denounced, in unmeasured language, every actor in the drama. The Commander-in-Chief in India, the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, and Colonel Crawley, alike came in for a share of his virulent abuse. The House of Commons caught the infection. It was dangerous to the popularity of any member to rise up and say that, after all, there might be some mistake; that it would be better to wait for the enquiry. The liberal members declared that there could be no mistake in the past, and that there should be no mistake for the future. To prevent the possibility of there being such a mistake, it was conceded that the Court Martial on Colonel Crawley should take place in England, away from the malignant influence of those who were regarded as accessories after the act. But this was not all. We believe that it would be discovered, if the whole truth were told, that even the Horse Guards took the popular side, and strongly disapproved of the conduct of Sir Hugh Rose. Yet all this time,—and it was a long

period of excitement and anxiety,—Sir Hugh did not recede one inch from the position he had taken up. To the newspaper criticisms he was indifferent. The radical denunciations in the House of Commons were probably to him, as a sensible man, far more pleasing than would have been radical praises. In reply to the remarks from the other quarter, he respectfully held his ground. The combined influence of these three attacks, one of which would be sufficient to soften the brain of some men, did not frighten Sir Hugh. He believed he was right, and he would not recede. It ended, as we all know, in the complete discomfiture of his opponents. Suddenly there was a collapse. It was then all at once discovered that Sir Hugh, Sir William Mansfield and Colonel Crawley had been extremely ill-used. Paymaster Smales was adjudicated a bankrupt, and the radical member for Brighton, fleeing the public scorn, was compelled to abandon his Parliamentary career, and to take shelter in private life.

Into the details of the Priestly case it is not necessary that we should enter, for who is there who is not familiar with them? In the story of the career of Sir Hugh Rose, however, some allusion to this case cannot be avoided, more especially as, notwithstanding our general admiration of his character, we are of opinion that in this instance he was from the very beginning entirely wrong. Nevertheless, wrong as he was, there were those about him who were even more open to blame. Sir Hugh acted upon,—his sole ground for action was,—the opinion of his Judge Advocate-General that Major Fitzgerald had committed a breach of discipline. If the Judge Advocate-General had not given that opinion, Sir Hugh Rose, had he wished it ever so much, could have done nothing. But fortified by the opinion of the “keeper of his conscience” that a breach of discipline had occurred, he acted. The opinion was incorrect, was unsound. But who gave it? It has been said that Sir Hugh's social instincts ought to have held him back from acting on such an opinion. We think they ought. But no man is wise at all hours, and it ought besides to be recollected, that not only his Judge Advocate-General, but every member of his staff present with him at the time, concurred with him in the view he took regarding the transaction. Sir Hugh left the United Service Club in consequence of the course the Club adopted on this occasion; but he showed subsequently, in a very significant manner,—in 1865,—that he would be glad if the whole matter were to cease to be remembered with ill-feeling. Considering the position he occupied he could not have evinced a more conciliatory spirit.

Our task is now finished. We have endeavoured to place before the readers of this *Review* an impartial sketch of the Commander-in-Chief who has just quitted us. Such an attempt, at an earlier date, would have been impossible. But if, whilst a great public character is in India, his enemies and detractors may say their worst of him, it is surely permissible to those who may entertain for him a genuine admiration, to describe his career, after his final departure for Europe, in a language which the incidents of it in their opinion demand. Sir Hugh Rose has indeed played no ordinary part in the world. We have seen him as a young soldier gaining the approval of one, who, at the time a young statesman himself, has twice been Prime Minister of England. We meet him again, gaining on his first essay in arms in a foreign country a sabre of honour and other marks of distinction from a foreign Sovereign, and the highest approval from his own commander. Had the Order of Valour then been instituted, there can be no doubt but that the Victoria Cross would have been awarded to Colonel Rose for his gallantry in Syria. We see him again, transferred to the diplomatic line, earning the warm approval of the greatest Foreign Minister of the nineteenth century,—the present First Minister of the Crown. Transferred to Constantinople, to give him a wider scope for his abilities, we find him there, with a fearlessness of responsibility which too many would have shrunk from, deciding the policy of his country at a critical period, and engaging her to set bounds to Russian ambition. A little later attached in a semi-military, semi-diplomatic capacity to the Marshal Commanding the French army in the Crimea, we hear of him again in the front rank, doing deeds which, but for his high rank, would have gained for him the coveted Cross. There is then an interval of rest, and he comes in the hour of danger to Hindostan. That romantic campaign of Central India,—romantic from its many incidents, its constant marches and combats, its deeds of glory,—for the double victory of Jhansie, and the “crowning mercy” of Gwalior, showed clearly to all who have studied war, that England yet possessed a General. That determination,—so rare in the present day,—to move forwards; that energy,—so uncommon in all ages,—not once witnessed in the five years’ course of the American War,—to turn a defeat into an utter, a ruinous, rout; that self-possession under all circumstances,—that noble self-confidence which hugs to itself responsibility, that directness of mental vision which keeps a man firm to his original object,—all combined to show indeed that in Sir Hugh Rose England possessed a Captain of a very high order of military ability.

Then, again, in his final career as Commander-in-Chief, we

see the same qualities developing themselves in another form. The care for the men who had fought so nobly under his eyes ; the efforts to wean the officers from looking to any other than a soldier's career ; the strong sense of discipline and regard for their men which he impressed upon the Generals and the Colonels, the Captains and the Subalterns of his army, were, throughout that career, most strongly marked. His own careful inspection of the troops, of the frontiers, his personal examination of officers, convinced every one that the Commander-in-Chief was in earnest ; that he only asked from officers that which he had done and was ready to do himself. At the same time his generous hospitality and his courteous demeanour to all were worthy,—the one of an officer occupying so high and distinguished a position ; the other, of the Chief of an army in which chivalry, it has been well stated, “has found her last refuge.” To say that he had faults, is only to say that he was mortal. But whilst we admit those faults, we would call attention to the higher virtues, the larger qualities by which the smaller failings are almost entirely overshadowed. We live, it is true, in a cavilling age ; in an age when all the acts of a public man are laid open to the public view, when much that is good is lost sight of, whilst all that is bad is repeated and exaggerated ; yet, even in this age, we believe that there are few who study the military character and achievements of Sir Hugh Rose, and who examine his public acts as Commander-in-Chief, but will join in the eloquent eulogy pronounced by Mr. Seton-Karr, and endorsed by the community of Calcutta, on the occasion of the farewell entertainment on the evening before His Excellency left Calcutta for the last time ; and will realise the conviction, that “in the long experience, tried sagacity, and “well known forethought” of our late Commander-in-Chief, “England possesses a solid and effectual guarantee for the “adequacy of our national defences, for the inviolability of our “coasts, for the protection of the fair homes of England,—for “everything, in short, within the scope of his command and the “limit of his observation, that shall concern the peace of the “subject, or the honour of the Crown.”

THE EARLY FRENCH IN INDIA.

1. *Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'ambassade de Chine.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.
2. *Nouvelle Biographie générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1861.
3. *The Modern part of an Universal History, from the earliest accounts to the present time, compiled from the original authorities.* London, 1781.
4. *A History of the Mahrattas.* By James Grant Duff, Esq. London, Longmans, 1826.
5. *Carnatic Chronology.* By Charles Philip Brown, late of the Madras Civil Service. London, Bernard Quaritch, 15, Piccadilly.
6. *Histoire Générale de l'Inde, Ancienne et Moderne,* par M. de Marles. Paris, 1828.

OF the five great European maritime powers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, France was the fourth to enter into the race for commercial communication with India. The fifth power, Spain, never attempted the contest, and Portugal, Holland, and England, had reaped considerable benefits from their enterprise before the attention of the French people had been sufficiently attracted to the trade. Nevertheless, though the last to enter upon the venture, though entering upon it after the three powers we have named had obtained a firm and solid footing on the soil, the genius of the French people asserted itself in a manner that speedily brought them on a level with the most securely planted of their European rivals. The restless action that had made the France of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the fomentor of disturbances in Europe soon found in India a wide field for its display, whilst the ambition that had urged her most famous monarch to dream of universal dominion in the West, began before very long to form plans for the attainment of a French empire in the East. It was a French statesman who first dared to aspire to subordinate the vast empire of the Mogul to a European will. It was a French statesman who first conceived the idea of conquering India by the aid of the Indians,—of arming, drilling, and training natives after the fashion of European soldiers, thus forming the germ of that sepoy army which has since become so famous. They were French soldiers who first

demonstrated on the field of battle the superiority of a handful of disciplined Europeans over the uncontrolled hordes of Asia. As we contemplate, indeed, the great achievements of France on the soil of Hindostan; as we read the numerous examples of the mighty conceptions, the heroic actions, the mental vigour, and the indomitable energy displayed there by her children, we cannot but marvel over the sudden destruction of hopes so great, of plans so vast and deep laid. There may be, indeed there always are, many excuses for ill success. Sometimes failure is to be attributed solely to the superior skill, genius, and force of character of an adversary. Sometimes, the hostile intervention of a third party, or his failure to keep engagements made with a principal, tends to the same result. But there are other fluctuating causes, which are often more influential still. An attack of dyspepsia prevented the annihilation of the Russian army at Borodino, and thus caused the annihilation of the soldiers of Napoléon in the snows of Russia. A careless movement on the part of Marshal Marmont, induced by a feverish desire to monopolise to himself the glory of expelling the English from Spain, brought on that battle of Salamanca which was the turning point of the Peninsular war. The storm on the night of the 17th June materially affected the movements of the French Emperor at Waterloo, and contributed greatly to the actual result of that terrible battle. The misdirection of a despatch brought on the battle of Navarino; and it is believed, in Vienna, that the accidental absence of the Austrian general from his post alone prevented the capture of Napoléon III. at Magenta. There are thus many causes, some natural, some dependent on the constitution of an individual man, some not to be foreseen and in no way to be calculated upon, which affect the fortunes of a people. It is not that all the genius, all the strong character, all the valour, are on the side of the conquerors. Genius, indeed, has been compelled to succumb to a combination of incidents apparently insignificant, and impossible to have been guarded against. There suddenly appear, when least expected, influences, apparently so small, and yet really so powerful, that all calculations are upset, and we are compelled to acknowledge the might of that Providential superintendence, which, working with its own instruments and for its own designs, fashions and directs the destinies of nations.

Notwithstanding this theory, there is always, when contemplating the results of the action of men, a great deal that is to be accounted for and explained on natural grounds. The character of the governing or directing body as a body, and the characters of the instruments used to carry out

their policy, are sufficient to explain many of the consequences. And it is in this respect that the history of the French in India presents a most interesting and instructive lesson. That lesson is interesting, because the great deeds of great men always charm and excite the imagination: it is instructive, because we have in it a great deal of individual action, and a great insight into individual character. The scene is laid at such a distant period from the present, that we have the actors before us conducting their skilful intrigues and engaged in their complex negotiations as they were at the time, and we have in addition now, what we had not then, a clear view of the motives that prompted them, of the causes that urged them on. So rich in detail is this eventful period, that the history possesses all the interest and excitement of a romance. Yet in no romance that was ever penned did any of the characters dare to entertain such widespread and deep-laid schemes as were cherished by many of the actors in this real scene. And it is yet another peculiarity of this eventful history, that the actors in it did not only dare to conceive, but they brought their vast plans to the very brink of success; they failed too, only to let those plans fall into the lap of another and a rival nation, which, bewildered by their vastness, long refused to entertain them, and only consented at last, when the force of events had convinced them that there was no middle course between the prosecution of those plans and their own destruction.

It is strange that this story, with all its wonders, has almost faded away from the tablets of history. There exists, indeed, a record, published in the last century, of the facts connected with the rise and progress of the French East India Company, but since its appearance a flood of light has been shed upon events which were then dark and mysterious. Yet even this record has been almost a sealed book to the present generation. Glimpses of the deeds accomplished by the French on Indian soil are occasionally to be found in old accounts of famous voyages, in forgotten French histories of India, and more recently in those English histories which are devoted to the glorification of the triumph of our own countrymen. Occasionally, too, in some old biographic memoir, or in the notes to some graver history, we meet with curious accounts of men, who, when their prospects as a nation had been annihilated, strove, and strove earnestly, in the service of native princes, to prevent the development of the fortunes of their successful rivals. We have sometimes wondered why a more modern history of this eventful episode has never been undertaken by the French. It cannot be because a brilliant career culminated in disaster. It was a

disaster which, at all events, reflected no discredit on the soldiers of France. What discredit there was is directly to be imputed to the effete administration of the most effete and degraded representative of a house which France herself has expelled. We believe it is rather due to the fact, that the mighty gulf of the French revolution intervenes between the times of which we are writing and the present; that the military history of modern France begins with the wars of 1792; and that, however, much France may regret that the great Eastern prize did not fall into her hands, she cares little for the details of a struggle which occurred before the period at which she conquered the great nations of the continent, and constituted herself, for a time, mistress and arbitress of the greater part of Europe.

We have stated that three of the maritime powers of Europe had effected permanent settlements in India, before the attention of France had been sufficiently attracted to the advantage of the trade. That this was so was attributable far more to the distractions of her government, than to any want of enterprise on the part of the French people. A period in which foreign wars alternated with civil dissensions, was certainly not favourable to fostering commerce with far distant countries. Yet, despite the turbulence of the period, and the inherent vice of their government, the desire for Eastern traffic displayed itself at a very early period amongst the French. In the reign of Louis XII. in the year 1503, two ships were fitted out by some merchants of Rouen to trade in the Eastern seas. But it is simply recorded of them that they sailed from the port of Havre in the course of that year and were never afterwards heard of. The successor of Louis XII., King François I., issued to his subjects, in the years 1537 and 1543, declarations in which he exhorted them to undertake long voyages, and placed before them the pecuniary and national advantages which would result from their following his counsel. But the records of the reign of François are filled with accounts of exhausting wars, and it is owing probably to this cause that we do not find that his wishes in respect of distant navigation were attended to. Probably the constant civil dissensions which occupied the reign of Henri III. neutralised any effect which an edict of his, to the same effect as those of his grandfather, dated 15th December 1578, might have had in less troublous times. The peaceful and prosperous reign of Henri IV. opened out, however, new prospects. On the 1st June 1604, a company was established under the king's letters patent, granting it an exclusive trade for fifteen years. But though the services of Gerard Leeroy, a Flemish navigator, who had already made

several voyages to the Indies in the employ of the Dutch, were engaged, disputes amongst the proprietors, and the paucity of funds, hindered the action of the company, and the design came to nothing. Seven years later, however, the project was renewed under Louis XIII., but owing to the same causes, nothing was undertaken during a period of four years. But in 1615, two merchants of Rouen, disgusted with the inactivity of the company, petitioned the king for the transfer to them of the privileges accorded to it, expressing at the same time their readiness to fit out ships that very year. This petition was opposed by the company. The king, however, after hearing the arguments on both sides, decided in favour of a coalition between the contending parties, and, on this being effected, he issued (2nd July 1615) letters patent conferring the former privileges on the thus united company.

This company quickly proceeded to action. In the following year (1616) they fitted out two ships, the command of the larger of which was given to Commodore de Nets, an old naval officer, and of the smaller to Captain Antoine Beaulieu, who had already made a voyage to the coast of Africa. Of the expeditions to the Indies, Beaulieu has written an interesting account. The first one, though not in itself to be called positively successful, was yet deemed so in that age, inasmuch as it was not absolutely a failure. It appears that the navigators met with considerable opposition from the Dutch at Java, and as there happened to be a considerable number of Dutch sailors amongst their crews, they were considerably inconvenienced by an order of the president of the Dutch possessions, by which all servants of the republic were required instantly to leave the French vessels. This necessitated the sale of Beaulieu's ship, and the transfer of himself and the remainder of the crew to that commanded by Commodore de Nets. They succeeded so far, however, in their trading negotiations, that notwithstanding the loss of one ship, the voyage was not financially a failure.

Encouraged, rather than deterred, by the result of this first effort, the company equipped another expedition of three ships in 1619, giving the chief command to Beaulieu, whom they created Commodore. The names of the ships were the *Montmorenci*, of 450 tons, carrying a hundred and sixty-two men and twenty-two guns; *L'Esperance*, of 400 tons, carrying a hundred and seventeen men, and twenty-six guns; and *L'Hermitage*, an advice boat, of 75 tons, thirty men, and eight guns. They were all victualled for two years and a half. This expedition sailed from Honfleur on the 2nd October 1619, and after a prosperous

voyage reached Achen in the island of Sumatra. At Java,—whither they subsequently proceeded,—Beaulieu had the misfortune to lose one of his ships,—*L'Esperance*,—not without strong suspicions, amounting in his mind to conviction, that it had been sunk by the Dutch. But whatever the immediate cause, it is certain that she foundered off Java with all her crew on board, and a cargo valued at between seventy and eighty thousand pounds sterling. After experiencing this loss, Beaulieu returned to Havre, and arrived there, with his vessel well laden, on the 1st December 1620.

For upwards of twenty years after this second attempt to open out a trade with the East, the company effected nothing. A few desultory efforts, by individual traders, to make a settlement in Madagascar, produced no definite result. The powerful minister, who then virtually ruled France, was occupied during the greater part of his tenure of power in firmly establishing his master's authority over the resisting nobles, and he could ill spare any considerable portion of his time to foster large commercial undertakings. In 1642, however, Richelieu was master; he had triumphed over every enemy, and he at once addressed himself to the revival of commercial intercourse with the East. Under his auspices, a new company was formed, for the avowed purpose of trading to the Indies. Letters patent, dated the 24th June 1642, accorded to it exclusive privileges for twenty years, and its directors, designating it "*La Compagnie des Indes*," began to make serious preparations to justify their right to the title. But their first ship had scarcely started on its expedition when Cardinal Richelieu died. Whether it was owing to this cause, to the ignorance and inexperience of the directors, or to the want of proper appreciation on the part of their agents, it seems scarcely possible to ascertain, but this is certain that the first measures of the company were signalized by little prudence. Instead of directing the course of their ships boldly to the far east, and thus following the example of their maritime rivals, the French company resolved to devote all their energies to the development of the large and fertile island of Madagascar.

Madagascar, originally discovered by Marco Polo, in 1298, and subsequently lost sight of, had been re-opened to European enterprise by the Portuguese under Lawrence Almeida in 1506. It was visited the following year by a Portuguese squadron under Tristan da Cunha, but that celebrated navigator, after a minute examination of the topography of the place, the customs of the inhabitants, and the productions of the soil, thought it inexpedient to form a settlement there, and continued his

voyage eastward. Two years later, however, the Portuguese government resolved to form a post on the seaboard of the island. A settlement was accordingly made on its northern part, but those who formed it had been massacred by the inhabitants before the period of the French expedition of 1642.

The first French vessel, equipped by the French India Company, reached Madagascar in the beginning of 1643, and landed at a point some five-and-twenty miles from the site of the old Portuguese settlement. Their landing was opposed, though ineffectually, by the natives of the country. They forthwith attempted to carry out a regular scheme of colonization, and to this purpose they devoted all the resources of the Company. They soon found, however, as the wise Tristan da Cunha had foreseen, that though in appearance rich and fertile, the soil of island could not produce, in any great quantity, those articles which entered the most into European consumption. When they began to make inroads into the interior, they found still greater difficulties awaiting them. They came in contact then with a numerous and warlike race, detesting strangers, 'determined to hold no communications with them, and preferring savage freedom to foreign domination. By these the French settlers were received, from the very outset, with marked hostility. Not content with repulsing every effort of the French to penetrate into the interior, the inhabitants, gaining boldness from success, assumed the offensive, and began in their turn to attack the wretched wooden stockades which the colonists had erected with infinite labour and expense, and had dignified by the name of forts. So numerous were the islanders, and so determinedly hostile, that the French experienced very great difficulty in offering to them an effectual resistance. The time and the labour employed in so doing drew them away almost entirely from cultivation, and though they were ultimately successful in defending their forts, it was a success which was as costly as a defeat, for it sunk all the large sums which had been expended on the enterprise without the chance of a return. It is surprising that, under these circumstances, and though the French India Company relinquished their claims to the island in 1672, the Government should have continued to maintain their hold of the forts on the seaboard till 1740, in which year Madagascar was definitively abandoned.

The ill-success of this enterprise was not, however, at once recognised in France, although for a time all desire for a renewal of the effort appeared to languish. The long minority of Louis XIV., the ministry of Cardinal Mazarin, with its wars of the Fronde and its contests with Spain, were not favourable to

commercial enterprise. Mazarin, however, died in 1661. His successor, Colbert, was one of those men who stamp their name on the age in which they live. Colbert was one of the glories of France. Born in the middle rank of life, the son of a merchant, himself educated as a banker, and having, in that capacity, been charged with the management of the affairs of Cardinal Mazarin, he had gained so entirely the confidence of that minister, that, on his dying bed, the Cardinal recommended him to his master as a man of immense capacity, strict fidelity, and unwearied application. Colbert succeeded him, first only as controller of finances, but not long after he was invested with the entire administration of the country. Under his guiding hand, France quickly assumed a position such as she had never before held in Europe. The finances, commerce, industry, agriculture, art, all felt the impulse of his strong will and firm direction. He made the French navy. In a few years after his accession to power, there were a hundred vessels of war, and 60,000 sailors inscribed on the rolls. He created the naval ports of Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort; he bought Dunkirk from the English, and he commenced Cherbourg; and binding together industry, commerce, "and the marine in one common future, he founded French colonies to assure outlets to industry and commerce, and an employment of the navy in time of peace."

Colbert had been neither blind nor indifferent to the great advantages which had accrued to the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English from their possessions in India, and he made it one of his greatest objects to encourage the formation of a grand company, somewhat on the English model, to open out a regular traffic with that country. He held out to it promises of the strongest support of the administration. He offered it a charter, granting it the exclusive right of commerce with India for fifty years; it was to be exempted from all taxation; and the government agreed to engage to reimburse it for all losses it might suffer during the first ten years after its formation. On these conditions, in the year 1664, the French "Compagnie des Indes" was formed. Its capital was 15,000,000 "livres tournois" equivalent to about £600,000; but as, even under the conditions mentioned, the entire sum was not subscribed for, a fifth of the amount, 3,000,000 livres was advanced by the treasury. This example had a great effect upon the nobility and rich courtiers; and these at once became eager to join an undertaking which the government seemed to cherish as one of its most favoured projects.*

* Louis XIV himself, under the influence of Colbert, endeavoured to reconcile his nobility to a participation in the enterprise, by declaring that trade to *India* was not derogatory to a man of noble birth.

The prospects of the company on its formation were thus brilliant. Starting under the auspices of a monarchy, which had not attained the height of its power, but was then fast rising up to it, which in its capabilities for offensive operations and for the display of real strength, contrasted favourably with the other European states, this company seemed to require but firm and steady direction to become a great success. Nevertheless its first movements were neither well considered nor fortunate. Hampered by the recollection of the attempt made in 1642 upon Madagascar, which still held out more attractions than the unknown Indies, and their judgment influenced by the knowledge of the fact that some portion of the seaboard was still held by Frenchmen, the directors of the new company conceived the idea that by transporting simple colonists to that island, they might yet realise some of the results of the labours of their predecessors. Their first expedition was accordingly directed to Madagascar. On the 7th March 1665, four large ships, equipped for war as well as trade, and carrying five hundred and twenty men, sailed from Brest harbour, and reached Madagascar on the 10th July following. The first act of the colonists was to change the name of the island from St. Lawrence, as it had been called by the Portuguese, to Isle Dauphine, in honour of the heir apparent, then four years old. It proved to be but a poor compliment to the Dauphin. They soon discovered that, instead of profiting by their predecessors' mistakes, they had themselves fallen into those predecessors' errors. The new colonists, like those who went before them, found that their labour was hindered by three causes, by climate, by the nature of the soil, and by the hostility of the natives. This last-mentioned cause produced yet another, for it necessitated to the unfortunate emigrants constant exposure and constant fatigue. To such an extent did they suffer, and disclose by their sufferings the hopelessness of the undertaking, that the company, although for a long time they continued to reinforce the colonists with supplies of men, resolved ultimately to give up all thoughts of permanently colonising Madagascar, and to divert their energies to another quarter. They were quickened in this resolve by the action of the natives, who succeeded in 1672 in surprising Fort Dauphine and massacring the majority of those who were within its walls. Of the baffled colonists, some proceeded ultimately to India; others, however, contented themselves with formation of a small settlement in the island of Mascarenhas lying with Cerné a little to the east of Madagascar. These islands, under the names of the Isles of France and Bourbon,

and again as the islands of Mauritius and Réunion, have since become well known. The Isle of Mauritius or Cerné had been early discovered, and as soon abandoned, by the Portuguese; occupied in 1598 by the Dutch, who, in honour of Prince Maurice of Nassau, called it Mauritius; abandoned by them at some time between the years 1703 and 1710; and occupied later, between that period and 1719, by the French, who changed its name to the Isle of France. Bourbon or Mascarenhas, called so from after a Portuguese nobleman, was absolutely desolate when the French first occupied Madagascar, but in 1654 eight Frenchmen and six negroes emigrated to it from the island, but deserted again four years later. The island continued uninhabited till 1672, when, on the subversion of the Madagascar settlement, an inconsiderable number of the colonists took possession of it, and became the nucleus of a settlement which was one day to be powerful.

But the French India Company had not wasted all its resources in their attempts on Madagascar. In 1666 another expedition was fitted out, and the command of it bestowed upon one François Caron, a man who possessed at that time considerable reputation for his experience in Eastern undertakings. Caron, though of French origin, had been born in Holland, and he had spent many years of his life in the service of the Dutch republic. At a very early age he had obtained a situation as a cook-mate on board a Dutch man-of-war bound for Japan; but during the voyage he showed such intelligence, that he was promoted to the post of chief steward. This office gave him a little leisure which he devoted to the study of arithmetic. On the arrival of the vessel at Japan, he at once made it his study to obtain a knowledge of the language of the country. Having acquired this knowledge, he was able to make almost his own terms with the agents of the Dutch company in that country, and he was soon appointed a member of the general council of administration, and director of commerce. But, little satisfied with this, he applied for a post of still higher importance in Batavia.* He was refused. Whereupon, Caron, listening only to his anger, abruptly resigned his appointment

* It is stated by some authorities that, when Caron was in charge of the Dutch agency at Japan, he made an audacious attempt to establish himself on the coast. Having ingratiated himself with the king, he obtained permission to build a house close to the Dutch factory. Knowing the Japanese

under the Dutch, and tendered his services to Colbert. Colbert closed eagerly with the offer, and Caron, soon after, received letters patent nominating him director-general of French commerce in India. Associated with Caron, was a Persian named Marcara, a native of Ispahan, from whose local knowledge of India many advantages were anticipated.

The expedition sailed from France in the beginning of 1667, and made a fair voyage to Madagascr. But, on arriving there, Caron found the French establishments on the coast in a condition so deplorable, and the prospect of being able to effect an amelioration so discouraging, that he determined not to waste any of his resources in the attempt, but to proceed at once to India. He directed his course accordingly towards Surat, a place which the enterprise of the other maritime powers of Europe had made familiar to traders to the East. On the 24th December he touched at Cochin, where he was well received. Thence he continued his voyage, reached Surat in the beginning of 1668, and established there the first French factory in India. The negotiations into which he entered were at first very successful. A very valuable cargo was quickly transmitted to Madagascar. And this result was no sooner known in France, than, as a reward for his exertions, and possibly to incite him to others, the king at once conferred upon Caron the riband of St. Michel.

In the following year an extension of their operations was resolved upon. Marcara was directed to proceed to the court of the then independent king of Golconda, with the view of obtaining from him the privilege of trading throughout his dominions, and of establishing a factory at Masulipatam. To obtain this, Marcara had not only to fight his way through those obstacles peculiar to an oriental court, but he had to meet also the opposition of the English and of the Dutch. However, he triumphed over all obstacles, and on the 5th December 1669, obtained a firman which permitted the French

to be ignorant of fortification, he built this house in the form of a tetragon—made it, in fact, a regular fortification. He then applied to the governor of Batavia to send him along with casks of spices, casks of the same size containing guns, and filled up with cotton or oakum. This was done, but, unfortunately for Caron, in rolling the casks up the beach, one of them fell in pieces, and a brass gun made its appearance. This discovered the deception. Caron was at once seized, sent to Jeddo, and confronted with the king. Being unable to offer any excuse, he was sentenced to have his beard pulled out hair by hair; to be dressed in a fool's coat and cap, and to be exposed in that condition in every street in the city. After this he was shipped back to Batavia.

This story is not credited by later writers.

company to undertake negotiations in the dominions of the king, without payment of duty, import or export ; and a license was granted them at the same time to establish a factory at Masulipatam. Thither, accordingly, Marcara proceeded:

It is curious, that the one fatal feeling which attended all the efforts of the French to establish themselves in India, and which contributed very greatly to their failure, should have shown itself at this early epoch. This feeling was jealousy. It seldom happened that a man, high in office, could endure that any great feat should be accomplished by another than himself. Rarely could a sense of patriotism, a love of country, an anxiety to forward the common weal, reconcile a servant of the French company to the success of a rival. We shall see, as we proceed what golden opportunities were lost, what openings were deliberately sacrificed to the gratification of feelings as mean and paltry in themselves, as they were base and even treasonable in men who had been sent to advance the fortunes of their country in a distant land.

The French had not been two years in Surat before this feeling evinced itself. Caron, though he could boast of great achievements himself, could not endure the idea that one of his associates should obtain solely credit for deeds in which he could claim no share. The success of Marcara then, so far from being to him a source of joy, as to a patriotic Frenchman it ought to have been, awakened feelings of envy. He at once removed all the friends of the Persian from employ, and represented his conduct in a most unfavourable light to the French minister. Marcara, however, on receiving an account of these aspersions, transmitted to Colbert a statement of his proceedings. This statement was so precise, and was so well supported by facts, that, after a full enquiry, Marcara was declared to have cleared himself of every charge brought against him. The contest, however, between the two principal officials in India, did not tend to the stability of the rising settlements.*

Caron, however, was bent upon effecting some results of greater importance.* He accordingly represented to the minister that, to obtain a firm footing in the country, it was necessary to hold some place in absolute possession, unassailable by the natives of India, and to use it as a stronghold whence commercial operations could be carried on with the inhabitants of the mainland. Following

* In consequence of his quarrel with Caron, Marcara, unable any longer to work with him, embarked with his adherents on board a French ship, and sailed to Java. Arriving at Bantam, they established factories there, of which, however, they were dispossessed by the Dutch some ten years after (1682).

the idea of Albuquerque, his own conclusions had led him to favour, for this purpose, the occupation of an island, and he had indicated the seaboard of Ceylon, then partially occupied by the Dutch, as well adapted to the end in view. He did not fail to point out likewise the great commercial advantages which must accrue to France from an immediate participation in the spice trade, and he intimated that he had sounded the king of Candy on the subject of the dispossession of the Dutch, and that the enterprise would meet with his support. The project was approved by Colbert, and a fleet under the command of Admiral Lahaye,—a man of considerable reputation who had quitted high civil employment to gratify his passion for warlike operations,—was placed at the disposal of Caron to carry out the design. They made their first attempt towards the end of the year 1672 on Point de Galle. But either the place was too strong or the jealousies on board the French squadron were too great, for the French were unsuccessful. They were more fortunate at Trincomalee, which they took and garrisoned. But they had hardly landed the guns necessary to defend the fortress, when a Dutch fleet of at least equal force under Commodore Rylckoff van Goens came in sight. Admiral Lahaye declined an encounter, but leaving the garrison at Trincomalee to shift for itself, made sail to Meliapore, then known as St. Thomas, on the Coromandel Coast. Though this place had been well fortified by the Portuguese, from whom it had been taken by the Dutch some twelve years before, the French commander managed to take it in a very short time with the loss of only five men.

This solitary result of an expedition from which so much had been hoped, gave little satisfaction to the French ministry. Trincomalee had had to surrender with all its garrison to the Dutch fleet, and now of their conquests,—for at Surat and Masuilpatam they had but factories—St. Thomas alone remained. As is common in such cases, the first outcry was against the projector, and every possible fault was at once attributed to Caron. Some were jealous of his position; others detested his imperious character, and declaimed against his grasping disposition. Had Caron succeeded, but little perhaps would have been heard of these faults, but having failed, they were made use of to procure his recall. The French directors, who likewise looked very keenly to results, were so much mortified at the ill-success of this costly expedition, that they also petitioned the minister to recall Caron, in order, they said, that they might inspect his accounts. The petition was complied with, and, to prevent the chance of any evasion of the instructions,

the order sent to Caron did not convey his absolute recall, but directed him, in complimentary terms, to return to France, that he might be personally consulted with regard to some new enterprise. Caron at once obeyed, and embarking all his wealth, of which he had amassed a great deal, he set sail in 1673 for Marseilles. He had already passed the Straits of Gibraltar, when he learned from a stray vessel the real intentions of the French government regarding him. He at once altered his course and proceeded towards Lisbon. But on entering the harbour the ship struck on a rock, and almost immediately foundered. The only survivor of the disaster was one of the sons of Caron.

In the expeditions undertaken against Ceylon and St. Thomas, a very prominent part had been taken by one François Martin, a Frenchman, who devoted a long career, in singleness of heart and with great success, to the furtherance of the designs of France in the East. Little is known of him prior to the year 1672 beyond the fact that he, too, had commenced his career in the service of the Dutch East India Company, and that he had left it at an early age to join the French. He had probably made the acquaintance of Caron when they were both serving under the Dutch flag. This is certain, that he was known at Surat as a man on whose energy and discretion Caron had the greatest reliance, and he was regarded, at the time of its being carried out, as the soul of the enterprise undertaken against Point de Galle and Trincomalee. Some, indeed, have asserted that the attempt on Point de Galle failed, because Martin, who had the direction of the attack, had applied for and been refused the governorship of that place. But this statement, which was but little credited at the time, is refuted by the whole of his subsequent career. It is no slight proof of the confidence which he had inspired in those under whom he served, that although he was the trusted subordinate of Caron, he was regarded with equal confidence by those into whose lands the departure of that official left the direction of affairs in 1674. These were Admiral Lahaye and M. Baron.

The position in which these gentlemen found themselves was by no means enviable. They had provoked the hostility of the Dutch by attacking their possessions, and the Dutch were now masters of the seas and inflamed against them with a particular animosity. They had retaken Trincomalee, and the French could scarcely hope that they would allow them to retain peaceable possession of St. Thomas. With a view, therefore, to provide themselves with a place of refuge in case of evil days,

the two French Directors ordered Martin to place himself in communication with Shere Khan Lodi, the governor of the possessions of the king of Bejapore in Tanjore and the Carnatic, for the grant of a piece of land, which they might call their own. Martin obeyed, found the governor accessible, and was allowed to purchase a plot of ground on the sea coast in the province of Gingee, to the north of the river Coleroon.

This arrangement concluded, Martin returned to St. Thomas. He there found the two Directors not at all doubtful regarding the intentions of the Dutch. It was no longer a secret that the Government of Holland, highly incensed at the attack upon their possessions in Ceylon, were by no means satisfied with the re-capture of Trincomalee, but had sent out pressing instructions to their agents to drive the French likewise from St. Thomas. They were determined, as they possessed the power, to exercise it in blotting out the French from the list of their rivals in the Indian trade. This, they imagined, would be effectually accomplished by the re-capture of St. Thomas. Whilst, therefore, showering rewards upon Admiral Van Goens for the energy with which he had acted with reference to Trincomalee, they urged him to follow up his blow, and, by a well aimed stroke, to put a final end to the ambitious projects of the French in the East.

The Dutch agents immediately set to work to carry out these instructions. Their first care was to provide themselves with native allies. They therefore represented to the king of Golconda that the capture of St. Thomas by the French was a deliberate and wanton attack upon possessions which they held only in vassalage to him; that the new comers were an enterprising and energetic race, who would not be content with merely a port on the sea coast, and that it concerned his safety as well as his honour to expel them. They acted in fine so much on the jealousy and fears of Abool Hassan, the last representative of the house of Kootub Shah, that he detached a considerable force to besiege St. Thomas by land, whilst the Dutch should attack it by sea.

The combined force made its appearance before St. Thomas in the beginning of 1674, but for a considerable time they failed to make any impression upon its defences. The place was garrisoned by nearly six hundred men, the remnants of the expedition which two years before had sailed with such alacrity against Point de Galle. Now, though reduced in numbers, they were animated by the best spirit, and they were under the immediate direction of a man who never knew what it was

to be discouraged. Such was the energy of their defence, that, finding at the expiration of some weeks that little had been accomplished towards the reduction of the place, the Dutch resolved to land a considerable body of men to co-operate with the Golconda army. By this means they were enabled to subject the garrison to a strict blockade. These proceedings were effectual. Unable to procure fresh supplies, and having consumed their last stores, the French were compelled to surrender. The conditions granted to them were favourable, for they were allowed to march out with all the honours of war, and to proceed in whatever direction they might prefer. If it had been the object of the Dutch to expel the French from India, they had much reason to complain of the agents who granted a capitulation containing such a clause. But these had little idea, in all probability, of the use that would be made of it.

To a small but resolute minority of the French garrison, this capitulation, if a blow was a blow which they had expected, and for which they were prepared. Having been allowed to choose their own destination, they at once selected the grant which they had purchased north of the Coleroon. Thither accordingly marched some sixty of them, under the orders of François Martin, and there they arrived in the month of April 1674. They had everything to do, and their resources were at a very low ebb. The remainder, who constituted a large majority, despairing of the fortunes of their country in India, determined to return at once in the ships that remained to them to France. Amongst those who adopted this course were the two Directors, Messrs. Lahaye and Baron.

The supreme authority in India now remained with Martin. He had with him sixty Europeans, besides the crew of the *Vigilante* frigate, which alone remained in the roads at his disposal. He had likewise all the effects which had been brought from St. Thomas, and a considerable sum in ready money. His first care was to obtain permission from the governor to erect such buildings as should be necessary to secure his people and their property from desultory attack. He had entered into such relations with the governor, that this permission was granted without much difficulty. The command of the sea by the Dutch had forbidden him to think of opening a trade with Europe, and as the governor was in want of funds, and he had those funds lying idle, he had thought it good policy to lend them to him at the then moderate interest of eighteen per cent. The character of Shere Khan Lodi enabled him to do this without

much risk, and, contrary to the old proverb, the transaction made of the borrower a fast friend. Under his protection, the slender defences and the houses within them sprung up rapidly, and by his wise dealings with the natives, a little village, containing the native population who worked for the factory, soon grew up under its walls. The whole formed a sort of town which was at first called by the natives Phoolchery, but was gradually altered to the designation, which it bears at present, and by which it has always been known to Europeans, of Pondichery.

The measures adopted by Martin for regulating his commercial transactions were characterised by the same prudence. In those days India supplied Europe with piece-goods, and it was to the opening of a trade in this commodity that the attention of the little colony was at first directed. So successful were their efforts that in about two years after their arrival, Martin wrote to the Company that he would be able to send them an annual supply to the value of 1,000,000 livres or more. He added a full description of the place; stated that he considered it as well adapted as any other on the coast for the purpose of a French settlement; that the roadstead in front of it, which prevented the near approach of men-of-war, rendered it secure against any sudden attack; that it was well sheltered from the monsoon; that it was healthy and well situated for commercial purposes. This report and the intelligence which accompanied it, so different to the accounts which the fall of St. Thomas had led them to expect, were received with the greatest satisfaction by the Directors.

It must not be imagined that the colonists were entirely free from troubles and alarms. Pondichery was in fact founded and nurtured amid the clash of arms, and the clamour of falling kingdoms. The Sultanut of Bejapore, from which the ground on which it was built had been obtained, ceased in 1676 to be ranked as an independent sovereignty. Twelve months later, Golconda, which had assisted in the expulsion of the French from St. Thomas, had itself fallen a prey to the insatiable ambition of Aurungzebe. At the same time the enemy of all established authorities, Sevajee, was engaged in levying contributions wherever he could obtain them, in annexing towns and provinces, and in laying the foundation of that predatory power which his successors carried to so great a height. In such a time the only chance of safety, especially for a community comparatively rich, was to be well armed, and well capable of offering resistance. None felt this more than

Martin. As then, he noticed the periodical increase of his manufactures, he felt that they had need of more numerous defenders than the few Europeans who formed his party. He accordingly, in 1676, applied to his friend Shere Khan Lodi for permission to entertain some native soldiers for the purposes of defence. Shere Khan willingly assented, and made over to him three hundred of his own men. Martin used these men not only as soldiers, but colonists. He gave each a piece of land, and encouraged them to build houses and to employ themselves profitably in the manufacture of tissues and other articles for export.

For some time everything went on well, and the settlement continued to increase in prosperity. But in the seventeenth century peace and tranquillity were rare in India, and the turn of Pondichery came at last. In 1676, Sevajee, having in the four preceding years possessed himself of many places on the Malabar coast, and been crowned king of the Mahrattas, proceeded to Golconda, and after having made an alliance with its king for the protection of his own territories during his absence, poured like a torrent on the Carnatic. In May 1677, he passed by Madras, then occupied by the English, and appeared before Gingee, regarded as inaccessible. Gingee however surrendered, owing, it is stated, to a previous understanding with the commander. Proceeding further south, he was met by Martin's friend, Shere Khan, at the head of five thousand horse, but Shere Khan was defeated and taken prisoner. Sevajee then invested Vellore, took Arni, and threatened to overwhelm the settlement established by the French, on the ground of their being dependents of his enemy Shere Khan.

The situation was critical. Martin's three hundred soldier-manufacturers would be powerless in such an emergency, even though they should be supported by the entire European community. Resistance, therefore, was out of the question. But Martin had before dealt with Asiatics, and he knew that there was one argument against which few of them were proof. For greater security, however, he took the precaution, in the first instance, to send all the property of the company by sea to Madras. He then requested one of the petty native sovereigns in his neighbourhood, who had made his own submission to the irresistible Mahratta, to represent his perfect readiness to acknowledge the authority of Sevajee, and to pay the necessary sums for a license to trade in his dominions. This request, accompanied by a handsome offering, did not fail of success. Sevajee, never very ready to attack Europeans, had, on this

occasion, no personal animosity to gratify, and he granted all that was asked of him on the sole condition that the French should take no part against him in military operations. The negotiation was scarcely terminated when the news of the invasion of Golconda by the Moguls called him away in a northerly direction, and Pondichery was the safer for the danger that had threatened it.

After this, affairs went on for some time quietly. But subsequently to the invasion of Sevajee, Shere Khan, the old friend and protector of the rising settlement, appears to have been engaged in constant warfare, and it was a warfare that did not always end in success. It became, therefore, an object to the French that he should repay, whilst yet he was able, the sums that had been advanced to him in 1674, amounting to eighty thousand rupees. To him, therefore, in a friendly manner, Martin signified his wishes. Shere Khan, unable to pay, granted him instead the revenue of the lands in the district of Pondichery, and made the cession of that place itself absolute, an arrangement which was very advantageous to French interests. Thus secure of a fixed revenue, Martin began with greater vigour than ever to carry out his improvements. His sixty Europeans had been reduced to thirty-four, but he did not despair. He continued to build houses, magazines and stores, and in the beginning of 1689, he obtained likewise, though with much difficulty, the permission of Sambajee, son of Sevajee, to make of the defences he had erected a regular fortification.

In that year, however, war broke out between France and Holland, and the Dutch appeared determined to take advantage of the opportunity to repair the fault they had committed in 1674, when they granted the French a free retreat from St. Thomas. The prosperity of Pondichery alarmed them. The occasion was propitious. The French navy was too much occupied in Europe to be able to assist its possessions on the Coromandel Coast,—which, indeed, had been systematically neglected from the outset. The Dutch, on the contrary, had a strong force in the Eastern seas, and, free from all fear of opposition, they resolved to use it to nip in the bud the young French settlement of Pondichery.

In accordance with these views a fleet of nineteen sail of the line, exclusive of transports and smaller vessels, appeared before Pondichery at the end of August 1693. It was one of the most imposing armaments that had ever appeared on the Indian seas. It had on board fifteen hundred European troops, and two thousand European sailors, besides some native Cingalese in Dutch pay; it had sixteen brass guns, six mortars, and a siege train. Nevertheless, scarcely satisfied with their own means, the Dutch

had previously written to Ram Raja, who, on the death of Sambajee, had been appointed regent of the Mahrattas, offering to buy from him the district of Pondichery. The reply of Ram Raja deserves to be remembered. "The French," he said, "fairly purchased Pondichery, and paid for it a valuable consideration, and therefore all the money in the world would never tempt him to dislodge them." But when the Dutch fleet appeared before Pondichery, the high-souled Mahratta was no longer able to exert his influence in their favour. He was shut up in the fortress of Gingee, on the capture of which Aurungzebe had set his heart. The surrounding country fell during this siege under the influence of the preponderating power of the Moguls, and these did not hesitate, on an application from the Dutch, to sell to them the district of Pondichery for fifty thousand pagodas, and even to detach a body of men to support them.

To resist this formidable attack, Martin had literally no resources. The French Company, on taking stock in 1684, had been terribly alarmed by finding that, instead of gaining by their commercial enterprises, they had actually lost one-half of their capital. They were, therefore, little in the mood to send out any material assistance to Martin, especially as they had all along regarded his undertaking as foolhardy and impracticable. Martin had been therefore from the very outset left to himself. We have seen what he had accomplished; how he had built and fortified a town, established a trade, gained the confidence of the natives, princes as well as people, and laid the foundation of an enduring prosperity. And now all this promising fabric was to be overthrown. In the course of one of those contests in which the country was always engaged, his native allies were temporarily on the losing side. From them, therefore, he could expect no assistance. He had six guns, thirty or forty Europeans, and some three or four hundred natives, and he was attacked by a fleet and army strong enough to take possession of all the European settlements in India.

It must have been a sad day for Martin when he beheld this storm breaking over his head, and destroying the tangible evidences of his wise and skilful policy. Nevertheless, he brought to bear against it all the resources of a mind habituated to calm and cool judgment. He had taken the precaution to move the idlers out of the town, and he prepared for a vigorous defence. The Dutch, however, gave him no respite. They landed their troops at the end of August, cut him off at once from the inland and from the sea, and plied their attack with such energy, that on the 6th September, having then offered a resistance of twelve days' duration, Martin had no hopes of being

able to prolong the defence, and demanded a parley. This resulted in a capitulation, signed on the 8th September, and consisting of thirteen articles, the principal of which were, that the place should be given up to the Dutch East India Company ; that the garrison should march out with all the honours of war ; that the native soldiers should retire whither they pleased ; but that the French should be sent to Europe either that year or the beginning of the next. These conditions were implicitly complied with.

Thus ended, apparently for ever, the attempt of the French to establish themselves permanently on the Coromandel Coast. Of all the efforts ever made by that nation to form a settlement in India, this one had been undertaken under the most gloomy auspices and with the smallest resources, and yet up to the time of the capture of Pondichery, it had succeeded the best. Formed of the remnant of the garrison of St. Thomas, composed originally of but sixty Europeans, never regularly reinforced, but receiving only stray additions, it had not only maintained itself for seventeen years, but it had made itself respected by the natives of the country. What it had accomplished in its internal arrangements, we have already recorded. As we recall the story of these seventeen years of occupation, the question cannot but arise, how it was that this handful of men, left to themselves, accomplished so much, whilst other expeditions, upon which all the resources of the company were so exuberantly lavished, failed so signally. We can only reply by pointing to the character of the leader. Everything was due to François Martin. His energy, his perseverance, his gentleness with the natives, his fair dealing, formed the real foundations of Pondichery. Never was there an adventurer,—if adventurer he can be called,—who was more pure-handed, who looked more entirely after the interests of France, and less after his own. In this respect he was the very opposite of Caron. Caron was avaricious, grasping, jealous of others' reputation. Martin was single-minded, liberal, large-hearted, without a thought of envy or jealousy, and a true patriot. Such are the men who found empires, and who are the true glory of their country ! The foundations which Martin laid were not, it is true, destined to be surmounted by an imperial edifice, but they only just missed that honour. That they were worthy of it is his glory,—that those that followed him failed, can reflect nothing upon him. We see him now with all his hopes baffled, his seventeen years' of expectation destroyed, a poor man, sailing to France with nothing to show as the result of all his labours. Was there indeed nothing ? Aye, if experience of a distant country

of successful management, of dealing with mankind, of making for one's self resources,—if these be nothing, Martin returned to his country destitute indeed. But in that age such acquirements were more highly considered than they sometimes are now, and no long time elapsed before Martin was to feel that they had gained for him the confidence of his country to an extent that enabled him to repair the losses of 1693, and to rebuild on the old foundation a power whose reputation was to endure.

Before, however, we proceed to record the further attempts of the French to establish themselves on the southern Coromandel Coast, it is necessary that we should glance at their proceedings in other parts of Hindoostan.

We have already alluded to their establishment at Surat.* This was strengthened in the year 1672 by the transfer to it of the head authority from Madagascar,—the Company's settlements in which were abandoned in that year, and Madagascar nominally transferred to the French Crown.† Some of the Madagascar settlers proceeded, as we have seen, to the Isle of Mascarenhas, afterwards known as Bourbon, others came on to Surat. But the establishment at Surat did not prosper. The wretched condition of the affairs of the parent company naturally affected their servants and prevented them from carrying on trade with the vigour or success of the Dutch and the English. Politically, the location there of the factory was of no advantage to the French, and its commercial value lessened with the rising importance of Pondichery and Chandernagore. For many years, therefore, the trade at Surat languished, and the place was finally abandoned in the beginning of the eighteenth century. It was abandoned, however, in a manner little creditable to the French company. They left behind them debts to a very large amount, and such was the effect on the native merchants, that

* Grant-Duff records that when Surat was plundered for the second time by Sevajee (Oct. 31d, 1670,) "the English, as on the first occasion, defended themselves successfully, under the direction of Mr. Strengthen Masters, "and killed many of the Mahrattas; the Dutch factory, being in a retired quarter, was not molested; but the French purchased an ignominious "neutrality by permitting Sevajee's troops to pass through their factory "to attack an unfortunate Tartar Prince, who was on his return from an "embassy to Mecca."

Ignominiously avoiding a combat is not characteristic of the French nation, and, considering that on this occasion, Savajee's force consisted of fifteen thousand picked troops, whilst the French were few in numbers, and occupied a weak position, it is scarcely astonishing that they entered into an engagement which secured to them their property. The plunder of the Tartar prince can scarcely be considered a consequence of this engagement. Surat was for three days in the possession of Savajee's troops, and the Tartar prince would have been plundered under any circumstances.

† Edict Louis XIV., 12th November 1671.

when a few years afterwards (1714) a company, formed at St. Maloes, despatched ships to trade at Surat, the ships were seized and sequestered on account of the debts of the French India Company, with which that of St. Maloes was in no way connected. In dealing with the French intercourse with this place we have advanced beyond the main point of the narrative; but, it is of the less consequence, as we shall have little further occasion to make any reference to Surat.

The French factory at Masulipatam was, as we have seen, founded by the Persian Marcara in 1669, under a patent obtained from the king of Golconda. Its trade at the outset was extremely flourishing, but the expulsion of the French from St. Thomas, by the aid, it will be remembered, of the Golconda army, was a heavy blow to its prosperity. It exerted for a long time after little political influence on the march of affairs. It revived, however, with the rise of Pondichery. In 1693 the French obtained permission to build a square, which is still in existence, and is known by the name of France Peta. Masulipatam became later one of the most important of the French settlements. To the circumstances connected with its rise we shall have occasion to refer further on.

In the year 1663 Shaista Khan, the maternal uncle of the Emperor Aurungzebe, having been driven out of the Deccan and compelled to flee for his life by Sevajee, whom he had been sent to repress, was appointed, to compensate him for his humiliation, viceroy of Bengal. It was during his viceroyalty* that a French fleet entered the Hooghly, and disembarked a body of settlers at the village of Chandernagore. This village was ceded to those settlers by an edict of Aurungzebe in 1688. Eight years later Sobha Singh, a landed proprietor of Burdwan, rebelled against the authority of the viceroy Ibrahim Khan, the successor of Shaista Khan, and rallying to his standard the Orissa Afghans and other malcontents, plundered Hooghly, and carried devastation to the very gates of the European settlements. In this crisis, the English, French and Dutch traders pressed upon the viceroy the necessity of their being permitted to fortify their respective settlements,—a favour which had been before asked and refused. The viceroy would only tell them in reply to provide for their own safety. This was regarded as a tacit permission to fortify, and was acted upon accordingly. Nevertheless, the French at Chandernagore never attempted to be anything more than traders. For a long time their efforts in that respect were not very successful. All French writers speak of their trade there, for many years, as languishing. By

* Stewart, in his History of Bengal, says "about the year 1676."

letters patent, dated February 1701, Chandernagore, with the other French possessions in the Indies (Balasore, Kassimbazar, —an offshoot from Chandernagore and Mssulipatam) was placed under the authority of the governor of Pondichery. It was not, however, till nearly thirty years later that the trade received an impulse which converted Chandernagore into one of the most flourishing settlements of the Company. To that change and its causes we shall refer at the proper time. The factory at Balasore was insignificant, and was abandoned at an early period.

It will thus be seen that of all the places in India in which the French had made a settlement, Pondichery was in 1693 the most advanced and the most promising; and now they had lost Pondichery. The Dutch knew well the value of their conquest. Its situation, sheltered for nine months in the year from the monsoon, the inconsiderable surf, and the fact of there being a little river falling into the sea navigable for flat-bottomed boats, rendered it superior as a settlement to any other place on the Coromandel Coast. They therefore determined to make it worthy to be the capital of Dutch India. Their first care was to strengthen its defences. They built new walls, strengthened by bastions, and made it the strongest fortress possessed by an European power in Hindoostan. They endeavoured also to cement their relations with the natives, and to establish with them the same cordial intercourse which had existed with the French. It was an end towards which they strove that, as in their wars with the Portuguese, they had kept the fortified places they had taken from them in India, so, after this contest with the French, peace when it came might once more confirm to them the possession of their Eastern gains.

Meanwhile Martin and his companions had arrived in France. The reception they met with was encouraging. The minister and the directors were equally pleased to honour a man who had effected so much with so little. The king himself conferred upon him the dignity of chevalier of the order of St. Lazare. On the other hand, his description of Pondichery and its advantages imparted vitality and excitement to directors who had had to experience nothing but losses. They began for the first time to appreciate the importance of the place which they had hitherto so neglected, and which, owing to that neglect, had been lost to them. Just then, however, nothing could be done. France was fighting single-handed against Spain, Germany, England and Holland, and of these England and Holland were her successful rivals in the Indies. There was nothing for it but to wait for peace.

Peace at last came. On the 21st * September 1697, the

* New style.

treaty of Ryswick was signed. One of the articles of that treaty engaged that there should be a mutual restitution of all places, taken on both sides, both in and out of Europe ; and at the close of that article was a clause in which the fortress of Pondichery was particularly mentioned, with an especial proviso, that its fortifications should not be destroyed, but that it should be delivered up in its then condition.

Pondichery thus recovered, the French Company resolved that it should not easily again slip from their possession. Martin was at once appointed to the command of the place, and instructions were given him to add still further to its strength. It was agreed to reimburse to the Dutch 16,000 pagodas, which they asserted they had expended on the fortifications. A squadron was at the same time sent out with him to India, having on board two hundred regular troops, several engineers, a large supply of military stores, several heavy and field guns, and materials in abundance for the use of the settlement.

It thus turned out that the conquest of Pondichery by the Dutch was really the cause of great advantages accruing to the French. Had Pondichery never been taken, it seems probable that it would have been left to fight its own way under Martin, and after his demise would have sunk ultimately to decay. Again we see an instance of the power of individual character. Martin in Europe showed himself more powerful, more persuasive than he had been in Pondichery. He stirred up the doubtful, animated the slothful, and inspired all with a feeling akin to his own enthusiasm. It was owing doubtless to him and to his representations that that particular clause was inserted in the treaty of Ryswick. Nor did he cease his efforts till he had seen preparations on foot which were to render the place which he had created equal to Pondichery of his ideal.

On arriving at his destination Martin commenced the work of improvement. He enlarged and improved the fortifications,* and collected a garrison of between seven and eight hundred Europeans ; he laid out a plan for a large town, the erection of which he commenced. In little more than a year a hundred new houses had been erected, and the place presented such an improved appearance, that it is stated that a person who had only seen it in 1693 would not have recognized it. Nor did he omit to renew his relation with the natives. By the same course of gentleness and straightforward dealing which he had formerly

* It is stated that the alterations in the fortifications were carried on under the direction of a Capuchin monk, named Father Louis.

followed, he attracted them in great numbers to the settlement, so much so, that in twelve years after his return, there were between fifty and sixty thousand of them inhabitants of Pondichery.

We have stated that on the abandonment of Madagascar in 1672, the supreme French authority in India was transferred to Surat. But, in 1701, less than three years after the re-occupation of Pondichery, the trade at Surat had become so unprofitable, that it was resolved to abandon the factory at that place. How the factory was abandoned, we have already seen. But, prior to that not very creditable episode, letters patent had been issued by which the superior council of the Indies, as it was called, was transferred from Surat to Pondichery, and this place was made the seat of the director or governor-general, with supreme authority over the other French factories in any part of India. Almost immediately afterwards Martin was appointed president of the superior council, and director-general of French affairs in India.

Meanwhile the affairs of the French company, always badly managed, did not reap much advantage from the peace. Unable from paucity of funds, to fit out trading expeditions of their own, they were compelled to have recourse to the system of selling trading licenses to others. With funds and good management in Paris, and a Martin at Pondichery, the French might have established a trade with India which it would not have been easy to destroy, and which would have immensely aided the ambitious projects of the successors of Martin. But, at the close of the seventeenth century, the resources of the French company were nearly exhausted. They struggled on, indeed, by means of the shifts to which we have adverted, for some time longer. But the material aid which they afforded to the settlement at Pondichery was of the slightest description. The traders who purchased their licenses made fortunes, whilst the directors of the company which granted those licenses were just able by their sale to realise sufficient to keep their servants from starving. This was an immense misfortune at a time when the affairs of the company were being managed in India by a man of conspicuous ability and of rare integrity. Whilst the town of Pondichery was increasing, and its native inhabitants continued enormously to augment, merely by reason of the good government that they found there, the connection with the parent company was becoming every day more precarious and uncertain, and the superior council could not but fear, that, like Madagascar and Surat, the time would shortly arrive, when Pondichery, too, would be abandoned.

But in 1715 Louis XIV. died. The Duke of Orleans, upon whom, as regent, the supreme authority of France then devolved, was at once applied to by the East India Company for a confirmation of their privileges. But the desperate nature of the affairs of the company were well known to the regent. It appeared to him that it was useless to confirm privileges of which the directors of the company were unable to avail themselves, and which they accordingly sub-let to others in a more prosperous position. It was not that the trade to India was a trade unprofitable in itself. It had been unprofitable to the company, solely because a system under which dividends were declared when there were no profits, and money was borrowed at a high rate of interest, must always be unprofitable. The capital of the company had been originally too small, and had therefore succumbed to early and unavoidable mischances. Acting under the advice of the famous Law of Lauriston, the regent believed that an Indian company, properly managed, might be of material assistance to the State in the wretched financial condition in which it had been left by Louis XIV. For these reasons, he not only declined his confirmation of the privileges of the East India Company, but by an edict dated May 1719, he revoked and suppressed all its privileges whatever. At the same time he established a new company of the Indies by uniting the old East India Company to the West India Company established two years before with a capital of £4,000,000 under the auspices of Law. To this new company he granted the possessions and effects of the other companies, charging them with their debts. To enable them to discharge those debts and to carry on the vast trade guaranteed to them by the edict, he created in their favour one million sterling in new shares, to be purchased only for ready money. In the following year, in consideration of the ready assistance afforded by this Company to the Crown in facilitating the diminution of the immense amount of paper money in circulation, a new decree was issued, declaring the privileges of the Company to be perpetual, and it is from that time known in history, as the Perpetual Company of the Indies.

The result of Law's gigantic plans is too well known to be alluded to, except in so far as they affected the scheme of virtually transforming the Perpetual Company of the Indies into a department of the government. Th collapse, brought about by the undue expansion of a scheme, which, retained within reasonable limits,* would have been of undoubted service to the State, came in 1720. After a series of edicts, all tending to give a forced circulation to depreciated paper, and to prevent the

* The expressed opinion of M. Thiers.

exportation of specie and the manufacture of ornaments of gold or silver, a resolution was arrived at on the 5th of May of that year, by which the value of the paper money was reduced by an enactment of the legislative. This was the final stroke. The Royal Bank, the creation of Law, succumbed under this last burden, and the Perpetual Company of the Indies, breaking off its banking connection with the government, reverted to the more legitimate undertakings of trade and commerce, though still under the supervision of the Crown. Two other edicts affecting the company were issued in 1723 and 1725, by the last of which its capital was fixed at 102,000,000 of francs, or £4,080,000, in fifty-one thousand shares of two thousand francs (£80) each.

This was a very great improvement on the state of affairs before the accession of the Duke of Orleans to the regency. The company delayed not to act upon it. At the end of the year 1720, they fitted out three ships, which were laden with a great quantity of silver in specie and bullion, in addition to a large cargo of European commodities. The arrival of these ships at Pondichery was the first intimation which the superior Council at that place had received of the change of system. It unfortunately happened that with these vessels there came an intimation that regular supplies of the same nature would be transmitted every year. The consequence was, that the first cargo was applied primarily to discharge the debts contracted by the company in various parts of India. With the surplus a small cargo was transmitted to France. Had the company now been able to carry out their promise of forwarding regular supplies, its financial prosperity would have been assured. But in the latter end of 1720, and in the years immediately following, the collapse of Law's system made itself most keenly felt. His connection with the government had made that collapse a national disaster. All commercial enterprises were affected by it, and the new India Company, so far from having it in their power to send out a squadron laden with bullion and merchandise, were not in a position, in 1721, to send out a single ship carrying cargo.

This failure on their part re-acted on the settlement of Pondichery. Martin, who from the time we have left him, had continued by his wise system of administration to improve and enlarge the town, and to attract within its walls a very large native population, had made great preparations to open out new markets for the expected cargo. When, instead of the cargo he received intimation that no ships could possibly be sent that year or the next, he was reduced to very great necessities. His credit had been pledged, and it was by reason of his

credit that he had obtained his position at Pondichery, and had made that place what it was. But it is on such occasions, that the real character of a man is best seen. The rich natives who had flocked into the town were naturally acquainted with the reason of the crisis. In the rectitude and in the good intentions of the governor, they had the utmost confidence. Martin, therefore, had but little difficulty in making arrangements which warded off actual disaster. He could not, however, so act as to induce those with whom he dealt to transfer to the company in France the confidence they felt in himself, and it was long before, as well with the natives as with the rival companies of England and Holland, the credit of the French company recovered from the blow which the too unbounded confidence of its own directors had dealt it.

The arrival, however, of two ships in 1724, and of seven others in the course of the two following years, did much to restore the credit of the company. From this time may be dated the period when the agents in India were able to transmit regular, though in the first instance but slender, returns to Europe. The trade thenceforth began visibly to extend, and the profits to increase. Though nominally independent, the parent company was always under the patronage of the ministry, and the extension of commerce with India was not a matter which a French minister of the eighteenth century would willingly neglect. Thus it came about that the action taken by Law was in the end really beneficial to the company. The depression caused by the failure of his main schemes once having disappeared, the many years of peace which, with but a slight intermission, signalled the administration of Cardinal Fleury gave the company a grand opportunity, of which they availed themselves, for the development of the new resources Law's measures provided for them. Henceforth, then, regarding the traffic as regularly established and steadily pursued, we shall make no special allusion to their commercial transactions, but shall confine ourselves more particularly to the policy and conduct of their agents in India.

Martin, to whom they owed everything, who was the real, we may say the only, founder of their prosperity, lived to see the commencement of the steady trade for which he had made so many exertions. The exact date of his demise is not accurately known, but it is believed to have occurred in 1725. Upon the plot of ground which he had occupied with sixty men just fifty one years before, there had risen, under his auspices, a great and flourishing city. He himself, its founder, had not only amassed no riches, but he died poor,—

poor but honoured. * He had devoted all his energies, private as well as public, to his country. Pondichery, at his death, was the best ordered European city in Asia. It possessed a large market-place, six gates, eleven bastions for the defence of its walls, a regular citadel well fortified, upwards of four hundred cannon upon the works, besides a large number of the field-pieces, bombs, mortars, and other military stores in the arsenal.* The governor had a very fine house with convenient offices. The houses and storehouses of private persons were likewise both numerous and magnificent. On the west side of the town was a public garden, beautifully laid out, and near this a magnificent house built expressly for the use of native princes and ambassadors, who were lodged in it when they chose to visit Pondichery, treated with infinite respect, and all their expenses defrayed. The town possessed, besides, three convents,—one, a very large one, belonging to the Jesuits, who employed themselves in the instruction of native children; and two others, smaller, belonging to the Carmelites and Capuchins. The native town was divided from the European town by a canal; the houses in this were solidly constructed of wood and chunam,—the latter being a composition made of shells ground to powder, and wrought into a kind of paste, which, by exposure to the air, becomes as white and almost as hard as stone.

It is curious to read the account of the state observed by the governor in those primitive days of Indian occupation. Attending upon him on great occasions, it is stated, "are twelve "horse guards clothed with scarlet, laced with gold, and an "officer, with the title of captain, commands them. He has "also a foot guard of three hundred men, natives of the coun- "try, called peons, and when he appears in public, he is carried "in a palanquin very richly adorned with gold fringe." Such, however, was the economy of the administration under Martin, that, except on public or particular occasions, these guards were employed in the commercial service of the company, and earned all the wages they received. At the time of Martin's death, the native population is computed to have exceeded one hundred thousand.

Nearly twenty-seven years had then elapsed since the Dutch had restored Pondichery, and they had been years of peace and growing prosperity. The French enjoyed in those days a great reputation at the courts of the various native princes for qualities the very opposite of those they were wont to display in Europe. The power and resources of France, the sacredness

of the persons of her sons, were subjects which the French in India never dwelt upon. They were careful, on the contrary, to pay the utmost deference to the wishes of the prince with whom they were brought in contact, and to attempt to gain his confidence by a recognition of his power and authority. Their policy, in fact, was to adapt themselves as much as possible to native habits, whilst not departing from those strict principles, an adherence to which alone can beget confidence. In this respect the ruler of Pondichery had something to repair, for the discreditable departure from Surat had materially affected French credit. Martin not only repaired that blot, but he brought his relations with the natives to such a point, that he and his French were not only trusted, but they were personally esteemed and regarded. In this way he laid the foundation for that intimate connection with native powers, which the most illustrious of his successors used with such effect, to build up a French empire in India. Perhaps it was that, left so long to his own resources in the presence of contending powers, any one of which was strong enough to destroy him, he deemed a policy of conciliation his only safe policy. But, even in that case, to him the credit is undoubtedly due of being able to dive so well into the character of the natives as to use them for his own purposes by seeming to defer to their wishes; to turn the attack of Sevajee into a claim for Mahratta protection, and to convert the loan to Shere Khan Lodi into the means of obtaining a fixed and perpetual revenue.

It is a remarkable result too of Martin's skilful policy, that the progress of Pondichery caused neither envy nor apprehension to any of the native rulers of the country. It is a result which can only be ascribed to the confidence which that policy had inspired. The four hundred guns on the ramparts were regarded, not as threatening to a native power, but as a means of defence against one of the rival nations of Europe. When a native prince visited Pondichery, he was received as a friend, he was carefully waited upon, he was pressed to stay. The idea of regarding the natives as enemies was never suffered by any chance to appear. Acknowledging them as the lords paramount of the country, the French professed to regard themselves as their best tenants, their firmest well-wishers. Pondichery rose, therefore, without exciting a single feeling of distrust. It was freely resorted to by the most powerful princes and nobles in its neighbourhood. The good offices of the French were not seldom employed to mediate in cases of dispute. Thus it happened that they gained not only toleration but friendship and esteem. They were the

only European nation which the natives regarded with real sympathy. Evidences of this regard were constantly given ; that it was real, subsequent events fully proved.

This cordial understanding with the children of the soil,—the solid foundation upon which to build up a French India,—was, with much more that we have described, the work of that Martin, whom the latest* French account of French India dismisses in half a dozen lines. Was it his fault that his successors risked and lost that which he had secured with so much care, with so much energy, with so much prudence? The most fervent admirers of Dupleix, the most determined defenders of Lally, the most prejudiced partisans of Bussy, cannot assert that. Was it not rather that the very facility of Martin's success opened out to his successors that splendid vision of supreme domination which is especially alluring to those who feel within themselves the possession of great powers? To answer that question, we must turn, in an enquiring spirit, to their careers.

* Inde, par M. X. Raymond.

THE RISE OF THE FRENCH POWER IN INDIA.

1. *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, per l'Abbé Guyon. Paris, 1744, 3 volumes.
2. *Memoir pour le Sieur de la Bourdonnais, avec les pièces justificatives*. Paris, 1750.
3. *Memoir pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la Compagnie des Indes avec les pièces justificatives*. A Paris, 1859.
4. *An account of the war in India between the English and French on the Coast of Coromandel, &c., &c.* By Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq., London, 1761.
5. *A voyage to the East Indies, &c.* By Mr. Grose, London, 1772.
6. *The Modern part of an Universal History from the earliest accounts to the present time*: London, 1781.
7. *A Philosophical and Political History of the settlements and trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies*. By the Abbé Raynal.—A new translation—Edinburgh, 1782.
8. *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from the year 1745*. By Robert Orme, Esq., F. A. S. 1803—reprinted by Pharos and Co., "Athenæum" Press Mount Road, 1861.
9. *History of the Mahrattas*. By James Grant Duff, Esq., Longmans, 1826.
10. *The Bengal and Agra Annual Guide and Gazetteer for 1841*. Calcutta, William Rushton and Co., 1861.
11. *Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre*, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844.
12. *Inde*, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine, Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.
13. *History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army*. By Captain Arthur Broome. Calcutta, Thacker and Co., 1850.
14. *A Gazetteer of Southern India*. By Pharos & Co., Madras, 1855.
15. *The History of British India*. By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, John Madden, Leadenhall Street, 1850.
16. *The National Review*, Volume XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193, Piccadilly, 1862.

17. *Nouvelle Biographie Générale depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862.
18. *Carnatic Chronology.* By Charles Philip Brown, late of the Madras Civil Service. London, Bernard Quaritch, 15, Piccadilly, 1863.
19. *The History of India.* By John Clark Marshman. Part I. London, Harrison, Pall Mall, 1864.
20. *Madagascar and its People.* By Lyons McLeod, Esq., late British Consul at Mozambique. London, Longmans, 1865.

IN the year 1725,* a small French squadron under the command of M. de Pardaillan, acting under the orders of the government of Pondichery, came to opposite the little town

* The writer of this article desires here to rectify a mistake which occurred in an article entitled *The Early French in India*, which appeared in the last number of this *Review*. It was stated at page 346 of that number, "that the exact state of his ('Martins') demise is not accurately known, but it is believed to have occurred in 1725." This statement was based mainly on the authority, of a biographical sketch of François Martin in the *Nouvelle Biographie Générale* published in 1861. This sketch concludes thus: "In 1702 the Company established at Pondichery a superior Council of which it named him ('Martin) President. When the traveller Luillier visited the colony in 1722 and 1723, Martin was still living; but he died probably before 1727,—the year in which the Company concluded with a Hindoo prince, a treaty in which he is not mentioned." The reference to the treaty intimates as plainly as words can intimate, that Martin was Governor of Pondichery when he died, and the first part of the quotation states boldly that his death occurred subsequently to 1723. The reputation for accuracy which the *Nouvelle Biographie Générale* enjoys, was sufficient to induce the writer, in the absence of any opposing testimony, to accept the statement regarding the date of Martin's demise,—the more so, as it appeared to him to receive indirect support from other authorities. The Abbé Guyon, for instance, in his *Histoire des Indes Orientales* states that Martin lived to see the settlement of Pondichery, and all that depended upon it in a flourishing condition. Now, as the real prosperity of Pondichery dates from the formation of the Perpetual Company of the Indies, this remark, coupled with the absence of any reference to the successors of Martin, appeared strongly confirmatory of the positive statement in the "*Biographie Générale*." The first doubt was suggested, long after the article had been printed off, by the perusal of the "*Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix*." In this it is stated that Dupleix set out for Pondichery in 1720, and that, on his arrival there, probably the following year, "the Governor of Pondichery was Monsieur Lenoir." This was directly at variance with the statement regarding Martin in the "*Biographie Générale*," but it was supported by the writer of the article "Dupleix" in the *National Review*, who had free access to the *Ariel* papers. But no other work to which it was possible to have access in this country threw any light on the subject. In this perplexity, the writer took the bold

of Maihi, just below Tellichery, on the Malabar coast, and summoned the place to surrender. The Governor refused. The situation of Maihi, indeed, seemed to place it out of all danger. On high ground rising up from the sea, and washed on its north side by a little river, the entrance into which, as it ran into the sea, was closed by rocks for even the smallest boats, Maihi seemed to be able to bid defiance to any enemy who should attack it on the side of the sea. So at least thought the Governor, and so, apparently, seemed to think the French Commodore. He, at all events, was hesitating as to the course he should adopt under the circumstances, when the captain of one of his ships submitted to him a plan which he begged he might be permitted to carry himself into execution. The name of this captain was Bertrand François Mahé de la Bourdonnais.

As this is a name which will occupy considerable space in these pages, it may be as well to take the earliest opportunity of describing who and what manner of man this was, the earliest trace of whose action in the Indian seas we have just adverted to. La Bourdonnais was born at St. Malo in 1699. When not ten years old he was entered as a common sailor on board a merchant ship bound for the South Sea. Returning thence, he made in 1713, a second voyage to the East Indies and to the Philippines. During this voyage, a Jesuit on board taught him mathematics. In 1716 and 1717, he made a third voyage to the North Sea, and in the following year a fourth to the Levant. In his twentieth year, he entered the service of the French India Company, as second lieutenant in a vessel bound to Surat. In 1722, he was promoted to be first lieutenant, and in that grade made a third voyage to the Indies. He occupied his leisure hours during the passage out in composing a treatise on the masting of vessels. But he had an opportunity of showing on the return voyage, that he was as daring in action as he was prompt and ready in suggestion. His vessel, the *Boubon*, on

step of appealing to the Governor of Pondichery. The appeal was most promptly and courteously replied to. The Governor, in the kindest manner, sent an extract from an historical document deposited in the archives of Pondichery, in which the dates of the demise or resignation of the several governors are recorded. From this it appears that Martin died at an earlier date than that given in the article on the *Early French in India*, and that it is to his successors, trained in his school, and especially to M. Lenoir, who became, for the first time, Governor in 1721, that the credit ascribed to Martin in page 346 of that article is due. The moral of the narrative is not affected by the alteration. It was in the system established by Martin, and in the men trained in his school that the natives shewed the confidence which was of such value to the settlement.

her arrival off the Isle of Bourbon, was in a sinking state and in want of every thing. No ship was in sight, and no aid was procurable from the island. In this extremity, La Bourdonnais proceeded in one of the ship's boats to the Isle of France, to search there for a vessel to render assistance to the *Bourbon*. His search was successful, and the *Bourbon* was, by this daring exploit, saved from destruction.

La Bourdonnais had scarcely returned to France, when he found himself under orders to return to the Indies as captain commanding a frigate. During his previous voyages, he had acquired a knowledge of navigation, of carpentering, of everything that related to the construction of a ship, and of gunnery. But in this, under the able instruction of M. Didier, an engineer in the Royal Service, he devoted himself to engineering, and soon became a proficient in that science. On arriving at Pondichery, he was attached to the squadron of M. de Pardaillan, just starting for the conquest of Maihi. It is under the orders of this commodore, hesitating regarding the attack of the place, that we now find him.

The plan which La Bourdonnais submitted to the commodore, was to land the troops on a raft of his own designing, in order of battle, under cover of the fire of the squadron. He pressed also that he might be permitted to lead them himself. M. de Pardaillan, struck with the ingenuity of the plan, and with the energy and quickness of decision evinced by the young officer, gave his consent to the scheme. It was carried out almost instantly. The raft was made, the troops were placed upon it, and, piloted by La Bourdonnais, were landed, with dry feet and almost in order of battle, at the foot of the high ground. This difficulty being surmounted, the place was stormed. As an acknowledgment of the skill and enterprise of his young captain, the commodore, by a slight alteration of the letters which went to form the name of the captured town, transformed it from the Indian Maihi or Mahi into the French Mahé.—the first name of La Bourdonnais. This new name not only took root, but it gradually effaced the recollection that the town had ever borne another.*

The order of events, as they occurred at Pondichery, will not allow us to proceed for the present with the career of La Bourdonnais. Him we shall meet again a little later on the scene. Meanwhile it will be necessary to advert to the proceedings of one whose influence upon French India was destined to be even

* We are indebted to the Carnatic Chronology of Mr. C. P. Brown, late Madras, C. S., for the information regarding the origin of the name "Mahé." It was evidently unknown to Mr. Mill, and equally so to the authors of the *Indian Gazetteers*.

more direct, more commanding, more enduring ;—whose brilliant genius all but completed the work which François Martin had begun ;—who was indebted for all that he did accomplish to his own unassisted energies ; who owed his failure to carry through all his high-soaring designs to that system of universal corruption, which, during the reign of Louis XV, consumed the very vitals of France, ruled in her palaces, and tainted all her public offices. We need scarcely say that we advert to Joseph François Dupleix.

This illustrious statesman was born at Landrecies, in the province of Flandre, in 1697. His father was a wealthy farmer-general of taxes, and a director of the Company of the Indies. The young Dupleix displayed, at a very early age, a strong passion for the exact sciences, and particularly for mathematics. To the mercantile life, to which his father had destined him, he shewed a decided aversion. To cure him, therefore, of his speculative habit of thought, and to plunge him at once into practical life, the old farmer-general sent the thoughtful and retiring student, then just seventeen, to sea. The result corresponded entirely to his hopes. Dupleix returned from voyages in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, cured of his love of abstract sciences, anxious to mix with the world, eager to put in force theories he had formed on the subject of commercial enterprise. It was in the power of the delighted father to comply at once with his wishes. Director of the Company of the Indies, and a man of no small importance in the direction, he was able to nominate his son, then only twenty-three, to the second position at Pondichery. This was the office of First Councillor and Military Commissioner of the Superior Council. Dupleix joined his appointments in 1720, and at once began to put in force the theories which had formed the subject of his speculations. He found the colonists absorbed by the contemplation and care of the trade between Europe and Pondichery. His idea was to develope and foster a coasting trade and inland traffic. He desired to open out large schemes of commercial exchange at the various towns on the coast, and with the large cities in the interior. It did not seem sufficient to him that Pondichery should be the exporter merely of her own manufactures and the manufactures of the country in the immediate vicinity ; he would make her the emporium of the commerce of Southern India. The Government of Pondichery was not pecuniarily in a position, at the outset, to embark in the undertaking, although the Governor, Lenoir, regarded its execution as practicable, and even eminently desirable. But this formed no bar to the prosecution of the plan by Dupleix. On the contrary, private trading

being permitted by the Company, he was glad of an opportunity of shewing the European residents of Pondichery, who were clerks of the Company, how they might, by legitimate means, enrich themselves. Anything which could give them in independent position, would tend to give them a higher interest in the country and in the prosperity of the settlement. He himself did not scruple to set a bold example and to embark his fortune in the trade. The results were such as he had anticipated. He speedily realised a very handsome return, and the knowledge of this had more effect than all his theories in inducing his fellow-countrymen to follow in his footsteps.

Since the formation of the Perpetual Company of the Indies, the control of the directors in Paris over their agents in Pondichery had become far more stringent and direct than it had been prior to 1720. Details were interfered with, regarding the proper management of which the Home Government could have no knowledge, and the most arbitrary and often ill-judged orders were issued. These orders led to misunderstanding and dissensions, and it resulted from one of these, M. Lenoir being at the time Governor-General, that in the month of December 1726, Dupleix was suspended from his office by order of the directors. But, though offered a free passage to France, Dupleix determined to await in India the result of an appeal he at once proceeded to make against that decision. At the end of nearly four years, the result he had striven for, occurred. The sentence of suspension was removed (30th September 1730), and, as a compensation for the injustice he had suffered, he was appointed very soon after Intendant or Director of Chandernagore—a junior officer, previously appointed by Lenoir, being removed to make way for him.*

From the period of its first occupation in 1676, to the time when Dupleix assumed the Intendantship, Chandernagore had been regarded as a settlement of very minor importance. Starved by the parent Company in Paris, it had been unable, partly from want of means, and partly also from the want of enterprise on the part of the settlers, to carry on any large commercial operations. The town, as we have seen, † had been fortified in 1688. Lodges, or commercial posts, dependent upon Chandernagore, had also

* In recording the early career of Dupleix, we have followed the account given in the *National Review* for October 1862. No. XXX,—an article which by the truth, the candour, and the boldness, with which it attacks pre-established opinion in order to restore the reputation of a much calumniated man, must be regarded as one of the most valuable contributions to Indian History which the present century has given us.

† *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXII. Art 5.

been established at Cossim Bazaar, Jougdia, Dacca, Balasore, and Patna. But their operations were of small extent. The long stint of money on the part of the Company of the Indies had had, besides, a most pernicious effect upon the several intendants and their subordinates. The stagnation attendant upon poverty had lasted so long, that it had demoralised the community. The members of it had even come to regard stagnation as the natural order of things. It had thus deprived them of energy, of enterprise, of all care for the future. The utmost extent of their efforts was limited to an endeavour to surmount a pressing emergency. That once accomplished, they relapsed at once into the *far niente* mode of life that had become habitual to them. The place itself bore evidence to the same effect. It had a ruined and forlorn appearance; its silent walls were overgrown with jungle; and whilst the swift stream of the Hooghly carried past it Eastern merchandise intended for the rivals who were converting the mud huts of Chuttanuttty into the substantial warehouses of old Calcutta, the landing places of Chandernagore were comparatively deserted.

To govern a settlement thus fallen into a state of passive and assenting decrepitude, Dupleix was deputed in 1731. But, decaying and lifeless though he found it, Dupleix regarded its situation with far other feelings than those of anxiety or dismay. He saw, almost at a glance, the capabilities of the place, and, conscious of his own abilities, having tried and proved at Pondichery his ideas regarding the power of trade, he felt that the task of restoring Chandernagore, would, under his system, be comparatively easy. The office of Intendant had for him this great recommendation, that there was something for a man to do, and he felt that he was the man to do it. Little time did he lose in deliberation. He at once set in action the large fortune he had accumulated, and induced others to join in the venture. He bought ships, freighted cargoes, opened communications with the interior, attracted native merchants to the town. Chandernagore soon felt the effect of her master's hand. Even the subordinates, whom he found there, recovering under the influence of his example from their supineness, begged to be allowed to join in the trade. Dupleix had room for all. To some he advanced money, others he took into partnership, all he encouraged. He had not occupied the Intendantship four years, when, in place of the half-dozen country-boats which, on his arrival, were lying unemployed at the landing-place, he had at sea thirty or forty ships, a number which increased before his departure to seventy-two, engaged in conveying the merchan-

dise of Bengal, to Surat, to Jedda, to Mocha, to Bussora, and to China. Nor did he neglect the inland trade. He established commercial relations with some of the principal cities in the interior, and even opened communications with Thibet. Under such a system, Chandernagore speedily recovered from its forlorn condition. From having been the most inconsiderable, it became, in a few years, the most important and flourishing of the European settlements in Bengal. Its revival caused the greatest satisfaction in France. The Government and the directors thoroughly appreciated the advantage of having at the head of the settlement, a man who had such confidence in his own plans, and who cared so little for reponsibility, that he never hesitated to advance his own funds for public purposes. Dupleix was always ready to do this, whilst he traded at the same time on his own account. Thus it happened that his fortunes and the fortunes of Chandernagore grew up side by side. If his own gains were great, a comparison of the Chandernagore of 1741 with the Chandernagore of 1731, would have shewn that the gains of the dependency which he governed were certainly not in smaller proportion.

But before we can record the close of this most successful administration, it is necessary that we should refer to other events which were influencing the course of French policy at Pondichery.

M. Lenoir, whose second administration of Pondichery and its dependencies had lasted nine years, was succeeded as Governor-General on the 19th September 1735, by M. Benôit Dumas, then Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon. Up to this period, since the death of Francois Martin, the relative position of Pondichery to the native chieftians in the neighbourhood had but little varied. But with the advent of M. Dumas came the commencement of a new order of things, in no way attributable, indeed, to the character of that gentleman, but the consequence rather of the character of the events of which the province of the Carnatic was about to become the scene. It is therefore necessary that we should record the events of the government of M. Dumas with some minuteness.

M. Dumas had been a servant of the old Company of the Indies. He had entered the service at the age of seventeen, in the year 1713, and had proceeded direct to Pondichery. Here he displayed so much ability and aptitude, that five years later, he was made a member of the Supreme Council, and in June 1721, Attorney-General. Transferred thence to the Isles of France and Bourbon as a member of the Supreme Government, and filling there in turn the offices of General Director for the

Company of the Indies, and of President of the Supreme Council, he was finally appointed Governor of those islands. This position he held till 1735, when he was appointed to succeed M. Lenoir as Governor-General of the French possessions in the Indies.* The new governor was a shrewd, calculating, prudent man,—one not given to risk much without having in view a very tangible result; brave, resolute, jealous of the honour of France, thoroughly acquainted with native ways, holding fast by the traditions of François Martin, a lover of peace, and anxious, above all, to extend the French territories in India by smooth means.

M. Dumas, it may be imagined, was just the man to carry out a mild and peaceful policy. Certainly under his sway Pondichery lost nothing of its attractiveness to the independent native rulers. Indeed, almost immediately after his accession to office, a circumstance occurred which served to knit, even more closely, the bonds of friendship that existed between the French and the most powerful of their neighbours,—Dost Ali Khan, Nawab of the Carnatic.

In 1732, Sadutoolla Khan, Nawab of the Carnatic, one of the most enlightened native noblemen of that period, died. His nephew and nearest of kin, Dost Ali, at once assumed the vacant dignity, without however obtaining the sanction of his immediate superior, the Viceroy of the Dekkan. It may have been partly on that account that Dost Ali showed very early a disposition to lean upon European support, and it was not long before he established very intimate relations with the courteous, hospitable, and friendly people who had established themselves at Pondichery. With M. Dumas, in particular, he formed an intimate friendship. Dumas, anxious to turn this to the advantage of the settlement, pressed upon Dost Ali the advisability of procuring for him the permission to coin money,—a permission which had been granted to the English, but, by them, after a short trial, neglected. The Nawab forwarded the request with his own strong recommendations to Delhi, and he succeeded, at the end of 1736, in procuring a firman issued by Mahomed Shah, and addressed to the Nawab of Arcot, authorising the coinage by the French of the current coin of the realm, in gold and silver, bearing, on one side, the

* The account of the previous services of M. Dumas is taken from the Letters Patent issued by Louis XV., dated the 4th September 1742, confirming the ennobling of M. Dumas, on the occasion of his return to France.

stamp of the Mogul, and, on the other, the name of place at which it was coined.*

The advantages which the French derived from this permission were very great indeed. The reputation of the Indo-French money became in a short time so great, that it was the cause of establishing a very profitable trade in bullion. But, in addition, the actual profits were large. The annual amount struck off did not fall short of five or six millions of rupees, † and the profits on the coining of this amount were considered equal to an income of 200,000 rupees annually ;—a very great consideration in a settlement which, like that of Pondichery, was left almost to shift for itself by the directors in Europe. ‡

But the intimacy with Dost Ali was productive of more important results. Dost Ali had two sons, of whom the eldest was Sufdur Ali, and several daughters, one of whom was married to his nephew, Mortiz Ali, and another to a more distant relation, Chunda Sahib. Of these, Sufder Ali, whilst he did not altogether share his father's liking for the French, had a very great respect for their power, and especially for the fortifications of Pondichery ; Chunda Sahib, on the other hand, carried his admiration for the foreigners to a very high pitch. Alone, perhaps amongst his countrymen, he understood them. Born himself without wealth, but possessing great capacity, considerable energy, and unbounded ambition ; brought, moreover, by his marriage with the daughter of Dost Ali, into a position, in which, whilst he dared openly aspire to nothing, he might secretly hope for almost anything ; yet possessing but a small personal following, and being ever in the presence of relatives whose claims and whose power were superior, and whose ambition was equal to his own ; he had been for a long time sensible that he must look for support beyond the circle of his own family. The position of the French had early attracted him. He appears

* The following is a translation of an extract from the letter addressed on this occasion by Dost Ali to M. Dumas : "The reputation you have acquired of being a true and faithful friend is known everywhere. In the view, therefore, to gain your friendship, I grant you permission to coin rupees at Pondichery of the coinage of Arcot, conformably to the Purwanah which I send you."

† The French rupee was a little broader than an English shilling, and very much thicker. In point of fineness it was superior to the English standard. The gold coin was called the 'Pagoda,' equal in value to about nine shilling. Three hundred and twenty rupees were considered equal to one hundred Pagodas ; hence an Indo French rupee was worth more than two shillings and nine pence.

‡ As a reward for the success of his negotiation in this matter, M. Dumas was made Knight of the Order of St. Michel, and received Patent Letters of nobility.

even then to have detected their latent desire to increase their territory. It is certain, at all events, that he took the first opportunity to proffer his aid to bring fresh lands under their rule. That he did this with the view to obtain for himself French support is scarcely to be doubted. Ever since his connexion with Dost Ali, he, of all the native allies of M. Dumas, had been the most frequent visitor at Pondichery, and had attracted, more than any other, the personal regards of the high officials in that city.

It had happened that at the end of the year 1735, the Hindoo Raja of Trichinopoly had died without issue. A contest for power immediately arose between his widow, the Ranee, and a relation of the deceased prince. In her distress, the Ranee appealed to Dost Ali for assistance. The opportunity was too tempting to be foregone. Dost Ali despatched a force, of which his son Sufder Ali was the nominal, his son-in-law Chunda Sahib the real, commander, to take possession of the disputed territories. The kingdom was soon over-run; the capital alone bade defiance to the invaders. Of this, however, Chunda Sahib obtained possession, 26th April 1736, on taking an oath,* that his troops should be employed only in the service of the Ranee. But he kept this oath only until Trichinopoly was in his power; he then imprisoned the Ranee, and being invested by Sufder-Ali, who returned to Arcot, with plenary powers, he assumed the government as Lieutenant for his father-in-law. While in that position he continued to maintain intimate relations with the French.

Adjoining Trichinopoly, lying between it and the Coromandel Coast, lay the Hindoo kingdom of Tanjore. This was bounded on the north side by the river Coleroon, which falls into the sea about thirty miles below Pondichery. Tanjore, one of the conquests of Shahjee, father of the famous Sevajee, had been bestowed in perpetuity by the latter on his brother Venkajee. Venkajee was succeeded by his son Tookajee. This latter, dying in the month of February 1738, left behind him three sons—Baba Sahib and Sahoojee, legitimate, the third, Pertab Singh, the offspring of a concubine. Baba Sahib succeeded to the sovereignty, but died the same year without issue. After a short interregnum, during which

* Orme states that the people of the country believed that the Ranee had fallen in love with Chunda Sahib; but the story is improbable. Chunda Sahib may have considered himself free from the responsibility of the oath, because he had taken it upon a brick instead of upon the Koran,—the brick having been wrapped up in the usual covering of the Koran,—Vide *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXV, Art. IV.

Seid Khan, the Mahomedan commandant of Tanjore, raised two candidates only to cause them immediately to disappear,—the surviving legitimate son, Sahoojee, obtained possession of power. But in a very short time Seid Khan brought forward Sidoojee, a pretended cousin of Sahoojee, and endeavoured to effect a revolution in his favour. Suddenly collecting their friends, they seized on the palace and on the strong places in Tanjore. Sahoojee had barely time to save himself on horseback. Accompanied by a few friends, he passed the Coleroon, and took refuge in the pagoda, Chillumbrum, a very strongly fortified position about six miles north of the Coleroon, and only twenty-four distant from Pondichery. From this place Sahoojee opened negotiations with M. Dumas. He offered to make over to the French the town of Karical, and the fort of Kircan Gurree, ten villages in the country adjacent, and all the lands depending upon them, if M. Dumas would afford him material aid in the recovery of Tanjore. The offer was the most tempting that could have been made. The French had been long engaged in endeavouring to effect an arrangement which would secure to them a footing in the kingdom of Tanjore, but up to that time they had been thwarted by the jealousy of the Dutch at Negapatam, a settlement a few miles south of Karical. Now, however, all that they desired was offered to them. The risk was but little, for they had but to supply one of the contending parties with material aid to ensure an easy victory. M. Dumas did not hesitate. He at once entered into an engagement with the envoys of Sahoojee, by which he bound himself to supply that prince with a lakh of rupees in silver, to furnish him with arms, gun-powder, and other warlike stores, and to render him all other assistance in his power. In return for this engagement, Sahoojee sent him a formal cession of the town of Karical, of the fort of Kircan Gurree on the river Karical, of the ten villages, and of the lands dependent upon them. In pursuance of this engagement, M. Dumas despatched two ships of war, the *Bourbon* of sixty guns, and the *St. Geran* of forty, with troops, artillery, and warlike stores, to take possession of Karical, and to afford the promised assistance. These ships anchored before Karical in the month of August of that year (1738).

Meanwhile, Sahoojee had been using other methods more congenial to him than force. By dint of bribes and promises he had gained over the principal nobility of Tanjore, and amongst them the all powerful Seid. A plan of operations was agreed upon in pursuance of which, the usurper, Sidoojee, was suddenly seized in his palace. Intelligence of this was at once

despatched to Chillumbrum, and Sahoojee immediately mounting his horse, returned in triumph to Tanjore.

This was the intelligence that greeted the captains of the *Bourbon* and the *St. Geran*, when they anchored in the roads of Karical. It was accompanied by an intimation that the French succours were not wanted; that Karical was occupied by between three and four thousand troops under Khan Sahib, a trusted officer of Sahoojee; and that any attempt to land would be considered as a hostile act, and would be met accordingly. In consequence of this intimation the senior French captain determined to suspend action pending instructions from Pondichery.

But whilst Sahoojee had transmitted instructions of the nature we have recorded to Karical, he had written in a somewhat different strain to M. Dumas. To him he declared his perfect willingness to surrender Karical, but the impossibility of doing so immediately. He was, he said, scarcely secure in his own capital, and he was threatened at the same time by Chunda Sahib from Trichinopoly. He pointed out the impossibility of surrendering, under such circumstances, resources which were essential to his safety.

These excuses, plausible though they were, did not deceive M. Dumas. Yet there can be no doubt that the slipping from his grasp of this much coveted place just at the moment his hand was closing upon it, was the cause of great mortification and annoyance. He was well aware, at the same time, that with the force in the two ships of war before Karical, it would have been easy to take possession of the place, and that, to a less prudent man, would have been a very great temptation. But M. Dumas' great characteristic was prudence. He would not risk, even for so great a prize, the character gained by the French as a non-aggressive nation. He preferred to wait for the opportunity which he felt sure would, sooner or later, present itself, satisfied that he had made a great step in advance in having secured from the king of Tanjore the legal cession of Karical and its dependencies. He therefore recalled the ships to Pondichery.

The opportunity he waited for soon came. No sooner did the intelligence reach Chunda Sahib that Raja Sahoojee had refused to fulfill his engagement regarding Karical, than it seemed to that astute prince that the moment had arrived for him to cement his alliance with the French. He accordingly wrote to M. Dumas, informing him that he was at war with Sahoojee and offering to march his own troops upon Karical, to conquer it, and to make it over, in full sovereignty, to the French. From

them he asked no assistance: he would employ, he said, none but his own soldiers.

Chunda Sahib, it will be recollected, was son-in-law of Dost Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic, and feudal lord of the territory to the north of the French possessions; he himself, as Dost Ali's lieutenant, held the country on the south-west; that on the south-east alone was held by the Raja of Tanjore. It was clear then that Chunda Sahib's offer to conquer a portion of that Raja's possessions involved no risk to the French; it did not even invoke the suspicion of a greed for territorial extension. It was the offer of a powerful Indian potentate to compel a weaker ruler to adhere to his agreement. M. Dumas then violated no principle of his predecessors' policy by accepting that offer. This he did almost as soon as it was made.

No sooner had Chunda Sahib received this permission to act, than he detached four thousand horse, commanded by Francisco Pereira, a Spaniard in his service, but who was entirely attached to French interests, to Karical. The Tanjore forces receded at their approach, and Pereira arrived at Karical, the 6th February 1739, without meeting with any opposition. He found, however, the fort of Kircan Gurree, on the river Karical, and about a mile and a half from the town, occupied by about four hundred Tanjoreans. He immediately attacked this fort, and stormed it the same day. He then hastened with the news to Pondichery. M. Dumas, delighted with the prompt success, at once equipped a small vessel of an hundred and fifty tons burden, and despatched her with all the troops and stores she could carry to Karical,—Pereira accompanying them. They reached their destination in four and twenty hours, when Karical, the fort of Kircan Gurree, and the adjacent territory, previously ceded by Sahoojee, were made over to the French by Pereira. This cession bears date the 14th February 1739. A few days later, on receiving an account of the French occupation, M. Dumas despatched to Karical a ship of war laden with everything necessary to place the settlement in a state of security.*

The effect of these forcible measures upon Raja Sahoojee was such as might have been expected from a man of his weak and unmanly nature. It completely overawed him. He at once sent messages to Pondichery, casting all the blame of his previous hostile conduct on the evil counsels of the Dutch at Negapatam; stating that he had always intended to cede the

* Full details of these occurrences are given in Guyon's "*Histoire des Indes Orientales*," and in the "*Memoire particuliere sur l'acquisition de Karical*."

territory at the proper time, and professing his readiness now to execute in full the treaty of Chillumbrum. As a proof of his sincerity, he sent at the same time two instruments, dated the 25th April 1739, one of which contained a ratification of the former treaty, and the other, an order to the inhabitants of the districts he had yielded, to acknowledge and obey the French in future as their masters. It is probable that the complaisance of Sahoojee in this matter was quickened by the fact that one of the clauses of the treaty of Chillumbrum contained a stipulation for the payment to him of an hundred thousand rupees,—a stipulation which the French, now in possession, might, according to oriental notions, have been inclined to evade. Before, however, his propositions reached Pondichery, a domestic revolution hurled Sahoojee from his throne. But his successor and half-brother, Pertab Singh, not only confirmed the agreement of Chillumbrum, but added to it a greater extent of territory. In a personal interview he held with M. Dumas in the beginning of the year 1741, Pertab Singh even recommended him to fortify the towns in his new possessions. From this date, the district of Karikal may be regarded as an integral portion of the French possessions in India.*

But meanwhile events of great importance had occurred. The Mahomedan conquests in the south of India had roused the jealousy of the Mahrattas, and an army of 50,000† men of these famous warriors had assembled under the orders of Ragoojee Bhonsla,—serving under whom, his first campaign, was the afterwards famous Mooraree Rao,—and had marched eastward with the avowed intention of plundering the long untouched Carnatic. But Dost Ali was not prepared to grant them an easy ingress. Learning, towards the end of 1739, that they were approaching by the Damalcherry pass, situated to the north of the river Pone, he at once occupied that strong position with the only troops at his disposal, amounting to about 10,000 men, and sent pressing orders to his son, Sufter

* The ceded districts consisted of the town of Karikal, the fortress of Kirkan Gurree, ten villages on the sea coast, and a tract of country fifteen or sixteen miles in extent, very fertile in rice, and producing also cotton and indigo, inhabited by ten or twelve thousand people, and yielding a yearly rent of ten thousand pagodas, equal to about £4,500 sterling. The town of Karikal, at the time of cession, contained 638 houses of stone and brick, and upwards of 5,000 inhabitants. The fortress of Kirkan Gurree was about gun-shot distance from Karikal. Both are on the river Karikal, a branch of the Coleroon, navigable for vessels of about 200 tons burden. Karikal is 75 miles south of Pondichery and 12 miles north of Negapatam.

† Grant Duff,—History of the Mahrattas.—Captain Duff took the numbers from Mahratta manuscripts; they differ somewhat from those given by Orme and other writers.

Ali, and to his son-in-law, Chunda Sahib, to hasten to his assistance. But both Sufder Ali and Chunda Sahib were prosecuting their conquests in the south of India, and though they professed their readiness to obey the summons they had received, they moved, especially Chunda Sahib, with slow and unwilling steps. Before they could arrive, the Mahrattas had approached the pass. This, as the most important, was held by Dost Ali in person, but there was a gorge, or opening, to the south of his position, the defence of which he had entrusted to one of his commanders, a Hindoo. This latter allowed himself to be seduced from his allegiance by appeals to his Hindooism, and permitted the Mahratta army to march through the gorge he was guarding on the night of the 19th May. The Mahrattas, thus secure of their prey, moved swiftly at day break next morning on the rear of the position occupied by Dost Ali. This chieftain, noticing the approach of cavalry, imagined that his son, Sufder Ali, had arrived to reinforce him, and he was only undeceived when their movements indicated undisguised hostility. Driven to bay, however, he determined to sell his life dearly. The battle which ensued, was, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, contested most desperately, and it only terminated when Dost Ali himself and his second son, Hassan Ali, lay dead upon the field, and his first minister, Meer Assud, had been taken prisoner. Almost all the principal officers were killed or trodden under foot by elephants, and the slaughter was unprecedented even in that age. No route could have been more complete.

The account of this defeat spread dismay and consternation in the Carnatic. Sufder Ali, the son of the deceased Nawab, received the news when he had advanced as far as Arcot: he immediately, for greater security, moved at the head of his forces to Vellore, which was better fortified, there to wait the course of events. Chunda Sahib, more dilatory, had not moved beyond the boundary of his satrapy. The intelligence he received determined him to remain within it, and to place its chief city in the best possible state of defence. He returned therefore to Trichinopoly.

On one important matter, however, the two brothers-in-law acted as though they had been inspired by one brain. Regarding the result of the contest with the Mahrattas as extremely uncertain, they bethought them of the protection which the fortifications of Pondichery might be able to offer, and they determined to consign, the one his father's family, the other his own, with all the valuables that could be lightly carried, to the courtesy of M. Dumas.

That gentleman found himself placed by the result of the battle in very much the same position, as that in which M. Martin had found himself after the defeat of Shere Khan Lodi by Sevajee. On that occasion, as on this, the Mahrattas had completely defeated the actual rulers of the country,—the allies and protectors of the French. The only difference was, and it was a very material difference, that the Pondichery governed by M. Dumas was far more capable of offering an effective resistance than the infant city under the rule of François Martin. M. Dumas, however, notwithstanding his confidence in the defences of Pondichery, was very well aware of the difficulties of his position, and he prepared to act with his usual prudence and judgment. He greatly strengthened, with all the means at his disposal, the west defences of the place. For fifteen days carts and beasts of burden were seen pouring into Pondichery laden with grain and other stores. M. Dumas superintended himself all the arrangements of procuring and storing grain, and of ordering the defences. No point was neglected; his industry was untiring. At the same time, the natives of the surrounding country, who had anything to lose, poured in in vast numbers, bringing with them their stores and valuables. But other and greater guests were approaching. On the 25th of May, five days after the battle, whilst the preparations we have above alluded to were still progressing, a grand cortegé was seen moving towards Pondichery. This proved to be the widow of Dost Ali Khan, with her children, her dependents, her jewels and other property, under the escort of a large body of cavalry. Arriving before the walls, she at once sent a message to the Governor, praying for admission into the city.

None knew better than M. Dumas, that if anything would most certainly draw down upon himself the power of the Mahrattas, and would infallibly induce them to move upon Pondichery, it would be the knowledge of the fact that the city contained within its walls the most valuable property of the late Nawab. It is certain that under any circumstances, the chivalrous feelings natural to a real man, would have incited him to throw wide open the gate to one who was not only a woman, but a woman in distress. But there was no occasion for him to act from mere feeling. It was preferable in his eyes to run the risk of bringing the Mahrattas upon Pondichery, than to undergo the certainty of being dishonoured and contemned throughout India. Sufder Ali also was still unsubdued, and the refusal to admit his mother would undoubtedly make an enemy of one, who had even then the best chance of becoming the feudal lord of the country about Pondichery. However, before replying to the request of the widow

of Dost Ali, M. Dumas summoned a Council. He told the members that, in his opinion, honour, gratitude, humanity, and policy, all pointed to the admission; he added his reasons, pointed out the risks, and then asked for their opinion. The Council approved his arguments, and a decision was at once arrived at to admit the cavalcade.

This was done with great state and ceremony. The garrison was placed under arms, the ramparts were manned. The governor himself in a magnificent palanquin, and followed by his horse and foot guards, went down to the Valdaour gate. The gate was then thrown open. Immediately there entered the widow of the Nawab, her daughters and relations, in twenty-two palanquins, followed by fifteen hundred cavalry, eight elephants, three hundred camels, two hundred bullock-carts, and two thousand beasts of burden. The entrance of the principal personage was saluted by a discharge of cannon from the ramparts, and she was conducted by M. Dumas in person to the apartments he had provided her.* A similar hospitable reception was accorded a few days later to the wife and son of Chunda Sahib†. Meanwhile the Mahrattas, taking advantage of their victory, had marched upon Arcot, and had taken it without opposition. Thence also they sent detachments to pillage the country. But though the devastation they caused was ruinous and often wanton, their actual receipts fell far short of their expectations. The inhabitants of the Carnatic had taken advantage of the first rumours of war to remove all their valuables into fortified places. Some had fled to Madras, some to Vellore, some to Pondichery. The consequence was, that though the Mahrattas gleaned every blade of grass, there was but little else to gather, and they were beginning to feel, that looking at it with the eyes of marauders, the campaign had been a failure.

That was a frame of mind which would willingly have listened to offers of payment for retiring from so barren and desolated a country, and such offers they did receive at the proper time. They had liberated Meer Assud, first minister of the deceased Dost Ali, and he, betaking himself to Vellore, prevailed upon his new master to make proposals of peace to the invader. Meer Assud was a bitter enemy of Chunda Sahib, and he had succeeded in imbuing the mind of Sufer Ali with

* These details are taken from the extracts from the archives of Pondichery given *verbatim* in the Abbé Guyon's work, already referred to.

† Orme states (Vol. I., Book L, page 43) that the wife of Sufer Ali also took refuge in Pondichery, but it appears from the correspondence of M. Dumas with the Mahrattas that she joined her husband at Vellore.

suspicions as to the designs of his brother-in-law. He had easily convinced him also that the sacrifice of Chunda Sahib would lighten the conditions likely to be imposed upon himself. This being agreed upon as a basis, negotiations were opened, and after a short interval, a treaty was signed in the month of August 1740, by which it was arranged that Sudder Ali should be recognised as Nawaab of the Carnatic in place of his father; that he should pay by instalments ten millions of rupees to the Mahrattas; that he should join his troops to those of the Mahrattas to drive Chunda Sahib from Arcot; and that all the Hindoo princes on the Coromandel coast should be reinstated in possession of the places they held prior to 1736. The two last articles, however, were kept secret, and the better to prevent their existence being suspected, the Mahrattas at once retired from the Carnatic.

Some information, however, regarding the secret clauses of this treaty reached M. Dumas, and he did not fail to take advantage of it.* He had already been threatened by Ragojee Bhonsla, and a correspondence, not tending at all to accommodate matters, had ensued between them. He had been asked to pay tribute, and he had refused; he had been called upon to give up the wife and son of Chunda Sahib with their treasures he had replied that all the French in India would die first; Pondichery had been threatened with the fate of Bassein, then recently captured by the Mahrattas from the Portuguese, he had answered that if the Bhonsla came against Pondichery, he would try to deserve his esteem by successfully defending it.* In this state of the

* The following are extracts from the correspondence between Ragojee Bhonsla and M. Dumas: From Ragojee Bhonsla. "Forty years have elapsed since our sovereign gave you permission to establish yourselves at Pondichery; nevertheless, since our army has arrived in these parts, I have not received a single letter from you.

"Our sovereign, persuaded that you were deserving of his friendship, that the French were people of their word, who would never fail in their engagements towards him, made over to you a considerable territory. "You agreed to pay an annual tribute, which you never have paid. At last, after a considerable time, the army of the Mahrattas has arrived in these districts. It has beaten the Mussulmans, pulled up with pride, and forced them to pay tribute. We need not tell you this news. We have now orders from the Maharaja to take possession of the fortresses of Trichinopoly and Gingee, and to put garrisons in them. We have also orders to collect the tribute due from the European towns on the sea coast. I am obliged to obey these orders. When we consider your conduct, and the manner in which the king has favoured you, in allowing you to establish yourselves in his territory, I cannot hinder myself from saying that you are wrong in not paying this tribute. We had consideration for you, and you have acted against us. You have given refuge to the Moguls in your town. "Was that well done? Again, Chunda Sahib has left, under your protection,

correspondence, the intimation he had received regarding the secret clauses was of great importance. He continued, with the same ardour, the repair of the fortifications at the same time that new ones were erected. He formed a body of European infantry 1,200 in number, and supplemented them by four or five thousand Mahomedans, whom he armed and drilled in the European fashion,—the germ of the Sepoy army,—and who were found most useful in performing the routine duties of the garrison. He brought into the town also, all the crews of the ships in the roads, and exercised them in the various operations of land warfare. Stores of all sorts he likewise continued to accumulate.

“the treasure chests of Trichinopoly and of Tanjore,—the precious stones, elephants, horses, and other things of which he possessed himself in those kingdoms, as well as his family,—was that, too, well-done?”
 “If you wish that we should be friends, you must give up this treasure, these jewels, these horses, these elephants, as well as the wife and son of Chunda Sahib. I send my cavalry to whom you can make them over. If you decline to do so, we shall be compelled to force you to it, as well as to the payment of the tribute which you have kept back for forty years.”
 “You know how we have treated the town of Bassein. My army is very numerous, and it wants money for its expenses. If you do not act in conformity with my demands, I shall know how to draw from you where-with to pay my whole army. Our ships will arrive in a few days. It will be better for you to terminate the matter quickly. I rely upon your sending me, in conformity with this letter, the wife and son of Chunda Sahib, with his elephants, horses, jewels, and treasure.”

Extract from the reply of M. Dumas : “You tell me that we have owed for forty years past a tribute to your king. Never has the French Nation been subject to any tribute. It would cost me my head, if the King of France, my master, were informed that I had consented to pay tribute to any one. When the princes of the country gave to the French a piece of land on the sands of the seashore, upon which to build a fortress and a town, they required no other conditions, but that the pagodas and the religion of the people should be unmolested. Although your armies have never yet appeared in our neighbourhood, we have always faithfully observed these conditions.”

“You say that you have orders to take possession of the fortress of Gingee and Trichinopoly. Well and good, so long as that does not oblige you to become our enemy. As many of the Moguls as have been masters here have treated the French with friendship and distinction. From them we have received only favours. In virtue of this friendship, we have given shelter to the widow of the late Nawab, Dost Ali Khan, with all her family. Ought we to have shut our gates and leave them in the country? Men of honour are incapable of such cowardice. The wife of Chunda Sahib has also come hither with her mother and her brother, and the others have proceeded to Arcot.

“You have written to me to make over to your horsemen this lady, her son, and the riches she has brought here. You, who are a nobleman full of bravery and generosity, what would you think of me, if I were capable of such baseness? The wife of Chunda Sahib is in Pondichery under the

Whilst these preparations were going on, the new Nawab, Sufder Ali, accompanied by his brother-in-law Chunda Sahib, paid a visit to Pondichery. The avowed object was to thank M. Dumas for the protection* he had afforded to the female members of their families. None knew better than Sufder Ali, how galling to the Mahrattas had been the knowledge that the families and valuables of his late father and of Chunda Sahib were in safety behind the walls of Pondichery. He was well aware that Ragojee Bhonsla, their leader, had expressed his determination to make the French suffer for their audacity; and he, in common with the other chiefs of the Carnatic, had been struck with admiration at the quietly defiant attitude assumed by M. Dumas. His object in visiting him now was to thank and to reward him. He was quickened in this also, by a message his mother sent him from Pondichery, desiring to see him. At the same time Chunda Sahib, knowing little of the storm that was brewing against him, after proceeding to Arcot to do homage to his brother-in-law as Nawab of the Carnatic and his liege lord, accompanied him to Pondichery.

There they arrived on the evening of the 1st September 1740, and were received with great demonstrations of friendship and respect by M. Dumas, in a tent splendidly adorned and illuminated, without the walls. After resting there some time, Sufdur Ali was conducted to the house which had been set apart for his mother and sisters in the public gardens. Here he remained for two days in mourning and seclusion. On the 4th, Sufdar Ali paid a visit of state to M. Dumas. He thanked him repeatedly for the courtesy and hospitality extended to the members of his father's family, at a season of great difficulty and danger; declared that it should never be forgotten, and that henceforth the French should be as much the masters of the Carnatic as he himself was. Although these words were merely the expression of the oriental form of gratitude, and

"protection of the King of France, my master, and all the French in India would die rather than deliver her to you.

"You threaten me finally that if I do not comply with your demands, you will send your armies against me and lead them hither yourself. I am preparing myself to the utmost of my ability to receive you well, and to deserve your esteem, by shewing that I have the honour of commanding the bravest nation in the world, who know how to defend themselves with intrepidity against those who attack them unjustly. Above all I place my confidence in Almighty God, before whom the most powerful armies are like the light straw which the wind blows away. I hope He will favour the justice of our cause. I have heard what has happened at Bassein, but that place was not defended by Frenchmen."

Memoire dans les archives de la Compagnie des Indes.

were doubtless only taken as such, the Nawab had evidently deemed it sound policy on his part to conciliate M. Dumas by some practical proof of his esteem. Simultaneously with the announcement of his arrival at Pondichery, he had delivered to the French Governor a parchment conferring upon him personally lands bordering on the southern territory of Pondichery, bringing in a yearly revenue of ten thousand rupees. This cession was soon afterwards confirmed by a firman from the Court of Delhi.

After a stay of several days in Pondichery the visitors left, Sufder Ali with his father's family proceeding to Arcot, Chunda Sahib, leaving his wife and family with their jewels in Pondichery, making his way alone to Trichinopoly. To the immediate fortunes of this chieftain, we must now turn our attention.

That M. Dumas had a strong idea that all danger from the Mahrattas had not passed away, is evident from the fact that even after their departure, he continued to labour at the fortifications and to store supplies. That he had communicated these suspicions to Chunda Sahib, and had induced him on the strength of them to leave his family and valuables at Pondichery, is extremely probable. Yet, it is certain, that Chunda Sahib had no sooner quitted Pondichery than he began to act in a manner entirely inconsistent with the idea that he had any fear of a second Mahratta inroad. During the first invasion, he had taken the precaution to store Trichinopoly with grain, under the conviction that with ample supplies within the walls, the fortifications were strong enough to keep out the Mahrattas for an indefinite period. But, no sooner had he returned from his visit to Pondichery, than, as though he felt assured of the future, he sold the grain, and so far from thinking that any necessity to defend his own territories could arise, he began to entertain a design of adding to them, and sent for that purpose his brother, Bara Sahib, to Madura. This was in the end of November. An account of the movements of Bara Sahib and the unprovided state of Trichinopoly was quickly conveyed to Ragojee, who, at the head of his Mahrattas, had retired only to Shevagunga, some eighty miles in a southerly direction from the capital. The news was that for which Ragojee had been waiting. Without an hour's loss of time, he assembled his forces, made forced marches upon Trichinopoly, and sat down before it, before Chunda Sahib had taken any steps to replenish his empty stores.

Nevertheless, though taken by surprise, Chunda Sahib resolved to defend himself with resolution. He had hopes, too, from his brother, Bara Sahib, and to him accordingly he sent a message

urging him to march to his relief. Bara Sahib at once complied, and collecting supplies, escorted them, at the head of three thousand horse and seven thousand foot, towards Trichinopoly. The Mahrattas, however, had knowledge of all his movements, and on his approaching to within about fifteen miles of the city, they detached a superior force,—amounting to about 20,000 men,—to intercept him. A desperate encounter ensued, Bara Sahib fighting with all the energy of despair. A chance shot, however, hurled him from his elephant, and his followers, missing the inspiration of his presence, at once gave way. The body of Bara Sahib, which was found on the field of battle, was carried to the camp before Trichinopoly, clothed there in rich stuffs, and sent in to Chunda Sahib, to announce to him, as under similar circumstances, the head of Asdrubal had announced to Hannibal the futility of depending upon his brother for aid.

Thus driven to depend upon his own resources, Chunda Sahib nevertheless continued to display unflinching resolution and determined courage. At last, after defending himself for upwards of three months, the trenches having been opened on the 15th December, having exhausted all his money, stores, almost all his ammunition, and having lost some of his best troops, he had no alternative but to surrender. The terms were hard, his life only being secured to him, but they were the best he could obtain. On the 21st of March, he opened the gates of the city, and surrendered himself a prisoner. He was at once sent off under a strong guard to Sattara, and the Mahrattas appointed Moraree Row as their viceroy of the kingdom, leaving 14,000 men to support him.

Whilst engaged in the siege of Trichinopoly, Ragojee Bhonsla had not ceased to lavish his threats upon M. Dumas. His demands even increased. They now embraced the immediate payment of 6,000,000 rupees, a regular annual tribute, and the delivery to him of the wife and son of Chunda Sahib, with their elephants, horses, and jewels. To these demands M. Dumas continued to oppose a steady refusal. He took, however, the precaution of despatching a special messenger to the Isles of France and Bourbon, requesting the early transmission of as many men as could be spared thence to reinforce his garrison. The Mahratta, however, was bent upon intimidating him. In this view, whilst still himself before Trichinopoly, he detached a force of about 16,000 men to beat up the coast. These marched upon Portonovo, a town about thirty-two miles south of Pondichery, and then used as a depôt by the Dutch, French and English. This they plundered, though little to the detriment of the French, who had taken the precaution to move the

greater part of their property within Pondichery. They next moved upon Cudalore, an English settlement, twelve miles from Pondichery, which they pillaged. Marching then to within five miles of the French settlement, and halting there, they sent in threatening letters to M. Dumas, detaching small parties at the same time to ravage the country and to collect plunder. At the same time, in pursuance of advices received from the Bhonsla, an expedition was organised on the western coast to attack the French settlement of Mahé.

M. Dumas was not appalled by these letters, nor by the still more threatening visit of one of the chief officers of the Mahratta army, sent to inform him that the fate of Trichinopoly was reserved for Pondichery. On the contrary, he received this officer with the utmost politeness, shewed him the supplies he had stored up, the guns bristling on the ramparts, the drilled Europeans, the armed Sepoys, hid, in fact, nothing from him. He then calmly informed him, that so long as one Frenchman remained alive, Pondichery would not be evacuated. With reference to the demand of the Mahratta General for tribute, he sent a message to him through the envoy that the territory occupied by the French possessed neither mines of gold nor mines of silver; but that it was rich in iron, and that those who occupied it were ready to use that iron against any assailants. The envoy left immensely impressed with the power and resources of the French settlement, and with the resolute bearing of its Governor.

It happened that on taking his leave, the Mahratta envoy had received from M. Dumas, under the name of cordials, a present of ten bottles of liqueurs. Some of these he made over to his General, Ragojee Bhonsla, and he, in his turn, gave them to his wife, who found them so much to her liking, that she insisted upon others being procured, whatever might be the cost. The influence of woman is proverbially powerful. Ragojee was most unwilling, after all his threats, to abate one iota of his demands against Pondichery. Yet the Nantes cordials had given the French an ally against whom he was but a child. These cordials were to be obtained by any means, and it seemed they could only be obtained by friendly communication with M. Dumas. The determination to obtain them led therefore, after a good deal of circumlocution, to negotiations, which ended finally in a pacification. Ragojee was so charmed by the opportune present of thirty bottles of these cordials, that he soon became disposed to forget all his previous anger against the French. He prohibited any pillaging in the neighbourhood of Pondichery, and he began to listen without anger to the reports

which were made to him that Pondichery was so strong, that in attacking it they had everything to lose and nothing to gain. He accordingly withdrew his demands for the payment of a sum of money as tribute, and for the delivering of the family of Chunda Sahib, and retired without any further demonstrations, fortified by cordials, to the western coast.

The expedition against Mahé, to the organisation of which we have alluded, resolved itself into a blockade, which lasted eight months, when it was put an end to by M. de la Bourdonnais in a manner to which we shall presently refer.

The conduct of M. Dumas on this occasion, his bold and resolute refusal to deliver up his guests, the coolness with which he had defied the conqueror of Trichinopoly, procured him, amongst the nations of Southern India, the reputation of a hero. Congratulations and thanks poured into him from all sides. The Viceroy of the Dekkan, Nizam-ool-Moolk, wrote to him a letter of thanks, couched in terms of the highest respect, and transmitted to him, at the same time, a dress of honour. Sufder Ali, as a mark of esteem, sent him the armour of his deceased father, richly adorned with gold and precious stones, together with three elephants, several horses, many swords and jewelled weapons, and accompanied by a letter carried by his favourite Minister. The Emperor of Delhi, Mahomed Shah, on hearing of this successful resistance to Mahratta presumption, conferred upon M. Dumas the rank and title of Nawab, with the command of 4,500 horseman, 2,000 of whom he was allowed to keep about his person in time of peace, without being at any charge for their maintenance. On the application of M. Dumas the title and command were declared transferable to his successor.

Shortly before the receipt of these honours, M. Dumas had intimated to his masters his wish to return to his native country. His retirement had been accepted, and Monsieur Joseph François Dupleix, the successful Intendant of Chandernagore, had been nominated to succeed him. M. Dupleix arrived at Pondichery in the month of October 1741, and took at once the oaths as Governor-General, at the same time that he declared himself to be the Mogul's Nawab, and caused himself to be acknowledged as such by the four thousand five hundred horse, of whom his predecessor had held command.

The sketch we have been able to give of the six years' administration of M. Dumas, slight as it is, is yet sufficient to shew that he was no unworthy successor of François Martin. His administration was signalised by the display of tact, prudence, boldness, and skill. He understood the native character thoroughly. So well did he make use of that knowledge, grafted

as it was on his daring yet prudent nature, that though all his allies were beaten, he managed to reap advantage, in the most legitimate manner, from their misfortunes. So adroit was his conduct, that the territory which he coveted he gained without drawing the sword,—he even accepted it, as a favour to his native friends, instead of asking for it as a benefit to himself. Under his rule, the dominions of the French on the Coromandel coast increased very greatly in extent and value, whilst the prestige of the French power attained, in the eyes of the natives, a height which, even to us who look back at it, appears perfectly astounding. It seemed, indeed, when Dumas left Pondichery, that it would be only necessary for his successor to continue the same cautious and prudent, yet daring and acquisitive, policy, to make Pondichery the most powerful and important city in Southern India.

That successor, as we have seen, was Dupleix. We left him last engaged, and successfully engaged, in restoring the credit and fortunes of Chandernagore. This he had succeeded in accomplishing beyond his most sanguine expectations. It could not be expected that, occupying as he had, the position of Intendant or Director-General of Chandernagore, nominally under the orders of the Governor and Superior Council of Pondichery, yet practically irresponsible,—daily and hourly forced in fact to act upon his own responsibility,—he should have not sometimes run counter to the ideas of his immediate superior. The very promptness of Dupleix's acts must have made them often appear rash and precipitate in the eyes of men of ordinary prudence and caution. Difference of opinion on these points had latterly arisen between himself and M. Dumas, and Dupleix, chafing under a control which he felt to be unwise, and believed to be unauthorised, had requested M. Godeheu, a member of his Council who was returning to Europe, to explain, more fully than he could write, the exact state of affairs. The directors at Paris entered fully into the views of their agent at Chandernagore, from whose daring yet practical genius they had so largely benefited, and on the resignation of M. Dumas, they at once appointed Dupleix to the post of Governor-General at Pondichery. Into this he was installed in the month of October 1741.*

* Neither Mr. Orme nor Mr. Mill gives the exact date of the appointment of Dupleix. The writer of the article in the "*National Review*," and the "*Nouvelle Biographie Générale*" give 1742, but the "*Archives de la Compagnie des Indes*," referred to in the "*Modern Universal History*," and by the Abbé Guyon, give the month of October 1741 as the precise date; and this is most probably correct. The fact that Dupleix visited Chandernagore in 1742 may have misled the other authorities.

He left Chandernagore, which he had found almost a ruin, the most important European settlement in Bengal, possessing two thousand brick houses, an extensive trade, and unsurpassed credit. He had made for himself, by private trade,—a proceeding not only allowed but encouraged by the directors,—an enormous fortune. In the early part of the year in which he was appointed to Pondichery, Dupleix had married the widow of one of his councillors,—Madame Vincent, * a lady who had been born and educated in India, but whose strong yet devoted character and brilliant intellect made her an admirable companion for the far-sighted and deep scheming politician. Her proficiency in the native languages rendered her aid invaluable to Dupleix in his confidential dealing with native princes. She likewise added to that proficiency a quickness of comprehension and zealous devotion to his interests, such as form, when united, an inestimable endowment.

On assuming the government of Pondichery, Dupleix found the settlement suffering from the effects of the Mahratta invasion. These marauding warriors, where they had not eaten up the land, had by the fact of their presence prevented its being tilled, and now the misery of famine had succeeded to the desolation of war. Added to this, the Carnatic was in a condition bordering upon anarchy. Sudder Ali had only rid himself of the anticipated rivalry of Chunda Sahib to fall into the real clutches of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the viceroy of the Deccan, who loudly called upon him for the arrears of revenue, due by him as a vassal of the Mogul. The fortifications of Pondichery, too, however formidable they might have appeared to a native power, were quite insufficient for defence against an European enemy, and there were no funds available to enlarge or to repair them, notwithstanding that, even at this date, the rumours of the probability of war between France and England were brought out by each sailing vessel.

But Dupleix was equal to the occasion. Convinced that Pondichery had now attained such a stage of development that it was necessary that her power should be recognised and acknowledged, he at once assumed, with an ostentatious publicity the dignities that had been conferred upon him by the Mogul—receiving homage from those petty chieftains in the neighbourhood, who were of a lower order of nobility. He at the same time set himself to work to enquire into the causes of the increasing public expenditure, to check corruption among the

* She was the daughter of a M. Albert, a Frenchman. Her mother belonged to the Portuguese family of De Castro.

subordinate officers of the administration, and to examine the state of the defences. On these several points, with the mode in which they should be remedied, he transmitted full reports to the Company. Having thus set everything in train, he proceeded to Bengal to be installed as Nawab at Chandernagore. When the ceremony, which was conducted with great pomp, was concluded, he went in state to Hooghly for the purpose of paying a visit of respect to the Mahomedan Governor. But this latter, recognising the superior rank of Dupleix, insisted upon making the first visit himself. The honours with which he was received, and the state which he assumed, appear to have made a deep impression upon the natives, prepared, as they were, to regard with favour everything that was French, and to have rendered his relations with them of a still more intimate and agreeable character.

On his return to Pondichery from these visits, Dupleix at once assumed a greater state than had been indulged in by any of his predecessors. It was a part of his policy to impress upon the native princes in his vicinity that he too was an officer of the Mogul; that he owed his rank to the Emperor of Delhi. He, therefore, would not permit a single sign or symbol, which rightfully belonged to his rank, to be omitted or neglected. Situated at Pondichery far away from the reach of the distracted court of the descendant of Akber, he was able to avail himself of the credit which his position as an officer of that monarch gave him amongst the natives, without in the smallest degree confining his own action, or making any infringement on the duties he owed to his sovereign. He, in fact, was absolute master of the situation, and he simply used the power given him by his title to strengthen and confirm his position.

Just at this moment, whilst engaged in this laudable design, and preparing at the same time to make Pondichery really as impregnable as the natives believed it to be, Dupleix received from the Company one of those strange despatches so often written by narrow-minded officials holding supreme power, to cripple and thwart their more capable agents on the spot. In this despatch, dated the 18th September 1743, he was informed by the directors in Paris, that, in consequence of the approaching prospect of a war between France and England, they were compelled to restrict the number of vessels for India to four, two of which were destined for Pondichery, and two for Bengal; they then proceeded to press upon him, as the greatest and most important service he could render, (1) the reduction of all the expenses in India by at least one-half, and (2) suspension of all expenditure on account of

building and fortifications. To carry out this service, they added their belief, "that this operation cannot be entrusted to better hands than yours, whose wisdom and zeal are known. It is that which determines it"—the Company,—“to charge you alone with the sole execution of this operation, free from consulting with the Council regarding it.”

The announcement, in this despatch, that a war with their great European rivals in India and on the seas was impending, and the injunction which accompanied it to spend no money on the fortifications,—the unsatisfactory condition of which was, nevertheless, known to the Company,—must have sounded strange in the ears of Dupleix. Not only were the fortifications in bad order, but on the front facing the sea there was a space of a thousand toises,—nearly a mile and a quarter,—which was absolutely open. Regarding this in connexion with the intimation he had received of the prospect of an European war, in which the enemies of France might obtain the mastery of the Indian seas, he felt that his duty as Governor of Pondichery,—a place for which he was responsible to his sovereign,—was paramount to every other. The orders which he received he therefore boldly disregarded. He caused a solid rampart to be erected along the entire length of the open space, with a broad and deep ditch in its front. On this, night and day, the workmen were employed; yet with all their vigilance, the rampart was not completed until nearly two years after war with England had broken out, and it required the exercise of all the genius and talent of Dupleix to prevent an attack, by a powerful English squadron, on the unfinished defences. The expenses of this undertaking Dupleix supplied by his purse and by his credit. From the same sources he furnished cargoes to the two vessels which, in pursuance of the notification, came out to Pondichery, and which otherwise would have been forced to return empty. The other point, that of reducing the public expenditure, he carried out with a firm hand. The difficulty of his situation in this respect was enhanced by the fact that he alone was entrusted with the execution of the order; that he was thus not only deprived of the support of his Council, but its members might cast obstacles in the way of the carrying out of an order, in which they were so lightly treated. Abuses were put down, corruptn was strangled, salaries were reduced, until, in spite of murmurs on all sides, which, however, were not directed against him personally, the necessary reductions were effected.

These proceedings on the part of Dupleix were most agreeable to the Company in Paris. His very disobe-

dience of their order, in repairing and completing the fortifications of Pondichery, seems to have met with their approval. No wonder, perhaps, considering that the expense of those repairs and of that completion had fallen upon himself. We find them writing to him in a letter, dated the 21st November 1743, regarding the provision of cargoes for the two ships they had sent out : "The Company, as you will see by "this letter, has been very much pleased at the zeal which you "and the Councils of Pondichery and Chandernagore have "displayed for its interests in procuring cargoes for our two "ships, the *Fleury* and the *Brillant*, sent from the Isle of "France. As it is by your endeavours that this operation was "completed, it is proper that you, especially, should enjoy the "honour of it."

With respect to the fortifications they wrote, under date the 30th November 1746 :—"The promptitude with which the "town of Pondichery has been enclosed on the side facing "the sea, has given us real pleasure ; we are under a great "obligation to you on that account"—for this disobedience of their orders ! Further on—"We have not seen with less "satisfaction all the measures you have taken, both to provide "notwithstanding your poverty, cargoes for the ships, the "sailing of which we had announced to you, and to second "M. de la Bourdonnais in the operations which he was "planning."

But it was before the receipt of this second letter that war between France and England had been declared. This war had been long threatening. The death of the Emperor Charles VI. without male issue, had tempted France, Prussia and Bavaria to combine to despoil his heroic daughter of the possessions she had inherited. In this war, the king of England, George II, soon found himself involved as Elector of Hanover. Without any declaration of war on the part of England, he had, in 1743, transported a combined army of English, Hanoverians, and Hessians, into the valley of the Main, to co-operate with the Austrians. On the 27th June of the same year, when in danger of being compelled to surrender with his whole army to the French General, the Duc de Noailles, the mad impetuosity of the Duc de Grammont not only saved him from that calamity, but enabled him to gain a great victory before even the two nations were professedly at war. But this was too much for the endurance of France, and in the month of March 1744, she formally declared war against England.

It will thus be seen, that the event which now took place had been long expected, that the breaking out of war had been

regarded as a mere question of time. We have seen how Dupleix prepared himself to meet those hostilities when they should come. We have now to regard him in a different aspect, to notice how earnestly and indefatigably he strove to ward them off altogether.

When the French Company in Paris intimated to their Governor-General at Pondichery, that war with England was inevitable, they apprised him at the same time that they had instructed the Governor of the Isle of France, M. de la Bourdonnais, to proceed with a squadron to his assistance, but they especially urged upon him to endeavour to bring about a treaty of neutrality with the Governor of the English settlement, and to arrange with him that the commercial operations of both countries with India should continue without molestation from either. Those instructions found Dupleix in the very mood to comply with them, though very little hopeful of success in the negotiation. Of the movements of La Bourdonnais he had no positive knowledge. Even before the declaration of war, the English cruisers had spread themselves over the Indian seas, ready to carry devastation into French commerce. Yet, from stray vessels and from other sources, intimation had reached him that a squadron under Commodore Barnet was on its way out, especially charged with the entire destruction of the French settlement.

Nevertheless he made the attempt, earnestly, almost beseechingly. But Mr. Morse, the Governor of Madras, and his Council, had precisely the same reasons for wishing for war, by which Dupleix was influenced in his desire for peace. The squadron under Commodore Barnet was, they well knew, in the Eastern seas, engaged in intercepting the French traders between China and Europe; it was shortly expected, indeed, with its prizes, at Madras; letters had been, some time previously, received announcing its departure from Europe, and those letters contained the instructions for the annihilation of French commerce to which we have just alluded. To the urgent requisition of Dupleix, Mr. Morse pleaded, therefore, the orders he had received from England.

But another disappointment awaited the French Governor. He had hoped that, should these negotiations fail, he might derive some assistance from the promised squadron of La Bourdonnais. But, just about the time that the unfavourable reply was received from Mr. Morse, intimation also reached him that in obedience to instructions received from Paris, La Bourdonnais had sent back his squadron to France, and was apparently powerless to assist him. Ignorant, as he was then, of the

undaunted energy and persistent resolution which so eminently characterised the Governor of the Isle of France, Dupleix felt himself at that moment absolutely cast upon his own resources. He had now but himself to depend upon. With a garrison of but 436 Europeans, the fortifications of Pondichery progressing, but not then finished, with but one small ship of war at his disposal, he had to meet the threatened attack of three men of war and a frigate, subsequently increased to six vessels of war, whose cannon alone, playing upon the unfinished rampart from the roadstead, could demolish, uninjured, the hostile town. Even the one vessel at his disposal he despatched to the Isle of France, with an urgent requisition to La Bourdonnais to come to his aid. This was a situation to test, in the most searching manner, the capacity of a man. Was it possible, under such circumstances, to escape the threatened danger and even to turn it to his own profit? It did not seem so certainly, yet Dupleix proved that it could be done. It was when the European enemy appeared most threatening, that the policy adopted from the commencement,—the system inaugurated by Martin and carried on by his successors,—the system of treating the natives of India as friends and as equals, bore its natural fruits. From the menaces of Mr. Morse, Dupleix appealed to the friendship of the successor of Shere Khan Lodi and of Dost Ali. The reply he received shewed that the esteem which the Nawabs of the Carnatic had always professed to feel for the representative of the French nation, was no transient or fair weather sentiment. Anwarooddeen, the representative, though not the relative, of those chieftains, had inherited their traditions; he responded to the call made upon him with a fidelity to professions not always exercised in Europe, and Pondichery was saved. To render the account of subsequent events more clear and intelligible, it is necessary that we should state very briefly the principal events that had occurred in the Carnatic since the time we last left it.

The Carnatic suffering from the famine caused by the invasion of the Mahrattas; Chunda Sahib a prisoner at Sattara; his brother-in-law, Sufder Ali, Nawab, but pressed by his feudal superior, the Subadar of the Dekkan, for arrears of revenue; such was the condition of the Carnatic in the middle of 1741. It was worse for the people than for the ruler. The people had been plundered and were starving. Sufder Ali, on the contrary, had had his treasures well guarded at Pondichery. Notwithstanding his professions, he had still abundance of wealth to pay up the arrears demanded by the Subadar. But he did not choose to pay it. The Subadar had not supported his demands by force, and Sufder Ali was resolved not to yield

to a mere verbal request. He amused, therefore, the Subadar with excuses, and, to be prepared for the worst, he took up his residence at Vellore, whilst he deposited his treasures in the custody of the English at Madras.* But a crisis was at hand. The assessment, which the stipulated payment to the Mahrattas had compelled Sufdur Ali to impose upon his nobility, had made him extremely unpopular, and had even caused a combination amongst some of his courtiers to resist it. The unsatisfactory nature of his relations with the Subadar had induced these conspirators to believe, that his overthrow would not be regarded with disfavour in that quarter. Amongst those who had joined this conspiracy, was the other brother-in-law of Sufder Ali, Mortiz Ali by name, a man well known for his cowardice, his cruelty, his wealth, and his parsimony. On the 2nd of September 1742, this man, taking advantage of the confidence inspired by the contempt which the Nawab felt for him, seized the opportunity of Sufder Ali being with but few attendants, first to cause him to be poisoned, and that proving ineffectual, to have him stabbed to death. He then proclaimed himself Nawab, and obtaining by artful representations possession of Vellore and acknowledgment from the troops, installed himself at Arcot. But the detestation of his crime combined with the contempt felt for his cowardice to make his tenure of office extremely brief. His principal officers appealed to Morari Rao, Governor of Trichinopoly, and he declared war against him. The English were requested by the insurgent nobility to protect the family and treasure of Sufder Ali, whilst the army, the support of his power, suddenly made a tumultuous demand upon him for the payment of their arrears. Mortiz Ali, terrified at these demands, and not possessing spirit equal to his crime, bent before the storm, and disguising himself in woman's clothes, fled in safety to the fort of Vellore. On his flight becoming known, the son of Sufder Ali, Seid Mahomed Khan, an infant who was with his mother at Madras, was at once proclaimed Nawab.

The appointment of an infant to this position did not tend to the tranquillity of the province. Every nobleman assumed an independent position. But, in the beginning of the following year, Nizam-ool-Mulk, the Subadar of the Deccan, appeared upon the scene at the head of an army of 80,000 horse, and 200,000 foot. He at once became the master of the

* Orme states that he transferred his confidence, in regard to the custody of his family and treasures, from the French to the English on the advice of his Prime Minister, Meer Assud, who suspected the connexion which existed between Chunda Sahib and M. Dupleix. This Meer Assud was he bitter enemy of Chunda Sahib, and the author of all his calamities.

situation. The upstart noblemen were put down on the threat of being scourged, should they dare to assume the title of Nawab, and one of his chief officers, Khoja Abdalla, was appointed to administer the province. The Subadar then moved upon Trichinopoly which the Mahrattas evacuated without striking a blow in its defence. Having recovered this principality for the Mogul, he returned to Golconda, taking Khoja Abdalla with him.

It had been intended by the Subadar, that this officer should return to assume the regency of the Carnatic the following year, but on the very eve of starting, he was found dead in his bed. Anwaroodeen, known as a brave and experienced soldier, was appointed to succeed him as governor and guardian to the son of Sufder Ali.

A few months, however, had not elapsed before, at a wedding to which Mortiz Ali, the murderer of his father, had also been invited, Seid Mahomed Khan was assassinated. In the confusion that followed, Mortiz Ali took to his horse, and escorted by a large body of cavalry, escaped to Vellore. The immediate result was, that Anwaroodeen, who was no relation of the old family, was appointed Nawab of the Carnatic.

This was the man to whom, in the difficult circumstances in which he was placed, the Governor of Pondichery made his appeal. He reminded him of the long standing friendship between his predecessors and the French nation; of the moral support and protection to the families of those predecessors given at the time of the Mahratta invasion; he alluded to the peaceable disposition always shewn by the French; to their desire to be at peace with all around them; and he urged upon the Nawab to prevent, by his authority, the aggression of the other European nation occupying a portion of the seaboard of the Carnatic, upon those who had always been friends to his predecessors, and whose governor was himself an officer and vassal of the Mogul.

Anwaroodeen was not insensible to the force and reason of this appeal. Neither of the European powers on the Coromandel coast had shewn up to that point any aggressive tendencies, nor had then the superiority of the European soldier in the field been demonstrated in any way. It was natural that he should desire to maintain peace in his jurisdiction and its dependencies, and it is very probable,—indeed, subsequent events proved,—that he was not at all insensible to the marks of friendship and cordiality which the rulers of Pondichery had always evinced. He therefore sent a pressing message to the governor of Madras, informing him, that he would not permit

any attack on the possessions of the French on the Coromandel coast. The despotic character of this resolution he endeavoured to soften by a shew of fairness; for he informed Mr. Morse at the same time, that should hereafter the French power preponderate, he would use the same authority to prevent any aggressive action on their part. Mr. Morse had no course but compliance.

But though thus saved from immediate attack, the situation of Dupleix was still particularly trying. The English squadron had come round to the coast, had even received reinforcements, and the vessels of which it was composed, cruising about, were enabled to intercept and destroy the French merchantmen. The Company of the Indies, even before the outbreak of the war, had ceased to send any ships to Pondichery, so that he was dependent for his intelligence on stray arrivals. At Pondichery too, and its neighbourhood, the prestige of France had received a rude shock. It was known everywhere, that but for the interference of the Nawab, he could have been compelled to succumb to the English, and as a matter of course, the time-servers and sycophants of whom there are many in every nation, fell off from him. Still, amid the doubt and despondency that surrounded him, he maintained a bold and resolute bearing. Though within all was anxiety, without, there was the security of apparent composure. He was, however, immensely relieved, when in the month of May 1746, he learned from a sure source, that the long announced and long despaired of squadron of M. de la Bourdonnais had been heard of at Mahé.

La Bourdonnais was last introduced in these pages as the skilful and enterprising officer who had devised the means by which Mahé,—so named, it will be remembered after himself,—had been captured in 1727. We shall now briefly relate the course of his life during the nineteen years that had elapsed since that first brilliant essay of arms in India. Reduced by the peace, to which France at that period seemed disposed, to inactivity, La Bourdonnais, after the capture of Mahé, fitted out a ship on his own account, and traded for three or four years in the Arabian seas. The ascendancy which he here speedily assumed over all with whom he came into contact, and which especially signalled itself on the occasion of a disturbance which he succeeded in quelling, between some Portuguese and Arab sailors, in the harbour of Mocha, recommended him to the governor of Goa, and induced that viceroy to offer him the command of a ship of war under the King of Portugal,—an appointment carrying with it several orders and titles. La Bourdonnais accepted the offer, and made an expedition to

Mozambique, and several cruises in the Indian seas. But the situation of a foreigner in the service of another country can never be wholly satisfactory, and at the end of two years La Bourdonnais found that the annoyances to which he was constantly subjected did not compensate for either the pleasure or profit of his command. He therefore threw it up and returned in 1733 to France. There he married, and in 1735, he was appointed to succeed M. Dumas as Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon.

To understand all that La Bourdonnais accomplished in his new position, it is necessary that we should refer to the connexion of the French with those islands from the time of their earliest occupation. We have already * given a brief sketch of their history from their first discovery by the Portuguese to the occupation of Bourbon by a small number of the baffled colonists of Madagascar in 1672, and the settlement in the Isle of France at some period between 1710 and 1719. It is probable, that the remnants of the Madagascar colonists, never^d much caring for labour on its own account would, had they been able, have taken an early opportunity of leaving an island, in which they seemed entirely cut off from association with the outer world. But they had escaped,—a mixed crew of men and women,—the latter it is stated being natives,—in two canoes, and they had no means of proceeding in any direction. They betook themselves therefore perforce to the erection of huts, and to the cultivation of articles of food. Fortunately the nature of the soil was such that a very small expenditure of labour was sufficient to enable them to live in comfort and abundance. Soon after their numbers were increased by the wreck upon their coast of a piratical craft,† on board of which were many female prisoners. By degrees, too, they were joined by deserters from East Indian ships which touched there. These were for the most part attracted by the easy life which the fertility of the colony enabled its inhabitants to enjoy. The prosperity of the island increased in a greater degree than could be imagined, if the elements of which its society was

* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXII, page 326-7.

† It is stated that amongst other additions from various sources, the early inhabitants of Bourbon "received an increase by some English pirates, "who came along with Avery, England, Condon, and Pattison, who, after "acquiring considerable riches in the Red Sea and Coasts of Arabia and "Persia, quitting their way of life, settled on the Island, and had a pardon "from the King of France. Some of them were alive in 1763, and "their descendants are numerous on the island."—Dalrymple's *Oriental Repertory*, Vol. II.

formed were alone considered. Houses were erected, small trading vessels were built, many of them for piratical purposes, slaves were purchased, and articles fit for export were cultivated. So glowing indeed were the accounts of this prosperity taken home to France by ships which touched at the island, that towards the close of the seventeenth or the beginning of the eighteenth century, the French Company put in their claim to its possession, and sent thither five or six families and a governor.* The governor was well received at first, but the descendants of the pirates and deserters soon found him an inconvenient incumbence. They accordingly seized and imprisoned him, and kept him in a dungeon till he died. Their rebellion had no other result. A new governor was sent with orders to punish the ringleaders, and to erect a fort for his protection,—orders which he is stated to have carried out effectually.

In 1717 the population of the island was computed at two thousand nine hundred free men, and eleven hundred slaves. In the following year an event occurred which gave an impetus to its trade, and which assured its future prosperity. This was the introduction of the cultivation of coffee, which thenceforth became the staple trade of the island. Two years prior to this possession had been taken of the deserted Isle of France, although no earnest attempt at colonisation was made before 1721, an edict, dated November of that year, however, decreed the erection of a Provincial Council in that island dependant upon that of Bourbon, and in 1723, M. Dumas, Resident of Bourbon, was appointed Governor of both islands. Great inducements were at the same time held out to the inhabitants of Bourbon to emigrate into the larger island. For this purpose grants of land were made to settlers, and sums proportionate to each grant were advanced to each settler by the Company. Yet for several years, it seemed as though the colonisation of the Isle of France was likely to be unprofitable, and that its abandonment was constantly threatened. The colonists had been unable at the expiration of twelve years to set on foot a trade sufficient even to enable them to repay the sums that had been advanced them by the Company. But, in the crisis of the hesitation as to the line of action to be adopted, La Bourdonnais appeared in France. The fame of his skill, his energy, his indomitable resolution had preceded him, and the Directors resolved to give

* It would appear, however, from the *Calendrier des Isles de France et de Bourbon* that the inhabitants had had a regular succession of Governors of their own since the formation of the settlement. Thus, it is recorded that "in 1675, Pere Hiacinthe, Capuchin, arrived there in the quality of Curate, "and took upon himself the right of Governor."

one more chance to the new colony, by appointing as Governor-General of the Isles of France and Bourbon, one who had given so many proofs of the possession of great qualities.

La Bourdonnais went there. He found in Bourbon a fertile soil, a healthy air, and, comparatively, a settled community. He found the greater part of the Isle of France, on the other hand, still covered with almost impenetrable forests, possessing two harbours, one of which at all events, up to that moment unimproved and scarcely safe, might, with a little labour, be made excellent for all purposes; a soil less fertile indeed than that of Bourbon, but still capable of production; and a climate, mild, temperate and healthy. The fact that it possessed a harbour, gave to the Isle of France a great superiority in the eyes of La Bourdonnais over Bourbon, and he at once made it the seat of Government.

But the people! Had La Bourdonnais been less of a real man than he was, he might well have been appalled at the task of making anything of a race to whom toil of any sort seemed the worst species of evil. Almost naked, defenceless, and starving, having preferred to be comfortless and miserable rather than to exercise even the small amount of labour, which, in such a clime would have amply supplied their necessities; dwelling in wretched cabins; possessing no energy, living in fear of their lives from the attacks of the Maroons—the free descendants of the slaves who had been kidnapped from Madagascar, and who had found a refuge in the interior—endowed apparently merely with the animal love of existence—these so-called colonists were yet capable of combining to resist any lawful authority over them. But La Bourdonnais was not a man to be baffled. He taught them, in an hundred instances, that he was resolved to be master. And yet, in doing this, he showed such tact, he was so gentle while he was determined, his measures were so wise, and the benefits resulting from them so evident to all, that he forced these colonists, even whilst murmuring against him, to admit in their reasonable moods, that he was the wisest, gentlest, and best of governors, the only man who could have induced them to forego their old habits of indolence and sloth.

By his own personal teaching—whether as regarded the merest rudiments or the higher requirements of agriculture,—the first principles of mechanical labour, or the acquirements of the skilled artisan,—by constantly impressing on the minds of these people the absolute necessity under which they lay to work, he succeeded, before long, in forming out of this unpromising raw material a civilized community. Under his influence, some took to planting,

some to manufacturing, others to soldiering. La Bourdonnais assisted them in many ways. He imported negroes from Madagascar, and employed these as policemen, as cultivators, and as artisans. In a short time the island assumed a new appearance. In place of the uncultivated waste of the interior, and the wretched hovels scattered along the coast, he caused to be built substantial private dwelling-houses, magazines, arsenals, barracks, fortifications, mills, quays, canals, and aqueducts. Of these last, one in particular is mentioned, built for the purpose of bringing down fresh water to the port and to the hospitals, as having been three thousand six hundred toises (more than four miles and a quarter) in length. But his greatest efforts were directed to the sea coast. There were, we have seen, two harbours, one on the south-east side of the island, open to the prevailing winds, the other on the north-west side, sheltered from the wind, but only to be entered through a narrow channel. On this he bestowed all his efforts, and he very soon made it fit, in every respect, for the reception of thirty-five or forty ships. He provided it likewise with wet and dry docks, pontoons, canoes, yards, and timber. It was thus as easy to lay up and repair ships at Port Louis, for so he named the capital, as in any port in Europe. In 1737, eighteen months after his arrival, he was able to launch a brigantine; the following year, he built two good ships,* and put another of five hundred tons on the stocks. This, however, was but a portion of what he effected in that respect during his Viceroyalty.

His internal administration was equally energetic and judicious. He took very good care that the negroes were not unduly oppressed by the colonists. He compelled the landowners to lay out tapioca plantations, five hundred yards square, for each negro and family serving under them. He encouraged the cultivation of sugar, soon to become a great success, prevented the indiscriminate slaughter of cattle, and, until the breed should revive, he forced the ship's crews to live upon fish and turtle during their stay in port.

Nor was he less successful in Bourbon, though that island, at the time of his arrival, was further advanced in civilisation than the other. His principal object was to administer the two

* As might have been expected, the first attempts at ship building was not altogether a success. It is related of his first ship, that "after a great deal of trouble, time, and expense in building she was found so heavy in launching, that they were obliged to haul her ashore again, and rip off a great deal of timber, and put other in her place before she was fit for sea." This vessel, the *Insulaire*, was lost in 1746, in the Ganges, on her way to Chandernagore, after the action with Commodore Peyton.

islands, so that they should be valuable to France, and to make them fit to be the commercial station between France and India. To this end, it was necessary that they should be fortified. Though the means were apparently wanting, La Bourdonnais commenced the work, and in less than five years, he succeeded in providing them with such fortifications as would have rendered any attack upon them extremely hazardous.

In 1740, the death of his wife rendered it necessary for La Bourdonnais to return to France. On his arrival there, he found that complaints had preceded him. Cardinal Fleury was then still minister. An honest, painstaking economist, with little breadth of view, Fleury had but one principle of external policy. This was the maintenance of peace, specially of peace with England, at any price. It was partly from a fear of giving umbrage to England, partly from his economic habits, that he starved the French navy, neglected the army, and gave no encouragement to commerce. Such a man could have little sympathy with a genius so fertile, an energy so buoyant, a desire to advance French interests so irrepressible, as were bound together in the person of La Bourdonnais. When, therefore, some of those repressed speculators, and baffled ship-captains, whose gains and depredations had been lessened by the measures of La Bourdonnais, presented to the Minister and to the Directors of the Company a long list of their grievances, accompanied by insinuations common to their class, that La Bourdonnais was working mainly for his own interests, the narrow mind of the Cardinal did not repel the charges, and, worked upon at the same time by the Directors, he began to concert with them measures for his disgrace. It was the intimation of this, and the consequent desire to justify himself, that brought La Bourdonnais from the scene of his labours.

Though narrow-minded to a degree, Fleury was an honest man. He received this great colonist with marked disfavour at the outset, but he did not remain long proof against the candour and frankness which characterised alike his demeanour and his statements. La Bourdonnais, in fact, insisted upon being informed of all that had been said against him, and, this done, he had little difficulty, not only in justifying his conduct, but in convincing the Minister and the Directors, of the great value of the measures he had accomplished. The personal charges against him dissolved into air. He shewed, in the course of his justification, that he had never possessed a foot of land in the islands; that he had never traded for a single *livre*; and that so great had been the confidence of the colonists in his impartiality, that all the differences in the islands had been

terminated by his arbitration, without recourse having been had, except in one solitary instance, to a lawsuit.

Released from the charges against him, and reinstated in the confidence of his masters, the fertile mind of La Bourdonnais began at once to resolve fresh schemes. At that time, (1740-41,) hostilities between France and England seemed imminent. The two nations had taken opposite sides in the war of the Austrian succession, and it was evident that not all the devices of Fleury would be able much longer to keep back a declaration of war. Under these circumstances, La Bourdonnais foreseeing that that nation which, on the breaking out of the war, should have an overwhelming superiority of force to the other in the Indian seas, would be able to crush its rival, advised that he should be allowed to equip and fit out a squadron of six or eight ships as vessels of war. With these he proposed to sail to the Isle of France, there to await the breaking out of hostilities. On that event occurring, he would be able, he said, to intercept and capture the English merchantmen, and then, steering to India, would ruin the English settlements in that country.

This plan, practical, easy of execution, and, under an unfettered La Bourdonnais, certain of success, was nevertheless too grand in its grasp to commend itself to the timid and cautious policy of the Directors of the French India Company. These, therefore, declared against it at once. But Fleury, cautious as he was, had too much of the statesman in his composition, not to perceive the immense advantages that might accrue from its successful operation. La Bourdonnais, too, was on the spot, and La Bourdonnais was careful to point out to him, amongst other arguments, that his consent to the plan did not commit him to any overt act of hostility against England, that the squadron would patiently await in the harbour of Port Louis the first declaration of war. Fleury, convinced by these and similar arguments, gave in to the plan, merely altering some of the details; the opposition of the Directors he for the time silenced.

The alteration in the details of the scheme, as originally proposed, consisted in the idea of substituting at least two ships of the French navy for those which La Bourdonnais was to fit out. But, in France, in the reign of Louis XV., action seldom followed counsel. When the time came for the squadron to sail, the two king's ships with which so much might have been effected, were diverted to some unimportant purpose, and La Bourdonnais found himself reduced to the command of five vessels belonging to the Company. But these would have been sufficient for his purpose, had he been allowed to pursue that

purpose to its end. They carried a considerable armament,* and they had on board 1,200 sailors and 500 soldiers. Yet, even amongst these, he had difficulties to contend with. But few of the sailors had ever been at sea, and the soldiers had been but little instructed in military exercises. With both these classes, La Bourdonnais pursued the course he had found so successful with the colonists of the Isle of France. He taught them what their duties were, and he set them himself the best example of doing them. To train them to the various labours likely to devolve upon them, was his constant and unremitting business on the voyage, and to such an extent did he succeed, that the ships which left France on the 5th of April 1741, manned by landsmen as sailors, and carrying recruits for soldiers, arrived at the Isle of France on the 14th August following, with crews as efficient as those which manned the King's navy, and soldiers as well trained in all their musketry exercises as those who fought at Fontenoy.

It was the sad fate of those heroic men who struggled to establish a French empire in India, to find their chiefest and most redoubtable enemies in France itself. The genius of Clive, the persistent valour of Coote, and the almost forgotten gallantry of Forde, † might have struggled in vain to overturn a settlement which was based on the solid foundations on which the early rulers of Pondichery had begun to build up a French India, had France herself been true to her struggling children. But the France of Louis XV. more resembled the Medea of the ancient story than the tender and watchful mother. Often did she, "with her own hands, immolate her offspring," and, failing this, she treated the best and bravest of her sons rather as enemies to be thwarted, baffled, persecuted, and driven to despair, than as men who were devoting all their energies, the every thought of their lives, to increase her dominions. Yes, it was France who was their enemy;—not the France of Napoleon III., jealous of the fame, the rights, the privileges, the comforts, of the meanest of her children;—not the France of the Revolution and of the first Empire, ambitious of glory and of dominion: but that France of the eighteenth century, which lay bound and gagged and speechless, untaught yet to give out even an inarticulate sound, at the feet of a man, who, shameless and conscienceless himself, cared little what might become of his subjects, provided only that he was

* These ships were the *Fleury* of 56 guns, the *Brillant* and *Aimable* of 50 each, the *Renommée* of 28, and the *Parfaite* of 16.

† Vide Broome's *History of the Bengal Army*. Vol. I, pages 215-220.

permitted to wallow perpetually in all the excesses of the vilest forms of debauchery.

And it was now, that France betrayed her champion. She betrayed the man, who, but for the acts of the rulers of France, would have enjoyed the best opportunity of effectively establishing a French empire in India, of rooting out every rival. La Bourdonnais had scarcely set sail, when those infamous intriguers and whisperers,—the certain hangers-on of corrupt Governments,—began to uplift the voices, which in his presence had remained mute. Amongst the Directors, the cry was raised that this expensive armament was useless for the purposes of France; that it was intended to minister to the ambition of its promoter. They declared that a policy of neutrality in the Indian seas was the only sound policy, and they expressed a conviction that, in case of war, the English would be glad to accede to such an arrangement. From the Directors the cry rose to the ministry. The weak Fleury, then nearly ninety years old, and no longer under the influence of the spell of La Bourdonnais' presence, after a short struggle, gave way to the clamour. In an evil hour for France and for French India, this dispenser under Louis XV of the fortunes of his country, transmitted orders to La Bourdonnais to send back his ships to France, "even though they should have to sail without cargoes."

Meanwhile, La Bourdonnais, unsuspecting of back-stairs influence, had, as we have seen, arrived at the Isle of France. The intelligence which awaited him there, was of a nature to stimulate all his energies. He received the news, which had some short time before arrived, of the danger which threatened Pondichery from the anticipated attack of Ragojee Bhonsla, and further that the authorities of the Islands, obeying an urgent requisition from M. Dumas, had despatched their garrisons to India. Impressed with the necessity of saving Pondichery at all costs, La Bourdonnais remained only a week at the Isle of France, and sailed then for Pondichery. Arriving there on the 30th September, he found that the tact and skill of M. Dumas had warded off the danger from that settlement, but that Mahé was still beleaguered. Thither, accordingly, to the scene of his early Indian triumphs, he sailed, and arriving there, he speedily re-established French ascendancy. There being nothing more for him to accomplish in India, he returned to the Isle of France to carry out the scheme he had concerted with Fleury. It was on his return thither, that he experienced the bitter pang which those alone can feel, who, prompted in all their actions by noble and generous sentiments, find themselves restrained and held back

by men of inferior, even of contemptible, powers. Then for the first time the order reached him to send back his ships to Europe. He knew the full significance of that order; he felt that it was to give up, for the coming war at all events, all hope of French preponderance in India; he felt that it would leave him a powerless spectator of the triumphs of the English,—disarmed and defenceless, perhaps even a prey to their attacks; he felt that it destroyed the hope of his life, the object of all his toil, the certain accomplishment, but for that, of his legitimate ambition. But what was he to do? The order was imperative. He must obey it. With a pang, the bitterness of which few men can have experienced, and which must have been enhanced afterwards by the prompt realisation of all his anticipations, he sent back the fleet. With it however he sent his own resignation, with an earnest prayer that he might be speedily relieved.

Why did he obey? Surely it was not his fault that he did obey. But what cruel destiny was it that was weighing down the fortunes of France? A few favouring gales, a swift sailing ship, an energetic captain, and the fate of India might have been changed! Scarcely had the first keenness of the disappointment caused by the departure of the fleet been obliterated in the energetic action which now found a vent in the care of the colony, when there arrived at Port Louis a French ship conveying a despatch from the Controller of the Finances and Minister of State, M. Philibert Orry, authorising La Bourdonnais to retain the fleet, and expressing a hope that he had disobeyed his previous instructions. Cardinal Fleury in fact was dying. Orry was virtual Minister, and taking in at once the great importance of La Bourdonnais' schemes, he had sent out this ship and these instructions. Too late, alas! for La Bourdonnais' hopes. The ships had gone, and there was no possibility of recalling them. Too well had he obeyed his Sovereign's order, for the obedience cost him an Empire.

Can we imagine,—some of us perhaps may,—the aggravation of disappointment which this message from the new Minister must have caused? How many it would have utterly crushed! How many it would have driven to despair! But La Bourdonnais was made of a very hard material. He was not proof against all the attacks of fortune, for he too, as we shall have occasion to describe, had his weak side, but this disappointment neither crushed him nor stopped his action. Learning a little later that the Minister and Directors refused to accept his resignation, he calmly resumed his duties as governor of the Islands, and began at once to make preparations for a possible future.

The French Ministry refused to accept the resignation of La Bourdonnais, but they did not immediately send back the ships. They informed him that he possessed all their confidence, and that it was to him they looked to take the Governor-Generalship of French India in case of any accident happening to Dupleix. Meanwhile Cardinal Fleury had died (29 January 1743), war had been declared between France and England, and La Bourdonnais saw with ain the great rivals of his nation reaping the field which he had sown to gather.* That English fleet under Commodore Barnet, of which we have already spoken had come to cruise in the Indian seas, and French merchantmen were picked up in every direction. La Bourdonnais could do nothing to hinder their depredations. As if to add to his perplexities, he, at this time, when utterly powerless himself, received a pressing message from Dupleix, with whom he had been some time in correspondence, begging him to hasten, with all the force at his disposal, to the defence of Pondichery.

Then was seen, in full perfection, an example of the truth of the maxim, that great difficulties are nothing more than obstacles which a real man may overcome. It would seem impossible that this man, left destitute himself, should have been able to carry assistance to a countryman in distress. But no axiom is more true than this, that nothing is impossible to a brave man,—brave, we mean, not in the narrow view of personal courage, but in its widest and its broadest sense,—brave to bear the reproach, the obloquy, hatred, the discontent, of his fellow men ;—brave to disregard the studied neglect, the insolent glance, the open attacks, of men whom accident has placed higher than himself in the social scale ;—brave, still, despite of all, to go on straight to the end he has marked out to himself, despite of jeers and taunts, of open opposition, and secret calumny. It was in that sense that La Bourdonnais was brave, and being thus brave, he conquered the impossible.

What was the impossible? Without ships, without sailors, without an army, the Indian ocean covered by hostile cruisers, with no resources but those which he had made in the colony, he was asked to embark an army, to traverse the Indian Ocean, to avoid or encounter the trained fleet of the enemy, and to relieve the beleaguered Capital of French India. Could he stamp upon the ground, and bring into existence the men, the guns, the material, the ships, that he had not? Did

* "We are now executing against you," said Commodore Barnet to the captain of a French merchantman he had taken, "that which M. de La Bourdonnais had projected against us."

it not seem a very impossibility ? Yet undeterred by this seeming calmly, patiently, steadfastly, did La Bourdonnais set to work to accomplish the undertaking.

To succeed in such an attempt, it was especially necessary to greatly dare ; to throw to the winds all dread of responsibility ; to use to the utmost extent the powers at his disposal. La Bourdonnais thus acted. Every ship,—and some, despite the English cruisers, did pass that way,—that touched at Port Louis, likely to be suitable for his purpose, he detained. The objections of the captains and of others interested in the vessels he peremptorily silenced. It was unfortunate that, in addition to other difficulties, the islands, owing to an unwonted scarcity caused by a total failure of the crops, were unable to supply sufficient food for the crews ; equally so, that a vessel laden with provisions from Europe, the *Saint Geran*, had gone down at the very entrance of the harbour. Such was the scarcity, that the inhabitants of the islands were restricted, by an order of the local council, to daily rations of one pound of bread or rice for every European and freeman, and a pound and a half of rice for each negro. The necessary requirements for the equipment of the ships' carpenters and smiths and tailors to work upon them, sailors sufficient to man them, and soldiers to be conveyed by them, were alike wanting. But La Bourdonnais determined to make what he had not. He himself, carpenter, engineer, tailor, and smith, constructed with his own hands the model of all the articles that were required. Under his own personal superintendence, some men were trained to act as tailors, to cut out and prepare sails ; others, as carpenters, busied themselves with gun-carriages, and fitted the vessels to receive them. Some were set to work to prepare materials for building ships, others to put together those materials. Then, again, the sailors were trained to work together, to serve the guns, to scale walls, to fire at a mark, to use the grappling hook. Finding their number insufficient, he recruited from the negroes, and formed the whole into mixed companies. Working in this way, he soon found himself at the head of a body of men, well taught and well disciplined, and ready to undertake any enterprise he might assign to them.

Nor was he less painstaking and energetic regarding the supply of provisions. He had already detained, and had begun to equip five vessels, including a vessel carrying twenty-six guns which had brought him the pressing requisition from Dupleix, when he received intelligence from France that a squadron of five ships had started from L'Orient, and would be with him in October of that year (1745). The arrival of this squadron would

cause a double strain upon his slender stock of provisions. He therefore arranged that so soon as a ship should be equipped, she should sail at once for the coast of Madagascar, and there lay in supplies of rice and other articles of food that might be procurable. In this way he managed to over-ride that which otherwise would have been an unsurmountable difficulty.

The squadron promised in October 1745, arrived in January of the following year. It consisted of one ship of war of seventy guns, the *Achille*, and of four unarmed merchantmen.* To arm and equip these latter, and to reconcile their officers to the displacement of their several cargoes,† tasked all his resources. However, he succeeded. The armament consisted almost entirely of eight and twelve-pounders, a calibre insignificant when compared with that of the guns ordinarily found, even in those days, on board a man-of-war. Even of these he had an insufficient number, and almost all his improvised fighting ships were pierced for a greater number of guns than they actually carried. However, one by one, partially equipped as they were, they left the island for the rendezvous at Madagascar. When all had taken their departure, he himself, brimful of bright hopes and enthusiasm, set sail to join them.‡

This was on the 24th March. Scarcely, however, had he sighted his squadron, when one of these tempests which periodically sweep over the Indian Ocean, burst upon him. His ships were driven from their anchoring ground, and for three days were tossed about by the storm. One of them foundered §; the Admiral's ship, the *Achille*, lost her three masts, and many of the others suffered equally. At last, however, they found a safe refuge in the Bay of Antongil, on the north-eastern coast of Madagascar. In this bay, lying off a desert island within it, the work of re-fitting was undertaken. Perhaps never was such a work begun under so many accumulated disadvantages. The island was marshy and insalubrious; the periodical rains had begun;

* LaBourdonnais' expression regarding these vessels runs as follows:—"It is proper to observe regarding these vessels, that they were very badly off for crews. The *Achille* alone was fitted out as a ship of war. The others were no more armed than simple merchant ships."

† The armament of these vessels necessitated the landing of all the merchandise with which these vessels were laden, to the great loss of the officers.

‡ We subjoin a list of the names of the vessels forming the squadron and their respective armaments. The *Archille* of 70 guns; the *Bourbon*, pierced for 42, carrying 34 guns; the *Phenix* pierced for 44, carrying 38 guns; the *Neptune*, pierced for 36, carrying 30 guns; the *Saint Louis*, pierced for 36, carrying 26 guns; the *Lys*, pierced for 36, carrying 24 guns; the *Duc d'Orleans*, pierced for 36, carrying 24 guns; the *Renommée* pierced for 28, carrying 24 guns; and the *Insulaire* of 30, carrying 20 guns.

§ The *Neptune des Indes* of 34 guns, not included in the above list.

the ships had suffered fearfully, and their crews were knocked up by fatigue. There was no landing place ; the forest, whence wood was to be procured, was on the mainland upwards of two miles distant ; between it and the shore, was a marsh three miles in circumference ; a winding river with sufficient water to render the frequent crossing it wearisome, but not sufficient to float the logs down to the sea ; and, even when in the sea, they were yet three miles from the shipping. But these difficulties, great as they were, were all overcome. He built a quay of the stone which the island produced, he erected workshops for the construction of masts, ropes, and other appliances ; he threw a road across the marsh ; he caused the logs to be dragged along the bed of the river, and constructing rude canoes, he launched them at its mouth, and by their aid paddled the logs to the side of the disabled vessels. To choose these logs, he penetrated into the pestilential forests, in order that he might be sure that he had the advantage of the best species of wood procurable. His example stimulated the whole fleet. Those who at first had been inclined to shew discontent, could not long resist his magic influence. But a short time elapsed before all worked with an energy of which before they had scarcely seemed capable. At the end of forty-eight days they had repaired every damage, though at a loss, from climate and exposure, of ninety-five Europeans and thirty-three negroes. The fleet, however, was saved, and was once more ready to sail for the long-wished-for goal.

At length, on the 1st of June, it started. It consisted now of but nine ships. Besides the *Achille*, of seventy guns, one vessel carried thirty-eight guns, one thirty-four guns, one thirty guns, one twenty-six, three twenty-four, and one twenty guns. He had on board 3,342 men, of whom nearly one-fourth were Africans. Sailing with a fair wind, constantly exercising and encouraging his crews, La Bourdonnais arrived off Mahé at the end of the month. Here he learned that the English fleet had been last heard off Negapatam, below Karical ; that though inferior in the number of ships, and slightly inferior in the number of crews, it was much superior in weight of metal, being armed with 24-pounders, and that it was waiting at Negapatam to intercept him. Summoning his captains on board his ship, La Bourdonnais at once held a Council of war. He was resolved to fight, but he wished first to test the temper of his subordinates. To his delight he found in them an eagerness, almost equal to his own, a desire to gain, if possible, the empire of India on the sea. His mind entirely at ease on this point, he altered his course, and a few days later arrived off Trincomalee.

It is time now that we should turn to the proceedings of the English fleet. We left Commodore Barnet, prevented by the interdiction of the Nawab Anwarooddeen from attacking Pondichery, reduced to the necessity of confining his operations to sea. Taking up a position at Mergui, near the entrance of the Malacca Straits, he had employed himself industriously in intercepting French traders, and in effectively stopping French commerce. Hearing some rumours in the early part of 1746 of the intended expedition of La Bourdonnais, he had returned to the Coromandel Coast, and anchored off Fort St. David. Here, in the month of April, he died, and the command of the squadron devolved upon Commodore Peyton.

This squadron consisted of one ship of sixty guns, three of fifty, one of forty, and one of twenty guns, six ships in all. * But they carried mostly twenty-four-pounders, and were armed with their full complement of guns. A judicious commander would have been able, with such a force, to cause terrible destruction amongst the lightly armed vessels of La Bourdonnais.

Intelligence had been conveyed to Commodore Peyton of the appearance of a French fleet off Ceylon, and he was cruising off Negapatam to intercept it. Early on the morning of the 6th July it was descried. The discovery was made about the same time on board the French vessels, and the hostile squadrons began at once to manœuvre, the English to preserve the advantage of the wind, the French to gain it. La Bourdonnais, knowing his inferiority in weight of metal, and his superiority in men, had felt that his only chance of success lay in a hand-to-hand encounter, and his great object was to board. But the skill of Commodore Peyton, who divined his enemy's object, defeated this intention, and at half-past four o'clock in the afternoon that officer had gained a position which enabled him to open fire at a safe distance on the French.

This distance was all in favour of the English. With their twenty-four-pounders they inflicted great damage amongst the French ships, which these latter, with their eight and twelve-pounders and musketry, were very partially able to repay. Three of their ships were disabled at the beginning of the action,—one indeed

* Subjoined are the names of the vessels and their Commanders :—

The Medway, Commodore Peyton, 60 guns,

The Preston, Captain Lord Northesk, 50 guns.

The Harwich, Captain Carteret, 50 guns.

The Winchester, Captain Lord T. Bertie, 50 guns.

The Medway's Prize, Captain Griffith, 40 guns.

The Lively, Captain Stevens, 20 guns.

The total number of the crews amounted to 1,660 men.

completely dismayed,—and had not La Bourdonnais, coming up with the *Achille*, the only ship of his squadron that carried its proper complement of heavy guns, drawn upon himself for half an hour the whole fire of the English, the squadron could not have escaped defeat. As it was, night separated the combatants before a decisive advantage had been gained on either side.

Day broke, shewing the French squadron formed in line, the advantage of the wind still being, as on the previous day, with the English. It rested with the latter, therefore, whether the contest should be renewed. There were very many weighty reasons in favour of prompt and vigorous action. The English had had but sixty men killed and wounded * the previous day, and one only of their ships had received any considerable damage from the enemy's fire; they were all ships of war; eight of the French ships were but imperfectly and lightly armed; the English fleet had been stationed off Negapatam to obstruct the advance of the French fleet: to abandon the field, therefore, was to leave Madras a prey to the enemy.

But in 1746, the English were not accustomed to regard the empire of the seas as their own. Some of those on board that squadron might easily have recollected the time when the English channel had been scoured for weeks, unopposed, by the victorious fleet of de Tourville,—the English fleet having sought refuge in the Thames. † Certain it is, that Commodore Peyton acted as English commodores of the time of the revolutionary war never would have thought of acting. Because one of his ships was leaky he deemed the attack too hazardous to be made. A Council of war having confirmed this view, he made sail to the south, bound for Trincomalee, leaving the way open to Pondichery—deserting that Madras which he had been sent to protect.

If ‡ La Bourdonnais was relieved by the departure of his enemy, he did not shew it. On the contrary, he made an appearance of pursuing the English. But it was only an appearance. He

* The English lost fourteen men killed and forty-six wounded: the French, twenty-seven killed and fifty-three wounded.

† After the battle off Beachy Head, 30th June 1690.

‡ La Bourdonnais states in his memoirs that it was with extreme regret he saw the English escape him. He adds, that being without provisions and having on board a great number of sick and wounded, he was constrained to renounce their pursuit. In his letter to Dupleix, however, he says nothing about the disappearance of the English, but writes thus: "The fear of missing Pondichery, the large amount of money for you on board, and, more than that, the scarcity of food, of which many ships had only four and twenty hours supply, made me contemplate the frightful situation in which I should be, if I were to fall to the leeward of the place; this determined me to bear up for Pondichery."

must, in reality, have been greatly relieved by their sheering off. He had expended a great portion of his ammunition, he had provisions but for twenty-four hours longer. The disappearance of the English left him free to accomplish his object. His dismasted ship, the *Insulaire*, he ordered to Bengal to be repaired ; then quickly collecting the remainder of his squadron, he resumed almost immediately his northerly course, and, on the following evening, cast anchor in the Pondichery roads.

One portion of his seemingly impossible task had thus been accomplished. Pondichery was safe, the French fleet mistress of the Indian seas, Madras uncovered. The positions of the contending rivals had been exactly reversed. It would now be for the French to threaten, for the English to sue for neutrality. What will be the result? Will the Nawab of the Carnatic, standing neutral between the contending parties, extend to the English the same protection he had accorded to their rivals? If not, it would seem as though their case were almost desperate. Abandoned by their fleet, with but three hundred Europeans within its walls, Madras presented far fewer means of defence than Pondichery. Governor Morse, too, was neither a Dumas nor a Dupleix. On the other hand, the French had at their head two masters, both men of genius, of energy, of ambition ; the one a master in council, an adept at statecraft, skilled in all the wiles of a subtle policy, but himself unacquainted with war and its details : the other a man, great in action and prompt in council, accustomed to command, accustomed to see his will obeyed, to bear down every obstacle ; but whether equally fitted to carry out the will of another, as yet unproved. The uncertainty in this respect formed the only cloud in the horizon of the fortunes of French India. Will the active genius, who has "conquered the impossible," who, by the sheer force of his will, has created the soldiers and the sailors, the ships and the guns, wherewith he has relieved Pondichery, will he now subordinate that will to the will of another man, his superior in position, but whom he has as yet only heard of as a successful trader? Up to the moment of casting anchor at Pondichery, not a shadow of a contest had arisen. Hitherto each had acted independently of the other. The communications between the two Governors had been most friendly. "The honour of success," wrote Dupleix in the early part of the year, "will be yours, and I shall hold myself lucky in contributing thereto through means that owe their value entirely to your skill." "We ought," wrote La Bourdonnais on his side, "to

"regard one another as equally interested in the progress of events and to work in concert. For my part, Sir, I devote myself to you beforehand, and I swear to you a perfect confidence." But circumstances had altered. Success had now been attained; the two men were about for the first time to come in contact. Which of them was to take the lead? It was in the chance of some disagreement between those strong natures, both accustomed to command, that lay the best chance for Governor Morse and Madras.

LA BOURDONNAIS AND DUPLEIX.

1. *Mémoire pour le Sieur de la Bourdonnais, avec les pièces justificatives.* Paris, 1750.
2. *Supplément au mémoire du Sieur de la Bourdonnais.* Paris, 1751.
3. *Pièces justificatives supprimées par le Sieur de la Bourdonnais.* Paris, 1751.
4. *Lettre, à M. de * * * sur le mémoire du Sieur de la Bourdonnais* Paris, 1751.
5. *Mémoire pour le Sieur de la Gatinais, Capitaine du Vaisseau dans les Indes.* Paris, 1751.
6. *Mémoire à consulter pour la famille du Sieur Dupleix.* • Paris, 1751.
7. *Second Mémoire à consulter pour la famille du Sieur Dupleix.* Paris, 1751.
8. *Observations sur les deux Mémoires à consulter distribués par la famille du Sieur Dupleix.* Paris, 1751.
9. *Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la Compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives.* Paris, 1759.
10. *A Voyage to the East Indies, &c., by Mr. Grose, 2 Vols.* London, 1772.
11. *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from the year 1745, by Robert Orme, Esq., F. A. S.,* 1803.
12. *Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre, par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen.* Paris, 1844.
13. *Inde, par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-Camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.
14. *A Gazetteer of Southern India, by Pharaoh & Co.,* Madras, 1855.
15. *The History of British India, by Mill and Wilson, in ten Volumes.* London, John Madden & Co., Leadenhall Street, 1858.
16. *The National Review, Volume XV.* London, Chapman and Hall, 193 Piccadilly, 1862.

17. *Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862.

THE eight ships which formed, after the repulse of the English fleet, the squadron commanded by La Bourdonnais, anchored off Pondichery on the evening of the 8th July 1746.

* The meeting between the Governor and the victorious Admiral was cordial.† There was no reason why it should not be so

* In all the histories, English as well as French, which have dealt with the relations between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, the writers have scrupulously followed the version published by the latter. It was reserved for a writer in the *National Review*, who had access to the unpublished documents in the Pondichery archives, to prove,—as he has proved most clearly,—that, for upwards of an hundred years, the world had been under a false impression as to the respective merits of these two famous men in this particular instance. It may be asked, why, under these circumstances, Dupleix was himself silent. The answer is because he was condemned to silence by his Directors, and they had not the manliness to clear him. This fact is evident from the following passage, extracted from the memoirs of Dupleix, published in 1759, long after the appearance of his rival's memoirs, and at a time when he himself was undergoing the severest persecution at the hands of the Company. Even then he would only allude to the transactions he had had with La Bourdonnais in the following cautious manner:—"The Company knows with what ardour M. Dupleix supported the project formed against Madras, and with what zeal he seconded M. de La Bourdonnais by the promptitude with which he made, under very difficult circumstances, all the preparations for this important expedition. It knows also better than any one what was the true cause of the contests that ensued between M. de La Bourdonnais and him, after the capitulation of that place. But M. Dupleix respects too much the orders of the Ministry and those of the Company to dare to publish that, which he has been enjoined to bury in the most profound secrecy, and whatever interest he may have in justifying a conduct which he is well aware many people have condemned, this motive, all powerful though it be, will yield always to the law of duty."

This is the lofty language of an honest man. Yet for this noble devotion to duty, the reputation of Dupleix, in this one particular respect, has been calumniated for an hundred years. He has been called jealous of La Bourdonnais when he aided him to the utmost of his power, until jealousy for his country's interest forced him to discountenance his proceedings; he has been accused of breaking his plighted word when he had never given it, of base and dishonourable conduct when he acted as an honourable and far-seeing statesman. The archives of the Company vindicate him completely. Dupleix died the year after the publication of his memoirs. Having connived at his being slandered whilst living, the Directors perpetuated the infamy by leaving the slander uncontradicted after his death. A revolution was indeed required to purify France from the foul and corrupt atmosphere inhaled and breathed out by her governing classes,—from King to East India Directors,—during the greater part of the eighteenth century.

† La Bourdonnais asserts in his memoirs that he was received in an unbecoming (*peu décente*) manner; but even if it were the case, it does not appear if we may judge from the correspondence, to have affected the friendly terms upon which he consorted with Dupleix for the first few days after his arriva

for they were striving alike after the same object,—an object which could be attained only by their mutual co-operation. La Bourdonnais held an independent command, but on the continent of India, he was subordinate to the Council of Pondichery.* In the contemplated expedition, however, against the English, Dupleix was very willing to give up the entire control of the operations to La Bourdonnais. He was mainly anxious to see that the operations themselves were well-matured, and he was naturally resolved to hold in his own hands the supreme political power. The correspondence between the two had been conducted, as we have seen, in the most cordial manner. Dupleix had declared that the honour of success would belong to La Bourdonnais; that he would use every effort in his power to contribute to that success. He had added: "I shall esteem myself happy to have contributed to it by causes which will only derive merit from your conduct and its happy results, for which I am ardently desirous. I hope that my previous assurances, as well as this one, will convince you of the light in which I regard the question. I feel too much the importance of our union, not to give myself entirely to bring it about. Have no fears, therefore, on the score, but count on me as on yourself."† La Bourdonnais had replied in similar terms: "Be assured," he wrote from the Malabar Coast on the 21st June, "that my conduct will be guided as much as possible by your counsels. I burn with impatience to embrace you, and to consult with you measures for repairing our losses." There certainly seemed no reason why these two men should clash.

And yet there was seen here, what the world has seen so often since, an example of the extreme difficulty with which men of

* The order sent from Paris to La Bourdonnais in 1741 provided, that whilst under all circumstances he was to command on the seas, his control over the land forces, in any French settlement, beyond the limits of the Isles, was dependent on the authority with which the local councils might invest him. *Extrait des ordres du Ministre, 16th Janvier 1741.* But the orders of 1745 were still less favourable to the independent action of La Bourdonnais. "The Company considers" wrote the Controller-General to the Council of Pondichery on the 16th October 1745, "that it is fit and proper that the Commandant of the squadron should be present in the superior Councils, that he should be summoned to them, when any military expedition is discussed in which this officer is to take a principal part; that he should have a deliberative voice. But it requires also, that whatever matters may be deliberated, and whatever the result of the deliberation, the opinion of the Council be carried out by him without obstacle or impediment, even though it should be a question of disposing of all the vessels of the Company which he commands." Reference to the bearing of these orders, at the time when they were received, will be found further on.

† Dated 23rd April 1746, and received by La Bourdonnais at Mahé.

action, accustomed to command,—to plan as well as to execute,—submit to a superior authority. They will obey, it is true, a man of acknowledged genius, in whose hands are vested irresponsible power. Thus Masséna and Ney, Soult and Souchet, acknowledged and obeyed genius and power combined in the person of Napoleon. But away from the influence of his presence, Ney chafed and grumbled when placed under the orders of Masséna, and even Souchet, able as he was, refused to make a movement which would have given to the French army a great superiority over Lord Wellington, when, as a consequence of it, he would have been brought under the orders of Soult. Perhaps it was, at Pondichery in 1746, that La Bourdonnais, conscious of his own abilities, felt a revulsion which he could not control at being called upon to work under one, who was known to fame chiefly as a successful merchant and trader, and whose skill as a manager of men he had had no opportunity of testing. This is certain, that La Bourdonnais had not been long on shore before he began to adopt a line of conduct entirely inconsistent with his well-known character for enterprize, to show doubt, hesitation, and uncertainty, to refuse to move on an expedition without positive orders from the Council, of which, in virtue of his commission as admiral, he was member, to decline even to make an election of the two alternatives which were presented to him,—to go in search of the English fleet, or to sail at once for Madras.

The taking of Madras had been all along regarded by the two French leaders as the first fruits of a decisive victory at sea. A very few days after his arrival at Pondichery, La Bourdonnais addressed a lengthy letter to Dupleix on the subject of his plans, and he thus alluded to the project regarding Madras: "At the time of our former squadron of 1741, you know what designs I had formed upon Madras. Encouraged by M. Dumas, to whom I had communicated my project, I begged him to communicate it to you at the time of your installation. You approved of it, and made preparations which the continued peace rendered useless. Since the outbreak of war, persisting in my first design, I have imparted it to you, begging you at the same time to add to your former preparations, others to facilitate our success. * * * * My plan is to destroy or disperse the English squadron, if it be possible; the capture of Madras must result."*

The reply of Dupleix was couched in the same spirit. "Your idea regarding Madras," he wrote,† "is the only one

* Dated 17th July, 1746.

† Dated 20th July, 1746.

"which can indemnify the Company for all its losses and expenses, restore the honour of the nation, and procure for this colony a more solid footing than hitherto. This enterprise is very easy, and your forces are more than sufficient to carry it out, but it cannot be attempted with safety before the English squadron is destroyed or beaten." As to the treatment of Madras in case it should fall into his hands, La Bourdonnais had thus, on the 17th July, addressed the Governor-General: "If fortune favours you," he wrote, "what do you think we ought to do with Madras? My idea is to take possession of and carry off all the merchandise we may find there, and to ransom the remainder; for if we should raze every stone in the town, it would be re-built in a year, and Madras would be much stronger than it is now." The answer of Dupleix on this point deserves to be remembered. He replied, on the 20th June:—"I cannot say at present what it would seem good to do with Madras; if you should have the good fortune to take it, circumstances will decide as to the fittest course to be adopted. But I beg you to recollect, that so long as Madras remains as it is, Pondichery will languish and its commerce will fall off. It is not sufficient to think only of a present and, perhaps, an uncertain advantage; we must look forward to the future. I am not of the opinion that this town, once dismantled, could be restored in a year. It has taken very many years to make it what it now is, and the facilities and means for re-establishing it are less than they were for making it."

In the letter from which we have extracted, La Bourdonnais had given an exact statement of the condition of the armament of his fleet, and had requested Dupleix to supply from the arsenal of Pondichery the deficiencies under which he laboured. He had indented upon Dupleix altogether for forty-four eighteen, and for fourteen twelve pounders. It was not in the power of Dupleix to comply literally with this demand, without weakening, to a dangerous extent, the defences of Pondichery. But he supplied instead a larger number than were demanded. In place of forty-four guns of eighteen, and fourteen of twelve, he sent him twenty-eight of eighteen, twelve of twelve, and twenty-two of eight, and offered to change those which were only slightly damaged. He accompanied this offer with an explanation so frank and courteous, that it seems surprising that his conduct in this respect should ever have been made the subject of animadversion.*

* After enumerating the necessity that Pondichery should be a strong place, under whose walls French vessels might always find a secure refuge.

Yet notwithstanding the supply of guns, ammunition, provisions, and men,* La Bourdonnais could not make up his mind to set sail. The idea that the English fleet might keep out of sight until it were reinforced from Europe, and, that thus reinforced, it might take him at a disadvantage when before Madras, seemed at first greatly to weigh upon him. To obviate this risk, and to draw the English within fighting distance, he proposed, on the 10th August, that a force should proceed to Cuddalore, twelve miles south of Pondichery, to attack Fort St. David, built by the English in its vicinity. If the English fleet were to bear up to assist that fort, he would then attack it; but if it should not, it would be a proof that it had been very severely handled in the former action, and he would have no difficulty in taking Fort St. David. †

Against this plan, as an alternative to the long meditated attack upon Madras, Dupleix strongly protested: "Cuddalore and Fort St. David," he wrote on the 12th, "are not worth the powder and shot you will expend upon them." He pointed out that their capture would very probably range the Nawab on the side of the English, and that this would save Madras. "The enterprise against Madras," he added, "is the only one which can

and alluding to the probable increase to their naval enemies by the chances of a war with Holland, Dupleix adds: "This augmentation of enemies, the only thing we have to apprehend, ought to render me more circumspect with regard to a place so considerable; the safety of which depends entirely on others:" (the victorious course of the French fleet). "A thousand mishaps, to which sea forces are subject, might disappoint this place for a long time of the guns you wish to take from it. The minister has given me orders to assist you, and I obey willingly orders so deserving of respect. But I cannot persuade myself that his intentions are that I should risk the safety of Pondichery. I believe, on the contrary, and I flatter myself that he will be better pleased, that I should not place it in jeopardy. Nevertheless to act up to his orders and your demands, I am ready to make over to you twenty-eight eighteen-pounders, twelve of twelve, and twenty-two of eight, and to change those which are but slightly damaged, and which, after being repaired, can be made serviceable. These guns will make a great gap, but the word of honour you give me to return them, and the moral certainty I feel of your victory over the enemy, permit me to take the step of dismantling the walls with less disquietude.—*M. Dupleix de La Bourdonnais, 20th July 1746.*

† The reinforcements furnished by Pondichery consisted of 200 Europeans, 100 topasses or Indo-Portuguese, 300 sepoy, besides officers, in addition to lascars, as well as 170 sailors and 50 European soldiers belonging to the garrison already serving on the fleet.

‡ It is in this letter that La Bourdonnais informs Dupleix of the sickness caused on board his squadron, and from which he himself especially suffered, from drinking the water taken in at Pondichery. In his memoirs, he makes of this a charge against Dupleix, insinuating that it was a part of the general scheme to annoy him.

"indemnify us, and do honour to the nation in India, and I cannot agree with you in your plan of abandoning that project for one which merits neither your attention nor mine, and of which the consequences will be costly and injurious to us." He continued to urge upon him, in a lengthened argument, that two principal objects had brought him to India,—the destruction of the English squadron, and the taking of Madras,—and that abandoning one of those, he ought to attach himself with his whole heart to the other. The day after the correspondence, La Bourdonnais took advantage of a favourable breeze to go in search of the English squadron. He arrived off Karical on the 13th August, and there obtained, with some difficulty, positive information of the enemy. They had been descried on the 10th, six vessels in number, a little to the north of the northernmost point of Ceylon, about fifteen miles off the coast. To the Dutch officer who boarded them they stated that they had been repulsed by the French, but that they were only waiting the arrival of reinforcements to renew the attack. All their damages had been repaired. Satisfied, then, as he stated that he was free from all attack on that side, La Bourdonnais resolved to return at once to Pondichery, and, arriving there on the 19th, to embark the soldiers, sepoys, and other troops awaiting him, and to proceed immediately with the grand design against Madras. He added in his letter, however, that his health was greatly enfeebled, and that not for all India would he stay on the coast after the 15th October, when the monsoon would set in. Instead, however, of acting upon this plan, which he had communicated to Dupleix through M. Paradis, the Commandant of the Pondichery garrison, who had been sent to confer with him, La Bourdonnais suddenly changed his mind and went in search of the English. He found them off Negapatam, and endeavoured to bring them to action. But though he hoisted Dutch colours to deceive them, they fled before him, he reported, in a manner that soon took them out of sight.* Thinking that they might return to Negapatam he waited there two days; but not meeting them, he again put out, and on the evening of the 25th, anchored off Pondichery.

This escape of the English and the uncertainty whither they had proceeded, completely changed the views of La Bourdonnais.

* Mr. Orme states that "the English, perceiving the addition of cannon with which the enemy had been supplied at Pondichery, avoided an engagement." Mr. Mill simply remarks that the English fled. Mr. Orme's reason would not, we think, be considered sufficient by any English Admiral of the present day. The English ships were mostly armed with 24-pounders, whereas the French had only taken on board twenty-eight 18-pounders, and others of smaller calibre.

He who, on the 14th, when he knew the English fleet to be below Negapatam waiting for reinforcements, had declared his readiness to proceed with the utmost haste to Madras, had become, on the 26th, after that fleet had sailed he knew not whither, hesitating and doubtful. He dwelt on the difference between commanding King's ships and vessels belonging to the Company. 'In the former,' he said, 'one hazards every thing for glory, in the latter one must look to profit,' and he stated his opinion that his squadron was insufficient for the double task of attacking Madras, and beating off the English squadron reinforced by its expected ships. In this difficulty he appealed to the Superior Council for their advice. *

An extraordinary meeting of the Pondichery Council met to consider this appeal. There were present at it thirteen members, and they came to a very decided opinion. This was contained in a letter addressed to La Bourdonnais bearing the same date. † In this letter, after re-capitulating the preparations that had been made, the time that had been lost, the change in the opinions of the Admiral, they set before him the choice of two alternatives. Either, they said, you should go to Madras and attack it, or you should go and drive the English fleet from these seas. At present they are, they said, in a position in which they can intercept every vessel coming from Europe, whilst you are here, effecting nothing now, and talking of leaving us to the mercy of the English fleet in October. They concluded with these words: 'We are "bound to add also that it would be shameful and disgraceful for "the nation to abandon these two means, whilst we have a moral "certainty that the treasure and the vessels which we expect from "Europe will be taken by the enemy's squadron, and an equal "certainty that you can succeed in one of the two. It is equally "important not to render useless the strength of your squadron, "and the money spent upon it. What reproaches will you not "have to make yourself, if at the same time that you abandon "the project which would serve to indemnify us, our enemies "take possession of the vessels we are expecting from Europe, "almost within sight of your squadron!'

It is strange,—the transformation which a forced subordination to authority can sometimes make in the entire character of a man. Who would have believed that the daring, energetic leader, who had 'conquered the impossible' at the islands, who had there made ships and sailors, and soldiers and guns, who had sailed across the ocean with his untried crews, and had met and

* M de La Bourdonnais à M. Dupleix, 26 Août 1746.

† Lettre du Conseil Supérieur du 26 Août, 1746.

scattered the war-ships of the enemy, that the man whose motto was action, should have suddenly so changed as to call forth an incitement to action couched in the terms we have just given? Yet we have seen in our own day how blind to all perceptions of right, how oblivious even of the ordinary obligations of politeness, how open to the malignant suggestions of whisperers and sycophants, wounded vanity will make even those, who, in other respects, soar far above the common run of their fellow men. Up to the time of the despatch of that letter, Dupleix and the Council had met every requisition on the part of La Bourdonnais in the most obliging spirit. They had made over to him the particular officers he had asked for, of whom Paradis was one, all the stores, ammunition, and, as we have seen, all the guns they could spare. They had only pressed upon him to act. But the feeling that he was thus under control, that he, who had always impressed his own will upon all around him, should be subject to the will of another, had changed the heart and the blood of La Bourdonnais. The burden of all his letters was that he could not attack Madras, because the English squadron had not been destroyed, that the English squadron had not been destroyed, because he could not bring it to action, and that he could not stay on the coast later than the 15th October. The meaning was that he would do nothing till then. Even the letter of the Superior Council failed to move him. Plain as were its terms, that he should either attack the English fleet or Madras, he had the boldness to declare that its contents prevented him from moving, because it did not prescribe precisely which of the two courses he was to adopt. Taking the letter in his hand, he declared publicly to all who would listen to him, that the Superior Council was the only obstacle to action on his part. This proceeding thoroughly roused Dupleix. He re-summoned the Council on the 27th, and put before it, for consideration, the course adopted by the Admiral.

The deliberations of the Council at this crisis were short, prompt, and to the point. They resolved to serve on La Bourdonnais a summons, calling upon him 'on the part of the King and the Company to make choice of one of the two plans which had been presented to him on the 26th,—the only plans we consider practicable, suitable to present circumstances, to the glory of the king, the honour of the nation, the interests of the Company, the force of his squadron, and the weakness of our enemies by sea and land; 'in default of doing this,—of the choice of which he is left master,—'to be held responsible in his own name for all that may happen in consequence, as well as for all the expenses which his project 'on Madras, so long meditated and conducted to the point of

"execution, has occasioned the Company. If hindered by sickness from acting himself, as there is no time to lose and moments are precious, the Council consider M. de la Portebarré, of whom the capacity and prudence are known, to be very capable of executing whichever of the two plans he may select."

The reply of La Bourdonnais was short: "I have received," he wrote, "the citation and its contents. I consulted the Council of Pondichery, only regarding the affair of Madras. It rested with it to give its opinion for or against that. As to the destination of my squadron, it has no right to interfere with it. I know what I ought to do, and my orders have been given for it to leave Pondichery this evening."*

The fleet accordingly sailed under M. de Portebarré,† La Bourdonnais himself alone remaining behind on account of his sickness. The squadron sailing along the coast succeeded in capturing two small vessels in the Madras roads. It then returned to Pondichery. The health of La Bourdonnais, meanwhile, had improved, and his announced determination to attack Madras seems to have improved his relations with the Council. On the evening of the 12th, accordingly, he embarked to proceed on this long meditated enterprise. On the 14th, approaching the shore twelve miles south of Madras, he landed 500 or 600 men, with two pieces of cannon. Sailing slowly, parallel with these troops, on the 15th, he arrived at midday within cannon shot of the town. He then landed with 1,000 or 1,100 Europeans, 400 sepoys, and 300 or 400 Africans, and summoned the place to surrender. He had still from 17 to 1,800 men on board his squadron.

* A Messieurs du Conseil Superieur de Pondichery, 27 Août 1746.

† Mr. Mill states, that Dupleix carried his "unfriendly proceeding," so far as to command La Bourdonnais to "re-land the Pondichery troops." It is very true that on the 27th August, knowing only, by the reply of La Bourdonnais to the citation, that the fleet was to leave, but ignorant of the direction it was to take, or the object on which it was to be employed, Dupleix directed the re-landing of 250 soldiers and 100 topasses with their officers, assigning the following as a reason: "The distance which your squadron may find itself from this place by some event which God alone can foresee, and *these troops being useless in your vessels*, I beg you to disembark the troops above referred to, in order that I may be in a condition to answer to the king for the place which he has confided to me," &c. But it is not less true that on receiving in reply from La Bourdonnais a letter of the same date, informing him of the destination of the squadron, that it was "to sweep the Madras roads," and that it would not be absent for more than eight or ten days, he withdrew from the squadron only 125 Europeans and 50 sepoys, retaining these for the defence of Pondichery.

Fort St. George, and the town of Madras, of which it formed the defence, had been built upon a plot of ground, which the last of the Hindoo rulers of Bijjanugger had made over to the English in 1639. Fourteen years later, the little settlement had been raised to the rank of a Presidency, and it constituted for a long time afterwards the principal emporium of the English in India. It was not very well situated for that purpose. On a bluff point of the coast, where the current was always rapid, and exposed to all the violence of the monsoon, and the inconvenience of a surf which made navigation for English boats impossible, it would have been difficult to find a position less adapted for commercial purposes than Madras. The roadstead was dangerous during some months of the year, especially from October to January, so much so, that on the appearance of any thing approaching to a gale during those months, vessels were forced to slip their anchors, and run out to sea. Nor did the fertility of the neighbouring country compensate for these disadvantages. The soil was hard, dry, and barren; the population poor and sparse. In those days, however, it was apparently the custom of the different European nations to select, as their settlements, points on the coast in as close a contiguity to one another as was possible. And the situation of Madras probably owed its value in the eyes of Mr. Day, the English merchant, who negotiated for the land, to the fact that it was but four miles from the Portuguese settlement of St. Thomé.

But notwithstanding its unfavourable situation, the industry and enterprise of English settlers soon brought prosperity to Madras. In 1687, the native population attracted thither by the protection and the opportunities of traffic they enjoyed under the English flag, amounted to 3,00,000, and the revenue derivable from taxation, was estimated, nine years later, at about 1,60,000 Rupees, equal,—allowing for the probable increase of population during that period—to a capitation tax of eight annas. In 1696, Mr. Thomas Pitt, the grandfather of the great Commoner and possessor of the famous Pitt diamond, became Governor, and held the office for eleven years. It was during his administration that Madras first came into hostile contact with the native princes of the country. Daood Khan, Nawab of the Carnatic, under the Emperor Aurungzebe,—a chief, noted for his fondness for the strong waters of Europe,—made a sudden demand upon Mr. Pitt, (1702,) for ten thousand pagodas, about forty thousand Rupees. Mr. Pitt endeavoured by civilities, and sumptuous entertainments to amuse the Nawab into forgetfulness of his demand. But if Daood Khan loved cordials much, he loved rupees even more. Finding his requests evaded,

he subjected Fort St. George to a strict blockade, cut off all supplies from the country, seized all the goods coming into the place, and only raised the siege when Mr. Pitt consented unwillingly to a compromise. In addition to Madras, and subordinate to it, the English possessed at this time on the Coromandel coast, the settlement of Fort St. David, close to Cuddalore, sixteen miles south of Pondichery, and the factories of Porto Novo, Pettipolee, Masulipatam, Modapollam, and Vizagapatam. It does not appear that the history of Madras was marked by any other incidents of importance till the period of which we are treating. In the year 1744, Mr. Nicholas Morse was appointed Governor of Fort St. George. Morse was an old Company's merchant, ignorant of politics, caring little for them, a quiet, easy-going, useless sort of man, who ever carried out, with a literal obedience, and regardless of any changes that might have occurred in the interval, the orders of his masters in England. Thus it was that, when shortly after his accession to office, he received overtures from Dupleix to preserve neutrality in India during the coming war, Governor Morse, well-convinced all the time of the wisdom of the measure, excused himself from entertaining it on the ground of the instructions he had received from the Company.

We have seen how little these instructions had availed the English. With the command of the seas when the war broke out, they had, nevertheless, been prevented by the interest of M. Dupleix with the Nawab Anwarooden, from profiting to the full extent from their advantage. A positive prohibition had been placed upon them with reference to the French settlements on the coast, and they had been compelled to confine their operations to the capture of stray merchant-men on the seas. The Court of Directors, deeming themselves secure of conquest, had never contemplated the possibility of Madras being in danger. They had, therefore, altogether neglected to supply soldiers for its defence; nor does it appear that the contingency of defence being necessary ever presented itself to Governor Morse. When, therefore, the news in quick succession reached Fort St. George, that *La Bourdonnais'* squadron had left the Isle of France, that it had engaged and repulsed the English squadron off Negapatam, that it had arrived at Pondichery, and was making preparations for an attack upon Madras itself, the surprise and consternation which prevailed amongst its residents may perhaps be imagined. The defences of Fort St. George were certainly not very formidable. The Fort itself was an oblong, four hundred yards by one hundred, surrounded by a slender wall, defended by four bastions and four batteries, very slight and defective in their construction, and with no outworks to defend them. The English

garrison consisted of three hundred men, of whom thirty-four were Portuguese vagabonds, deserters, or negroes; sixty were sick and ineffective, and only two hundred fit for duty. The officers were three lieutenants, two of whom were foreigners, and seven ensigns who had risen from the ranks.*

In his extremity Governor Morse applied to the Nawab of the Carnatic. It will be recollected that when this nobleman had forbidden the exercise of hostilities by the English against any place in the possession of the French on the Coromandel coast, he had accompanied his order by a promise, that should the French at any future time obtain the superiority, he would place similar restrictions upon them. The event, which had then seemed so improbable as to be impossible, had now happened. The French were preparing to attack the English settlements on the Coromandel coast. Governor Morse, therefore, claimed at once the interference of the Nawab.

It cannot be supposed that a man possessing the Indian experience of Governor Morse was unacquainted with the formalities necessary for approaching an Indian ruler. It is, nevertheless, certain, that he managed the mission to the Nawab,—a mission on which the very existence of the English at Madras seemed to depend,—in such a manner as to militate very much against its chances of success. It is a time-honoured custom in Eastern Courts, that an envoy should never go into the presence of the Prince to whom he is accredited empty-handed. Whether the custom is good or bad is not the question. It is a custom, the form of which is kept up by the English even in the present day; to neglect it, in the days of which we are writing, was regarded as nothing less than an insult. But Governor Morse, in his blunt English way, as though he had been dealing with his own countrymen, did neglect this precaution. He sent his messenger empty-handed into the presence of the Nawab, bluntly to remind him of his promise, to claim for the English that protection which he had so recently accorded to the French messenger, well provided with presents, and to beg the Nawab's permission to punish his rivals. It thus happened that, when the English messenger arrived, he found the Nawab apparently undecided, and though that nobleman declined to give any formal permission to the French to attack Madras, he refrained, equally to their advantage, from giving utterance to a direct prohibition.

Governor Morse was under the influence of the disappointment attending his negotiations with the Nawab, when, on the 29th August, the fleet of *La Bourdonnais* appeared in the

roadstead. The unskilful manner in which the squadron was handled made it evident, however, to the garrison of Fort St. George, that the famous Admiral, who had brought the ships from the Isle of France, was not with them.* Seeing nothing of the English fleet, and finding the way open, the officer commanding the squadron, M. de Portebarré, contented himself, as we have seen, with making prize of two merchantmen he found on the roadstead, and then returned on the 5th September to Pondichery. Eight days after, La Bourdonnais embarked, and arriving before Madras on the 15th, summoned it, as already recorded, to surrender.

Up to this point, Governor Morse had been partially sustained by the hope, that Commodore Peyton would yet be prepared to strike a blow for the preservation of the principal English settlement on the Coromandel Coast. But these hopes were destined to be disappointed. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the French fleet, he received the disheartening intelligence that the Commodore with all his ships had appeared on the 3rd September off Pulicat, and had then borne up for Bengal. That leaky sixty gun-ship was again assigned as the reason for the desertion of Madras, the excuse for avoiding a trial of strength with the battered squadron of La Bourdonnais.

Meanwhile, La Bourdonnais, having landed his troops on the 15th, prepared, on the evening of that day and during the 16th, to erect batteries which should play upon the town. On the 17th, the native portion of the garrison made a sortie, but they were easily repulsed, and the French following up their success, took possession of the Governor's house,—about half-musket range from the walls of the town,—and fortified themselves in it. On the 18th, early in the morning, they commenced the bombardment from their land batteries, and as soon as night fell, the three vessels of the squadron, possessing the strongest armament, opened fire on the town. A circumstance occurred in the course of the night of the 18th, which shows how easy it would have been for Commodore Peyton, commanding as he did a squadron which sailed better than that of the French, to have saved Madras. On the 17th September four ships were sighted off Pondichery. Dupleix conceiving they might be part of the English squadron, wrote off hurriedly to La Bourdonnais with the information. To him this was most startling. Had it been true, it would have been but a confirmation of the views which he had so often pressed upon Dupleix, that to attempt the siege of Madras before the English fleet had been destroyed, was

* Orme, I. 66.

the height of rashness. He himself declares that he felt, under the circumstances, that but one path lay before him, and that was to push the siege with the utmost vigour. Mr. Orme, indeed, asserts, though upon what authority we know not, that "the report caused so much alarm in the French camp, that "they were preparing to re-ship their heavy cannon." However this may have been, his at least is certain, that had Commodore Peyton borne up at that moment for Madras, and attacked the half manned French fleet in the roadstead, he would have inflicted upon it very great damage, even if he had not compelled the raising of the siege.

But on the morning of the 19th, an express arrived from Dupleix, stating that the information regarding the strange ships was incorrect. Relieved on this point, yet not knowing how soon a hostile squadron might appear, La Bourdonnais pushed the siege with vigour, and with such effect, that in the evening he received a letter from Mrs. Barneval, the daughter of Madame Dupleix, and married to an English gentleman in Madras, offering on the part of Governor Morse to treat.

The reply of the French Commander being favourable to such a course, Messrs. Monson and Hallyburton presented themselves on the following morning in the French camp. They proposed to enter into negotiations to pay a certain sum to induce La Bourdonnais to retire from before the town. This, however, in unmistakeable terms, the Frenchman refused, and the deputies returned to demand fresh instructions from the Governor. On the departure of the deputies, the fire recommenced, and continued till 3 o'clock. Between that hour and 8 o'clock in the evening, however, no one appeared on the part of the English, except a foreigner in the service of the Nawab, without powers or authority to negotiate. At 8 o'clock, therefore, La Bourdonnais re-opened the fire, and maintained it throughout the night both from the land batteries and the ships. The re-appearance of the English deputies on the following morning caused it to cease.*

This time, these latter were armed with full powers to capitulate. After some discussions, they agreed to the conditions, of which the following are a free summary:—They agreed first to make over to M. de La Bourdonnais at 2 P. M. on that day, the 21st September, Fort St. George and the town of Madras with their dependencies. All the garrison, and generally all the English in the town, to become prisoners of war. All the

* The French did not lose a single man in the siege: the English only *ve.*—*Grose's East Indies.*

councillors, officers, employés, and other gentlemen in the service of the Company to be free on their parole, to go and to come as they wished, even to Europe ; provided only they did not carry arms against France, offensively, or defensively, without being exchanged.

The articles of the capitulation having been signed, it was arranged that those regarding the ransom of the place should be regulated in a friendly way by M. de La Bourdonnais, the Governor, or his deputies, the two last engaging on their part to deliver faithfully to the French the goods and merchandises received or receivable from merchants, the books of account, the arsenals, ships, provisions of war and supplies, together with all the property appertaining to the English Company, without reserve ; besides materials of gold or silver, merchandises, goods, and any other effects whatever, contained in the fort or town, to whomsoever they might belong, without exception.

The garrison was to be conducted to Fort St. David, as prisoners of war. But should the town of Madras be ransomed and restored, the garrison might be allowed to re-occupy it, as a means of defence against the natives. But in this case, an equal number of French prisoners, (made elsewhere,) were to be restored to the French.

The sailors were to be sent to Cuddalore, and their exchange begun with those actually in Pondichery, the remainder to proceed in their own ships to England. But they might not carry arms against France until regularly exchanged, either in India or in Europe.

On the same day that this capitulation was signed, La Bourdonnais wrote a few hurried lines to Dupleix. His first letter, dated 2 P. M. on the 21st, simply states that he had just entered Madras at the head of 500 men, and that the white flag had been hoisted, on the ramparts. The second, dated 8 P. M. of the same day, is more important, as shewing the view which La Bourdonnais entertained at the time, regarding the conditions he had granted. In this he says :—"The haste with which I informed you of the taking of Madras, did not allow me to enter into any detail ; I was too much occupied in relieving the posts of this place. The English surrendered to me with even more precipitation than I wrote you. I have them at my discretion, and the capitulation which they signed has been left with me, without their having dreamt of demanding a duplicate."

Two days later, the 23rd, he wrote a long report, in which he discussed the whole question of the future. This letter began thus: "At last, Madras is in French hands. The

"conditions on which it surrendered, place it, so to say, at my discretion. There is, nevertheless, a sort of capitulation signed by the Governor, of which I subjoin a copy; but it does no more, as you will see, than authorize me to dispose of the place."

It would appear from these extracts, and from the tenor of the capitulation itself, that Madras had surrendered at discretion; that the town, the fort, and everything belonging thereto, had become absolutely French property. It is equally clear that there had been some discussion between La Bourdonnais and the English deputies regarding a ransom, but that it was finally resolved to leave this question for future adjustment.*

* La Bourdonnais thus describes in his memoirs the engagement he entered into regarding the ransom. "The next day, the 21st, the deputies returned for the second time, and agreed at last to surrender on the conditions which had been proposed to them the previous evening, that is to say, on the condition of being permitted to ransom the town. Immediately the articles of capitulation were written out, Mr. Hallyburton took them to the Governor, who having examined them, sent them back by the same Mr. Hallyburton, with orders to represent to M. de La Bourdonnais, that neither the Governor nor the Council ought to be regarded as prisoners of war, so long as the question of the conditions of ransom should be under consideration. Upon this representation M. de La Bourdonnais, who wished the Governor and his Council to remain prisoners of war, until these conditions should be agreed upon, contented himself with assuring the deputies, that he would give an act of liberty to the Council and the Governor, as soon as they should agree with him regarding the ransom. The deputies having then demanded that this proposition should be inserted in the capitulation, M. de La Bourdonnais consented, and it was made an article. The deputies then took back the capitulation to the Governor, who signed it. In bringing it back again, they asked M. de La Bourdonnais for his parole, as an addition to the promise regarding the ransom. 'Yes, gentlemen,' replied he, 'I renew to you the promise I made you yesterday to restore to you your town, on condition of a ransom which we will settle in a friendly way, and to be reasonable regarding the conditions.' 'You give us then your word of honour,' answered the deputies. 'Yes,' said he, 'I give it you, and you may be assured that it is inviolable.' 'Very well,' replied the two Englishmen, 'here then is the capitulation signed by the Governor, you are now master of the town, and you can enter it when you like.'"

It must always be borne in mind, however, when reading the memoirs of La Bourdonnais, *1stly*, that they were written some time after the events described, and, *2ndly*, that they were written with the view of exculpating himself from specific charges brought against him. Now, the question of the ransom, and especially the question, as to whether any absolute engagement was entered into at the time of the surrender, formed one of these specific charges. On such a point, therefore, it is necessary to read La Bourdonnais' own statement with the greatest caution. The official correspondence is a far surer guide. Let us see what that says. We have given all that relates to the proceeding relative to the surrender, in the text. From this

Meanwhile, the intelligence had reached the Nawab Anwar-oodeen, that the French had really carried out their intentions, and had laid siege to Madras. Inclined, as this prince undoubtedly was, to French interests, nothing was further from his intention than to permit their establishing themselves on the territories of their European rivals. He, therefore, at once despatched a messenger on a swift dromedary to Dupleix, the bearer of a letter, in which the Nawab expressed his surprise at the events passing at Madras, and threatened that, unless the operations against that place were instantly put an end to, he would send an army to enforce obedience to his commands. But Dupleix thoroughly understood Asiatics. Determined not to forego his designs on Madras, yet unwilling to bring down upon himself the hostility of the representative of the Mogul, he devised a plan whereby, as he thought, Madras would be lost to the English for ever, even if it were not gained to the French. In accordance with this idea he sent instant instructions to his agent at Arcot to inform the Nawab that he was conquering Madras for him, and that it was his intention to make it over to him on its surrender.

Well acquainted with the vague ideas regarding the ransom of Madras, to which La Bourdonnais had given utterance in previous correspondence, it became imperatively necessary for Dupleix to make known to that officer the engagement into which he had just entered. At 8 P. M., on the evening of the 21st, therefore, he despatched to him a special messenger conveying a letter, in which La Bourdonnais was informed of the negotiation with the Nawab, and was specially warned to entertain

we find, first, that no mention is made of any promise regarding a ransom. In the letter, dated 8 P. M., of the 21st, written only six hours after the interview, he describes above, La Bourdonnais says: "The English surrendered to me with even more precipitation than I wrote you. I have 'them at discretion.'" Not a word about ransom. In the more elaborate letter written two days later he writes: "The conditions on which it 'surrendered. place it, so to say, at my discretion. There is, nevertheless, 'a sort of capitulation signed by the Governor, of which I enclose a copy; 'but it does no more, as you will see, than authorize me to dispose of the 'place. Again, not a word of the solemn and reiterated promises recorded at such full detail in the memoirs!

If, further, we examine the capitulation itself, we shall find everything conditional. There had undoubtedly been some discussion regarding a ransom, but the question had been referred for further deliberation; that it was a doubtful one is, we think, shown by the words employed in the fourth article, in which it is stated, that "if the town is restored by ransom, then 'the English,' &c., &c.

However this may be, it is certain that there was no occasion for La Bourdonnais to make such an offer, Madras being completely at his mercy; and, likewise, that it was entirely opposed to the views to which he knew that Dupleix, his superior officer on Indian soil, entertained.

no proposals for the ransom of Madras after its capture, "as to do so, would be to deceive the Nawab, and make him join our enemies."*

This letter reached Madras on the night of the 23rd. Before its arrival La Bourdonnais had, as we have seen, sent to Dupleix a copy of the capitulation, together with a long letter, in which he entered fully into the subject of the reasons by which he had been actuated. Three courses he stated were before him. He might either make Madras a French colony; he might raze it to the ground, or he might treat regarding its ransom.† The first he did not consider advisable, because it was not, in his opinion, for the interests of the Company, that they should have on the same coast, and in close vicinity to one another, two rival establishments. He added: "by the first orders received from the Minister, I was forbidden to keep any conquests:‡ it is

* The perusal of this letter, will leave no doubt on the reader's mind of the sincerity of Dupleix's negotiations with Anwarooddeen. He writes: "I have informed the Nawab, through my agent at Arcot, that as soon as we are masters of the town of Madras, we will make it over to him, it being well understood, in the state in which we may think fit," meaning, he would first raze the fortifications. He adds: "This information ought to determine you to press the siege vigorously, and not to listen to any propositions which may be made you for the ransom of the place after its capture, as that would be to deceive the Nawab and make him join our enemies; besides, once masters of the place, I do not see with what the English will be able to ransom it. So long, too, as Madras remains as it is, it will always be an obstacle to the increase of this place. I beg you to weigh well these considerations."

Dupleix to La Bourdonnais, dated Pondichery, 21st September 1746,
8 P. M.

† The fact that, in this letter, which accompanied the capitulation, La Bourdonnais expressly considers himself at liberty to decide upon one of the three courses indicated, two of which would have rendered the ransom of the place impossible, proves conclusively that, up to the 3d, he had entered into no binding engagements to ransom Madras, and that the story related in his memoirs was manufactured afterwards.

‡ As this is the only place in the entire correspondence in which La Bourdonnais alludes to the prohibition on the part of the French Ministry to keep any town or settlement conquered from the enemy, and as, nevertheless, he uses it in his memoirs as a principal justification of his conduct; as, moreover, Mr. Orme, Mr. Mill, and other writers of Indian history down to the latest, Mr. Marshman, have adopted without examination the assertions of La Bourdonnais on this point, it becomes necessary to subject those assertions to the test of critical enquiry.

It is perfectly true that the French Ministry had sent to La Bourdonnais an order, prohibiting him "from taking possession of any settlement or *comptoir* of the enemy for the purpose of keeping it;" but even independently of the circumstance that such an order did not render necessary the restoration of the captured place to the enemy, it is a fact that this order bore no reference to the campaign in which La Bourdonnais was engaged in

"certain that at the peace, the surrender of this place would form one of the articles of the treaty, the king will restore it, and the Company will have no advantage from it."

Against the second plan, the destruction of the place, he argued, that it would be impossible to prevent the English from establishing on the coast some other emporium equally fit for their purpose, and at a less expense than they would now willingly pay for the ransom of Madras. He then added that his opinion was strongly in favour of that plan, and that there would be no difficulty in carrying it out, as Governor Morse was ready to

1746. It is true, that in his memoirs, he places it among other orders issued in 1745 and 1746, to all of which the date is attached, but he has curiously omitted to assign any date to this one. The fact is, it was issued in 1741, at a time when La Bourdonnais had just been placed at the head of a combined fleet of King's and Company's ships to cruise in the Eastern seas, the moment hostilities should break out. But even, under those circumstances, it was not intended to be prohibitory in its action. As Professor H. H. Wilson justly remarks :—(Wilson's Mill, Vol. III, page 49. *Note*). "The letter to the proprietors explains the purport of M. La Bourdonnais' instructions more correctly (than Mr. Mill had stated). He was not to form any new settlement, and the only alternatives in his power with regard to Madras were to restore or destroy it. The object of the French East India Company was to improve their existing settlements, at least, before new ones were established." Thus, even when originally issued, the real purport of the order was very different from that which La Bourdonnais assigned to it. But the circumstances of 1746 were far different from those of 1741. In 1746, he was acting on territory, which, the moment it became French by conquest, fell at once under the sway of the Governor-General of French India. It was clearly beyond his authority to maintain, that because, when conducting an independent cruise five years before, he had been restrained from making conquests that were to be permanent, he was, therefore, restricted from carrying out then the instructions of one who had supreme authority on all Indian soil that had become, or that might become, French. The following extract from the commission borne by Dupleix shows very clearly that his powers were of that extensive nature. He was nominated "Governor of the town and Fort of Pondichery, and of the places subordinate to it, President of the Superior Council, to command there, not only the inhabitants of the said places, the clerks of the Company who and other inhabitants established there, but all Frenchmen and foreigners who may establish themselves there hereafter, of whatsoever quality they may be; likewise all officers, soldiers, and *gens de guerre* who may be there, or in garrison." Further he was ordered "to do generally whatever he might consider proper for the preservation of the said *comptoirs* and commerce, and the glory of our name, and to be entitled for the said charge to the accustomed honours, authority, pre-eminence, and prerogative, and to all the appointments ordered by the Company. Further, all the officers and servants of the Crown and clerks of the Company were ordered to recognize the said Sieur Dupleix in the said quality of Governor and President of the Superior Council, and to obey him, without contravention in any sort or manner on pain of disobedience." The orders of October 1745 were even more categorical in their assertion of the supreme authority of the Governor of Pondichery on Indian soil.

give bills on England for the amount demanded, and to make over eight or ten hostages till payment had been made. This letter, with the capitulation accompanying, was sent to Pondichery by M. Paradis, the commandant of the Pondichery contingent. On the following day, La Bourdonnais wrote a short note to Dupleix summarising his arguments, and begging that he might be furnished with the ideas of the Governor-General as to the manner in which Madras should be treated;* and on the 25th he sent a formal reply to a letter he had received from the Superior Council of Pondichery, thanking him in the name of the nation for the difficulties, the cares, the labours, the fatigues, he had experienced and overcome,—which contained this remarkable expression: "I have received the "gracious letter you have done in the honour to write me on "the subject of the taking of Madras; after the thanks you "have to render on that account to the God of armies, it is M. "Dupleix who deserves your gratitude. His activity, his attentive "care in supplying me with all that I needed for the siege, were "the chief causes of its success."

We have thus alluded in detail to the course pursued by La Bourdonnais after the taking of Madras. in order that no doubt might exist in the mind of the candid reader, as to the actual occurrences of that much canvassed period. We think it is clear, *1stly*, that La Bourdonnais had, as commander of the expedition, no right to conclude any definitive treaty with the English without the consent of the Governor-General of French India; *2ndly*, that up to the 25th September, the fifth day after the capitulation, no such definitive treaty had been entered into, although there had been some conversation regarding a ransom; and *3rdly*, that, up to that date, the feelings of La Bourdonnais, gratified by success, had been most friendly towards the Pondichery authorities. He had even gone out of his way, as we have seen, in a letter to the Superior Council, to render justice to Dupleix.

We have now to refer to that action on the part of Dupleix and the Pondichery Council, which changed that friendly feeling into one of fierce and bitter hostility, ruinous alike to the cause and to the leader. But before doing this, we must examine at some length the motives which influenced Dupleix in the responsible position which he occupied, in deciding upon his course of action.

* Dated 24th September 1746. The actual words were: "Faites moi "donc, Monsieur, un plan suivi de la façon dont vous pensez que je dois "traiter cette ville:" a request which shows very plainly that no positive engagements to ransom the town had been entered into on the 21st.

There can be no doubt but that at this period, the main object of the policy of Dupleix was the expulsion of the English from the Coromandel Coast. The experience of the three preceding years had taught him that the safety of the one European power could only be assured by the expulsion of the other. It had tasked all his energies, he had had to draw upon all his resources, to preserve Pondichery from the dangers which had threatened it in 1744. But for the prohibition given by the Nawab Anwarooddeen, the French settlements must then have been destroyed. But that was a reed upon which it would not be wise to lean for ever. The successor of Anwarooddeen might not be animated by the same sentiments; another incursion of the Mahrattas might render powerless the representative of the Mogul; or anarchy might again prevail, as it so recently had prevailed, throughout the Carnatic. That he could not depend upon the French Ministry, or on the Directors of the French Company, the events of the last few years had fully convinced him. With a three years' warning of the hostilities that were pending, the men who governed French India in Paris had literally starved their most important dependency. They had sent it neither ships of war, nor money, nor even good intelligence. Hesitatingly and fearfully they had despatched two merchant vessels in as many years, with most inadequate supplies. Nay more, when another enterprising Governor had proposed a plan, whereby, at the smallest amount of risk, the ascendancy of France in the East could have been secured, and had wrung from the aged Minister an assent, they had taken the earliest opportunity to cancel the scheme, and had deprived the Governor of the means by which he had hoped to carry it into execution.

From France then Dupleix had little to hope. On the other hand he beheld England thirsting to destroy him, England strong in the energy of her sons, the resources of the Indian Company, and more than all, in her comparative good Government. He had seen that in the year which was now going on, England had acted as La Bourdonnais had proposed to act, and had thereby reaped the most important results. That stroke on the part of England, but for the interference of the Nawab, would have destroyed him. The superior energy and good direction of the England of the eighteenth century over the France of Louis XV., could not then have failed to impress him with the belief, that, in all probability, an opportunity would be afforded to the English of renewing the attempt under more favourable conditions.

What then formed his chance of success at such a conjuncture? Surely there was but one. It was to adopt that policy, even

then consecrated by genius, the policy of Alexander, of Hannibal, of Gustavus,—to carry the war into the enemy's country, and to use the means, which had been so wonderfully, so unexpectedly, placed at his disposal, to crush him at once and for ever. Madras once in his hands, Fort St. David could scarcely hold out, and then, secure of the Coromandel Coast, it might be possible to despatch a fleet to Bengal, to destroy the settlement which had rivalled, and was now threatening to surpass, his own tenderly nursed settlement of Chandernagore.

Such being his views, his mortification may be well conceived, when he learned that notwithstanding his previous warnings, notwithstanding the positive arrangement he had made with the Nawab, La Bourdonnais was still harping upon the ransom of the place which he had conquered. The result of this he felt could only be, that the moment the English fleet should recover its former superiority in the Indian seas,—an event daily dreaded alike by Dupleix and La Bourdonnais,—an attempt would promptly be made to subject Pondichery to the fate of Madras, an attempt of which, if successful, the English would undoubtedly take the fullest advantage.

Impressed with these ideas, he wrote on the 25th September a letter to La Bourdonnais, in which, whilst reminding him that according to the orders of the Minister, he was subject to the authority of the Superior Council of Pondichery, he pressed upon him the necessity of abandoning all notion of a ransom. "The ransom which you are thinking of demanding from Madras," he said, "is only a momentary, and, at the most, an uncertain advantage. All the hostages which you may have will not bind the English Company to accept the bills which the Governor may give you, and he, now a prisoner, will probably say that he has acted under compulsion to procure his freedom, and the Company will say the same." The same post conveyed to La Bourdonnais an official letter from the Superior Council on the same subject.

This letter, and the tone of superiority which pervaded it, seem to have decided the action of La Bourdonnais. It would appear that up to, and during, the 26th September, he had been engaged in discussing with Governor Morse and the English deputies the terms of ransom. On the morning of the 26th, he wrote to Dupleix to state that he had almost agreed with Mr. Morse regarding the conditions; that there remained only a few slight differences to adjust, and to arrange the terms of payment. But during the 26th, he received, from Dupleix not only the letters to which we have alluded, but another from the Council, dated the 24th, in which he was informed that Messrs. Dulaurent

and Barthélemy would arrive that day from Madras, to congratulate him on his success, and to form with M. M. Desprémesnil, Bonneau, Desforbes, and Paradis,—all Pondichery men, a Council over which he was to preside. Instantly his part was taken. He states in his memoirs that from that moment he could not doubt the views of Dupleix ; that he saw that he was resolved to be master of Madras and of the ships, to dispose of all as he wished. The assumption of such superiority he resolved at once to dispute.

Although the ransom-treaty was not then signed, he wrote to Dupleix as though it had been : “ I wish with all my heart,” he said, “ that the deputies had arrived five or six hours earlier ; “ there would have been time then to inform them of all that passed “ between the English Governor and myself. But all had been concluded at the time of their arrival.” He added : “ if nevertheless these gentlemen wish to employ themselves during their stay in this town, I will find them employment.” At the same time he addressed the Council, taking up high ground ; acknowledging that all the then French establishments in India were under the Governor-General of Pondichery, he claimed the right of disposing of Madras, because he had conquered it. He disavowed, in fact, all subordination to Pondichery. The next morning he put the seal to his declarations, by sending to Madras the copy of an unsigned convention with Governor Morse, by which he bound himself to restore Madras to the English on receiving bills for 1,1,00,000 pagodas, payable at certain dates not very distant.*

Then ensued between the two men, a contest injurious to the cause which they had equally at heart, to the country to which they belonged, and fatal in its result to the fortunes of one of them. Dupleix feeling that this restoration of Madras was in effect to leave Pondichery open to attack, the moment La Bourdonnais and his squadron should have sailed to the islands, determined to maintain the authority which the King and the Company had conferred upon him. La Bourdonnais, on his side, unwilling to submit to any authority, and impatient of all control, declared that the Minister having left to him, as Admiral, the sole conduct of his operations, he was even on Indian soil independent of the Government of Pondichery. Admitting that the phrase, “ master of his operations,” used by the French Minister to La Bourdonnais, seemed to convey to him an independent

* Equal to four lakhs and forty thousand rupees. The terms were 500,000 pagodas, payable in Europe at six months' sight in five letters of exchange of 1,00,000 each ; and 6,00,000 in three equal payments of 2,00,000 pagodas each, the first payment to be made one month, and the second one year after the arrival of the ships from Europe.

authority, it was manifest that it could never have been the intention of the French Government thus to establish a second supreme authority, an *imperium in imperio*, within a few miles of the seat of their Government. Yet, La Bourdonnais cared little for such considerations. Although, before starting on this expedition from Pondichery, he had carried his recognition of the authority of the Council to such an extent as to refuse to act without a positive order from them; he now, when the victory had been achieved, and when he was required by them to carry out their instructions, as emanating from an authority paramount to his own, daringly disavowed his subordination, and refused to recognize their supremacy.

It may not be out of place to enquire here, what it really was what was the motive reason that prompted him to this insubordination, to this sacrifice of the best interests of his country. Was it solely because he deemed his own policy to be the correct policy? That could hardly be. No one had felt more strongly than La Bourdonnais, that it would be impossible for him to remain on that coast with any degree of safety, later than the first month in October. His plan had been to send two or three of his ships to winter at Acheen, and to bear up with the remainder, laden with cargoes, for the islands *en route* to France. Yet, it was not once or twice, but many times, that Dupleix had explained to him, that, under those circumstances, Pondichery would be in the greatest danger. Unprotected by a squadron, having incurred the wrath of the Nawab, and invited the retaliation of the English, nothing but the return of La Bourdonnais in the spring, with an overwhelming force, could have long saved the French capital, situated as it was between two English settlements,—Fort St. George and Fort St. David,—from capture. The ransom of Madras, then, not for cash, but for bills of exchange not then accepted, with the vision looming in the future of that Madras shortly being in a position to demand a ransom from Pondichery, could not have seemed, even to La Bourdonnais, a sound policy for France.

But there is another light in which it is necessary to regard the transaction. Let us enquire whether, though it was not a sound policy for France, it did not seem a sound policy for the private interests of La Bourdonnais. And here we meet with some revelations which cannot fail to startle. We have seen, in the course of the preceding narrative, that during the six days, from the 21st to the 25th September, a negotiation had been going on between La Bourdonnais and Governor Morse, as to the amount and the terms of the ransom. But besides the question of public ransom for Madras, there was the other, perhaps equally

weighty question, of private present to La Bourdonnais. That he did receive * a considerable present is apparently undeniable, and, though such a transaction accorded with the customs of India in those early days, this acceptance of money must, in almost every case, have considerably influenced the conduct of those who

* It was charged against La Bourdonnais in his life time, that he had accepted a present from the English of 1,00,000 pagodas (about four lakhs of rupees) as the price of the ransom-treaty made with the English.

The charge was brought forward separately by M. Desprémesnil and M. Kerjean. The first said, that he had heard M. Dupleix affirm that an Englishman had told him that 1,00,000 pagodas had been given to La Bourdonnais for the ransom. He added that he had done his best to ascertain the truth of the fact, but had been able to learn nothing.

The second, M. Kerjean, asserted that he had heard a Jew, retired to Pondichery, affirm that the English had given M. de La Bourdonnais 1,00,000 pagodas, as an acknowledgment of the good treatment they had received at his hands, and that he, the Jew, as his share of this payment, had been taxed at 7,000 pagodas, which amount he had not paid.

La Bourdonnais' reply to these assertions, was, in substance, that they emanated from two men, one the nephew, the other the son-in-law of Dupleix, that he had avoided the last farewell to the English Governor, because he heard that he intended to offer him a present; that had he received such a present, he would not have placed himself in the position of being obliged to restore it, by deferring the evacuation of Madras from October to January; that it was not probable that he would have been received with such distinction in London by two members of the Madras Council, if they had known,—as if it had been true, they must have known—that the ransom had been the result of a bribe.

Here the matter dropped for a time, it being considered that the charge had fallen through. It was revived, however, in 1772, by an English gentleman, Mr. Grose, who wrote an account of his voyage to, and residence in, the East Indies. He states as follows:—"The Governor and Council settled the price of the ransom with the French Commodore (La Bourdonnais) at 1,00,000 pagodas, or £421,666 sterling, *besides a very valuable present to the Commodore who was willing to evacuate his conquest upon these terms*, and leave the English in full possession of their Presidency.—*Grose's East Indies*, Vol. II, page 29.

In *Mill's India*, 5th edition, Vol. III, pages 37, 38, we have evidence to the same effect. Professor H. H. Wilson affirms that "a letter to a proprietor of India Stock, published in 1750, by a person who was evidently concerned in the Government of Madras at the time, describes discussions which took place at home, in regard to the payment of certain bonds given by the Government of Madras to raise money to the extent of 1,00,000 pagodas, which, it is intimated, were presented to the French Commander as the price of his moderation."

Only a few years ago, a case was submitted to the opinion of Council, regarding the validity of these very bonds, and it is believed that documents proving their existence are still to be found in the India House. This fact was communicated to the writer by a leading member of the Indian Bench, who had himself seen the case, and who had no doubt of the authenticity of the documents on which it was drawn.

The balance of later evidence seems, therefore, to weigh strongly against La Bourdonnais.

received it. With the knowledge of this fact before us, the refusal of La Bourdonnais to entertain the statesman-like plans of Dupleix becomes at once intelligible. Knowing, as we know now, that of the three measures which he himself submitted to Dupleix, *viz.*, the occupation of Madras by the French, its destruction, and its ransom—that of the ransom was the only one which would bring him in material advantage, all the mystery that enveloped his conduct disappears. He stands robbed of much of his glory, of that bright halo of pure disinterestedness with which historians have sought to encircle him,—but he is at least an intelligible being. We can watch his acts now, morally certain that we have our eyes on the secret spring by which all those acts were directed.

But we would not be understood to assert that this was the sole motive which influenced him. We even conceive it possible that La Bourdonnais himself was not at all conscious of the effect thus produced upon his actions. Even great men are very often unconsciously acted upon. More specially was this likely to be the case with a man, who chafed so fretfully against superior control as did La Bourdonnais. Determined not to subordinate his will to the will of Dupleix, he may have been himself unaware of that secret influence, which, notwithstanding, most powerfully moved him. What is most probable is, that the two motives, powerfully assisting one another, so worked upon and mastered his reasoning powers, that he was but faintly, if at all, aware of the real moving and guiding power within him, but persuaded himself that he was influenced by considerations of duty,—the selfish and sordid views which lay at the root of his conduct being kept entirely out of sight. However that may be, we have in this place to judge of the man by his acts. And in looking at those acts, we cannot but take advantage to the full of any circumstances which tend to throw light on the motives that prompted them. Hitherto, no consideration has been paid to those motives. In the contest between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, the former has been ruthlessly condemned,—condemned,—we are satisfied,—without a full and fair enquiry,—without having been heard by means of public documents, in his own defence. Yet, it is surely something in the question between them to enquire, whether there were any secret motives besides those that have been assigned, which might have tempted either of them to over-step his powers. In the case of Dupleix, we see the avowed reason,—the determination to root out the English at any cost from the Coromandel Coast,—based upon the powers which, as Governor-General of French India, he believed himself to possess,—but we can find no trace of any other. He had no personal objects to gain by

refusing to ransom Madras. It appeared to him so plain that the restoration of that place involved two dangers,—hostility from the Nawab, and renewed hostility from the English,—to Pondichery which might be defenceless: the reason of his conduct is, in fact, so plain, so apparent, that we search in vain for any secret motive, least of all for any which might have been beneficial to his private fortunes.

But it is not so with La Bourdonnais. It is now clear that, up to the 26th September, he had entered upon no positive engagements to ransom his conquest. It is, we think certain, that on that 26th, the terms were verbally agreed to with Governor Morse, one of those terms stipulating for a private present to himself of nearly £40,000;—that, receiving on the the same day convincing intimations from Pondichery, that Dupleix and the Superior Council would be no party to any scheme for a ransom, he suddenly resolved to break with them, to assert his own independent action. It is too much to infer that the alarmed private interests stimulated, perhaps unconsciously, his jealous and easily roused ambition to a revolt against the better feelings of his nature?

To return to the narrative. We left La Bourdonnais on the evening of the 26th, and on the morning of the 27th September, refusing to acknowledge the authority of the agents sent to co-operate with him by the Superior Council, sending to Pondichery for ratification, a copy of the treaty of ransom, and yet,—strange inconsistency,—asserting his entire independence of the control of that Council.

But before this actually happened, some intimation that it was about to happen, had reached Pondichery. Amongst the officers of the besieging army,—the Commandant, in fact, of the Pondichery contingent,—was M. Paradis, a Swiss by birth, in the French service, and a man of a bold, energetic, daring nature. He had previously been known to La Bourdonnais, and the latter had, even before his arrival at Pondichery, made a special application for his services. Placed in command of the Pondichery contingent, and second only on land to La Bourdonnais himself, he had behaved in a manner to give the greatest satisfaction to his chief, and, until the time of the capitulation, the relations between the two had been of the most cordial nature. On the 26th, we learn for the first time, that some difference had arisen on some point connected with the command of the troops, and that Paradis had left Madras for Pondichery on the 23rd, armed with letters from La Bourdonnais for Dupleix. It seems probable that Paradis, from his position in the force, had been made acquainted with the nature of the negotiations that were

progressing at Madras, and that he had pointed out to the Superior Council that, unless they asserted their authority, none would remain to them. The Council were probably influenced by these considerations when they sent M.M. Desprémesnil, Dulaurent, and Barthélemy to Madras. But, on the 28th, they received the defiant letters of La Bourdonnais. They at once wrote to him a letter, in which they recapitulated the arguments they had used against the restoration of the place to the English; told him that M. Desprémesnil, the second member of Council, and then at Madras, would be authorized to take over from him the command of the place, with the Pondichery contingent under him; and concluded with a formal protest against all the engagements he might contract without the knowledge and confirmation of the Superior Council. On the following day, Dupleix despatched to him a letter written with his own hand,—most touching, most entreating in its terms, conjuring him as a brother, as a friend, to give up all idea of ransoming the place, and to enter heartily into the designs he was nursing for the uprooting of the English. After dwelling upon the worthlessness of a ransom agreed to by prisoners, and adducing examples from history to prove, that conditions made under such circumstances had never been considered binding, he added, “In the name of God, in the name of your children, of your wife, I conjure you to be persuaded of what I tell you. Finish as you have begun, and do not treat with an enemy who has no object but to reduce us to the most dire extremity. Such are the orders which the enemy’s squadron executes wherever it is able. If it has not done more, it was because it could not do more. Providence has been kinder to us than to them. Let us then profit by our opportunity, for the glory of our monarch, and for the general interests of a nation which will regard you as its restorer in India. Heaven grant that I may succeed in persuading you, that I may convince you of the necessity of annulling a treaty which makes us lose in one moment all our advantages, the extent of which you will recognise immediately, if you will pay attention to my representations.” Meanwhile, the three Councillors, M.M. Desprémesnil, Dulaurent, and Barthélemy, finding their powers disavowed by La Bourdonnais, transmitted to him on the 27th a formal protest against his usurpation of authority, as well as against the restoration of Madras to the English; they sent also to the various commanders of troops, copies of the King’s orders conferring supreme authority in India upon Dupleix,—a step to which, they said, they had been driven by the measures adopted by M. de la Bourdonnais in opposition to the orders he had received from Pondi-

chery. On the 30th, the three Councillors made a second protest, and announced their intention to withdraw to St. Thomé, there to await further orders from Pondichery.

This was only the prelude to other and stronger measures. On the 2nd October, a Commission, composed of the Major-General de Bury, M. Bruyère, the Procureur General, and M. Paradis, arrived at Madras, armed with powers to execute the orders with which they were entrusted by Dupleix, as representative of his Sovereign in the East Indies. They carried a declaration made by Dupleix on behalf of the King and the Company of the Indies, which they were instructed to read publicly at Madras, setting forth, amongst other terms, that the treaty of ransom had been made "by the simple act, without lawful authority, of "M. de la Bourdonnais, with prisoners who were unable to "engage others on their account, especially in an affair of such "importance; that it was null and void, and to be regarded "as never having been executed." A second declaration, issued by Dupleix, on behalf of the King, and carried by them, created a provincial Council of Fort St. George, "to render justice in the name of the King, civil as well as criminal, to all "the inhabitants present and to come." Of this, M. Desprémesnil was appointed President, and M. M. Dulaurent, Barthélemy, Bonneau, Desforgues Bruyère, and Paradis, members. By another declaration, M. Desprémesnil was nominated Commandant and Director of the town and fort of Madras, "to command "in it, under our orders, the officers of land and sea forces, the "inhabitants, the clerks of the Company, and all other French "men and foreigners established in it, of what condition soever "they might be." They carried with them, besides two requisitions, one from the Superior Council of Pondichery, the other from the principal inhabitants of the town, both alike protesting against the usurpation of authority on the part of La Bourdonnais, and against the restoration of Madras to the English, as a measure injurious to the national interest, and fraught with danger to Pondichery.

Early on the morning of the 2nd October, six of * the members of the newly appointed provincial and executive Councils, accompanied by their chief clerk, entered Madras, and proceeded to the head-quarters of La Bourdonnais. By him they were received and conducted to the large hall. Here the business of the day was commenced by General de Bury handing over to La Bourdonnais a letter from the Superior Council, stating that

* They were, M. M. Desprémesnil, Dulaurent, Brathélemy, Bruyère, Paradis, and General de Bury.

he, the general, was authorized to reply to his letter of the 27th ultimo. The chief clerk then read out loud, in the presence of a large concourse of people, who were attracted by the rumours of some extraordinary scene, the several declarations and protests we have enumerated above.

Whilst this reading was going on, officers of all grades came crowding into the hall, the great majority of them belonging to the troops who had come with La Bourdonnais from the Isles. As soon as the clerk had finished, La Bourdonnais replied. He stated that he would recognize no authority in India as superior to his own; as the orders, which he had received from France, concluded with a special proviso, leaving him "master of his operations."* M. Desprémesnil replied, that the authority just quoted in no way invalidated the powers conferred upon the Governor-General, and, in fact, bore no reference to the subject La Bourdonnais, however, was obstinate, and seeing himself supported by a number of his own adherents, he assumed a haughtier tone, and threatened to beat the general, and get the troops under arms. Immediately a cry was raised in the assembly against taking up arms against one another. Upon this, La Bourdonnais assembled in the next room a Council of war, composed of the officers who had come with him from the islands, and after a short sitting, communicated the result to the deputies from Pondichery. This was, in effect, that they considered he ought not to go back from the promise he had given to the English. Upon this, the deputies retired.†

La Bourdonnais having thus repulsed the demands, legally preferred, of the Pondichery deputies, proceeded without delay to deprive them of every chance of executing them by force. Spreading a report that the English fleet had been seen off Pulicat, he issued a general order to send fifty men on board each vessel. He at the same time privately instructed his trusted subordinates to assign this duty to the troops of the Pondichery contingent. This was executed on the morning of the 4th

* Undoubtedly this was the case, and this was recognized by the Council of Pondichery, when two months before they had pressed upon him the necessity of a decision regarding them. La Bourdonnais had then refused to act, unless the Council prescribed to him a positive course. It may be observed in addition, that the fact of his being master of his operations, while it left to him the choice of his ground, did not relieve him of subordination to the authority of the representative of his Sovereign, in territories subject to that Sovereign.

† There are two accounts of this interview,—one a *Procès Verbal* drawn up at the time by Desprémesnil and his colleagues; the other the accounts written three years afterwards by La Bourdonnais. The latter abounds with personal imputations which we have omitted.

October, and he found himself then at the head of troops entirely devoted to him, absolute master of his movements.

The members of the Provincial Council did not the less attempt to establish their lawful authority by legal means. Discovering during the day the ruse which La Bourdonnais had employed so well, apparently for his own interests, they resolved to place him under a moral restraint. For this purpose, General de Bury, accompanied by M. M. Latour and Largi, proceeded to his head-quarters, and delivered to him a written document, addressed to him as Commandant of the French squadron, forbidding him to leave Madras with the French troops, without a written order from Dupleix. But the time had passed when it was necessary for La Bourdonnais to dissemble his resentment. He had rid himself of the Pondichery troops, and he was determined to use his usurped authority with the utmost rigour. He at once placed three deputies under arrest, and when Paradis, hearing of this indignity, hastened to remonstrate with him, he charged him with being "a marplot who had brought them all within two fingers of destruction," and sent him to join his associates. He declared at the same time that he would leave them prisoners to the English on the 15th October,—the day on which he had covenanted to restore Madras to that nation.

We will not attempt to describe the feelings of Dupleix on receiving a report of these proceedings. To carry through the darling object of his policy, the destruction of the English power on the Carnatic, he had employed entreaty, advice, persuasion, menaces, and moral force,—and all in vain. The determined pertinacity of his rival left him stranded. Not a single resource remained to him. His authority denied, his soldiers sent on board the Admiral's ships, his deputies arrested and confined in Madras,—his entreaties answered by cold refusals, his assertions of authority by a contemptuous denial of it,—what remained for him to do? It was vain to appeal to Paris. Thence no reply could arrive within fifteen months, and La Bourdonnais could not stay fifteen days longer, without extreme risk, upon the coast. He was maddened, not only at the dissipation of the vast schemes which he had formed, but at his powerlessness to prevent any act which it might please the infuriated chief of the forces, naval and military, to carry out. The utmost that he could do was to protest. This he did, in a temperate and dignified letter,[†] so soon as intelligence of the proceedings at Madras reached him.

[†] Dated Madras, 6th October 1746. From the Superior Council of Pondichery to La Bourdonnais. "We learn by the letter of the Council of Madras of the 4th current, that you have caused to be arrested M. M. Bury,

Nor was La Bourdonnais himself at all at his ease. The month of October,—a month famous for the storms and hurricanes which it brings upon the open Coromandel coast,—was now well upon him. He had felt and had always declared that it would be dangerous to stay in the Madras roadstead after the 15th October. Yet, so intent had he been on this quarrel with Dupleix, that very little had been done in the way of embarking the property of which he had made prize. Not even an inventory had been made out. To leave Madras, too, on the 15th, as he had intended, with a treaty unratified by the Superior Council of Pondichery, would be to make over his conquest to Dupleix without conditions, and to lose for himself and for France the ransom-money he had been promised. That defiance of the Pondichery authorities which had apparently succeeded so well, what would it profit him, if, after his departure, those authorities should choose to ignore all his proceedings, and should deal with Madras as a conquest of which they alone had a right to dispose? And yet what was more probable than that they would thus act? Relying upon the physical force which he disposed of, he had contemned their orders, refused to acknowledge their authority, arrested their Generals, and put them to open scorn. It would have been contrary to all his experience of men to imagine that, the physical force being on their side, they would acknowledge any of the arrangements, which, in open defiance of their instructions, he might have made.

At the moment then of his apparent triumph, La Bourdonnais felt all the hopelessness and helplessness of his position. Unless he could come to terms with Dupleix, all his plans would be subverted, the bills for public ransom and private gratitude would not be worth the paper on which they were written. Yet, how to come to terms with those whom he had slighted and scorned, seemed of all tasks the most impossible. To bend his

Paradis, Latour, Largi, and Changeac. Our former letters, and that which M. Bury intimated to you, would have informed you that the Pondichery contingent, not being under your orders, we had nominated a Commandant at Madras, and had established a Council there. Things being upon this footing, we might have demanded of you, by what right, and by what authority, you have caused them to be arrested. But we feel the inutility of such a demand. We can now take no part with reference to all that you may do, but to wait tranquilly the issue of your proceedings.

We confirm the order to the Council of Madras, to the officers and troops of Pondichery, not to evacuate Madras, and not to embark on board the ships, at least, until you forcibly compel them. But we tell them, nevertheless, to obey all your orders for the performance of the garrison duties of the place. We permit ourselves to hope that a ray of light will induce you to reflect very seriously.

haughty spirit to sue for the amity which, when pressed upon him "as a brother, as a friend," he had rejected, was a course which La Bourdonnais, of all men, would have scorned. Something, nevertheless, must be done. Dupleix could afford to wait for the future. It was from La Bourdonnais that the overtures must come.

He made them. Not, indeed, in that open, straightforward way, which would have acknowledged his error, and which would have caused the immediate renewal of cordial relations with Dupleix, but in that tortuous, indirect manner which those adopt, who, having committed an error, and finding that the consequences of that error are recoiling on themselves, are yet too much the slaves of a false pride to make a candid confession.

This was the plan he adopted. He commissioned Paradis, the Commandant of the Pondichery contingent, and whom, it will be remembered he had placed in arrest, to sound Dupleix as to whether he would agree to the treaty of ransom, provided the restoration of Madras were deferred from October to January or February, with a view ostensibly, to make a proper division of the spoils. If he could agree to that, Paradis added, La Bourdonnais would leave behind 150 of his own troops to reinforce those of Pondichery.

This proposition came upon Dupleix just immediately after his authority had been insulted and defied, when he, the civil power, had had flaunted before him, by the chief military power, the irresistible argument of brute force. He had divined some, if not all, of the motives of La Bourdonnais, and he had made up his mind to keep no terms with him. Openly to break off all correspondence with one who wielded the physical force of the colony, would be, however, in his opinion, conducive neither to French interests in general, nor to the interests of Pondichery in particular. But on receiving this indirect overture from Paradis, he saw in it a means of getting rid of one who refused to carry out himself, and who prevented others from carrying out, the views which he deemed essential to French interests. He resolved, therefore, to adopt that policy, which the weak in all ages have deemed a legitimate weapon when battling against the strong, and to dissemble. He, accordingly, wrote on the 7th October to La Bourdonnais, stating that he would entertain the project. But on the following day, a circumstance occurred which immensely strengthened the hands of Dupleix. Three ships of war, long expected, the *Centaure* of 74 guns, the *Mars* of 56, and the *Brillant* of 50, having on board 1,520 men,* anchored

* Grose's East Indies, Vol. 2, Chap. XXIX.

that morning in the Pondichery roadstead. They brought out startling intelligence. M. Orry had been, in December 1745, replaced as Controller-General by M. Machault d'Arnonville,—a member of the Council of State,—of no experience in finance, but devoted to Madame de Pompadour. The Company informed Dupleix of this, as well as of the fact that war between France and Holland was imminent, and that he would, therefore, have to arrange to meet a new enemy in his neighbourhood. They also forwarded to him, in anticipation of his being joined by La Bourdonnais, specific instructions as to the relations to himself, which the Commander of the French fleet would bear.

As this was the very point upon which La Bourdonnais had based his resistance to the orders of Dupleix, this document had naturally very great interest for the Pondichery Council. It was dated the 6th October 1745, and was thus worded: "The Company considers it right and proper that the Commander of the squadron should be present at the meetings of the Superior Council; that he be summoned to it when any military expedition, in which this Commander is to bear a principal part, is under consideration; and that he have in it a deliberative voice. But it requires also that the conclusion, which shall be arrived at after discussion, whatever be the nature of the affairs, be carried out by him without opposition, even though it should concern the disposing of all the ships of the Company which he may command." These orders appeared to Dupleix to be too clear to be disputed; he therefore sent a copy of them the same day to La Bourdonnais with the additional intimation that they had been approved of by the new Minister.*

* The date of this letter,—the 6th October 1745, a date exactly two months antecedent to the appointment of M. Machault as Controller-General,—together with the statement made by Dupleix that its contents "had been approved by the new Minister," afforded an opportunity to La Bourdonnais, of which he took full advantage, to contest its validity. "How is it possible," he observes in substance in his memoirs, "that the new Minister should have sent M. Dupleix orders, dated the 6th October, when his appointment dates only from the 6th December, and I myself received by the same opportunity letters from M. Orry, the old Minister dated the 25th November." He proceeds on this, to speak of it as a "pretended letter." But this reasoning, plausible as it is, has no foundation. It is perfectly true that M. Machault's appointment as Controller-General dates only from the 6th December 1745, but it is no less so, that for several months prior to that date, he had been designated as the successor of Orry, who was in disgrace, and that he had been consulted on all the arrangements that were under discussion. Dupleix merely states in his letter that the orders he had received from the Company had been "approved of" by the new Minister. What was more natural than that such important orders had been submitted, before transmission to a distant settlement, to the man who was virtually, though not actually, minister, and

But the shifts to which a wilful nature, working for a definite end, is able to resort, were not yet exhausted. La Bourdonnais, in his reply, thus referred to the instructions of the new Minister : " With respect to the extract you have sent me, you may depend that I shall always conform to the orders of the Minister after I shall have received them. But he no longer writes to me here, and the extract you have sent me concerns the Company's captains and not me." * He added that he had received but one letter from the Company, and begged Dupleix to have the

who would be entrusted with their execution ? That such was the practice is certain, and the very word used by Dupleix implies that the practice was carried out on this occasion. The very ships, which carried out the orders, sailed from France before the actual nomination of Machault ; it would have been a transparent falsehood,—for which there was neither necessity nor excuse,—for Dupleix to have employed the expression which he did use, if it had not been founded upon fact. Of the authenticity of the order there can be no doubt. But there is another point. La Bourdonnais adds that the letter of Orry to him was a confirmation of his independent authority in the Indian seas, and he quotes two garbled extracts from it to prove this. We give here entire the two first paragraphs from which those extracts are taken, believing that they strongly confirm the view we are supporting. It must be remembered that the letter is addressed to La Bourdonnais, as Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon, and that at the time it was despatched, Orry had not the smallest idea that La Bourdonnais would have been able to succeed, before its receipt, in fitting out a fleet for the Indies. He believed him, in fact, to be still at the Isle of France. The letter runs thus :— " The Company will send you this year, Sir, six of its vessels, of which five will sail at the beginning of next month, and the sixth in the course of February. It has determined to address them all to you, leaving you master, to dispose of them according to circumstances, and the news you may receive from the Indies. It ought, however, to be your chief duty to send to Pondichery, at a proper season, the number of vessels which may be necessary to convey to it in safety and with promptitude, the money and the troops, the ammunitions of war and the supplies, which are destined for that settlement.

" I do not dictate to you the manner in which you ought to act, to succeed in this expedition, of which you will yourself feel all the importance, persuaded as I am, that you will do all for the best. Your chief point of view ought to be the preservation of the town of Pondichery, and of the other establishments which the Company possesses beyond the Cape of Good Hope and in India. This object ought to be preferred to all other enterprises. You should come to an understanding on this point with M. Dupleix, and should send him all the assistance he may demand of you, and for which he will look to you."—*Dated 25th November 1745.*

Now, this letter gives very large powers to the Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon, but it in no way authorises that Governor to assume authority in the country of the Governor, for whom some of the assistance was intended. And yet that was the strained interpretation La Bourdonnais put upon it.

* *La Bourdonnais to Dupleix, dated Mauras, 10th October 1746.*

others sought for. This despatch had scarcely been sent off when the missing letters arrived. Whether or not they contained any reference to the orders sent to Dupleix, it is impossible to say, * but this is certain, that from the date of their receipt, the tone of his letters changed. In that of the 10th, he announced to Dupleix that he would wait the receipt of his ideas till the 13th, and assured him that there was no condition he would refuse, if it did not involve the forfeiture of his word. The same evening, he received the reply of Dupleix to the overtures made through Paradis, and he at once transmitted to Dupleix the conditions on which he would make over Madras to the Pondichery authorities and depart.

The principal of these conditions were. first, a promise, that the treaty he enclosed should be rigidly observed ; that the Governor should be taken from his officers, and not from Pondichery ; that Madras should be evacuated on the 1st January 1747. The treaty contained articles very favourable to the English, especially when it is remembered that Madras, with its wretched garrison, was incapable of further defence when it surrendered. The second article provided that one-half of the munitions of war should be returned to the English ; the fourth, that the residue of the supplies, of which the quantity was large, after the re-victualing of the French squadron, should be restored to them ; the other articles related to the ransom and matters previously noticed. On the following day, the 12th, he sent another letter, in which he stated that as M. Desprémesnil had assured him that Dupleix would agree to the conditions, he was now impatient to depart. He enclosed five articles, the two principal of which provided that Madras should be evacuated, at the latest, at the end of January, that it should not be attacked by either nation before that period, and that as long as it should remain in the hands of the French, the roadstead should be accessible to the ships of both nations. The Superior Council replied to these letters on the 13th and 14th. With reference to the conditions insisted upon by La Bourdonnais, they agreed to keep the engagement entered into with the English, provided the English kept theirs ; but they required that La Bourdonnais should leave them 150 of his troops as he had promised Paradis, that Desprémesnil should be Commandant, assisted by a Council of four, two of whom might be named by La Bourdonnais, subordinate to Pondichery ; and that the place should not be evacuated till

* He writes, in his letter of the 10th October to Dupleix, thus ;—" I have just received the letters of the Minister, they, in no way, affect my previous orders." But the letters are not given.

a complete division of the prize property should have taken place. In their letter of the 14th, * the Council positively refused to agree to evacuate the place by the time proposed, and entered into reasons which shewed how dangerous it would be to French interests, to accede to the other conditions proposed.†

But before this letter reached La Bourdonnais, an unforeseen event had cut the more than Gordian knot which neither party could agree to untie. In his letter of the 11th October, addressed to Dupleix, La Bourdonnais had remarked—"What we have most against us, is the monsoon; I can stay here very well till the 20th, perhaps, even to the 25th, if the weather continues favourable." On the following day he wrote—"Already the northerly wind has set in, then follows, as you know, the decided necessity of quitting the place. * * * I am writing to-day to each captain, giving them such orders, and in case the new moon and bad weather should compel them to put to sea, they may re-gain the coast afterwards." The next day, the 13th, was a lovely day, one of the finest of the season. During the night, however, there came on one of those hurricanes which periodically cause ruin and devastation along the Coromandel Coast. The French vessels, with the exception of three,—the *St. Louis*, the *Lys*, and the *Renommée*,—which had been sent to Pondichery with a portion of the spoils of Madras, were in the roadstead loading. In addition to their crews, they had on board nearly five hundred troops,—the Pondichery contingent, which, it will be recollected, La Bourdonnais, to assure his own unquestioned authority in Madras, had embarked upon them. The storm—as usual with us such storms—gave but little warning of its approach. Before,

* In reply to La Bourdonnais' of the 12th.

† We extract the most salient passages from this letter of the Superior Council, dated Pondichery, 14th October 1746, "M. Dupleix has communicated to us your letter of the 12th. with some articles which we have examined very attentively. Many reasons prevent us from being able to accede to them. The time to which you limit the evacuation of the place, is not sufficient to enable us to make a division of the artillery, rigging, and the supplies, and to take them away. All that we can promise you, is to work as promptly as possible. * * *

"With respect to the hostages, letters of exchange and bills, we are very willing to engage to receive them, on the understanding, that this acceptance on our part does not pass for an acquiescence in the articles which relate to them * * * The roadstead of Madras cannot be open to the English during the division of the prize property; the English squadron has only to come there with five or six ships from Europe, as well as from India, and to disembark their crews gradually. It would thus be very easy, as you will see, for the English to take possession of Madras, at least to concentrate there a force of 2,000 Europeans. It is for this reason that we have inserted a paragraph that the roadstead of Madras must not be open to the English."

however, it attained anything like its greatest severity, the ships had all slipped their cables, and put to sea. All night long the hurricane raged with terrible fury. La Bourdonnais, who, at the first whistle of the storm, had busied himself in making preparations to meet every possible conjuncture of fortune, vainly strained his eyes, as the day slowly broke, to discover any trace of his fleet. Not a vessel was to be seen. The hurricane continued to rage furiously, and, at 8 o'clock in the morning, appeared to be even augmenting in force. During the whole of that day his anxieties increased. But he was not idle. Here, again, the old qualities of the great organiser of the islands displayed themselves to their full perfection. He sent parties along the coast, with means and appliances to succour the crews that might stand in need of aid. At Madras itself, he made preparations on a large scale for the same purpose; he wrote letters to Dupleix, detailing his terrible anxieties, and asking news of the ships at Pondichery; besides this, all the boats having been destroyed, he detached catamarans,* at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 3 in the afternoon, when the storm had begun to abate, with letters detailing the state of things at Madras, and asking for information from any vessel they might fall in with. No intelligence reached him, however, before 8 o'clock, nor did a single sail appear in view. At that hour, he learned that the *Marie Gertrude*, an English prize, having many soldiers in her, had been lost with nearly all on board, between St. Thomé and Covelong; that one ship totally dismantled, and another, with all her masts standing, were anchored safely off St. Thomé; that a Dutch vessel had gone down near the same place, and that two small trading barques had met with a similar fate. All next day his anxiety was increasing; every hour brought bad tidings. At 9 o'clock, he learned that the *Bourbon* was at anchor fifteen miles off, with only a foremast standing, and leaking terribly; that the *Achille* was almost in the same state, and that another ship, name unknown, had been descried totally dismantled. Every hour brought news of fresh disasters. At 7 o'clock in the evening, he reported to Dupleix that the *Bourbon* was lost beyond redemption,† and that it would be possible to save only a very few of the crew; that the *Duc d'Orléans* was lost, one man only being saved, and that another vessel, totally dismantled, was in sight.

On the 16th, the weather moderated; but it was not till the 17th, that La Bourdonnais became acquainted with the entire extent

* A catamaran is composed of three or four pieces of wood, about twenty feet long, tied together, upon which a man stands with a paddle.

† She was, however, eventually saved.

of his losses. Of the eight French vessels * anchored in the Madras roads on the evening of the 13th, the *Achille*, after incurring great danger, losing two of her masts, and throwing over sixteen 18-pounders, anchored safely in the roadstead; the *Neptune* had been totally dismasted, had thrown over fourteen 12-pounders, and had seven feet of water in her hold. All her prize-cargo had been ruined. The *Bourbon* was saved by a miracle: she had lost her main and mizen masts, and been compelled likewise to throw over fourteen of her guns. She had received in other respects such damage, as to make her quite unfit to put to sea. The *Phenix* was lost with all on board; the *Duc d'Orléans* underwent the same fate, eight only of her crew being saved; the *Princesse Marie* was dismasted, and had seven to eight feet water in her hold; the *Marie Gertrude* and the *Advice* had foundered. Of these eight vessels, then, four were lost; two of the others were rendered utterly unseaworthy, and the remaining two were so damaged, as to require almost super-human exertion to fit them for sea. The French fleet had, in fact, suddenly ceased to exist. The loss in men alone had exceeded twelve hundred. †

It was whilst in the midst of his troubles, before even he knew the full extent of his losses, that La Bourdonnais received that letter, dated the 14th October, from the Superior Council to which we have alluded, ‡ and in which they declined to fix an absolute term to the time of the withdrawal of the French troops from Madras. He apparently had expected some such answer. "I have received from the Council," said he, in reply, "the answer which I expected regarding the affair of Madras. I shall take that which I believe to be the simplest part, which is to leave you a copy of the capitulation, and to abandon to you the field, in order to devote myself entirely to saving the *débris* of our losses." Four days later, writing when his losses were fully known to him, he still expressed himself hopefully about the future, proposing to winter and repair damages at Goa, whilst the undamaged portion of the fleet should remain at Acheen for the protection of Pondichery. He then added—"My part is taken

* These were the *Achille*, the *Bourbon*, *Phenix*, the *Neptune*, the *Duc d'Orléans*, fitted out as men-of-war, the *Princesse Marie*, an English prize, the *Marie Gertrude* and the *Advice*, also prizes.

† Besides sixty men of the English garrison who were on board the *Duc d'Orléans*.—*Gros's East Indies*.

‡ *Vide* note to page 461.

"regarding Madras; I abandon it to you.* I have signed the capitulation, it is for you to keep my word. I am so disgusted with this wretched Madras, that I would give an arm never to have put foot in it. It has cost us too much."

The next day he signed the treaty,—the same treaty which on the 11th and 12th, he had forwarded to Pondichery, and to some articles of which, on the 14th, the Council of Pondichery had objected—he signed this treaty, stating in the preamble, that he did so, because the Pondichery Council, by articles signed the 13th, and by that same letter of the 14th,† had engaged itself to hold to the capitulation in those terms.

Having thus concluded, by an act not only unauthorized, but under the circumstances, even dishonourable, that struggle for authority, and,—would that we could omit the remainder,—for his own private ends—for the securing to himself of the private sum which was additional to the public ransom,—La Bourdonnais assembled the members of the English Council, and reading to them the treaty in both languages, received their acceptance of its terms. Governor Morse and five of his‡ Councillors then attached to it their signatures. The treaty was sent the same day to Pondichery, accompanied by an intimation from the Admiral to the Council, that he would hold them responsible, individually and collectively, for all contraventions perpetrated against it by the French.

Meanwhile, La Bourdonnais had made extraordinary exertions to repair and re-fit his vessels. Here he was in his real element. Nothing could surpass his energy, or the zeal and determination

* It is necessary to notice that this was not written until La Bourdonnais had made a vain attempt to bring under his orders, the captains of the *Centaure*, the *Mars*, and the *Brillant*, just arrived from England. They pleaded, in reply, the orders they had received to place themselves at the disposal of the Governor-General and Council of Pondichery.—*La Bourdonnais à Messieurs du Conseil Suprême de Pondichery, -le 18th October 1746.*

† In a foot-note to page 461, we have given the most important extracts from this letter. If the reader refer to it he will find, that so far from giving La Bourdonnais authority to accede to the terms mentioned, it distinctly objected to two of the most important conditions,—conditions, which, nevertheless, are found unaltered in the treaty which La Bourdonnais, on the strength, as he says, of this letter, signed. La Bourdonnais, in his memoirs, declares that the previous letters of Dupleix, agreeing in general terms to his conditions, authorized him to act thus; but, why then, did he quote these in the preamble?

‡ Mr. Grose, who was a contemporary, and who naturally adopted the English view, writes:—"If the French had not perfidiously broke their engagement, the price of the ransom would have been a very favourable circumstance to the English Company." No doubt, and that is just why Dupleix opposed it, though he broke no engagement, having made none.

he instilled into his subordinates, in less than five days after the remnants of the shattered squadron had re-anchored in the Madras roads, he had succeeded in rigging the *Achille* with jurymasts; the *Neptune* and the *Princesse Marie* had been rendered seaworthy, and even the *Bourbon* had been patched up sufficiently to make the passage to Pondichery. Having placed what prize property he could on board these vessels, La Bourdonnais, on the morning of the 23rd October, ordered a grand parade of the troops, and formally made over command to Desprémesnil. As he did this, it came on again to blow, and the ships, fearful of another hurricane, at once made for the open sea. La Bourdonnais himself waited for the conclusion of the ceremony, then threw himself into a country boat, and amid a terrible storm put out to join them, thus bidding a last adieu, amid the conflict of the elements, to that Madras, with regard to which he "would have given an arm never to have set foot in it."

All, meanwhile, had been quite at Pondichery. The storm of the night of the 13th and the two following days, had not extended so far south as the French capital. The three ships arrived from France, as well as the three which had been despatched from Madras some time previously to the storm, had thus ridden calmly in the Pondichery roads, whilst their consorts at Madras had been damaged or sunk. No sooner had these terrible losses become known, than the council assembled to concert measures to be adopted to meet the possible results of such a calamity. Little, however, could be done, as the demands made on Pondichery for the expedition to Madras had exhausted all its stores, and the ships were not in a condition to take the sea immediately. On the 22nd a Council was held, at which the captains of the ships assisted to deliberate on the disposal of the fleet. After hearing the opinions of the captains, a resolution was arrived that the six vessels, then off Pondichery, should proceed to the roadstead of Acheen, under M. Dordelin, the senior captain, there to remain till the 20th or 25th December, when the squadron should bear up for Pulicat, to proceed thence, if circumstances were favourable, to Madras. These orders were sent sealed to M. Dordelin. Neither Dordelin nor any of his junior captains appear to have been men of energy or character. The authority in whose presence they found themselves at the moment, acted upon them with a force that, to their feeble natures, was irresistible. They had not been many hours at sea, when they received a letter from La Bourdonnais informing them of his departure from Madras, and directing them to proceed along the coast to join him. On opening at the same

time their sealed orders, their perplexity was extreme. It was difficult for them to decide to whom their obedience was due. Whilst yet hesitating they fell in with the maimed squadron of La Bourdonnais. His daring, decided spirit settled the question in a moment. Taking upon him the command of the united squadron, he ordered them to accompany him as he continued his course for Pondichery. In that roadstead he anchored on the 27th.

Once more at Pondichery, the contestation between the two men recommenced. It formed part of the plan of La Bourdonnais—and there can be no doubt that as a plan it was able and well considered—to have taken round the squadron to the Malabar Coast. Leaving the sound vessels cruising in the Arabian Sea, he would have taken the damaged ships into the neutral harbour of Goa, and have there completely re-fitted them. Buying then other vessels at Goa and Surat, he would have re-united his squadron, and have come round with a force, sufficient to counterbalance the English force, to the Coromandel Coast. But to carry out this plan, he required to draw upon all the resources of Pondichery.

He required to borrow from her all her soldiers, all her heavy guns, a great part of her ammunition, and the remainder of her all but exhausted stores. He demanded of Pondichery, in fact, to take upon herself all the risks which might possibly attend his cruise, remaining herself all the time open to the attacks of an enemy. The idea, however, quite mastered him for the moment, and he pressed it with all his earnestness upon Dupleix. "Aid me," he said, "with the same zeal with which you aided me for the taking of Madras, and we shall be able not only to recover ourselves, but to gain fresh advantages."

It is doubtful, whether, even under any circumstances, the Governor of Pondichery would have felt himself justified in undertaking so great a risk, even with the prospect of gaining so great an advantage. Certain it is that, after the experience of the preceding four months, Dupleix felt no inclination to permit the safety of the colony to rest on the caprices of a man who, up to that time, had never ceased to thwart and oppose his best devised schemes. Considering that the squadron of Commodore Peyton was yet unconquered, he felt that it was absolutely necessary for the safety of Pondichery, that the bulk of the fleet should proceed to an anchoring ground, whence it would be recalled on an emergency. Such a position did Acheen, in the opinion of himself and his Council, offer. Although, therefore, the letters of La Bourdonnais, making this proposal, were couched in the most conciliatory language; although in

them, Dupleix was urged to forget the past, and give once more, as he had given before the expedition to Madras, all the resources of Pondichery, in aid of the new scheme, he felt constrained to refuse to entertain it. The fact is, he could not forget the past; he could not forget the terrible trials of the preceding six weeks; the open defiance of his authority, the arrest of his agents, the disposal of the Pondichery contingent on board the ships of the squadron, the usurpation of an authority supported by physical force alone. These things, indeed, would have been very hard to forget at any time. Especially were they so at the moment when he, who had suffered most from such proceedings, had upon his shoulders the sole responsibility of the future of Pondichery. To have again voluntarily placed that settlement in the power of one who had shown no respect for the authority of its Governor, would have been the height of folly. The honied phrases of La Bourdonnais fell, therefore, upon ears which thoroughly mistrusted both them and their author. The Superior Council declined to entertain his plan for a moment. La Bourdonnais himself had refused to land; they declined to proceed on board his ship, as he requested, to discuss matters together. Neither party, in fact, would trust the other. Under these circumstances, it is scarcely, to be wondered at, that the tenor of the reply to La Bourdonnais' proposition went simply to reiterate to orders, which had directed the squadron to proceed to Acheen.

In the first letter,* which La Bourdonnais addressed to the Superior Council after his junction with the squadron of M. Dordelin, he had promised that he would not interfere with their command over the Company's ships. This promise, on his new plan being rejected, he proceeded to fulfil. He had at his disposal seven vessels,—four in good order,† three damaged and shattered.‡ Of these he proposed to form two squadrons, which sailing together, should endeavour to gain Acheen. If they succeeded, he would send thence the *Lys* and the *Sumatra* to the islands, and, repairing the *Achille*, would make, at the end of December, for Pulicat, then to carry out the orders of the Superior Council. But should he not be able to gain Acheen with the two squadrons, the first under the command of M. Dordelin was to make for that place, there to act under orders from

* *A Messieurs du Conseil du Pondichery, le 26th Octobre 1746.*

† These were the *Centaure*, the *Brillant*, the *Mars* and the *St. Louis*.

‡ The *Achille*, the *Lys*, and the *Sumatra*. The *Sumatra* had come in a shattered condition from the islands. The other ships, the *Bourbon*, the *Neptune*, the *Renommée* and the *Princesse Marie* had been too disabled to make the voyage.

Pondichery, whilst he himself, with the damaged squadron, should bear up for the islands.

Upon this plan he acted. On the 29th of October, after a stay in the Pondichery roads,—for he did not land in the town,—of only two days,— he set sail with the seven ships before indicated for Acheen. The result he had anticipated happened. The three damaged ships were soon left out of sight by those of the uninjured squadron. These latter sailing their best, as had been ordered, reached Acheen on the 6th December. *La Bourdonnais*, despairing of being able to gain that anchorage with ships that had been so shattered as his own, gave up all idea of reaching it, and bore up for Port Louis. He arrived there, his ships in a miserable condition, on the 10th December.

In this manner, after a short sojourn of four months, did *La Bourdonnais* leave those latitudes, to gain which had been the dream of his heart during the best years of his life. Yet, in those four months, what stirring events had been concentrated ! Arriving in the Indian seas with a fleet which he had, for all the purposes of the expedition, made himself, with crews he had trained, and soldiers whom he had taught and drilled, he first encountered and beat off an English fleet inferior, indeed, in the actual number of the ships, but far superior in weight of metal ; then, re-fitting and re-arming at Pondichery, he sailed out to encounter once more the English squadron. Not daring to accept his challenge to an engagement, they fled before him, and he, having thus obtained the mastery of the seas, sailed then to attack the stronghold of the English on the Coromandel Coast. Taking it without the loss of a man, he heard very soon afterwards of the arrival of a reinforcement of three ships, armed as ships of war, at Pondichery ! What a position did that give him ! Conqueror of Madras, master of the ocean, with no one to oppose his onward progress, with a Governor General at Pondichery who was constantly impressing upon him the necessity of rooting out the English from every settlement in India, he might have sailed up the Hooghly, have conquered Calcutta, and have destroyed English commerce in the Indian seas. In acting thus, he would have fulfilled the very purpose of his mission ; he would have carried out the most cherished dreams of his life. Why, then, did he not effect this ? The answer is to be found in the motives which we have unveiled. It was partly, we believe, chiefly, because though he had triumphed over difficulties, such as would have baffled most men, though he had conquered enemies on shore, and driven every rival from the sea, he had not overcome himself.

Yet, there was another reason too, which it is impossible to ignore. The price of the ransom-treaty of Madras, even if it had no acknowledged influence on his conduct, stimulated nevertheless, by its demoralizing power, that spirit of rebellious pride, which led him first to oppose every order which would have set aside the treaty that he had concluded, and afterwards to assume a position, as defiant as it was unbecoming, as baneful to the interest of France, as it was prejudicial to his own character.

And yet it is not France that has the right to pronounce upon him severe judgment. Left by France to himself, he had civilized for her one great island in the Indian Ocean, and, making resources for himself, had done what none other of her sons has ever succeeded in doing,—had subdued the chief settlement of her great rival. Even that great fault,—great inasmuch as it led to greater,—the acceptance of a present as the price of the treaty of ransom, was after all but a compliance with customs that were common enough in India, and which, in one shape or other, few commanders of that age, whether they came from England, from France, or from Hindostan, were virtuous enough to resist. If, then, the recollection of the struggles, partly the consequence of this fault, for supreme power with Dupleix, cannot entirely be obliterated, we may at least prefer to dwell on the great triumph we have alluded to,—on the unsurpassed energy, daring, and strength of will, by which alone it could have been achieved !

He has now, at the epoch of which we are writing, gazed for the last time on the scene of his triumphs. No more was he to be called upon to strike a blow for French India. Arriving in the Isle of France, in the beginning of December, he found a successor, M. David, installed there, with orders to leave to La Bourdonnais the command of the fleet, only in case he found the accounts of his Government in proper order.

M. David having pronounced favourably in this respect, La Bourdonnais was placed in command of the squadron, and directed to proceed to France, taking Martinique on the way. A storm shattered his ships off the Cape of Good Hope, but he succeeded, with four of them, in gaining Martinique. Here he learned that the homeward route was barred by English cruisers, whom it would be impossible to avoid, and who were too numerous to contend against. Impatient, however, to arrive in France to justify himself, he proceeded under a feigned name to St. Eustache, converted all his property into jewels,*

* Madame de La Bourdonnais embarked in a Portuguese ship with most of these jewels, and arrived safely in Lisbon ; thence she proceeded to Paris.

and took a passage in a Dutch ship. War, however, had been declared between England and Holland, and the Dutch vessel was taken, and carried into an English port. Here La Bourdonnais was recognized, and was at once constituted prisoner of war.

His reception in London, whither he was taken, was, however, most flattering to him. Regarded as the champion of English interests in India,—a poor compliment to a French admiral,—testimonies of esteem and regard were showered upon him. He was at once allowed his freedom and permission to return to France on parole, and he was treated by the Royal family, the Directors of the East India Company, and others, with the greatest distinction. Hearing, however, that his own Government and the Directors were incensed against him, he resolved to proceed without delay to France.

La Bourdonnais left London on the 22nd February 1748, and, in a few days, found himself at Versailles. Here, however, a very different reception awaited him. Louis XV, King of France, in the very height of his sensual career, had no thought but for the gratification of his palled and jaded appetites. The reigning favourite, Jeanne Antoinette Poisson, Madame d'Etioles, the supposed daughter of a clerk in a mercantile house, created by the King, Marquise de Pompadour, held in her hands the whole direction of affairs. Such was the destiny of the France of Louis XV, that the fate of her armies, the fame and fortune of her generals and admirals, the prosperity of her citizens, depended on the absolute voice of one shameless woman. Caring only for power, she maintained her influence over the king by ministering, by means of others to his debaucheries, whilst he signed the decrees that she had ordered to be prepared. The ministers were her creatures. Orry, whom she had disgraced, and who had died the previous year, had been succeeded, as we have already seen, by Machault, a man of little experience, as Controller-General of Finances, whilst the Chief Directorship of the Navy had been conferred upon Le Normand de Tournem, a subordinate in the Revenue Department, and the reputed father of the favourite.

Under such a regime justice was not even thought of. It being the object of Madame de Pompadour to consolidate her own power, she cared only for those whose wealth and influence could be useful to her. In her hatred, she was vindictive and remorseless. Many a man expiated a trifling wound to her vanity, or a thoughtless sarcasm on her position, by a life of imprisonment in the Bastille. She possessed a cold and

callous heart, utterly incapable of sympathy or feeling. The selfish and animal nature of the King she new thoroughly, and she managed him with an art that brought him quite under her control. Not that he loved her. Love was a feeling of which Louis XV was incapable. Cold-blooded, indeed, must have been the man who, as the remains of the woman with whom, and under whose influence he had lived for nineteen years, were being carried in a drizzling rain to the grave, could jocularly remark—"The marchioness has bad weather for her journey." Yet over that cold selfish nature she possessed complete mastery. Though he was often aware, and disapproved of, the tendency of her projects, he never had sufficient energy even to remonstrate against them. She provided him with debauchery in the *Parc aux Cerfs*, and he left to her unlimited and unfettered action.

Such were the rulers of the France to which La Bourdonnais returned, proposing first to clear his character, and secondly, to suggest new operations for the extensions of French territory. But he returned to a France which was not even the France of Fleury, nerveless and palsied as he had considered that to be. The France of 1748 used the spasmodic vitality she possessed chiefly against her own children. La Bourdonnais arrived to find himself the object of the most serious accusations,—accusations which the office-holders, who registered the decrees of Madame de Pompadour, regarded as fully proved by the fact that they had been preferred. He was accused of having disregarded the King's orders, of having entered into a secret understanding with the enemy, and of having diverted to his own use the funds of the Company. No explanation was listened to, or rather all means of explanation were denied to him. He was thrown into the Bastille. Permission to see his wife and children was denied him. Paper and ink were withheld from him, and this great soldier, whose active spirit had found the outer world not too wide for its conceptions, was shut up for three years in a narrow cell, whilst the charges against him were examined, according to the tedious forms of the period, before a Commission. But the spirit of La Bourdonnais could not be idle even in a prison. He devised means to write his memoirs. Handkerchiefs steeped in rice-water served him for paper, coffee dregs for ink, and he made a pen out of a piece of copper money, which he flattened out, rolled up, and pointed. At the end of three years, the Commission solemnly declared his innocence, and the gates of the Bastille were opened to him. But it was then too late. Paralysis of one side had resulted from his long confinement,

and his general health had been undermined. His affairs, too, compulsorily neglected, were in a state of disorder. Indignation at such a reward for his services increased the malady which confinement had induced. It had, in fact, broken his heart. His release, therefore, brought him but little benefit. A few months later, the 9th September 1753, he died, the first Franko-Indian victim,—the first out of others who were to follow,—to the misgovernment of Louis XV.

But it may be objected that a man who could act as we have described La Bourdonnais to have acted, can scarcely with propriety be styled “a victim,”—that he who could make the honour and glory of his country, second to his own interests and his own ambition, more deserved the designation and punishment of traitor, than merited commiseration. Undoubtedly that might have been so, had his contemporaries enjoyed the same opportunity that we have, of prying into the inner heart of the man, of searching out his secret motives. But, in considering the conduct of France towards La Bourdonnais, we must always recollect that the charge, which in these days is considered the gravest against him, *viz.*, that of receiving a bribe to agree to the ransom of Madras, was but lightly pressed, was supported by no proof, and was never believed. He stood before his countrymen, as a man who had sacrificed his every energy to promote the glory of France, and who had failed in consequence of the jealousy of others. It was that failure, no matter how brought about, which constituted his real crime in the eyes of the palsied administration of Louis XV. A Government, such as that was, cares for nothing, looks at nothing, but results. Its administrators may have been culpably careless themselves, they may have neglected every necessary provision for success, they may even, by their incapacity, have made success impossible, but, notwithstanding, they do not the less force the responsibility of the result on the man whom they employ. They save themselves by making of him a victim.

As to the fault itself, nothing is further from our intention than to attempt to excuse or to extenuate it. Yet, in justice to La Bourdonnais, it must be recorded that the fault was less his, than of the age in which he lived. Whilst we lament his weakness in this respect, let us remember how few of our own early Indian administrators were clean-handed. After reading the account of the vast sums paid to the conqueror of Plassey by Meer Jaffier for his elevation, of the bribes then offered by Meer Kassim, and accepted by the members of Council to dethrone that same Meer Jaffier in favour of himself, and then, of the presents in hard coin paid by Meer Jaffier for his restoration, we

may then be disposed to judge La Bourdonnais by the more lenient code that obtained in the earlier period of British conquest of India, and, if we cannot acquit him entirely, we must at least be forced to the admission, that there were few men, in that age, who would have been proof against a similar temptation.

It is our own belief, founded upon a diligent study of all the papers that have been written on this question, of the accusations and retorts, the charges and the defence, that whilst La Bourdonnais accepted the bonds for the amount intended as a private present to himself, he was not, consciously to himself, influenced by their receipt. The fact is, he was naturally disposed to rebel against authority on the spot superior to his own. The orders he had received from France gave a colour to the view, upon which he insisted, that he was supreme everywhere, except within the walls of Pondichery and its dependencies, and, in his impatience under restraint, he would read those orders only in the light most favourable to his own wishes. We do not doubt that the money consideration really helped to drive him on in the course which led to an open breach with the civil power. But his mind was so full of the consciousness of his own dignity, he chafed so much against orders, he had become so blind to what ought to have been to him the simple line of duty, and so bent on asserting his own rights, that we can well believe he would himself have repelled with sincere indignation the charge that he was really fighting to secure a bribe. We have had instances in our own day of the strange forgetfulness of propriety that can be displayed by men, who, in other points, might claim to be regarded as great men, when they are baulked in the course they have planned out for themselves. It matters little what is the cause, but the fact is undeniable, that when once a man gives himself to the sway of his passions, he is like a steed without a rider. The greater his capacities, the more headlong, the more dangerous will be his course. His manly sense of honour, his chivalry of nature, leave him as if by order. He stoops to acts which he would scorn in others, which, in the possession of his right senses, he would scorn in himself. He looks only at the end. Reckless as to the means, he presses into his service the meannesses which come readily at his call, blinding his eyes to their nature. Happy the man, to whom a sudden revelation discloses the abyss upon the brink of which he is acting, whom a knowledge of the means he is employing recalls, before it be too late, to himself! To La Bourdonnais, alas! no such perception of danger was granted, and, in his struggle for power, he lost, by his

protracted stay at Madras, the best chance of completing the work of François Martin.

Meanwhile, his rival remains at Pondichery, master of Madras, master even, for the moment, of the seas. His policy has triumphed, but yet dangers seem to be rising upon two sides of him.

On the one side, England, alarmed at the loss of Madras, is making super-human efforts to retaliate on Pondichery. On the other, the Nawab of the Carnatic, jealous of French aggrandisement, is demanding with eager messages, the surrender to himself of Madras, the renunciation of further, designs of conquest, and threatening hostilities in case of refusal. In our next number will be recorded the consummate skill by which Pondichery was preserved, Madras retained, and which planned the first direct blow for a French Empire in India.

THE FIRST STRUGGLE IN THE CARNATIC.

1. *Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives.* Paris, 1759.
2. *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from the year 1745,* by Robert Orme, Esq., F. A. S., 1803.
3. *Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre,* par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844.
4. *Inde,* par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.
5. *The History of British India.* By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, John Madden and Co., Leadenhall Street, 1851.
6. *The National Review*, Volume XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193, Piccadilly, 1862.
7. *Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862.
8. *An authentic account of the late Admiral Boscawen during the time he commanded in Coromandel, and of the transactions of the fleet and army under his command.* Asiatic Annual Register, 1802.

THE mode in which Dupleix had purchased the consent of the Nawab of the Carnatic to the prosecution of his plans against Madras has been already recorded. With one great end in view,—that of wresting Madras from the English,—he had, during a crisis, which might otherwise have been fatal, sacrificed the less important portion of the scheme, and renouncing extension of territory for his own countrymen, had promised the Nawab to resign to him the conquests he should achieve. We have given our reasons why we believe Dupleix to have been sincere in this engagement. In his letter on the subject to * La Bourdonnais,—a letter intended for no other eye,—he had ex-

* In the last number of this *Review*, page 449, we gave in a note our reasons for asserting that La Bourdonnais had been offered and had accepted a bond for 1,00,000 pagodas as an inducement to allow Madras to be ransomed. Since that article appeared, we have received, through the courtesy of a friend who has examined the documents, the strongest confirmation of this statement. It is clear from one of the India House records, Law Case No. 31, dated 3rd March 1752, that the Court of Directors of that day were

pressed his intention to resign the town to the Nawab after demolishing its fortifications, and he had used this as a reason why it would be impossible for him to agree to any terms regarding ransom with the English. We have seen how the obstinacy of La Bourdonnais had for a long time prevented the accomplishment of these designs,—how, from the date of the capitulation, the 21st of September, to his departure from Madras, on the 23rd of October, that impetuous and self-willed officer had kept Madras in his own hands, and how, therefore during that time, and for a week subsequently, the entire attention of Dupleix had been devoted to obtaining possession of the place, which had been conquered only to be kept from him. We have seen, too, how fatal the delay had been to him in one respect,—the destruction of the fleet which had been at once his mainstay for defence, and the power upon which he counted for future blows against the English. Yet, damaging as had been the result in that respect, it sank into apparent insignificance when contrasted with the effect it had upon the suspicious mind of the Asiatic who had trusted him, only, it would seem, to be deceived.

The fact, indeed, that upwards of five weeks had elapsed since the French flag had first floated over the ramparts of Fort St. George, and that there were no indications of lowering it to make way for the flag of the Mogul, was in itself a circumstance more than sufficient to justify the doubt which Anwar-ooddeen was beginning to display. The quarrel between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais would naturally appear but a shallow and transparent artifice, invented for the purpose of cheating him out of his promised gains. It was enough for him that Madras continued French; to the name of the Frenchman who commanded there he was indifferent. His engagement had been made with the Governor of the French possessions in India, and to that Governor he looked for its absolute and literal fulfilment.

When, however, day succeeded day, and week followed week, and he received, instead of Madras, excuses founded upon the alleged insubordinate behaviour of the French official in command at Madras, the patience of the Nawab began to give way. Who were these French, he asked, these foreigners who had been so submissive and compliant, that they should thus not only beard him to his face, but should use him as a tool wherewith to effect their purposes? Upon what force did they rely to enable them

convinced, on the testimony of Madras Members of Council, that La Bourdonnais was promised, by bond, 1,000,000 pagodas, over and above the 1,000,000 pagodas stipulated in the bond given him for public use, in consideration of his ransoming Madras. The statement may now, therefore be accepted as an historical fact.

to carry out their daring resolves? If they had a few hundred European and two or three thousand native soldiers, he could bring into the field twenty men to their one, and, against the means which the possession of a few places on the coast might make available for them, he could wield the resources of the entire province of the Carnatic. He would teach these faithless Europeans to know their place and to respect his power, and if they should hesitate longer to carry out their engagement, he would compel its fulfilment by force of arms. At this determination Anwarodeen had arrived long before La Bourdonnais had made over his conquest to Desprémesnil. He had even sent a detachment of his troops to the vicinity of Madras, there to remain until it should be joined by the main body. This main body, in number about 10,000 and commanded by Maphuz Khan, eldest son of the Nawab, followed very shortly after, and encamped under the walls of Madras about the same date as that on which La Bourdonnais bade a final farewell to the roadstead of Pondichery.

This then was the first great difficulty which it fell to the lot of Dupleix to encounter after the departure of his rival. Let us consider for a moment what was actually his position. He had promised to make over Madras to the Nawab, but he had resolved, at the time he made that promise, first to demolish its fortifications. The insubordination of La Bourdonnais had prevented the possibility of doing one or the other before the 21st September, and on that date his lieutenant, Desprémesnil, found himself threatened by the troops of the Nawab. He was, on the other hand, embarrassed by the engagements into which La Bourdonnais had entered with the English, and with which, although he had not ratified them, it would now be incumbent on him to deal in a decided manner. There was thus presented to him a complication of difficulties such as might appal a mere ordinary mortal. Yet Dupleix set himself to meet them in the clear and logical manner natural to his well-ordered intellect. Of all the difficulties we have enumerated, that caused by the threatening attitude of the Nawab, was the most pressing. This, therefore, he set himself in the first instance to encounter. No man was more sensible than he of the very delicate nature of the task which thus lay before him. He had, indeed, promised to make over Madras to the Nawab, intending, as we know, to make it over in a dismantled state. But being now for the first time in a position to perform the promise, he was prevented from accompanying that performance by the dismantling which, in his opinion, was a most necessary adjunct to it, and the more so, because Madras was at that moment invested by the Nawab. To dismantle Madras in the presence

of the army of Maphuz Khan, would have roused in the breast of the Nawab an indignation equal to that which had been already kindled by abstaining from surrendering it. To make over Madras, on the other hand, with its fortifications still standing would, he considered, be an act of treachery to French interests. It would be in that case, he felt, in the power of the Nawab to make his terms with the English, and to re-sell them a place which the French had conquered with the view of the permanent expulsion of that nation from the Coromandel Coast. To such a line of conduct Dupleix could never reconcile himself. In the temper of the Nawab, however, any other course was fraught with danger. That danger and the possible disaster consequent upon it were, however, in the eyes of Dupleix, less formidable than the certain danger and certain disaster attendant upon an abject submission to the threats of the Nawab. He resolved, therefore, to risk the fury of his wrath rather than surrender French interests to his mercy, and to retain Madras for himself, rather than make it over with its fortifications undestroyed. But while he came to this fixed resolution, he determined to employ every art, to exhaust every device, to induce the Nawab to forego his claim, and to avert those hostilities with the satrap of the Mogul, which now, for the first time, seemed to threaten the French colony. As to his promise, he considered himself absolved from its performance by the fact, that the Nawab was now endeavouring to obtain by force of arms that which Dupleix, if left to himself, would have been willing, on the earliest possible occasion compatible with his own security, to concede.

Having resolved on this course, Dupleix sent instructions to Desprémesnil to keep Madras at all hazards, but to refrain from any act of hostility towards the troops of Maphuz Khan, beyond those which would necessarily result from the defence of the place. The French troops who garrisoned Madras amounted to between five and six hundred Europeans, and about the same number of natives disciplined in the European fashion. In obedience to the orders received from Dupleix, the governor, Desprémesnil withdrew the whole of these troops within the walls on the approach of the enemy, with the intention of confining himself strictly to the defence of the town. But as Maphuz Khan showed himself very earnest in his attack, and in the course of a few days reduced the garrison to some difficulties, by cutting off from them the only spring which supplied them with good water, Desprémesnil found it necessary to abandon this cautious policy, and to try the effect of a sortie. On the 2nd November therefore, early in

the morning, he detached a body of 400 men, accompanied by two field-pieces, to attack that portion of the enemy's army which had gained possession of the spring. As this handful of men advanced, the guns following close in their rear, to encounter, as it seemed, certain destruction from the overwhelming force of the Moguls, the enemy's cavalry hastily collected and galloped towards them with the intention of riding them down. Still steadily, undaunted by the imposing array of the squadrons charging towards them, the French advanced. When, however, they judged the enemy to have arrived within point-blank range, they opened out from the centre, uncovering the field-pieces, and halted. The fresh discharge from the two guns went straight into the mass of the hostile cavalry, killing some of the foremost horses. This caused a temporary confusion and halt, which gave the French time to load again. The enemy, unaccustomed to such rapid firing, knowing so little of the European practice of artillery as to consider one shot in a quarter of an hour excellent practice, were confounded at this second discharge. Instead, then, of taking advantage of it to charge home, they halted to look on in mingled doubt, wonder, and fear. But when a third discharge succeeded a second, and a fourth a third, all carrying destruction into their ranks, they hesitated no longer. Terrified at this novel mode of warfare they fled precipitately, leaving their tents and baggage a prey to the conqueror. They lost from this canonade about seventy men, whilst amongst the French not a man was even wounded.

Meanwhile, Dupleix had been not less indefatigable at Pondichery. The accounts he received as to the reality and earnestness of the attack on Madras, had convinced him likewise that persistence in a purely defensive line of action would be highly impolitic, and he had determined to effect a diversion by threatening the enemy's camp from the side of Pondichery, with the view of compelling him to raise the siege. The command of the detachment which was to effect this end, and which numbered about 230 Europeans and 700 native sepoys, he entrusted to Paradis, the most capable officer under his orders.

The news of the march of this detachment reached Maphuz Khan immediately after the defeat of his cavalry by the Madras garrison. He appears to have instantly taken a resolution worthy of a greater commander. This was to march with the bulk of his force to intercept and destroy the small detachment, before an opportunity should be afforded it of opening communications with the garrison of Madras. With this view, he marched to St. Thomé, and took up a position on the northern bank of the little river Adyar, which runs into the sea on its

southern side, and which it would be necessary for Paradis to cross in order to communicate with Madras.

On the morning of the 4th November, Paradis came in sight of the host of the Nawab, numbering nearly ten thousand men, posted on the north bank of the river, their position covered by guns. He had no guns, but he was a man of a stern and resolute nature, prompt in his decisions, and losing no time in carrying them into effect. He was little startled by the sight before him. His orders were to open communication with Madras, and these he could not carry out by either halting or retreating. He therefore resolved to cut his way through the enemy. Without waiting to reconnoitre, he dashed into the river, which he knew to be fordable, scrambled up the bank in face of the enemy's guns, then halting to deliver one volley, ordered a charge. The effect was electric. The enemy at once gave way, and retreated in terrible confusion into the town, from behind the defences of which they attempted to offer a new resistance. But Paradis was not the man to leave half his work undone. He followed the enemy with vigour, and halting in front of the town, poured in volley after volley on the masses jumbled together in the crowded streets. These had but one thought—to escape. Their very numbers, however, impeded their movement in any direction, and it was not until after many of them had fallen, that they succeeded in extricating themselves from their position. Hardly had they accomplished this, however, when they found themselves assailed by another enemy. The garrison of Madras has hastened on the first intimation of the approach of Paradis, to march to his aid. They arrived in time to intercept the retreating masses of the Nawab's army, and to convert their defeat into an utter and demoralising rout. Their General, Maphuz Khan, had fled on the first charge of the French; the body of men who formed his army, without a leader, and terror-stricken by their crushing overthrow, at once gave up all thoughts of gaining Madras, and did not halt till they had traversed many miles from that place in the direction of Arcot.

It may be well asserted that of all the decisive actions that ever were fought, there is not one more memorable than this. Not indeed that there has not since been displayed a daring equal to that of Paradis, or that numbers as disproportionate have not within the memory of the living achieved a victory as important. The circumstance which stamps this action as so memorable, is that it was the very first of its kind, that it proved, to the surprise of both parties, the absolute and overwhelming superiority of the disciplined European soldiers over his Asiatic rival.

Up to that time the native princes of India had by virtue of their position as lords of the soil, or as satraps of the Mogul, of their numerous following, their acknowledged power, arrogated to themselves a superiority which none of the European settlers had ever thought of disputing. With the French, as we have seen, it had been a maxim of settled policy to avoid even the semblance of hostility towards them. We have noticed how Martin and Dumas and Dupleix had toiled to effect this end. When at last Dupleix, to avoid a more dangerous contingency, accepted this dreaded alternative, he did so more in the hope that he might find some means of pacifying the Nawab, whilst the siege was in progress, than in any expectation of routing him in the field. And now suddenly, unexpectedly, this result had been achieved. From being the suppliants of the Nawab of the Carnatic,—the vassals whose very movements depended upon his license,—they in a moment found themselves, in reality, his superiors. This action at St. Thomé, in fact, completely reversed the positions of the Nawab and the French Governor. Not only that, but it inaugurated a new era, it introduced a fresh order of things : it was the first decided step to the conquest of Hindostan by an European power. Whether that power were French or English would depend upon the relative strength of either nation, and even more on the character of the men by whom that strength should be put in action. The battle which introduced this change was one then that well deserves to be remembered, and, in remembering it, let us not, who are English, forget to record that the merit of it is due, solely and entirely, to that great nation which fought with us the battle of empire on Indian soil, and did not win it.

To Dupleix this great victory presented the means of extricating himself from all his difficulties. He now found himself able to carry out the plans which he had conceived at the time of the capture of Madras by La Bourdonnais. The conduct of the Nawab in declaring war against him, in besieging Madras, and in endeavouring to intercept and destroy his little army, had quite cancelled the obligation under which he had placed himself to make over to him his conquest. That difficulty had been happily surmounted. Nor did the other, bequeathed to him by La Bourdonnais, that of restoring Madras to the English, present any longer an obstacle. He had never ratified the unauthorised engagements into which La Bourdonnais had entered. To him they were as though they had never been made. Madras, he knew well, would have surrendered at the same time, or at the utmost a day later, had no reference been made to a ransom. The place was not at the time capable of further defence. He

regarded it therefore as his conquest, as a lawful prize to French valour, and he determined, now that he possessed the power, to use it for the interests of France, regardless of those engagements into which La Bourdonnais had been lured, and which he had never sanctioned.

No sooner, then, had he received intimation of the utter defeat of the Nawab's army, and of the triumphant relief of Madras, than he appointed Paradis Military Governor of that place, instead of Desprémesnil, who as a civilian would not, he considered, exercise sufficient authority over the troops, and instructed him to issue a declaration, proclaiming Madras to be French by right of conquest, and disavowing all engagements entered into by La Bourdonnais as null and void.

Paradis was not slow to act upon his orders. He had beaten the Nawab's army on the 4th November, and had entered Madras the same day. On the 9th he received his instructions, and on the 10th he issued his proclamation. In this, he annulled La Bourdonnais' ransom-treaty; declared all the merchandize, provisions, warlike stores, and horses to be French property, and ordered all the English residents who would not take the oath of allegiance to the French, to quit the town within four days. On the other hand, the English were permitted to dispose of their moveables, clothes and jewels, and they were simply required not to serve against the French till they should be exchanged. Governor Morse and the other officials were conveyed as prisoners to Pondichery, where, however, they were treated with the greatest courtesy and consideration. * The entire English community had, indeed, protested against the high-handed proceeding of Paradis, and some of its members had even made their escape to Fort St. David. Amongst those who adopted this course was a young writer named Robert Clive.

Fort St. David, about 12 miles south of Pondichery, and about two north of Cuddalore, had been purchased by the English in the year 1691, and had been, by degrees, fairly fortified. Its strength for purposes of resistance was increased by its proximity to Cuddalore, which was fortified on three sides, that facing the sea being alone undefended. It had now become by the capture of Madras, the English seat of Government, and those who occupied the chief places of authority were animated by a

* Mr. Orme declares that the English prisoners were marched in ostentatious procession through the streets of Pondichery, but he gives no authority for his statement. The fact is, that the English prisoners were treated with the greatest consideration. The story of the procession was invented by La Bourdonnais, who had left Pondichery long before the prisoners arrived.

resolute determination to defend it to the last extremity,—even to invoke, for that purpose, the aid of the native chieftains.

It was indeed high time that they should do something, for Dupleix had resolved that their last place of refuge should be his next conquest. This great statesman, in fact, believed that now, after all the vicissitudes of his career, after all the trials he had been subjected to, he had at last found his opportunity. Madras in his possession, free from all fear of effectual interference on the part of the Nawab, what was there to hinder him from carrying out his darling plan of expelling the English from that coast? To bring matters to their present point, he had risked the contest with La Bourdonnais, the fury of the ruler of the Carnatic, and now, having attained that end, he felt his hands free to push his advantage to its utmost limit, and to strike at Fort St. David. With his accustomed promptitude, he determined to carry out this plan without any loss of time,—a determination the more necessary, as he fully expected that a few months would deprive him of the advantage which he then possessed of the mastery at sea.

The command of this expedition Dupleix intended to entrust to the officer whom of all under his orders he considered the most capable. This was Paradis. To him, therefore, he sent instructions to return to Pondichery with all the troops he could spare, so soon as he should have settled the affairs of Madras. It was not before the first week of December, however, that Paradis was able to move. Leaving then the bulk of the garrison behind him, he marched on that day at the head of 300 men, escorting the plunder of Madras, in the direction of Pondichery.

These proceedings on the part of the French did not escape the attention of the Nawab. The month that had elapsed since the defeat at St. Thomé had very much effaced the sharper stings of the lesson the Moguls had then received. Maphuz Khan, especially, burned with impatience to efface the galling recollection of that day's defeat. No better opportunity, he thought, would present itself than that which seemed now about to offer, when a body of three hundred men should be embarrassed by the numerous coolies laden with the plunder which they were escorting. Impressed with these ideas, he assembled a body of 3,000 foot, and 2,000 horse, the flower of his army, and took up a position at the little village of Konetur, thirty-two miles south of Madras, through which he knew that the French detachment must pass. Paradis was marching in a careless style, unsuspecting of the vicinity of an enemy. He had divided his force into two bodies, an advance party and rear

guard, and between these were the coolies. Suddenly the cavalry of Maphuz Khan appeared upon the plain, and made as though they would attack the rear guard. The attitude of the French, however, shook their resolution, and they contented themselves with hovering about in the vicinity, dashing at stragglers, and forcing the troops who composed the rear guard to constant formations. Uneasy at this, and fearing to be overtaken by night before he should reach the Dutch settlement of Sadras, Paradis at once altered his order of marching. Sending the coolies in front of the troops, he covered these with the body that had formed his advanced guard, and with these hastened on to that place. The rear guard, meanwhile, had the task assigned it of proceeding at a more leisurely pace, so as to engage the attention of the enemy. This manœuvre answered all his expectations. The first detachment with the coolies reached Sadras without the loss of a man, whilst of the second, only twelve men were captured, and these more from a disposition to loiter than from the fault of the Commander. Arriving at Sadras, he halted until he should receive further reinforcements from Pondichery. On the arrival of these he marched without molestation to join the main encampment of the French army at Ariancopan, two miles south of Pondichery. Here he arrived on the 17th December. Maphuz Khan, for his part, finding it impossible to gain any material advantage over the French troops, had desisted from his attempts after the arrival of the French at Sadras.

The junction of Paradis completed all the preparations of Dupleix. With a force of about 900 Europeans, 600 natives, 100 Africans, six field-pieces and six mortars, he was, it appeared, absolutely master of the coast. The English garrison of Fort St. David numbered but 200 Europeans and half the number of natives. The French too, had all the inspiration of recent victory. The success of the intended expedition seemed certain, far more certain in fact, than the success of La Bourdonnais had appeared at the period of his attack upon Madras. No one knew better, however, than Dupleix that, in spite of all favourable appearances, one necessary element of success was yet wanting. He had the soldiers, the guns, the munitions of war, but had he the General? This was the one want without which the success which seemed to be his would yet slip from his grasp. He knew this well, and with his accustomed energy, he set himself to supply it.

The Commander-in-Chief of the French troops in Pondichery at this time was General De Bury, an officer not only old, but possessing the worst characteristics of age. To entrust the command of the expedition to such a man was, Dupleix felt, to

ensure its failure. Yet, as the senior, he had the right to command. On the other hand, there was Paradis, the hero of St. Thomé, an engineer by profession, and a man whose courage and capacity were established. In his hands the expedition would have the best chance of success. To give the command to Paradis, therefore, all the efforts of Dupleix were directed.

Unfortunately for France, for himself, he did not succeed. There were other officers between Paradis and De Bury, and these protested against such a supersession. His Swiss birth, his inferior rank, the jealousy which his recent success had caused amongst the small-minded, all contributed to hinder the elevation of Paradis, and in the presence of the great discontent which the proposals excited, Dupleix was, at last, forced to abandon the idea.

Under the command of De Bury, therefore, the force marched on the night of the 19th December, crossed the river Punar the following morning with but little opposition, and took possession of a walled garden, about a mile and a half to the north-west of Fort St. David. Here deeming themselves secure, and being fatigued and hungry from their march, the troops lodged their arms, and prepared to cook their dinners.

It is time now that we should turn to the movements of the English. Irritated by the high-handed proceedings of Dupleix at Madras, by the abrogation of the treaty, these had resolved to undergo any extremity rather than surrender. In addition to the garrison of 300 men, to which we have adverted, they had taken into their service 1,000 irregular native troops, known then by the name of peons, and, what was of more importance, they had entered into an intimate alliance with the Nawab. In concert with him, it had been agreed that, whilst the French should be engaged in the attack on Fort St. David and Cuddalore, both which they were determined to defend to the utmost, he should suddenly seize that opportunity to attack them, and place them between two fires.

It is probable that, had the French been led by a general of even ordinary capacity, this attack would have failed, but De Bury was wanting in all the qualities that go to form a general. In taking possession of the garden, and allowing his troops to disperse to cook their morning meal, he considered he had quite sufficiently acted his part. He took no care that pickets were told off, or that sentries were posted. Not a single man was therefore on the look out. He did not even himself suspect the capabilities of the position he was occupying. Carelessly giving himself to the repose which his age required, he acted, and allowed his soldiers to act, as though he and they had just

completed an ordinary march, in a time of peace, through a friendly country.

Rightly was he punished for this neglect. His men were dispersed, their arms grounded, he himself taking his repose, when suddenly the alarm was given that the enemy were upon them. A panic seized them. Grasping at the first weapon that was at hand, some indeed half-dressed, they rushed *pell-mell* to quit a place which they might have defended against the Nawab's whole army. Their one thought was to reach and cross the river, and towards it they ran without order or array. But the enemy, who were 6,000 horse and 3,000 foot of the Nawab's army, commanded by his two sons, were there before them. Notwithstanding this, the French rushed recklessly into the river, impatient only to gain the opposite bank. Fortunately for them, their artillery, which was admirably handled, and to the troops composing which the panic had not extended, kept the enemy at a distance. More than that, its commander not content with covering the disordered retreat of the infantry, deliberately transported his own guns one by one, in face of the enemy, and, when on the other bank, served them so as to keep the Moguls at bay. It was not until the French had retreated for upwards of two hours, that the natives could be prevailed upon to pursue them, and then only after they had been urged by the English garrison of Fort St. David, which had arrived too late to take any part in the skirmish at the river Punar. Their pursuit, even when they did enter upon it, was fruitless in results. The French had long before recovered from their panic, and the attitude they presented on the approach of the enemy, made the Mogul princes think rather of their own safety than of an attack on their position. M. De Bury on his part was equally indisposed to expose his army to further risks. As soon, therefore, as the allied force of the English and Moguls commenced a retrograde movement towards Cuddalore, he continued his retreat to Ariancopan, where he arrived the same evening, after having sustained a loss in this ill-conducted expedition of twelve men killed and one hundred and twenty wounded. A small quantity of muskets and stores, which had been left behind in the garden at Cuddalore, fell likewise into the hands of the enemy. He had on his side the satisfaction of having saved all his artillery, and of having killed and wounded of the Nawab's army upwards of two thousand men.

For three weeks after this fruitless expedition, the French army continued in its encampment. Dupleix, however, had not been idle. On the fresh outbreak of hostilities, he had despatched instructions to M. Dordelin, who, it will be remembered, commanded the squadron which had gone to winter at Acheen,

to hasten with his our ships * to the coast. In the expectation of the early arrival of these, he resolved to re-open negotiations with the Nawab, to point out to him the folly of extending further protection to a people, reduced as were the English to the last extremity, and the expediency of maintaining amicable relations with the European power, which, in Europe as in Asia, occupied the first position among nations. That self-interest might aid in inducing the Nawab to lend a willing ear to these proposals, he directed the Commandant of Madras to undertake without delay measures to threaten Arcot with an attack from a French army.

The messengers of Dupleix found the Nawab tired of fruitless hostilities, and not altogether indisposed to enter into an accommodation with the French, though still demanding the execution of the original agreement. To induce him either to decide at once, or to render his decision of less importance, Dupleix determined to endeavour to surprise Cuddalore. On the night of the 10th January, he embarked five hundred men from the camp at Ariancopan in boats for the purpose. The night was dark but fine, Cuddalore was open on the seaside, and everything promised success. But the boats had hardly got through the surf, when a storm arose which forced them to return.

Ten days later, M. Dordelin's squadron arrived. It now seemed to lie in the power of Dupleix to make upon the English settlement a combined attack by sea and land, such as must be fatal. It is difficult to say why the attempt was not made. The importance of it was undoubtedly obvious to Dupleix. It is probable, however, that he was hampered by the character of his naval and military commanders. Dordelin was feeble and unenterprising; De Bury, as we have seen, worn out and incapable.

But though he did not use the squadron for the purpose to which it might, under better auspices, have been directed, its presence on the coast was not absolutely resultless. The Nawab, struck by this accession of force, and learning at the same time that the country round Arcot had been ravaged by the French troops, could no longer resist the conclusion that he had engaged in a struggle which could but end in loss and dishonour to himself; that the English had evidently been abandoned even by their own countrymen, and that every consideration of policy prompted him to accept the offers of the French Governor. He no longer, therefore, continued to insist upon the fulfilment of the agreement regarding Madras, but signed at once a treaty,

* The *Centaure*, the *Brillant*, the *Mars*, and the *St. Louis*.

by which the French were confirmed in possession of all the territories which they then held, and the Nawab agreed to leave the English to their fate. This treaty was ratified by Maphuz Khan in person during a visit of ceremony which he paid to Dupleix at Pondichery, at the end of following February.

Now, at last, the English were apparently in his power. Abandoned by every one, numbering but two hundred, occupying a position little capable of prolonged defence, what could possibly save them? If, at this conjuncture, Dupleix had put into action that great principle of warfare,—a principle applicable alike to all transactions in which men ordinarily engage,—to bring the greatest force to bear on the decisive point of the scene of action, he must have gained his great end. Between the time of Dordelin's arrival, the 20th January, and the visit of Maphuz Khan at the end of February, there had been ample time to carry out an expedition, which must under ordinary circumstances have succeeded. In allowing his fleet and army to remain inactive during this period, we fail to trace the practical ability and fertile genius which so often guided the operations of the French Governor. The inactivity is the more inexplicable as Dupleix well knew that Commodore Peyton's squadron in the Hooghly was waiting only the arrival of reinforcements, then daily expected, to re-assert the predominance of the English power in the Bay of Bengal. It is possible, indeed, that this very knowledge may have contributed to his inaction. We have seen how in his correspondence with La Bourdonnais, he clung to the idea of keeping a reserve of French ships within call of Pondichery. Dordelin's squadron was all that remained to him, and it can be conceived that he hesitated to engage those four ships, under a Commander so wanting in energy and steadfastness, against the batteries of Fort St. David, knowing, as he did, that the northerly breezes which at that season blew down the Bay, might at any moment bring upon them the squadron of Peyton, reinforced by fresh ships from England. It is probable, likewise, that the same consideration urged him, as soon as his negotiations with the Nawab had been brought to a successful close, to despatch that squadron to the safe and neutral anchorage of Goa. This he did on the 19th February.

But whatever were his motives, whether he was influenced by the considerations we have recorded, or by others of which we have no knowledge,* it is certain that he lost a golden opportunity.

* In his memoir, Dupleix does not allude to the possibility of using his ships for the purpose of attacking Cuddalore and Fort St. David, although Cuddalore, at least, was open towards the sea. He seems to have been

He too was fated soon to experience the truth that such opportunities, once granted, are seldom offered a second time ; that, when offered, therefore, they ought to be seized with a promptitude and used with a determination, before which all other considerations should be made to give way.

He did not, however, at all resign the great object of all his political manœuvres. On the contrary, he was more than ever bent on the expulsion of the English from Fort St. David. No sooner then had the accommodation with the Nawab been completed, and the Mogul troops withdrawn, than he summoned a Council of War, placed before it the situation in which he was, the daily expected approach of an English squadron, and the expediency of attempting once more the capture of Fort St. David. He urged at the same time the fitness of Paradis for the command, and pressed upon the assembled officers the necessity of suppressing all considerations of self-interest in the presence of a crisis, calling so much for self-denial and earnest co-operation for a great end, as that which then existed. This appeal to their patriotism was at once heartily responded to, and the French officers consented to acknowledge and obey Paradis as their general.

Before, however, all these preliminaries had been carried out, the garrison of Fort St. David had received a small reinforcement of twenty men, and a considerable supply of money. An English ship decoyed into the Madras roads at the end of November by the sight of the English colours flying over the Fort, and then suddenly attacked, had managed nevertheless* to escape and to make its way to Trincomalee. There, the captain received information of the actual state of affairs on the Coromandel Coast, and thinking he might be able to serve his countrymen, he gallantly resolved to bear up for Fort St. David. He succeeded in this, in spite of the four ships of war under the unenterprising Dordelin, and conveyed to the English garrison a reinforcement of twenty men and £60,000 in silver. This was the more acceptable, as shortly before, another English ship, carrying soldiers and bullion, and consigned to Madras, had touched at Fort St. David, where, deeming the state of the garrison irretrievable, her captain had refused to land either soldiers or money, but had proceeded in all haste to Bengal.

impressed by the idea that as the superiority at sea was about to pass almost immediately to the English, he could not better employ his time than to endeavour to detach the native powers from their alliance.

* Other ships were not so fortunate. One, especially, having on board £60,000 in bullion, besides stores of all sorts, was entrapped into the roadstead in the same manner and there boarded.—*Orme*.

The small reinforcement we have referred to reached Fort St. David on the 2nd March. On the 13th, Paradis put his troops in motion, and marching along the coast, took up a position the same day on the north of the Punar, about a quarter of a mile from the river. The Punar, though in some parts fordable, was in others of a sufficient depth to make crossing in the face of an enemy a difficult operation. Knowing this, the English garrison wisely resolved not to wait for the French within the walls of the fort, but to oppose the passage of the river. They accordingly moved out, took up a position on the southern bank of the Punar, and commenced a brisk cannonade on the French with three field pieces they had brought with them. Paradis, for the time, contented himself with replying, but in the evening he moved with the bulk of his force higher up the river, and crossed it without opposition,—the English volunteers, who had been sent to observe him, retiring on the loss of two of their number, and retreating with the main body within the Fort. Paradis immediately took possession of the walled garden from which De Bury in the former expedition had fled so precipitately, and made his preparations for the attack on the Fort on the following day.

Then was seen, with a clearness incapable of being misunderstood, the terrible, the fatal effect of throwing away an opportunity. From the 16th December to the 13th February, the French army had been idle at Ariancopan. Dordelin's squadron had arrived on the 20th January, and, within ten days of its arrival, the Nawab had signified his intention of withdrawing his support from the English. Had Paradis been allowed to march even a month earlier, on the 13th of February, instead of on the 13th March, he must have been able within those twenty eight days to force his way into Fort St. David. Even one week earlier, and his chances would have been considerable. Whilst Dordelin's squadron might have attacked the open face of Cuddalore with a certainty of mastering it, he might have moved, with an equal confidence of victory, upon Fort St. David. That it would have fallen may be considered certain when we recollect how easily it surrendered, after its defences had been greatly strengthened, some years later to the attack of Lally. Had that been accomplished, the fleets of England would have found no resting place for the soldiers they carried with them on the soil of the Carnatic, and the ineradicable foundation of a French Empire might have been laid.

But it was not to be. The inaction of one month, unexplained, and to our minds inexplicable, threw away that great chance, lost that splendid opportunity. In this one instance

Dupleix acted as though he believed he could count for ever on the favours of fortune. The fickle goddess shewed him in return that she will never continue to help those who decline to help themselves. She aids the daring and skilful warrior, but she leaves him the exercise of his free will. Should he evince carelessness, indecision, or blindness, she leaves him then, and rightly leaves him, to the consequences of his own acts.

On the 14th March, Paradis was in the position, in which, had Dupleix willed it, he might have been early in February. In February he would have had the English garrison, then having received no reinforcement and destitute of supplies, to deal with. But, on the morning of the 14th March, as before making his advance against the Fort, he cast his eyes over the sea, the sight of several vessels, evidently vessels of war, sailing from the north, met his anxious gaze. Who could these strangers be? Not Dordelin and his ships, for Dordelin, he knew, was well on his way to Goa. They could scarcely even be French, for the French had but one vessel in Madras roads. Who could they be, he felt, but the reinforced squadron of Peyton? His uncertainty, if he felt any, did not last long. The hoisting of the Union Jack soon told him that the third expedition against Fort St. David had failed.

It was, indeed, the long expected, long dreaded squadron, reinforced by two ships, one of 60, one of 40 guns, and what was of equal consequence, strengthened by the arrival of a new Commander. This officer, Admiral Griffin, learning at Calcutta the danger which threatened Fort St. David, had sailed without delay to its succour, and thus arrived in time to save it and the English garrison from the fate by which both were threatened. He brought with him as a permanent reinforcement a hundred Europeans from Bengal, but the sailors on board the squadron were capable of affording still more numerous aid.

Under such circumstances but one course remained to Paradis. The arrival of this fleet endangered the safety of Pondichery. His little army constituted the main strength of that place, as well for defence as for attack. Thither, accordingly, he must return. He made up his mind at once, and before the English had recovered from the reaction of joy which the arrival of their ships produced amongst them, he had re-crossed the Punar, and was well on his way to Ariancopan. There he arrived the same evening. A few days after, on the appearance of Admiral Griffin's fleet before Pondichery, he was recalled within the town.

It was now the turn of Dupleix to be cut off from the sea, to be left entirely to his own resources. Not only was a powerful English fleet in the Pondichery roadstead, but ships from England, from Bombay, Tellichery, and other places, continued to bring reinforcements to the garrison of Fort St. David. The three hundred Europeans and natives of which it was composed in January, had increased in July to 2,000, including upwards of 600 Europeans borrowed from the fleet. The friendship of the Nawab, he knew, would always go with the stronger power. Madras had but a small garrison, and any movement of the Nawab's troops would cut off the only possible communication,—that by land,—with Pondichery, whilst that city itself lay exposed to the bombardment, as well as to the blockade, of a powerful squadron. Yet Dupleix was born to shine in adversity. Never did his great qualities appear so great as when he was surrounded by dangers. Though cut off from all communication with the sea, he yet managed to send instructions to Dordelin to proceed, as soon as the monsoon should be over, to the islands, to join his squadron to any French ships that should be there, and to represent to the Governor the necessity under which he himself was of speedy and efficient aid. He held himself, meanwhile, ready not only to defend himself against all attacks, but even, should occasion offer, to retaliate on the enemy.

The possession of the Isles of France and Bourbon, midway between the mother-country and India, gave the French a very great advantage over their English rivals in this early stage of the battle for empire. These islands formed, in fact, the base of the operations, naval and military, which the French undertook in India. Secure, as they were believed to be, against hostile attacks, a French squadron could wait its opportunity in the commodious harbour of Port Louis, could re-fit, and re-victual; and could reckon, almost to a certainty, the changes of meeting or avoiding a hostile fleet. Here single ships could be detained, as they had been in the time of La Bourdonnais, until a sufficient number should be collected; and even should that number prove insufficient for the purpose required, that man, full of energy and resources, had proved the possibility of providing ships from materials which were to be found in the islands themselves. The English possessed no such position. It was only when allied, as they were on the occasion of which we are writing, with the Republic of Holland, that they were able to make use of the Cape of Good Hope, and even to augment their armament from its resources. This uncertain and temporary advantage, however,

liable at times to be rendered nugatory, was not to be compared with the permanent benefit resulting to the inhabitants of Pondichery from the possession of a solid *point d'appui* in the Indian Ocean.

It was to drive from these islands the advantages they were so well capable of affording, that Dupleix despatched Dordelin on his mission. His arrival at the islands in December 1748, was opportune. He found the Governor of Bourbon, M. Bouvet, well inclined to respond to the call, and possessing or expecting the means which would enable him to do so with effect. In fact, one ship of fifty guns, and another of forty had arrived some short time since from France, conveying reinforcements and treasure for Pondichery, and were then shortly expected on their return from a cruise in search of prizes on which they had been despatched to the Malabar coast. Two smaller vessels were in Port Louis ready to sail.

Accidental causes deferred the departure of this squadron now consisting, by the union of the cruising vessels, of seven large ships* and two small ones, from the islands till the beginning of May. M. Bouvet then set sail, and having a fair wind, arrived off Kâlicol about the middle of June. There he learned the superiority in numbers of the English squadron,† and he resolved, instead of hazarding an engagement, the result of which might jeopardize and even ruin French interests in India, to manœuvre so as to delude the English Admiral with the expectation of a contest, and to take advantage of darkness of the night to run on to Madras. It must be admitted that he carried out his plan with exceeding skill. Arriving off Fort St. David, in the afternoon of the 21st, and descriing and being descried by the English squadron, with which, he being to windward, it was optional with him to engage, he altered his course to the south-west, as though he intended to wait for the morning to attack. The English Admiral was so impressed with the idea, that either this or a design to gain Pondichery was his intention, that he took no more advantage of the landwind which blew from off the coast in the evening, than to maintain out at sea the latitude of Fort St. David. But night had no sooner fallen, than the French Admiral again altered his course, and stood up for Madras. Having reached it the following morning, he waited only to land three hundred soldiers, including several that were invalids, and £200,000 in silver; this successfully achieved, he hastened back to the Isle of France, having

* There were one of 74 guns, one of 56, two of 50, two of 40, and one of 26 guns.

† This consisted of three ships of 60 guns, three of 50, three of 40, and one of 20 guns.

completely deceived the English Admiral, and accomplished at least one great part of his purpose.

But the indirect effects of this expedition were greater even than those which were apparent. Ignorant of the course taken by the French fleet, Admiral Griffin left his position off Fort St. David to go in search of it. This intelligence had no sooner reached Dupleix, than he determined to profit by it, and by a bold effort to surprise Cuddalore. To this end he despatched on the 17th June a force of 1,800 men, of whom 800 were Europeans, to make such a detour as would bring them without being observed into the vicinity of that town, upon which they were to fall in the darkness of midnight. But Major Lawrence, who had arrived six months before from England to command the English forces in India, was too well served by his subordinates. He was informed not only of the approach of the French, but of their intentions. He made no secret of the knowledge. Indeed, he openly used it to increase the confidence of the enemy. He ostentatiously removed the garrison and the guns from Cuddalore, and gave out that he intended to confine himself to the defence of Fort St. David. No sooner, however, had night fallen than he threw a strong garrison into the place, and mounted all the guns he could spare upon the ramparts. The French, completely deceived by his movements during the day, made sure of their conquest, and neglected every precaution. At midnight they advanced carelessly towards the place, believing they would meet with only a nominal resistance. But they had scarcely planted their scaling ladders, than they were received with such a fire of grapeshot and small arms, as sent destruction and disorder into their ranks. Utterly confounded and panic-stricken, they retreated in the utmost confusion, scarcely stopping for a halt, till baffled and humiliated, they reached Pondichery.*

Thus for the fourth time was Dupleix forced to renounce his designs upon the last refuge of the English. The fault on this occasion was certainly not his own. An experienced and resolute General at the head of such a force as that of which the French detachment was composed, would have made Major Lawrence bitterly regret his *finesse*. Had the French advanced against Cuddalore, as soon as they observed its walls dismantled and its garrison retreating, the chances in their favour would have been very great. Major Lawrence, and not the French would then have been surprised; the tables would have been turned on the author of the stratagem. But to do this, required a head

* We have been unable to ascertain the name of the officer who commanded the French troops on this occasion.

to devise, a resolution to execute promptly and at the moment. These were wanting in the leader of the French force. A foolish confidence reigned where energy and watchfulness ought to have held sway, and the movement which might have been made fatal to the English was, without thought, without examination, tacitly and complacently permitted by the French leader to become the means of inflicting upon his army a terrible defeat,—upon the French colony a danger that appeared to forebode almost inevitable destruction.

For, in ordering this last attack, Dupleix had a far different purpose than that by which he was promoted in sanctioning those that preceded it. Then he was fighting for empire, he was struggling to expel the English from the coast. But since the last attack for that object, made on the 14th March had been foiled by the arrival of the English fleet, the aspect of affairs had changed. It was not only that Admiral Griffin still remained on the coast, preventing French traffic, obstructing all communication with France; it was not alone that M. Bouvet had appeared off Madras only to land a few soldiers and to return to the island; but since that attack, intelligence had reached Dupleix that the English had fitted out a most formidable fleet and army,—larger than any that had yet appeared in the Indian seas,—with the express object of laying siege to Pondichery, and of retorting upon that city the disaster which had befallen Madras. He knew, from letters received from the French Ministry, that that fleet and army had left England during the preceding November, and might be expected to appear at any moment in the Bay of Bengal. It was, then, in an entirely defensive point of view that he had designed his fourth attack upon Cuddalore. Securing that place, and by its means Fort St. David, during the absence of Admiral Griffin, he would have deprived the English force of any base of operations on the shore, and would have compelled them to attempt, in the face of an enemy, a landing upon a coast which presented natural difficulties of a most formidable character. The carelessness of his officers defeated, however, this well-considered project.

Forced then, once again, to depend upon his own resources, to resign himself to defence, he began, with characteristic energy to strengthen as much as possible, before the enemy should appear, the places which he yet held. Of these, next to Pondichery, the principal was Ariancopan, a small post two miles from Pondichery, and about a mile and a half from the sea. To this place Paradis was sent, in his capacity of chief engineer, with instructions to make it as capable as possible of defence. He executed his instructions in a most effective manner. The fort

itself was a triangle, with but few defences exterior or interior. Paradis set to work to construct three cavaliers within the body of the place, a deep ditch, and a covered way. The care of the works thus fortified was consigned to a young captain, named Law, a nephew of the famous Scotch financier, whose influence on the affairs of the French India Company has been before referred to.

We have already recorded the noble manner in which Dupleix, in the early days of his administration, had devoted himself to the completion of the fortifications of Pondichery.* The fortifications facing the sea, on which he had laboured with so much earnestness, consisted of two demi-bastions, one at each extremity of the face. On the three other sides the city was defended by a wall, and a rampart flanked by eleven bastions. The entire works were surrounded by a ditch and an imperfect glacis.† The side opposite to the sea, facing the interior, was also defended by several low batteries, capable of mounting upwards of one hundred pieces of cannon, and commanding the approaches from that side. Besides these artificial defences, was a formidable natural protection, consisting of a hedge of prickly pear, which beginning on the north side at the sea, a mile from the town, continued a semicircle all round it, until it joined the river Ariancopan, close to the fort of the same name; from that point the river continued the line of defence to the sea. Within this enclosure were cocoanut and palm trees so thickly studded as to render the ground very difficult for the advance of an enemy. Of these fortifications, Paradis after the completion of the defences of Ariancopan, was constituted chief engineer, and charged with the defence.

It will be recollected that on the occasion of the attack upon the French at St. Thomé by the Dutch in 1674, that enterprise owed its success principally to the fact that the Dutch Admiral had succeeded in inducing the King of Golconda to operate by a land attack at the same time; and, that similarly, during the siege of Pondichery in 1693, the Dutch had enlisted in their service a large body of native troops. Dupleix was now warned by the French minister that these tactics would again be pursued that immense efforts would be made to gain over the native

* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXIII, page 155.

† The account of the fortifications of Pondichery, and of the siege generally, so far as relates to the operations of the English, has been taken from the journal of an English officer present at the siege, re-printed in the *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1802, and which Mr. Orme has copied almost *verbatim*.

princes to English interests, and that the English Commandant was well provided with presents for that especial purpose.

Leaving, for a moment, the French Governor, devoting himself to the defence of the territories which he held for his sovereign, and endeavouring, by all the means in his power, to counteract beforehand the effects which the presents of the English were, he well knew, only too likely to produce on the mind of Anwarooddeen, we must turn to the proceedings of that fleet, the departure of which from England had caused so much perturbation and excitement in the French settlement. It was true, indeed, that the English East India Company, indignant at the loss of Madras, had determined to spare no efforts for its recovery, and that the English ministry, sharing the sentiments prevalent at the Indian Board, had promised to aid them with a fleet and army. Of these, when all the other arrangements for their departure had been determined upon the double command was bestowed upon Rear-admiral the Hon^{ble} E. Boscawen, this constituting the second and final occasion, subsequently to the Revolution of 1688, in which two such commands were united.

Admiral Boscawen was a man of birth and character. A grand nephew of the famous Marlborough, he had entered the Navy at the age of twelve years, and passing with credit through all the subordinate grades, had found himself, when only twenty-six years old, captain of a man-of-war. Two years later, the ship which he commanded formed a part of that fleet at the head of which Admiral Vernon took Porto Bello and failed at Carthagen. In these expeditions, only partially successful as they were, captain Boscawen lost no opportunity of distinguishing himself, and he soon acquired a reputation for skill and enterprise such as, combined with his high birth, marked him out for future command.

This was not long in coming to him. When it was decided in England to make a great effort to deliver a counter-stroke for the capture of Madras, Boscawen, then only in his thirty-sixth year, was selected to command the expedition. The instructions he received were, to endeavour to deprive the French of the base of their operations against India, by the capture of the Isles of France and Bourbon, and, succeeding or not in that, to deliver his main blow against Pondichery itself.

On this expedition, with eight ships of war,* and a convoy of eleven ships having on board 1,400 regular troops, Boscawen

* The fleet was composed of one ship of 74 guns, one of 64, two of 60, two of 50, one of 20, a sloop of 14 guns, a bomb-ketch with her tender, and a hospital ship.—*Orme*.

left England on the 15th November 1747. The greater number of these reached the Cape of Good Hope on the 9th of April of the following year. The remainder arrived sixteen days later, but it was not till the 19th May that the Admiral left Table Bay for the islands. He had received here, however, a considerable accession of force in six ships and 400 soldiers belonging to the Dutch East India Company. The united force, with the exception of three vessels, sighted the French islands on the morning of the 4th July.

Had the Isle of France been in the same position with respect to its defences in which it was in 1735, the English Admiral would have found little difficulty in gaining possession of it. But by the efforts of La Bourdonnais during the five years of his administration subsequent to 1735, fortifications had been erected all along the coast, such as rendered an attack upon it, especially at a season of the year when the wind blew strongly from the land, a matter of great uncertainty. Thus, although the garrison was small, consisting of only 500 regular troops and 1,000 sailors lent from M. Bouvet's fleet, then at anchor within the harbour, the defences had been so skilfully thrown up, and there appeared to be such a firm resolution to defend them with pertinacity, that the Admiral, after three days spent in examination of the coast, and in futile efforts to obtain some information as to the strength of the garrison, felt constrained to call a council of war to deliberate on the expediency of an attack. At this council it was resolved, with the concurrence of the Admiral, to avoid an encounter which might perhaps disable the fleet from attempting its greater undertaking, and to push on with all speed to Pondichery. They set sail for Fort St. David accordingly on the following day, and parting company with the Dutch ships, arrived there on the 11th August, effecting a junction with Admiral Griffin's squadron.

This union constituted the force at the disposal of the English Commander, the most powerful that had ever arrived in the Indian seas,—far more so than that with which the Dutch had conquered Pondichery in 1693, and infinitely more effective than that which La Bourdonnais had led to the capture of Madras. In this case, moreover, the English General was at ease regarding his communications. There was no hostile fleet threatening to interfere with his plans, or to contest with him the supremacy at sea. He was in possession of such strength,* that he was able to divest his mind of all fears of naval attack, and to flatter himself

* His fleet after the junction with the fleet of Admiral Griffin, who himself left for England, consisted of 30 ships, of which 13 were ships of the line.—*Orme*.

with a certainty of the conquest of Pondichery. To attempt this last, he landed an army which, by its junction with the troops already at Fort St. David and with 120 Dutch sent from Negapatam, amounted to 6,000 men, of whom 3,720 were Europeans. Of this force he detached 700 Europeans on the morning of the 19th August to attack Ariancopan. We have noticed the preparations which Dupleix had made at this place,—the out-work of Pondichery,—to resist the enemy. So well, indeed, had his plans been carried out, that the English were entirely unacquainted with the additions that had been just made to its strength, and, like the French at Cuddalore, they marched to its attack with a careless confidence, that seemed to betoken a certainty on their part of easy victory. Captain Law, who commanded the garrison, allowed them to approach within forty yards of the works without firing a shot. Then, however, he opened upon them with grapeshot and musketry, making great havoc in their ranks. The English, completely surprised, without scaling ladders, unable to advance and unwilling to retreat, for a short time kept their ground. But as the fire of the enemy continued they became sensible of the folly of a further continuance in such a position. They accordingly moved off, but not until they had lost 150 of their number killed and wounded. This success greatly inspired the French garrison, and restored to them the confidence which their several repulses at Cuddalore had taken from them. They had reason now to hope that a persistent defence at Ariancopan would contribute to save Pondichery. Impressed with this view, they proceeded at once to throw up a battery of heavy guns on the opposite side of the little river on the north of the Fort, by means of which an advancing enemy would be taken in flank and enfiladed. Upon this the English, after one or two failures, erected a battery covered by an entrenchment, to reply to and silence the enemy's fire, and manned it partly by sailors from the fleet. Captain Law, however, resolved to take advantage of the enthusiasm which their recent success had excited amongst his garrison, and moved out of the fort with 60 cavalry and about 150 infantry under cover of a fire from the ramparts. Charging then at the head of his horse, he threw, first the sailors, and immediately afterwards the regular troops, into disorder, drove them from the entrenchment, and took some prisoners, conspicuous amongst whom was Major Lawrence, whose defence of Fort St. David and Cuddalore had given him a reputation which he was soon to raise to a far greater height.

Up to this point the French had great reason to congratulate themselves on the success which had attended their defensive operations. They began even to entertain the hope of keeping

Ariancopan secure from the enemy. But, at this crisis, one of those accidents from which no army is absolutely secure occurred to dash their hopes. A large store of gunpowder within the fort was suddenly ignited and blew up. The effect was most disastrous. Nearly 100 men of the garrison were killed and wounded, and, what was of greater importance, a conviction was produced amongst the panic-stricken garrison that the place could no longer be successfully defended. They accordingly blew up the walls and the cavaliers, and retreated at once to Pondichery.

Still, however, their success against the English had produced a great effect upon the garrison of that city. Their confidence, too, was increased by observing the caution of the English Commander. Admiral Boscawen, indeed, occupied Ariancopan on its evacuation by the French, but, instead of moving at once upon Pondichery, he remained five days to repair the fortifications of a place which was useless to him, and which, in its dismantled state, could not be used to any purpose by the enemy.

On the 6th September, however, Boscawen moved on Pondichery, taking possession of a redoubt on the north-west angle of the prickly pear hedge. But it was not until the 10th that he opened ground, and then only at a distance of 1,500 yards from the covered way. The next day 150 men having been detached to make a lodgment about an hundred yards nearer, 1,200 men of the garrison* under the command of Paradis made a sortie, attacking both trenches at once. But the fall of Paradis, who was mortally wounded early in the sally, threw the party into disorder, and they were repulsed with the loss of seven officers and an hundred men. The death of Paradis, which occurred within a few days of his wound, was the greatest misfortune that could have occurred to Dupleix at this conjuncture. He was his most capable officer,—the only man upon whose combined prudence, knowledge, and daring, he could absolutely rely. In his memoirs he describes him as “a man of intelligence, well acquainted with his profession, thoroughly acquainted with the locality, and with all the defects of the place. He had prepared all manner of devices to offer opposition to the enemy, especially in the weak points of the place.” The loss of such a man was the greater, as there was no one within the walls to supply his place. That is, rather, there would have been no one, had not Dupleix himself showed that great genius is capable of universal application, and that even the arts of the warrior are not beyond its attainment.

* The French garrison consisted of 1,800 Europeans and 3,000. sepoys

Another, though a lesser, misfortune befell him at the same time. True to the instructions he had received in England, Admiral Boscawen had not delayed to urge the Nawab of the Carnatic to pronounce decidedly against those French whose destruction he announced to be certain. The Admiral supported his requisition by presents of considerable value. Dupleix had little to offer on his part. Yet so great was the respect in which the French name was held, so high the opinion entertained of the great qualities of Dupleix, that, notwithstanding their apparently forlorn and helpless condition, the Nawab hesitated long before he gave way to the entreaties of Boscawen. It was only after the fall of Ariancopan, and when the French were shut up within the walls of Pondichery, that he agreed to the alliance pressed upon him, and promised to assist the English with 2,000 horse. He actually sent, however, only 300 men, and those towards the conclusion of the siege.

One consequence of the death of Paradis was that the management of all the details of the defence devolved upon Dupleix. To use his own modest expression, "the study of mathematics, and especially of fortification which his father had impressed upon him, became now of great assistance to him; he was sufficiently fortunate to be able to recollect the knowledge of this nature which he had acquired, so that all his operations succeeded even beyond his hopes." Fortunately for him, his efforts were seconded by the inexperience of the English Admiral in military operations, and the consequent neglect by him of some of the first principles affecting the conduct of a siege. But even this incapacity would not have interfered with the ultimate success of the English, had the garrison been permitted to give way to the despondency which reigned among them, in consequence of the death of the chief engineer. It was Dupleix who prevented this. It was Dupleix, who, calm in danger, maintained an outward serenity and confidence that became contagious; who, by the attention he paid to all points of defence, by the skill with which he strengthened the weak places, and repaired those damaged by the enemy's fire, speedily transferred to his own person a belief in his capacity that savoured almost of enthusiasm. It was, in a word, this civilian governor who became the life of the defence, the hope of the defenders, the one principal cause of the ill-success of the besiegers.

From the 6th of September, the day on which Boscawen moved on Pondichery, to the 17th October, forty-two days of open trenches, the siege was pushed with all the vigour of which the English leader was capable. But his efforts were thwarted by the skill and gallantry of Dupleix. Constant sorties, more or

less successful, always retarded and often defeated the advances of the besiegers. The English, having after much labour, advanced the trenches to within eight hundred yards of the walls, it was found that owing to the existence of a morass, it was impossible to carry them further on that side, and it became necessary to raise the batteries that had been erected. When at last a heavy fire was opened on another part of the town, it was found, that owing to the skill and energy of Dupleix, the fire of the besieged at that point was double that of the besiegers. The ships of the fleet which were brought up, as a last resource, to bombard the town, were compelled to sheer off after receiving much more damage than they had been able to inflict.* So energetic, so determined, so successful was the defence, that the English Admiral found at the end of five weeks that he had actually gained no ground at all; that he had lost some of his best officers and very many men; that the enemy had been able to concentrate on his several attacks a fire far more destructive than that which he had been able to bring to bear on their defences. Added to this, the periodical rains which began to fall at the end of September, had brought sickness into his camp, and had warned him that the real difficulties of his position were only about to begin. Under these circumstances, acting under the advice of a council of war, he commenced, on the 14th October, the destruction of the batteries and the re-embarkation of the sailors and heavy stores. On the 17th, this vast army, the largest European force that had till then appeared on Indian soil, and which counted a Clive † amongst its ranks, broke up and retreated to Fort St David, leaving behind it 1,065 men, who had perished either from the fire of the enemy, or from sickness, contracted during the siege. ‡

Thus had Dupleix, by his firmness, his skill, the wonderful activity of his genius, baffled that great enterprise which was to bring destruction upon French India, to root out the French

* The author of the journal before referred to, innocently remarks that "owing to the distance of the ships from the town, and the heavy "swell of the sea, shots never successively struck the same object."

† The author of the journal writes as follows: "The celebrated Lord "Clive, then an ensign, served in the trenches on this occasion, and by his "gallant conduct gave the first prognostic of that high military spirit, which "was the spring of his future actions, and the principal source of the decisive "intrepidity and elevation of mind, which were his characteristic endowments."

‡ The loss of the French during the corresponding period amounted to 200 Europeans and 50 natives. On their way to Fort St. David, the English wreaked a last vengeance on the port of Ariancopan, by utterly destroying what remained of its defences.

establishments from the soil of Hindostan. If we take a retrospective glance at all that had been accomplished during this first struggle in the Carnatic, we shall be utterly unable to refrain our tribute of admiration from the man who possessed the brain to conceive, the steadfastness to carry out, that long list of daring achievements. The capture of Madras, its preservation to the French, the determination to dare the brunt of the contest with the Mogul, the glorious result that followed that determination, together with this crowning defence of Pondichery, were works of his conception ; to him, too, is mainly due the merit of their execution. Even at the greatest crisis of his fortunes he found means to send efficient aid and support to the other settlements dependent on Pondichery,—a wonderful feat, gratefully acknowledged as such by his masters.*

If, on one occasion, owing to circumstances of which we have no knowledge, he failed to take advantage of a great opportunity that offered for the destruction of the last establishment of the English on the Coromandel coast, few will deny that he made up for that one mistake by the wonderful skill and energy with which, as civil governor, as commandant, as engineer, he conducted the defence of Pondichery against a force that might well have been regarded as irresistible. Truly may we echo the language used on the occasion by the Directors of the French Company, and declare that if all his other achievements merited the thanks of that France

* "All that you have done up to that time ought, in truth, to have made us tranquil regarding the fate of Pondichery, and your last letters of the 23th August, written at the time that the English had commenced their attack upon your advanced posts, left us nothing to desire, either with reference to the precautions you had taken, or to the courageous dispositions which you had inspired in the garrison and in everybody. Ought then our demonstrations of joy to be less, when on the 20th of last month, a courier despatched by Monsieur Durand, our agent in London, announced to the Court this new triumph of the national arms?

"If it has been already satisfactory for you, that the Company could declare that the capture of Madras was due to the succours which you had furnished to M. de la Bourdonnais; that it was your firmness, the wisdom of your measures, and the choice of the brave officers you had employed, which compelled the Moguls to sue to you for peace; that you would even have taken Fort St. David from the English, but for the unexpected arrival of Admiral Griffin; and that, finally, despite of the difficulty of communications during the entire war, you had found means to provide for the substance and security of the settlements of Chandernagore, Karical, and Mahé; what praises do you not deserve now, when by the glorious use of the succours sent you by M. David" (alluding to M. Bouvet's fleet) "you have repulsed the most powerful efforts of your enemies, and have preserved to the Company all their establishments."—*Lettre de la compagnie des Indes, le 11 Avril, 1749.*

whose interests he served so well, this crowning success placed him on a pinnacle far beyond the reach of ordinary applause.

We can well imagine,—we who have traced Dupleix up to this point of his career, who have noticed the manner in which he seized every occasion of exalting the power of France in the eyes of the natives of India,—how eagerly and effectively he used the opportunity offered by the retreat of the English army to increase and magnify its effects. Messengers were instantly despatched to Arcot, to Hyderabad, even to Delhi, to acquaint the native potentates how the most formidable foreign army that had ever landed in India had been shattered against the walls of Pondichery. The answers to these communications showed how thoroughly he had mastered the characters of those whom he addressed. Letters of congratulation poured in to him from all sides. He received the greatest compliments on his success. The English were regarded as an inferior, almost an annihilated power; and the one result of this long-threatened attack was to invest Dupleix with an influence and an authority, such as had up to that time devolved upon no European leader on Indian soil.

The siege of Pondichery had been raised, as we stated, on the 17th October. The English had retired in a state of deep dejection to Fort St. David, where for a time they occupied themselves more with thinking of their own safety than of attacking the possessions of France. Dupleix, on his side, made earnest preparations for the renewal of offensive operations. He received early in the following year (1749) further supplies of men * and money from M. Bouvet, who, despite the presence at Fort St. David of the still numerous English fleet, gained the Madras roadstead and landed the soldiers and specie without molestation. It was at this time, when Dupleix was planning new enterprises against the English, that orders from Europe reached both parties for a suspension of arms, pending the result of negotiations which had been entered into at Aix-la-Chapelle. These were shortly afterwards followed by an intimation of the conclusion of the treaty which bears the name of that ancient city.

By one of the articles of this treaty a mutual restitution of conquests was agreed upon between France and England,—a condition which necessitated the abandonment by Dupleix of that Madras, gained with so much daring, and guarded with so much jealousy and vigilance. Bitter must have been the pang with which the French governor received the order to make a restitution which he knew well would be the first step towards

providing his hated rivals with a new foundation of greatly increased power; deeply must he have lamented the blindness of the ministers, who, not possessing his vast *coup d'œil*, could look upon Cape Breton as a sufficient compensation for a place which, if retained in 1749, would, as we shall see hereafter, most certainly have given the French an overwhelming superiority, leading to empire, in Southern India. But Dupleix was there, not to remonstrate, but to obey. The orders he had received were without appeal, and in obedience to them he, towards the close of the month of August, made over Madras to Admiral Boscawen. As if to add to his chagrin, he was forced to make it over, not in the state in which he had gained it, but improved in every way,—with new and fresh fortifications, the town cleared of obstructions, and every thing in train to make it worthy of the fortune to which he too confidently had destined it.

Thus, after a contest of five years, the two nations found themselves, in outward appearance, in the position in which they were at the outbreak of hostilities. Yet, if apparently the same, in reality how different! The vindictive rivalry between both, exemplified in the capture of Madras, the attempts upon Fort St. David and Pondichery, had laid the foundation of an eternal enmity,—an enmity which could only be extinguished by the destruction of one or other of the adversaries. Then again, the superiority evinced by the Europeans over the natives, in the decisive battle at St. Thome, had given birth, especially in the mind of the French leader, to an ambition of empire which, if at first vague and indistinct, assumed every day a more and more practical shape. Added to this, the expense of keeping up the greatly increased number of soldiers sent out from Europe pressed heavily on the resources of both nations, and almost forced upon them the necessity of hiring out their troops to the rival candidates for power in Southern India. Thus, during five years which elapsed between 1745 and 1749, their position had become revolutionised. No longer simple traders, regarded as such only by the rulers of the Carnatic, they were then feared, especially the French, by all the potentates in the neighbourhood, their alliance was eagerly sought for, their assistance an object of anxious entreaty. From vassals they had jumped almost to the position of liege lords.

A new era, resulting from this war, dates thus from the moment when the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle placed the rival European powers in the position in which they had nominally been in 1745. By the East India Companies in Paris and London this change was not even suspected. They fondly

believed that the new treaty would enable their agents to recommence their mercantile operations. They hoped that the reaction, after five years' hostilities, would lead to a feeling of mutual confidence and trust. Vain dream! The peace that reigned in Europe, was it not then to extend to both nations in India? Alas! with ambition aroused, mutual jealousy excited, the temptation of increased dominion knocking at their doors, what had they to do with peace?

FRENCH INDIA AT ITS ZENITH.

1. *Mémoire pour le sieur Dupleix contre la Compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives.* Paris, 1759.
2. *An account of the War in India between the English and the French on the coast of Coromandel, from the year 1750 to the year 1760.* By Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq. London, T. Jeffereys, 1761.
3. *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from the year 1745.* By Robert Orme, Esq, F. A. S. 1803.
4. *Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre,* par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844.
5. *Inde,* par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-de-camp du Ri d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché de l'Ambassade du Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.
6. *The History of British India.* By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, John Madden and Co., Leadenhall Street, 1851.
7. *The National Review*, Vol. XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193 Piccadilly, 1862.
8. *Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862.

THE peace between the powers of Europe which had been signed at Aix-la-Chapelle afforded, as we have already stated, an opportunity for the introduction into India of a system, afterwards carried to a very considerable extent, whereby the European powers moved by promises of material advantage, lent out their European soldiers to the native rulers. It is but right to add, that in almost every case the temptation came from the natives, and it should also be remembered that the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had been concluded at a time when an unusual number of the troops of both nations had been thrown on the Indian soil, and when therefore the employment of, and provision for, these soldiers, caused no little anxiety to the governors of the settlements. Dupleix indeed, in a letter * which he wrote to the

* Dated 31st March 1749.

French Company at the time, expressly justified his recourse to such a line of conduct by the necessity under which he was to practise the strictest economy.

In this custom, however, it was the English who set the example. The account of the expulsion of Rajah Sahoojee from Tanjore has been given in a previous number.* The duplicity of that monarch, his double overthrow by his own people, and his final expulsion in 1749 in favour of Pertab Singh will doubtless be recollected. It is necessary to refer to it here, because it was this same Sahoojee, twice expelled from his kingdom, who by his promises and entreaties, induced the English to lend themselves to the principle of supporting expelled and wandering royalty,—a principle which nearly ruined them on this occasion, and which more than ninety years after, almost brought their empire to destruction in the snows of Afghanistan.† Eleven years had elapsed since Sahoojee had been expelled, and during that time Tanjore had enjoyed a quiet and a prosperity to which, under his rule, it had been a stranger; yet the desire of governing, so strongly planted in the Asiatic breast, would not allow the dethroned monarch to be tranquil. Although his experience of the attraction of a crown had been such as would have been sufficient to deter a man of ordinary sense from again striving for the dangerous prize, although on one occasion he had barely escaped from his enemies' hands, and on the second had been seized by them in the midst of his own guards, to the imminent danger of his life, he never ceased to sigh for his departed grandeur. To attain that state of sensual existence which had once been his, he was ready not only to stake his life, but to consent to the dismemberment of his country.

When, therefore, the news of the meeting of the European plenipotentiaries at Aix-la-Chapelle caused a suspension of arms in India, Sahoojee, who had been struck with the great superiority evinced in the field by the European over the Asiatic soldiers, resolved to endeavour to enlist on his behalf the aid of some of those redoubtable warriors. It was, however, he well

* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXIII, pp. 136-140.

† It is much to be regretted that the principle yet lives and flourishes, although it is carried out in a different manner. In the present day the spendthrift Rajahs and Nawabs, whose own vices have caused their expulsion from the thrones they had soiled, appeal, not to the Governor-General of British India, but to secret intriguers in England. By an expenditure of money, often as great as that which in former days they would have lavished on their armies, they obtain the aid of all who are venal. It is even whispered that resolutions not to rest till they have been restored have been pronounced in places where such language must be inconsistent with duty.

knew, useless for him to appeal to the French. Not only had he deceived them in 1738, but they had since lived upon good terms with his successor Pertab Singh. His only chance was with the English, and to them, therefore, he made his demand.

He was extremely liberal in his offers. The payment of all the expenses of the war, and the cession of Devicotta, a town on the mouth of the Coleroon, one hundred and twenty-two miles south of Madras, with the territory attaching to it, formed a tempting bait to a people possessing a surplus of soldiers, and just resting after a war which had severely tried their resources. At any rate it was eagerly grasped at, and in the beginning of April 1749, a force of 430 Europeans and 1,000 sepoy under the command of Captain Cope was despatched to re-establish ex-Rajah Sahoojee on his ancestral throne.

In a history relating mainly to the transactions of the French in India, it will be necessary to follow the movements of the English only in those instances in which an effect was thereby produced on the policy of their rivals. We do not propose therefore to enter into the details of this expedition against Tanjore. The results will be found chronicled hereafter. It is essential, however, that we should allude prominently to the fact of the enterprise, in order to make it clear that in the course which Dupleix adopted at this period, he but followed an example which the English had set him. The main difference between his proceedings and theirs was this:—that whereas in all his undertakings he had a settled purpose and design,—his smallest actions tending to one mighty end,—the proceedings of the English were the result of a haphazard and purposeless policy, their leaders not comprehending, even in the smallest degree, the result to which, if successful, they must inevitably tend.

In a previous number * we have recorded the fate which befell Chunda Sahib in his endeavours to defend Trichinopoly against the army of Ragoojee Bhonsla. Taken prisoner by that General, he had been sent off (1741) under a guard to Sattara, and there kept for seven years in confinement. Vainly did he exert his utmost endeavours during that time to effect his release. Although in that period the Moguls had re-occupied Trichinopoly, although the Nawabship of the Carnatic had passed from the family of Dost Ali, to which he was related, to a stranger, he was kept rigorously a prisoner. Not indeed that the Mahrattas had any State object in view in thus keeping him from his native province; it was simply a question of ransom. Chunda Sahib was comparatively poor. Allied only by marriage

* *Calcutta Review*, No. LXXXIII, page 148.

with the house of Dost Ali, he had not exercised independent authority for a sufficiently long time to amass any very considerable wealth. The jewels, which constituted the greater part of it, were with his wife and family in Pondichery. The remainder had been taken when he lost Trichinopoly. For a long time, however, the Mahrattas insisted upon the payment of a kingly ransom as an essential condition of his release, and all this time Chunda Sahib, unable to pay it, saw opportunities vanish, kingdoms pass into other hands, and he felt too that every year added to that forgetfulness of himself, which is the unvarying consequence of the absence of a leader from the scene of action.

At last, however, fortune seemed to unbend. In the month of April 1748 Mahomed Shah, Emperor of Delhi, died. His eldest son, Ahmed Shah, succeeded him, but the first months of his accession were too much engaged in preparations to maintain himself against his namesake, the Abdalli, and other enemies, to allow him to turn his attention to the events that were occurring in the remote Dekkan. It was, however, just at this moment that the attention of the feudal lord of the Empire was particularly required in those parts. A few months after the death of Mahomed Shah (June 1748), Nizam-ool-Moolk, viceroy of the Dekkan, followed him to the grave at the ripe age of an hundred and four years. The succession had become, through the weakness of the central authority, by custom rather than by consent, hereditary in the family. Now Nizam-ool-Moolk had left five sons. The eldest, Ghazee-oodeen Khan, was however high in the Imperial service, and preferred pushing his fortunes at Delhi to striking for an inheritance which he felt could only be gained by the sword. The second son, Nazir Jung, had been engaged in constant rebellion against his father, but he was with him, having been recently released from captivity, when he died. The other three sons were men of little mark, who had been content to live a life of ease and pleasure at the court of Aurungabad. Besides these sons, there was a grandson, Mozuffer Jung, the son of a daughter, who had been always indicated by his grandfather as his successor. The consent of Mahomed Shah to this arrangement had been previously obtained, and on the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk, a firman was issued by the court of Delhi nominating Mozuffer Jung viceroy in his place.

When that event occurred, however, Mozuffer Jung, the legitimate successor, was at his government at Bijapore, whilst the lately rebellious son, Nazir Jung, was on the spot. This latter at once acted in accordance with the customs which had

obtained from time immemorial under the Mahomedan sway in Hindostan. He seized his father's treasures, brought over the leading men and the army, and proclaimed himself viceroy of the Dekkan. The claims of Mozuffer Jung he derided, and set him at open defiance.

Mozuffer Jung, however, was not inclined to give up his pretensions without a struggle, though for the moment he did not possess the means to support them. In this crisis he bethought him of the Mahrattas, the hereditary enemies of Mahomedan authority, and he decided to go in person to Sattara to demand their assistance. At Sattara he met Chunda Sahib, of whose great reputation he was fully cognizant. The two men felt at once that they could be mutually serviceable to one another. They therefore soon came to an understanding. They agreed to endeavour to obtain material aid from the Mahrattas, insisting also on the unconditional release of Chunda Sahib.

A negotiation was accordingly opened. But whilst it was in progress, and seemed to promise well, Chunda Sahib, who had little real wish to conquer the Carnatic with the aid of his old enemies, communicated full details of their plans to Dupleix, with whom he had maintained, through his wife, a constant correspondence. Threatened at the time by the English, Dupleix had no desire to add to the existing complications by bringing on the province a Mahratta invasion. The prospect, however, of placing on the viceregal throne of the Dekkan one who would thus be a *protege* of his own, and over the province of the Carnatic a man so devoted to French interests as he knew Chunda Sahib to be, was too alluring to be resisted. Pondering in his mind how this could be effected, the thought struck him that it needed only a daring and decided policy of his own to bring about such a result. He at once embraced the project with all the ardour of his impassioned nature; wrote to Chunda Sahib to negotiate only for his release, and not for troops; engaged to the court of Poona to guarantee the ransom that might be agreed upon; and promised to both Mozuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib all the influence and power which he, as ruler of French India, was capable of exerting. His despatch had the desired effect. On receiving a guarantee from Dupleix for the payment of 700,000 rupees, Chunda Sahib was released and furnished with a body-guard of 3,000 men to escort him to his own country.

One of the first acts of Chunda Sahib after his release was to enter into an engagement with Dupleix, whereby he took upon himself the payment of about 2,000 natives, drilled in the European fashion, belonging to the Pondichery garrison

In consideration likewise of being assisted by 400 Europeans, he agreed to make to the French the cession of a small tract of land in the immediate neighbourhood of Pondichery. Whilst arrangements were in progress for these troops to join him, he had succeeded in making his way, after some changes of fortune, to the frontiers of the Carnatic, and in augmenting his force to 6,000 men. Here he was joined by Mozuffer Jung at the head of 30,000. Chunda Sahib, who was by far the abler character of the two, resolved, so soon as he should be joined by his French auxiliaries, to march upon Arcot. A victory here would place the resources of the Carnatic at his disposal, and bring him into close association with the French. He could then make it, with every prospect of success, the basis from which to operate against Nazir Jung.

Towards the end of July the French force already indicated, under the command of M. d'Auteuil and accompanied by the son of Chunda Sahib, joined the latter at the Damalchery Pass, which he had taken care to secure. Here they received information that Anwarooddeen and his two sons, at the head of 20,000 picked troops, including among them 60 European adventurers, had taken post at Amboor, about thirty miles to the south, prepared to give them battle. Thither accordingly they marched. The position taken up at Amboor was extremely strong, being defended on one side by a mountain surmounted by a castle, and on the other by a large lake. The ground between these, constituting naturally a very strong pass into the Carnatic, had been further fortified by entrenchments. These were defended by guns served by the Europeans to whom we have alluded. Behind these was the main army of the Nawab.

It was on the morning of the 3rd August that the combined army of Chunda Sahib and M. d'Auteuil came in sight of this position. It was at once resolved to storm it, and d'Auteuil offered to lead the attack with his French. Such an offer was gladly accepted, and at the head of his gallant countrymen, d'Auteuil advanced boldly to the attack. The Nawab's guns, however, were so well served by the Europeans in his service, that the assailants fell back with some loss. Indignant at this, d'Auteuil rallied them and led them himself, notwithstanding a heavy fire, up to the foot of the entrenchment. The breast-work was even mounted by some of them, but in the crisis of the attack, M. d'Auteuil was wounded in the thigh, and in the confusion that followed, his men lost order and retreated. The command then devolved upon M. de Bussy, and the troops, encouraged by him and other officers, eagerly called to be led on for the third time. This determination on their part dishearten-

ed the defenders, many of whom had already fallen. Even had they stood more firm however, they could scarcely have resisted the impetuosity of the charge. Led on by the gallant Bussy, the French reserved their fire till close to the entrenchments; then delivering a volley, they dashed over the breastwork, and the day was their own. Having lost this defence, the native portion of Anwarooden's army made but little resistance. Followed by the troops of Chunda Sahib and by that leader in person, the French pushed on. It was in vain that Anwarooden, himself 107 years old, made the most gallant efforts to restore the fight. In the very act of singling out Chunda Sahib for a hand to hand encounter, he was shot through the heart by an African soldier. A general disorder followed; the defeat became a rout; Maphuz Khan surrendered himself a prisoner, and the second son, Mahomed Ali, saved himself by an early flight. The camp, the baggage, sixty elephants, many horses, and all the artillery fell into the hands of the victors. But their greatest prize was the province of the Carnatic, secured to them by this victory. Of this they obtained an immediate gage in Arcot, the capital, which they occupied the next day. In this battle the French lost 12 men killed and 63 wounded. About 300 of their sepoys were killed and wounded.*

The earliest act of Mozuffer Jung on his arrival at Arcot was to proclaim himself Subadar or Viceroy of the Dekkan, and to nominate Chunda Sahib Nawab of the Carnatic.† Having secured the surrounding country by means of flying parties, the two governors proceeded to Pondichery. Mozuffer Jung to acknowledge the aid he had received, Chunda Sahib to pour out his thanks for the protection which, for so many years and under such trying circumstances, the French governor had afforded to his family. They were received with the greatest pomp and ceremony. No one knew better than Dupleix the effect of display upon the oriental mind. He took care, however, that accompanying the glitter of outward show, there should be a simultaneous exhibition of that material power which, more than any other, is in Asia capable of ensuring respect. The defences which had defied the English were dressed out for the occasion; the European troops, whose superiority had been proved at St. Thomé and Amboor were conspicuously drawn up, the ships in the harbour displayed their brightest flags. No artifice was omitted in fact to impress

* Chunda Sahib presented the French troops after the battle with 75,000 rupees, and M. d'Auteuil with land worth 4,000 rupees per annum.

† One of the first to congratulate Chunda Sahib on his elevation and to acknowledge him as Nawab, was the Governor of Madras, Mr. Floyer.—*Memoire pour Dupleix*, page 46.

upon the minds of his guests, that the pomp and ceremony of their reception were but the natural consequence of a wealth and influence which rested upon a power that nothing in the south of India could resist. The effect was all that he could wish. Mozuffer Jung was captivated by the display; the gratitude of Chunda Sahib was unbounded. In the first moments of his delight he conferred upon Dupleix the sovereignty of eighty-one villages, adjoining the ground of which Pondichery was the representative capital. Mozuffer Jung stayed eight days at Pondichery. His army, amounting to from 45,000 to 50,000 men, remained encamped meanwhile within twenty miles of the city.*

But amid all the festivities that followed the arrival of these two Nawabs, Dupleix did not lose sight of the main object which had brought them into the field. We have already stated, that though Mōzuffer Jung held the higher rank, Chunda Sahib was of the two by far the abler man. When then Mozuffer Jung, at the expiration of eight days, rejoined his camp, twenty miles from Pondichery, Dupleix retained Chunda Sahib to settle the plan of the campaign. It was true that the possession of the Carnatic seemed to have been decided by the battle of Amboor. The old Nawab had been killed, his eldest son taken prisoner, and the younger, Mahomed Ali, had sought refuge in flight. Yet so long as there remained a pretender to the dignity, Chunda Sahib could not consider himself firm in his seat. It is beyond question that he had, both by hereditary descent and by imperial nomination, a greater right to the office than any of the family of Anwaroodeen. He was, in the first place, the representative of the family of Dost Ali, and, in the second, he had been nominated by Mozuffer Jung, whose title to succeed Nizam-ool-Moolk as viceroy of the Dekkan, had been confirmed by a firman from the Court of Delhi.† But in the distracted state of the Mogul empire, no right could be considered secure that was not based upon a possession that could be maintained. Nor, at the same time, could any possession be regarded as perfectly tenable, to which any pretender was in the field waiting for his opportunity. Dupleix, well aware of this, did not cease to press upon Chunda Sahib the absolute necessity of ensuring the submission of Mahomed Ali, before he resigned himself to the more peaceful cares of his govern-

* *Extrait de la lettre de M. Dupleix à la Compagnie; le 28 Juillet 1749. Copie d'un extrait du registre des délibérations du Conseil supérieur de Pondichery, 13 Juillet 1749. Memoire pour Dupleix, Orme, Cambridge, Raymond, &c., &c., &c.*

† Dupleix, page 42. Seer Mutakhareen.

ment. Rapidity in his movements was, he pointed out, the more requisite, as Mahomed Ali, had taken refuge in Trichinopoly, the fortifications of which had been greatly strengthened since Chunda Sahib had been compelled to surrender it to Ragoojee Bhonsla. Added to this, it was known that Nazir Jung, the pretender to the viceroyship of the Dekkan, was engaged in levying an army wherewith to crush his nephew and rival. It was, therefore, more especially necessary to clear the Carnatic of all foes, before this greater enemy should be ready to march upon it. The exhortations of Dupleix to Chunda Sahib to march without any delay upon Trichinopoly were therefore earnest and repeated.

One circumstance, however, served to hinder the native chieftains from moving. The battle of Amboor had been fought on the 3rd August; Madras, in pursuance of the articles of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, had been made over to the English at the end of the same month, but still Admiral Boscawen remained on the coast. More than that, he had taken advantage of the disordered state of affairs to possess himself of the little settlement of St. Thomé, upon which he had hoisted the English flag. It was known, too, that he was himself strongly impressed with the necessity of remaining to support English interests, and that he had declared he would remain, if he were publicly requested to do so.* It appeared then to Chunda Sahib, that for him to move on Trichinopoly, whilst Admiral Boscawen was on the coast, would act as a final inducement to that officer to remain, and would impel the English to cast in their lot, whilst their forces were yet considerable, with his rival, Mahomed Ali. He, therefore, hesitated as to his action, preferring to wait, at all events, in the hope that the October gales might compel the departure of so dangerous an enemy.

Whilst he and his allies are thus watching their opportunity, it may be convenient for us to turn to the movements of the English, and to relate as briefly as may be the result of their expedition against Tanjore.

This expedition had been undertaken, as we have already stated, with the avowed object of re-seating upon the throne of that kingdom the twice expelled Raja Sahoojee,—with the real purpose of gaining for themselves the possession of Devicotta. Consisting of 430 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys, under the command of Captain Cope, this force had left Fort St. David in the early part of April, and on the 24th, arrived on the bank of the river Vellaur, near Portonovo. On the following morning

* Orme.

a terrific storm ensued, which caused great damage to the land forces, and greater to the fleet. Of the former, many of the carriage, cattle, and a large proportion of the military stores were destroyed; of the latter, the Admiral's flagship, the *Namur*, of 74 guns, the *Pembroke*, of 60 guns, and the *Apollo*, hospital ship, with the greater part of their crews, were totally lost.* It thus became necessary to suspend for a time the progress of the undertaking.

When, however, after having made good his losses, Captain Cope renewed his march and arrived on the borders of the Tanjore territory, he found the actual state of things to differ very much from the representations that had been made him. Not only was there no disposition evinced by the Tanjoreans to strike a blow for Sahoojee, but their army was found posted on the southern bank of the Coleroon, ready apparently to oppose the passage of the English. Their real object, however, was to entice Captain Cope into the difficult country to the south, where his destruction would have been certain. But the direction taken by the English after the passage of the river, shewed very plainly the real object they had in view in espousing the cause of Sahoojee. Their army marched in the direction, not of Tanjore but of Devicotta, where they expected to find support from the fleet. But on their arrival that same evening, within a mile of Devicotta, not a ship was to be seen. Having with them no supplies, and finding the place too strong to be escalated, they resolved, after cannonading it fruitlessly during the night, to retreat. This they effected without serious molestation, and on the second day reached Fort St. David. Had the real object of the English been that which they professed,—the restoration of the ex-Raja Sahoojee,—they had seen enough to be convinced that to effect this they must be prepared to employ all the resources of their Presidency in a war with a native power. They no longer, however, even pretended to have this in view. But Sahoojee had promised them Devicotta,† and the advantages presented by that place were too great to be lightly given up. Whether they received it from Sahoojee or Pertab Singh was to them immaterial. They were resolved to possess it at any price, and with this avowed object, throwing over Sahoojee, they despatched

* Journal of an Officer.

† The river Coleroon, which runs into the sea near Devicotta, was believed to be capable of receiving ships of the largest tonnage. The only difficulty was presented by the sands, but it was thought that these, with a little labour and expense, might be removed.—*Or me.*

by sea a second expedition, consisting of 800 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys under the command of Major Lawrence.

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of this expedition. It will suffice to state that it was successful. Devicotta after a gallant resistance was stormed, and Pertab Singh, to avert further hostilities, and anxious now to secure the alliance of the English against Chunda Sahib, whom he regarded as the most dangerous enemy of the Tanjore kingdom, agreed to cede that fortress to that nation, together with so much of the surrounding territory as should produce an annual revenue of Rs. 36,000. The English, on their part, agreed to abandon the cause of Sahoojee, and even to keep him under *surveillance* at Madras, on condition of his receiving a life pension of Rs. 4,000. Such was the result to him of his alliance with an European power.

The English were occupied with their new conquest, when they learned the success of Chunda Sahib at Amboor. They hastened to acknowledge him at Arcot. Nevertheless, noticing his subsequent visit to Pondichery, his protracted stay there, and the intimacy which he vaunted with Dupleix, they were not deaf to the solicitations,—poor as they considered his chances of success,—of Mahomed Ali. They waited, however, the further proceedings of Chunda Sahib, before committing themselves to any definite action. When, moreover, they saw that that chieftain remained idle at Pondichery, making no movement against his rival, they hesitated still more as to the course they should follow. Admiral Boscawen, on his part, was eager to support Mahomed Ali, and even offered to stay on the coast, if he were officially requested to do so. But Mr. Floyer shrank from a line of policy which seemed to commit the Presidency to the support of a pretender *in extremis*. He therefore suffered the Admiral to depart on the 1st November, taking from him only 300 men as an addition to his garrison.

The departure of Amiral Boscawen constituted the opportunity for which Chunda Sahib had been so long watching. All his preparations had been made. Dupleix, with that rare disinterestedness and care for the resources of the colony which so eminently characterised him, had advanced to this chief 100,000 rupees from his own funds, and had induced other individuals to advance 200,000 rupees in addition.* He also supplied him with 800 European troops, 300 Africans, and a train of artillery, from the support of which Pondichery was thus freed, whilst the troops remained at the disposal of Dupleix. They

* These advances were secured on lands which were temporarily made over to the French.

were now with Chunda Sahib under the immediate command of M. Duquesne. On the very day after the departure of the English fleet, this united army marched upon Trichinopoly. There, as Dupleix pointed out to the leaders, they would find the end of all opposition. The only man who had the shadow of claim to oppose to the pretensions of Chunda Sahib was in that fortress. To take it, therefore, was to destroy the last stronghold of the enemy, and with it the only chieftain capable of offering any opposition.

It is indeed clear to us now, as it was clear to Dupleix at the time, that upon the capture of this place depended the permanent preponderance of French influence in Southern India. Had that been accomplished, there could have been no possible rival to Chunda Sahib, the English would have had no excuse to refuse to acknowledge his supremacy. In fact that supremacy would have been so firmly rooted, so strongly established, that they would not have dared to dispute it; they would, in a word, have been forced to recognize the superiority on the Coromandel coast of a governor, who, by inclination, gratitude, interest, was bound irrevocably to the French.

Such indeed was the policy of Dupleix. To carry it out he had brought every resource to bear on his native allies. He had given them money, men, guns and officers, and they, on their part, had left Pondichery, under an engagement to pursue the course of action he had pressed upon them, as alike best suited to his interests and theirs, *viz.* to march direct upon Trichinopoly.

Yet here was another instance afforded of the uselessness even of great genius, when the tools which genius is compelled to employ, are weak and vacillating. Surely Dupleix had a right to believe that his native allies, having been equipped and supplied by him, and having started on an expedition they had promised to carry out, would at least march to their destination. Once there, he relied on his own Commander, Duquesne, to do the rest. His mortification then can be imagined when he learned that after crossing the Coleroon, they had diverged from the road to Trichinopoly and had taken that to Tanjore.

The fact was that, during their stay at Pondichery, Chunda Sahib and Mozuffur Jung had exhausted on their own pleasures the money Dupleix had intended for the expenses of the army, and they found themselves, after crossing the Coleroon, in an enemy's country with an empty treasure chest. In this emergency Chunda Sahib bethought him of the king of Tanjore,—a prince whose riches were proverbial, and whose arrears of tribute to the Mogul, Mozuffur Jung, as Subadar of the Dekkan,

considered himself entitled to receive. In the hope of compelling the monarch to pay such a sum as would place them at ease regarding their expenditure, and in the belief that with the aid of their French allies the task would be easy of execution and short in its time of duration, they, without even consulting Dupleix, turned aside from the road leading to Trichinopoly, and took that to Tanjore.

This city, situated in the delta of the Coleroon and the Cavery, was defended by two forts, the greater and the lesser. The former was surrounded by a high wall and a ditch, but the fortifications were too inconsiderable to resist the attack of a vigorous enemy. The lesser fort, a mile in circumference, was far stronger, being surrounded by a lofty stone wall, a ditch excavated from the solid rock, and a glacis. Within this was a pagoda surpassing in magnificence all the buildings of Southern India, and believed to contain countless riches. The allied army arrived before this place on the 7th November, and at once summoned it to surrender. The king, Pertab Singh, with a view to gain time, expressed at once his willingness to negotiate, whilst at the same time he sent pressing messages to the English and to Nazir Jung, demanding assistance. The English, who had already despatched 120 men to aid Mahomed Ali at Trichinopoly, ordered twenty of these to proceed to Tanjore. How Nazir Jung responded to the summons we shall see further on. On receiving the reply of the Tanjorean, Duquesne, the Commandant of the French contingent, acting upon the instructions received from Dupleix, urged upon Chunda Sahib not to waste his time in vain negotiations, but to compel compliance with his requisitions by force. This was undoubtedly the direct and proper course to pursue. But Chunda Sahib, who wanted only the money, and who believed the Rajah was in earnest about paying it, earnestly requested Duquesne to abstain from all appearance of hostilities so long as negotiations should be going on. In Pertab Singh, however, he met a man more wily and cunning than himself. For six weeks he suffered himself to be duped by protestations and promises, fruitless though they were of any result. In vain did Dupleix press upon him the superior advantage of Trichinopoly; to no purpose did he point out to him that he was giving time to Mahomed Ali to strengthen his position, and to Nazir Jung to march upon his communications. Chunda Sahib was infatuated with his negotiation. To such an extent did he carry this feeling, that Dupleix, seeing the gathering storm, and apprehending not only the failure of his hopes, but danger to French interests, sent positive orders to Duquesne to break off the negotiation by an attack upon

Tanjore. Duquesne obeyed ; and his vigorous measures had a decisive effect. On the 26th December, he captured three redoubts about 600 yards from the walls ; three days later, after some fruitless negotiations, he assaulted and carried one of the gates of the town. This so intimidated the Rajah, that he at once gave in, and on the 31st signed a treaty whereby, amongst other stipulations, he agreed to pay to Mozuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib seven millions of rupees ; to remit from the French East India Company the annual ground rent of seven thousand rupees, which it paid him ; to add to the French possessions at Karical territory comprising eighty-one villages ; and to pay down to the French troops 200,000 rupees. But meanwhile, Nazir Jung had succeeded in collecting an enormous army, and was on his march to crush his nephew and rival. Intelligence of this had already been conveyed by the English to the king of Tanjore, and this monarch had recourse to all the arts of which he was master, to lengthen out the term of payment. By sending out, in satisfaction of the sum he had agreed to pay, sometimes plate, sometimes obsolete coin, sometimes jewels and precious stones, he detained Chunda Sahib for some weeks longer under his walls, and it was not until a pressing message from Dupleix informed him that Nazir Jung had entered the Carnatic, that this chieftain renounced the hope of obtaining, even by those instalments, the promised ransom. Even then Dupleix recommended vigorous measures. He urged upon him to seize Tanjore at once, both as a means of punishing the faithless Rajah, and of providing himself with a place of refuge. Chunda Sahib was willing enough to act up to this advice, but his troops refused to follow him. They too had heard the rumours of the approach of the vast army under Nazir Jung, and, panic-stricken at the report of its numbers, they broke up without orders, and fell back rapidly on Pondichery.

Thus, by the weakness of the instruments he was compelled to use, were the great plans of Dupleix temporarily shattered. Nay more, the very men who had caused their defeat, and who by their want of energy had plunged themselves as well as him into misfortune, now came to beg him to extricate them from their difficulties. He made the attempt, not indeed with any great confidence in his allies,—for the past three months had shewn him their weakness,—but yet with a steadfastness, an energy, an adaptation of means to the end, such a seven at this distant day must challenge and command our admiration. He did not, as we shall see, succeed in the outset, but his patience, his perseverance, his energy, could not be long working without producing some advantageous result. Before, however, noticing

the manner in which he acted, we propose to take a comprehensive glance at the situation.

The army of Mozuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib, 40,000 strong, panic-stricken from the rumours of the vast force of Nazir Jung, and mutinous from want of pay, was under the walls of Pondichery. With it had come the French detachment of 800 men, now commanded by M. Goupil, its former leader, Duquesne, having died of fever at Tanjore. On the other side, the enormous army of Nazir Jung, consisting of 300,000 men, of whom one-half were cavalry, together with 800 pieces of cannon and 1,300 elephants, was marching on them from Arcot. On their way they were joined by Moorari Rao at the head of 10,000 Mahratta horse, fresh from a skirmish with the allied army at Chillumbrun; whilst on reaching Valdaur, fifteen miles from Pondichery, Mahomed Ali, the pseudo-Nawab of the Carnatic, brought six thousand horse into their camp, and, what was of far greater consequence, they were strengthened a few days later,—the 2nd April,—by the junction of 600 Europeans under Major Lawrence. The English, in fact, had resolved to take advantage of the check received by the French *protégés* at Tanjore, by using all their influence to support the rivals and opponents of those chieftains.

Against such a force what was Dupleix to do? There was but one course, which even to conceive, it was necessary that a man should have been born with a daring and subtle intellect. Successfully to encounter this force it was absolutely necessary that the opposing army, however disproportionate in numbers and deficient in material, should oppose to it a bold and resolute front. Yet how to infuse the necessary courage into the panic-stricken and mutinous soldiers of his two allies; this was a problem which seemed hard to solve. Dupleix nevertheless attempted it. First of all, he stopped the mutinous spirit. This he effected by advancing from his own funds a sufficient sum to pay up their arrears. Their courage he endeavoured to re-animate by showing that he was not afraid to support them by the entire available garrison of Pondichery. Goupil who had succeeded to Duquesne, having himself fallen ill, Dupleix placed at the head of the contingent M. d' Auteuil, who had recovered from the wounds he had received at Amboor, and increased its strength to 2,000 men. The force, encouraged and strengthened by these means, moved in a north-westerly direction from Pondichery, and took up at the end of Marey a strong position opposite the enemy's camp at Valdaur. At the same time Dupleix did not neglect those means which he had often used so successfully, of endeavouring by intrigues

and secret communications to work upon the mind of Nazir Jung in favour of French interests. He was on the point of succeeding, when unexpected events, impossible to have been guarded against, neutralised the effect of these negotiations, and brought down the fabric of his vast plans.

It happened, unfortunately for Dupleix, that a very bad feeling prevailed at this moment amongst the officers of his army. The twenty thousand rupees received at Tanjore had been divided amongst those troops only, who had participated in that service. Many of these had received leave of absence, and those who took their place, as well as those who joined with the fresh troops, grumbled most unreasonably at having been assigned a duty which would expose them to great risks without the chance of prize-money. For the moment Dupleix was powerless to punish the malcontents, so few were the officers at his disposal. He trusted, however, to their military honour to behave as soldiers and Frenchmen in the presence of an enemy. But in this hope he was disappointed. On the very evening of the day in which the two armies had for the first time exchanged a cannonade from their respective positions,—the 3rd April,—thirteen officers of the French army went in a body to M. d'Auteuil, resigned their commissions, and refused to serve. This was not the least of the evil. Not content with refusing to fight themselves, these officers had done their best to induce the soldiers they commanded to follow their example. By a baseness happily unparalleled they had succeeded in sowing the seeds of disaffection and distrust. Even the sepoys in the pay of France could not see unmoved the sudden withdrawal of those they had been accustomed to regard as their leaders. Doubt and hesitation pervaded their ranks, and d'Auteuil suddenly found, on the eve of a battle which, if it were unfavourable to him, would be ruinous to French interests, that he commanded an army which was utterly demoralised, which could not be relied upon to face the enemy.

Few men have ever found themselves in circumstances more difficult, more requiring quick and prompt decision. To stay where he was, to meet with his demoralised force and the native levies of his two allies, the vastly superior numbers of the Nizam, the Mahrattas, and the English, was to court destruction for all. His men would not fight, and their retreat would have drawn with it the disorderly flight of the followers of Mozuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib. It seemed, too, more than probable, that such a rout would encourage the enemy to make another attempt upon Pondichery. On the other hand, the withdrawal of his troops during the night would save the

French army for future operations, and would assure the safety of the French capital. But before taking any steps in the matter, d'Auteuil made one great effort to induce his army to sustain the part which best befitted them as soldiers. But his entreaties, his remonstrances, even his threats, were all in vain. The poison of mistrust had entered their ranks; the mutinous officers had persuaded them that they were being deliberately sacrificed to superior numbers, and so firmly had they imbibed this idea, that all the reasoning of their Commander was ineffective. They would not fight. Convinced now that his only course was to retreat, d'Auteuil sought an interview with his two allies, and laid before them the circumstances of the case. He shewed them that he was forced to retreat, and he put it to them whether they would prefer to follow his fortunes, or to endeavour to make their own terms with the enemy. Then came out the difference in the character of the two men. Chunda Sahib, whose long acquaintance and constant intercourse with the French had given him a high appreciation of their character and a confidence in their fortunes, declared unhesitatingly that he would cast in his lot with his European allies. Mozuffer Jung, naturally weaker, possessing little self-reliance, and unable to believe that d'Auteuil had not some other motive for his conduct, determined, on the other hand, to trust to the tender mercies of his uncle.

In accordance with these resolutions the French contingent commenced its retreat at midnight, followed by Chunda Sahib, who, with his cavalry, insisted upon taking the post of honour in the rear. So great, however was the disorder in the French camp, so complete their demoralisation, that no one communicated the intelligence of the intended movement to the gunners, who, to the number of forty, manned batteries in the front of their camp; these, therefore, with their eleven guns, were left behind.

Day dawned before the retreat of the French was discovered. But no sooner was it known than Moorari Rao, at the head of 10,000 Mahratta horse, started in pursuit of them. They came up with them just before they reached the prickly pear-hedge, which formed the outer defence of Pondichery. On seeing their approach, d'Auteuil formed his men up in a hollow square, whilst Chunda Sahib held his cavalry in readiness to attack them after their repulse. Moorari Rao, however, a splendid horseman, little acquainted with squares or European tactics at all, boldly charged and broke into the French formation. But at the same time Chunda Sahib charged his cavalry, who were thus, with the exception of fifteen, prevented from following

him. In this manner Morari Rao was with but fifteen men inside the French square, apparently lost. But the sullenness of the Europeans and his own daring saved him. He dashed at the other face of the square, and succeeded, with the loss of nine men, in cutting his way out. He then joined his cavalry who were engaged with Chunda Sahib. With him and with the French he kept up a running fire till they reached the hedge, when he thought proper to retire.

In this retreat the French lost nineteen men in addition to the forty left behind, many of whom were sabred by the natives, the remainder rescued from their clutches, and taken prisoners by the English. It was, however, less the loss of men and of guns that afflicted Dupleix, than the destruction by this *contre-temps* of his vast plans. We have said that he was on the point of succeeding in inducing Nazir Jung to enter into engagements with himself. He had even persisted in this attempt after he had become aware of the existence of the mutinous feeling amongst the French officers, and it is probable that, had the army only maintained its position in the field during the next day, Nazir Jung would have signed the treaty which was being pressed upon him. But this mutiny spoiled all.

"It is easy to imagine," he says, writing in the third person in his memoirs "what was the mortification of Dupleix, when "he was informed of all the details of the conduct of our cowardly officers, and further, to complete his misfortunes, that Mozuffer Jung had been taken prisoner and placed in irons by Nazir Jung." This last intelligence was but too true. Though Nazir Jung had sworn upon the Koran to restore his nephew to the governments he had held, yet, in accordance with the customs not uncommon in Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth and in India in the eighteenth centuries, he had at once loaded him with irons. He thus became undisputed viceroy of the Dekkan, and one of his first acts was to appoint Mahomed Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic. This was the destruction of those great schemes to which we have alluded, whereby Dupleix hoped to bring Southern India in entire subordination to French interests. No doubt his mortification was extreme, yet great as it was, it neither caused him to give himself to despair, nor even to abandon his plans. On the contrary, it impelled him to try new and bolder expedients to bring them to maturity.

He himself and the other inhabitants of Pondichery had received the first intelligence of the disgrace of the French army from the run-away officers themselves. These had hurried into the town on the morning of the retreat, and alarmed the inhabitants with the cry that the French army was beaten and that

the Mahrattas were upon them. The first act of Dupleix, on receiving intelligence of a nature so different to that he had expected, was to arrest these cowards. He then hastened to meet the army, to endeavour, if possible, to weed it of the disaffected, and to revive the spirit of the remainder. To this end he had recourse to the most stringent measures. All the disaffected officers were placed under arrest; d'Auteuil even was brought to trial for retreating without orders. The others were reminded that their retreat was in no way due to the enemy, but to the recreant behaviour of their own officers. This confidence, in difficult circumstances, did not fail to beget its like. The French soldiers felt in his inspiring presence that they had been indeed guilty, and to insubordination succeeded an irrepressible desire to be allowed an opportunity of recovering their name.

But whilst thus engaged in restoring the discipline of the army, Dupleix was equally prompt in dealing with the enemy. This could only be in the first instance by negotiation, and we shall see that in this he exerted the skill of which he was so great a master. Instead of shewing, in this hour of his extremity, by any abatement of his pretensions, how fallen were the fortunes of Pondichery, he directed his envoys to make demands little inferior to those which would have resulted from a French victory. They insisted, therefore, in his name, that no one of the family of Anwarooden should be appointed Nawab of the Carnatic, and that the children of Mozuffer Jung should be established in the estates and governments of their father. But they did not stop there. To favour their negotiations, they had recourse to those wiles which they had learned from the Asiatic princes, and which they now shewed they could use more skilfully than their masters. Thus they took credit for the defeat of d'Auteuil, and exaggerated the loss experienced by Morari Rao in his attempts to cut them off from Pondichery. All this time these same agents intrigued with the chiefs of the Nizam's army, especially with the Patan Nawabs of Kuddapa, Kurnool and Savanore, and succeeded in establishing with these and others, relations of a confidential nature.

Nazir Jung himself refused to agree to the terms proposed by MM. du Bausset and de Larche, the envoys of Dupleix, and on the seventh day, these two gentlemen returned to Pondichery. By this time a good feeling had been restored in the army; the officers who had disgraced themselves had been severely punished; others, less guilty, were only anxious by some brilliant achievement to wipe out the stain on their honour; d'Auteuil, who had shewn very clearly that he had acted in the only manner possible

for him to act under the circumstances, had been restored to the command. Now was the time to strike a blow ; this the opportunity to shew the viceroy who had rejected his proposals that the French were yet, as an enemy, to be feared. No sooner then had the envoys returned, than Dupleix sent instructions to d'Auteuil to beat up the camp of Morari Rao, situated between Pondichery and the main body of Nazir Jung's army. On the night of the 12th April, only eight days after the retreat from Valdaur, d'Auteuil detached 300 men under the command of M. de la Touche to surprise the enemy. They marched about midnight, reached and penetrated the camp without being discovered, killed about twelve hundred of the surprised and terror-stricken enemy, and returned to Pondichery at daybreak, having lost but three men of their party. This bold stroke had such an effect upon Nazir Jung, that trembling now for his own safety, he broke up his camp and retired in all haste to Arcot, abandoning the English, who returned to Fort St. David.

Having thus caused the prestige of success to return to his colours, Dupleix resolved to follow up his blow. Nazir Jung, on reaching Arcot, had resolved on a movement, by means of which, whilst he himself should remain safely shut up in that capital, he might avenge himself of his enemies. At the town of Masulipatam on the Orissa coast and at Yanoon, situated at the junction of the Coringa river and the Godavery, the French had some time since established lodges or factories. These Nazir Jung resolved to seize, and did seize.

It happened that shortly before these occurrences, two ships, the *Fleury* and the *d'Argenson*, bound for Bengal, had touched at Pondichery for the purpose of discharging a portion of their cargoes, and re-loading at that place. Without confiding in any one, Dupleix made the necessary preparations, and the night before these ships were to sail he embarked on board of them 200 European and 300 native soldiers, with a battering train, and directed the Commander to sail direct for Masulipatam and take possession of the place. They arrived there on the evening of the third day. The Commander at once landed his troops, surprised the town, and took possession of it without the smallest resistance, and without spilling a drop of human blood. The French colours were at once hoisted on the place, and preparations were at once made for its retention.

But it was in the neighbourhood of Pondichery that Dupleix resolved to strike his most effective blow. Very soon then after Nazir Jung had left for Arcot and the English for Fort St. David, he ordered d'Auteuil to march with 500 men, cross the river Punar, and take possession of the fortified pagoda of Tiruvadi,

only thirteen miles from Cuddalore and almost in sight of the army of Mahomed Ali. The object of this was to obtain a *point d'appui* on the Punar, which would give them command of the neighbouring country and its revenues. The expedition completely succeeded. D'Auteuil captured the place without resistance, and having garrisoned it with 20 Europeans, 20 topasses, and 50 sepoys, began to make arrangements for pushing his conquests further. But Nazir Jung alarmed at the loss of Tiruvadi, yielded now to the pressing solicitations of Mahomed Ali, and reinforced him with 20,000 men. At the same time the English, to whom the possession of Tiruvadi by the French was a standing menace, sent a force of 400 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys under Captain Cope to join Mahomed Ali. This combined army took up a position on the 30th July near the French force, which they found encamped on the river Punar, about seven miles from Cuddalore.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming superiority of the enemy, d'Auteuil resolved to maintain his position. This was not only strong by nature, but it had been strongly fortified. To hazard an attack upon Frenchmen in a position defended by entrenchments did not suit the feeble nature of Mahomed Ali. Acting on Captain Cope's advice, therefore, he moved against Tiruvadi in the hope of drawing out d'Auteuil to its assistance. But d'Auteuil was too wary to be caught by so transparent a device, and Mahomed Ali, when he wished to change the feigned assault into a real one, found that his soldiers had the same objection to stone walls as to entrenchments, when both were manned by Europeans. He accordingly marched back to his position in front of the French camp, and encouraged by Captain Cope, opened upon it a violent cannonade. The fire of the French was however so brisk and their guns were served so efficiently, that at the end of six hours the allies had had enough of it, and retreated with a considerable loss in killed and wounded. The French loss was slight; but they were too few in numbers to venture in pursuit. They contented themselves with maintaining their position, ready to profit by the disagreement which, they felt sure, would be produced by this defeat between Mahomed Ali and his English allies.

So, indeed, it happened. As prone to be unduly depressed in adversity as to be inflated in prosperity, Mahomed Ali thought himself not safe from the attacks of the French so long as he remained in the open country. He therefore proposed to retreat upon Arcot. The English, who wished to cut off the French from Pondichery, finding that Mahomed Ali would neither listen to their advice nor advance any more money

returned to Fort St. David. No sooner was Dupleix acquainted with this movement, than he directed d'Auteuil to break up from his encampment, and march on Tiruvadi; there to join a corps of 1,300 Europeans and 2,500 sepoy led by de la Touche, and 1,000 horse commanded by Chunda Sahib. With this force he was to surprise the camp of Mahomed Ali. This Nawab, with an army of upwards of 20,000 men, of whom the greater part were cavalry, had taken up a position between Tiruvadi and Fort St. David, with the river Punar in his rear, pending instructions for which he had applied to Nazir Jung. Here, on the afternoon of the 11th September, the day after the departure of the English, he was attacked by d'Auteuil. The French army advanced in good order, the artillery in front, the cavalry on either wing. In this formation, in full view of the army of Mahomed Ali, the handful of men moved forward, halting occasionally to fire their guns. So long as they were at a distance, the gunners of the Nawab's army replied by an ineffective fire. But when within two hundred yards of the entrenchments, d'Auteuil brought up his infantry, and ordered a general charge, the courage of the Asiatics gave way. Not an effort was made to defend the entrance into the camp; the entrenchments were abandoned as the enemy reached them; and the French, quickly bringing up their guns, opened out from one end of the camp a tremendous fire on the masses now huddled between them and the river. Unlike Chunda Sahib, Mahomed Ali shewed neither courage nor presence of mind. Here, as at Amboor, he thought only of his own safety. His men, left to themselves, behaved, as might have been expected, like sheep without a shepherd. The 15,000 cavalry who were in the camp did not strike one blow for their master. How to cross the Punar in safety was the problem each man sought to solve for his own advantage. Victory they never had dreamt of; now even orderly retreat was out of the question. Fortunately for them the river was fordable. Yet, before it could be crossed by the fugitives, they had left nearly a thousand of their number on the field of carnage. They left besides, to fall into the hands of the French, a great quantity of munitions of war, immense supplies of grain and fodder, thirty pieces of cannon, and two English mortars. The French did not lose a single man in the engagement; a few sepoy only were wounded by the explosion of a tumbril.

If battles are to be judged by their consequences, this action may truly be termed a great victory. By it, the French more than regained the ascendancy they had lost by the disastrous retreat from Valdaur; Chunda Sahib, their ally, resumed, in consequence of it, a position in which he could lay a well-founded

claim to the possession of the Carnatic; whilst his rival, Mahomed Ali, who had but two months before been master of the whole of that province,—the territories ceded to the French and English alone excepted,—was forced by this defeat into the position of a beaten and baffled fugitive, fleeing with two attendants for refuge to Arcot. The English on their part, sulky with Mahomed Ali, on the point of losing their Commandant Major Lawrence, who was about to embark for England, were likewise by the same means reduced to an almost compulsory inaction, for they were not at war with France, and the dispersion of Mahomed Ali's army had left them almost without a native ally whom indirectly to assist.

It was true, indeed, that Nazir Jung was yet exercising the functions of the office of Viceroy of the Dekkan, and Nazir Jung was their ally. Sunk in debauchery and the pleasures of the chase, Nazir Jung, however, left the direction of affairs to his ministers and nobility, and the chief of these had already,—thanks to the intrigues of Dupleix,—been won over to the interests of France. Whilst the army he had given to his *protégé*, Mahomed Ali, was being destroyed in the field, he remained inactive at Arcot, not yet thinking himself in danger, nor yet believing that the army which fled before him at Valdaur would dare to compete with him in the field. Of this inaction, which he had used all his efforts to secure, and of the consternation caused amongst partisans of Mahomed Ali by the victory of d'Auteuil, Dupleix resolved to take the fullest advantage. He therefore sent instant orders to d'Auteuil to detach a sufficient force under N. de Bussy to attack Gingee, a fortress fifty miles inland, and the possession of which would, he thought, decide the fate of the Carnatic.

The town of Gingee, surrounded by a thick wall and flanked by towers, is situated at the base of three mountains forming the three sides of an equilateral triangle. Each of these mountains was defended by a strong citadel built on its summit, and by the sides, in many places naturally steep, and in others artificially scarp'd, by which alone access was possible. A cordon of advanced works contributed likewise to make all approach a matter of extreme difficulty. It was no wonder then that in the eyes of the natives Gingee was deemed quite impregnable. Even Sevajee, the ruthless founder of the Mahratta power, had been forced, in 1677, to come to an understanding with its commander to effect its reduction, and Zulfikar Khan, the general of Aurungzebe, had brought about the same result by means of a blockade of the strictest nature. The belief in its impregnability made it always the refuge of defeated armies, and the scattered

parties of Mahomed Ali's force, to the number of 10,000 or 12,000 men, had fled to it after the battle on the Punar for that protection which it was deemed so well able to offer. Against this,—the strongest of all the fortresses of the Carnatic,—Dupleix directed d'Auteuil to send a detachment with all possible speed, indicating at the same time Bussy as the Commandant of whom he would approve for such a service. This is not the first time that we have met with this officer. He it was, it will be recollected, who, when the French troops had twice recoiled before the entrenchments thrown up by Anwarooddeen at Amboor, when their Commandant, d'Auteuil, had been struck down, rallied the repulsed infantry, and led them, the third time, victoriously to the charge. But little is known of his early childhood,*—a strange circumstance when it is recollected that he occupies a principle figure, in the estimation of some the foremost figure, in the history of the French in India. This much, however, is ascertained,† that he had lost his father at an early age, and inheriting little beyond his pedigree, he had come out to the Isle of France at the time that La Bourdonnais was governor, and had formed one of the expedition led by that famous Admiral to India in 1746. When La Bourdonnais returned to Europe at the end of that year, de Bussy remained behind as an officer of the Pondichery army. Here he found himself, constantly in contact with Dupleix, and, in their frequent meetings, he had not been less struck by the large views and brilliant genius of the Governor-General than had been Dupleix by the noble nature, the striking talents, the desire to acquire knowledge, especially knowledge of India and its people, displayed by the young officer. He had given many proofs of adding to these qualities a courage, a daring, and a presence of mind, which, when united in a soldier, inevitably lead him to fortune; and it was on this account that he had now been selected to lead a detachment of the French army on the most daring expedition on which European troops had yet been engaged in India.

The force placed at the disposal of Bussy consisted of 250 Europeans and 1,200 sepoys, and four field-pieces. They left the scene of the action with Mahomed Ali on the 3rd September, and came in sight of Gingee on the 11th. Here, at the distance of three miles, Bussy encamped, and here intelligence reached him that the remnants of Mahomed Ali's army, 10,000 or

* Even that admirable work, the *Nouvelle Biographie Générale* throws no light on this point.

National Review, Vol. 15., Art. *Dupleix*.

12,000 strong, together with 1,000 sepoy^s trained by the English, and some European gunners with eight field-pieces were encamped on the glacis, and were about to take advantage of their overwhelming superiority of numbers to attack him. Immediately afterwards the enemy were seen advancing. Bussy waited for them till they came within pistolshot, when he ordered a general advance, the four guns opening at the same time on the enemy's cavalry. This, as was usual, not only prevented their advance but threw them into confusion. They had already broken, when the main body of the French army under d'Auteuil was seen approaching the field. A general panic instantly ensued amongst all branches of the enemy's forces, and Bussy, taking advantage of it, advanced and secured their guns, killing or taking prisoners the Europeans who served them. He then pushed forward and drove the fugitives under the walls of Gingee, the cannon of which opened fire on the pursuers.

But it did not stop Bussy. Following the fugitives to the entrance of the town, he applied a petard to the principal gate and blew it in. He at once rushed forward, sword in hand, followed by his men, and engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand contest with the defenders. Nothing, however, could resist French gallantry. Before night-fall the place was their own, and it was occupied during the night by the remainder of the force under d'Auteuil. Their situation was, nevertheless, still one of great danger. We have already stated that the town of Gingee lies at the base of three mountains, the summits of which were strongly fortified. From these summits there poured in now an incessant fire on the French in Gingee. Small arms, grape, round shot, and rockets were used with all the vigour of which the garrison were capable. For some time Bussy replied by a fire from his mortars, keeping his men under cover. But no sooner had the moon gone down than he moved out three detachments of picked troops, all Frenchmen, to escalate the three citadels at the same time. The ascent was steep; redoubt after redoubt hindered their progress; a terrific fire rained upon them from all sides; but no obstacle was too great to be overcome by Bussy and his comrades. The storming of one redoubt filled them with the greater determination to attempt the conquest of another; their onward progress gave them fresh animating power, whilst the defenders, after each loss, became more and more discouraged. At last mounting higher and higher, they came to the citadels. These, too, just as day broke on the horizon, fell into their hands, and the victors could gaze and wonder at the almost insuperable difficulties which they nevertheless had surmounted.

It was indeed a wonderful achievement, great in itself, and calculated by its effect upon the people of Southern India to be much greater. They could be no second-rate warriors who could, within twenty-four hours, defeat an army vastly superior in numbers, and storm a fortress reputed impregnable, and which for three years had defied the best army and the best general of the renowned Aurungzebe. Not lightly would such a feat be esteemed in the cities of the South. The fame of it would extend even to imperial Delhi on the one side, and to the palaces of Poona on the other. It was a blow, which by the intrinsic advantages resulting from it and by the renown it would acquire for those who delivered it, would strike down not only Mahomed Ali; but Nazir Jung, would seat the nominees of Dupleix at Golconda and Arcot, would bring Delhi itself almost within the grasp of the French governor. Yes, well followed up, using carefully yet vigorously every opportunity, this capture of Gingee might indeed be made the first stone of a French empire in India.

The immediate results of the capture on the minds of the natives were all that could have been expected. Nazir Jung, till then devoted to pleasure, now roused himself to action. Yet even he, the Viceroy of the Mogul, the disposer of an army of 300,000 men was thunder-struck at the feat. These French, he felt, must be beaten or conciliated. It appeared to rest with him whether he should attempt the first, or accomplish the second, for almost simultaneously with the news of the fall of Gingee intelligence reached him that d'Auteuil was marching on Arcot, and he at the same time received peaceful overtures from Dupleix. The principal of these suggested the release of Mozuffer Jung and his restoration to the governments he had held in his grandfather's life-time, the appointment of Chunda Sahib to be Nawab of Arcot, and the cession of Masulipatam to the French. It is probable that Nazir Jung would have made no difficulty regarding the second and third of these conditions, but the release of Mozuffer Jung was tantamount to a renewal of a civil contest, and rather than assent to that, he preferred to try the fortune of war. Summoning then his chiefs to Arcot, he set out at the head of an army consisting of 60,000 foot, 45,000 horse, 700 elephants, and 360 cannon, in the direction of Gingee. When, however, he had arrived within twelve miles of the French force,—which, after making one or two marches in the direction of Arcot, had returned on the news of the approach of the enemy to Gingee,—the periodical rains set in with such violence, that any movements in the face of an enemy became impossible. An inaction of two months' duration, from September to the beginning of December,

succeeded, the French army remaining encamped about three miles from Gingee whence, for some weeks, it drew its supplies. When they had been exhausted, it received them, thanks to the excellent arrangements of Dupleix, and despite the unsettled state of the country, direct from Pondichery. Nazir Jung, on his side, was forced to remain in ~~the~~ most inconvenient position, hemmed in by water-courses swollen by the rains, and able to obtain supplies only with the greatest difficulty.

But these two months of military inaction constituted a busy period to Dupleix. Corresponding secretly with the chiefs of Nazir Jung's army, he had succeeded in persuading many of them, especially the Patans and the Mahrattas, that it would be more to their interest to regard the French as friends than as enemies. Both the sections had several causes of dislike to Nazir Jung. His manifold debaucheries, the treatment, after his solemn promise to grant him liberty, of Mozuffer Jung, his constant refusal to entertain the propositions for peace, and the knowledge, that with Mozuffer Jung upon the viceregal seat, they would enjoy not only peace and alliance with the French, but an accession of honours and dignities, all conspired to whet their desire to be rid of him. On the other hand, their admiration, mingled with fear, of the French nation, and especially of the statesman who was so daringly guiding its fortunes, gave to the proposals of Dupleix a weight which they found it difficult to resist. A secret agreement was accordingly arrived at between the two parties, which stipulated that if Nazir Jung should refuse any longer to agree to the terms offered by Dupleix, but should decide upon marching against the French, the malcontent nobles should withdraw their forces from those of their feudal superior, and should range themselves, a short distance from them, under the flag of France. To such an extent were the details of this arrangement carried out, that a French standard was secretly conveyed to the malcontents to be by them on the proper occasion hoisted on the back of an elephant in the most conspicuous part of the field. Other secret arrangements were at the same time entered into between Mozuffer Jung and the conspirators, with which Dupleix had no concern. There can be little doubt but that the death of the Subadar and the distribution of his treasures equally between Mozuffer Jung on one side, and the conspirators on the other, were resolved upon.

But meanwhile better thoughts had come over Nazir Jung. The difficulties of his army, the fear of finding himself engaged in a long and doubtful campaign with an enemy whom all that he had heard and knew caused him to dread, and, above all, the

deprivation of much loved pleasures which this campaign would necessitate, induced him to reconsider the terms repeatedly pressed upon him by Dupleix. To these he had given no reply. But when the fine days of the early December shewed him that the time had arrived when action could not be avoided, he determined to yield everything, to set free Mozuffer Jung, to yield Masulipatam, to appoint Chunda Sahib,—to make any concession in fact, so that he might be free to drain the cup of pleasure. He accordingly wrote to Dupleix, offering to agree to his terms. With this letter he sent three of his officers provided with full powers to negotiate, for the purpose of signing the treaty. Dupleix, caring little with whom the treaty was made, provided only that his own propositions were agreed to, determined to accede to the offers of Nazir Jung, and wrote at once to the Commander of the French forces to suspend all hostilities until he should receive further instructions. His orders, however, arrived too late. M. de la Touche, upon whom the command had devolved, in the absence of d'Auteuil laid up with the gout, had, before this letter reached him, received from the conspirators the signal he had preconcerted with them to advance. They were in fact acquainted with the contents of the letter sent to Dupleix, and justly feared that, if time were allowed, it would interfere with their long-meditated plans. Hence the sudden resolution to bring matters to a crisis and their call upon the French General to perform his part. Ignorant of the negotiations going on at the time at Pondichery, de la Touche had no option. In compliance, therefore, with instructions which had been given him as to his action in the event of his receiving such a summons from the conspirators, he set out on the night of the 15th December from Gingee at the head of 800 Europeans, 3,000 sepoys, and ten guns, in the direction of the Subadar's camp, under the guidance of a native who had been sent for that purpose by the conspirators. After a march of sixteen miles, de la Touche, at 4 o'clock in the morning, came in sight of the enemy. Their advanced posts which gave the alarm were soon dispersed, and de la Touche found himself with his 3,800 men in front of an army of more than 25,000. By the skilful management of his guns, however, he succeeded in keeping at bay, and eventually throwing into confusion, the vast masses of cavalry which were constantly threatening to charge him. No sooner were these dispersed than he advanced on the infantry, and after a very severe contest succeeded in breaking them. But this had hardly been accomplished when he perceived a body of at least 20,000 men advancing on his left flank. At the sight of this new enemy the French began

almost to despair of success, but as they advanced nearer, de la Touche discovered to his joy the French standard displayed on the back of the foremost elephant; almost immediately afterwards a messenger from Mozuffer Jung conveyed to de la Touche the intelligence of the success of all the plans of the conspirations.

Nazir Jung, in fact, relying on the full powers with which he had accredited the envoy he had sent to Pondichery, would not believe that they were French who were attacking him. When it would no longer admit of a doubt, he sent orders to his generals to repulse "this mad attempt of a parcel of drunken Europeans,"* whilst, seated on his elephant, he took his station amongst his guns. Near him, on another elephant, was seated Mozuffer Jung under the guardianship of an officer who had received instructions to behead him on the first appearance of treason. In the midst of the action, seeing some of his men retiring from the field, the Subadar enquired and learned that the Patan Nawabs, the Rajah of Mysore, and the Mahrattas, had ordered their troops to abstain from any participation in the action. Enraged at this, he started on his elephant to threaten them, first giving orders for the beheadal of Mozuffer Jung. The Nawab of Kuddapa, whom he first met and upbraided, replied by a defiant answer, and directed his attendant to fire at the Subadar. As the piece however missed, he unslung his own carbine, and shot Nazir Jung through the heart. The Subadar's head was instantly cut off and laid at the feet of Mozuffer Jung, whose own had just escaped a similar ceremony.†

This was the intelligence conveyed to M. de la Touche by the messenger of Mozuffer Jung, just after the French, to their delight, had beheld their national standard displayed on the foremost elephant of the advancing party. The first act of the French leader was to despatch his second in command, de Bussy,—although he had been wounded in the fight,—to congratulate the new Subadar on his elevation. Bussy found the newly-made potentate seated on the splendidly caparisoned elephant of his late rival, acknowledged as the Mogul's viceroy, not only by the conspiring nobles, but by all but a very small minority of the army which but a few hours before had obeyed the orders of Nazir Jung. The same evening M. de la Touche himself accompanied by his principal officers paid a congratulatory visit to Mozuffer Jung, and received from him the commission to

* Orme.

† He simply owed his escape to the fact that the officer in whose charge he had been placed was one of the conspirators.—*Dupleix*.

inform Dupleix that nothing would be undertaken without his advice, to obtain which he, Mozuffer Jung, purposed instantly to proceed to Pondichery.

Whilst matters had thus progressed in the field, Dupleix had been awaiting in Pondichery the return of the messenger he had sent to the army to direct the suspension of hostilities. But before that messenger could return, the intelligence of the great victory and its results reached the town.* The excitement, the joy, the enthusiasm may be imagined. That the French might have entered into a satisfactory arrangement with Nazir Jung had been hoped. But every bound of reasonable expectation was exceeded when it was known that, owing to the exertions of 800 Frenchmen, and 3,000 sepoys trained by them, the *protégé* of France had become the ruler of Southern India, the lord over thirty-five millions of people. Still greater was the national exultation when it became known through a brief despatch from M. de la Touche, how modestly Mozuffer Jung bore his triumph; how deferentially he acknowledged his obligations to the French people; and how submissively he had announced his intention to do nothing until he should have communicated personally with the great ruler of French India. The fire of artillery, the chanting of *Te Deums*, illuminations, processions, and durbars, announced all the joy which these occurrences inspired.

Well, indeed, might the French in India feel a pride in their success. Not seventy-six years had elapsed since François Martin at the head of sixty Frenchmen had bought the plot of ground on which had since risen the city of Pondichery, and we find his successor in a position to give laws to thirty-five millions of people! Though besieged and taken by the Dutch, though besieged but two years before by an immensely superior force of English, Pondichery had risen to see the decadence of one nation as a rival on Indian soil, and the compulsory inaction and loss of reputation,—both indeed destined only to be temporary,—of the other. The genius of the people had suited itself so well to the natural temperament of the children of the soil, that the French were regarded everywhere as friends; the increase of their territory excited no jealousy. Their policy had been a policy of fidelity and trust. The intimacy of François Martin with Shere Khan Lodi had been continued by his successors to the family of Dost Ali. Neither the overthrow of that Nawab, nor the captivity of his successors had been able to shake it. To support that traditional alliance, M. Dumas had bade defiance to

* Mr. Orme states that it was conveyed in person by Chunda Sahib to Dupleix.

the threats, qualities which, in that rude day, the princes of Asia could admire though they could not imitate. From such an one, practising such lofty sentiments, there was nought, they would believe, for them to fear. That one act of abnegation was sufficient to make them acquiesce without envy, without the least hesitation or doubt, in the substantial acquisitions that had been made that day to Dupleix. He indeed was the hero of the day's ceremony. He emerged from that tent the acknowledged superior of the lord of Southern India.

We have not yet enumerated all the advantages which accrued to the French on the occasion of this visit. In addition to those promulgated by Mozuffer Jung at the time of his installation, one sum of five hundred thousand rupees was made over to Dupleix for the soldiers who had fought at the late battle; another of the same amount was repaid to the Company, on account of moneys that had been advanced, and security given for the amount remaining due. The increase of revenue likely to accrue to the French Company by the territorial cessions we have adverted to, was computed at little short of 400,000 rupees annually. To commemorate these great results thus obtained, Dupleix ordered the creation of a town on the site of the battle which had caused them, to be entitled Dupleix-Futteh-abad.* This design, founded on sound policy, being in strict conformity with those native usages by which alone the mass of the people were likely to be impressed, and not, as has been ignorantly charged against him, on ridiculous vanity, was not, it is true, destined to be realised. Events were too strong even for this strong man. He, the pioneer of European conquest and European civilisation, whose vast plans were not, as so many of his contemporaries believed, too vast to be accomplished, was yet destined to see them appropriated to a great extent by his rivals. It will be for us, very soon, to enquire and to search out the one weak point in that strongly welded armour,—the one part wanting in that almost consummate genius, by means of which one great adversary, possessing the quality wanting to Dupleix, shattered the vast fabric of his plans ere yet they were proof against attack.

Not only the urgent and pressing instructions from the French East India Company, but his own conviction of the necessity of the case, disposed Dupleix at this period to consolidate his conquests by a definite peace. Peace, however, was utterly impossible so long as the rival candidate for the Nawabship of the Carnatic, Mahomed Ali, was at large maintaining his pretension. This chieftain, seeing that by the death of Nazir Jung

* Indicating "The place of the victory of Dupleix."

his chances of dominion had been reduced almost to zero, abandoned by the English, and without following, had fled, on the news of the defeat to Trichinopoly, behind whose walls he had once before found refuge. Dupleix, who had on that previous occasion experienced the delays and difficulties attending the attack by a native army on a fortified town, was particularly anxious to induce the fugitive nobleman to enter into some arrangement, by which, in virtue of some concessions made to him, he would engage to recognise the new order of things. He was the more hopeful that negotiations to this effect might succeed, as Mahomed Ali was now literally abandoned by all the world. To his gratification and surprise the first overtures for this object came from Mahomed Ali himself. Rajah Janojec, one of the Mahratta leaders who had been with Nazir Jung, and had subsequently transferred his temporary services to his successor, was charged by Mahomed Ali with a proposal to recognise Chunda Sahib as Nawab of the Carnatic, and to make over to him the city of Trichinopoly and its dependencies, on condition (1) that he should be put in possession of the treasures left by his father, no enquiry being made into his administration; (2) that the Subadar should engage to give him another government in the Dekkan. Dupleix eagerly embraced these terms, and requested Janojec to inform Mahomed Ali of his acceptance of them. This led to the opening of a correspondence between the French governor and Mahomed Ali, throughout which the latter ardently expressed his desire to be reconciled to the Subadar.

This important matter being regarded as settled, Mozuffer Jung, not doubting that peace would henceforth reign in the Carnatic, informed Dupleix of his intention to proceed to the northern part of the Dekkan, as well to consolidate his power, as to settle divers matters which in consequence of the war had fallen into great confusion. But he represented at the same time to Dupleix that, in order to undertake, with safety and success, a journey across provinces which had been so recently hostile, it would be very desirable that a body of French troops, upon whom he knew he could rely, should accompany him. He expressed himself willing to defray all the charges connected with these troops, and, he added, he would not send them back before he had given to them, as well as to the Company they served, real marks of his gratitude.

This proposal chimed in exactly with the policy of Dupleix. It assured him against any change of policy in the councils of the Subadar. It made him virtually master of the Dekkan, ruling Southern India through the representative of the Mogul. He consented therefore to the proposal. Perhaps if he had known

of Ragoojee Bhonsla, and his, till then, irresistible Mahrattas; Dupleix had, for seven years, fed the hopes of the imprisoned Chunda Sahib with the prospect of a throne. And now this policy had blossomed and borne fruit. Chunda Sahib, released from captivity by the efforts of Dupleix, had made common cause with Mozuffer Jung, the claimant of the viceregal dignity in the south of India, and, after many reverses, the two friends,—thanks to French generalship and French valour,—seemed to have attained the summit of their very highest wishes.

The glory which M. Dupleix had acquired by this successful policy attained its most dazzling elevation when, on the 26th December following, Mozuffer Jung and his followers arrived at Pondichery. Entering the town in the same palanquin with the French governor, this ruler of thirty-five millions paid him in outward appearance the homage and respect due to a feudal superior. He at once made over to him all the treasure, the jewels, the gold and silver ornaments found in the camp of his late rival, and requested him to assume the office of arbitrator between himself and his confederates, the Patan Nawabs, with whom already misunderstandings had broken out. Dupleix in this trying position was true to the traditional policy of the French in India. It was a main portion of that policy to respect native customs, to conciliate native opinion, to rule by means of that rather than by force, to be liberal, generous, trustful, confiding. His position as the secret ruler of the Dekkan, directing all its resources, surely yet unostensibly, by means of its native ruler, keeping his own power, of the superior might of which he was assured, necessarily in the background, was in his opinion more strong and more really powerful, than if he had claimed for himself the ostensible dignity, and with it a territorial extension, such as would provoke the jealousy of those even who granted it. His first act, therefore, was to disclaim for his own part any share in the booty taken after the victory. This, he decided, in his quality of arbitrator, should be divided equally between Mozuffer Jung on one side, and the confederate Nawabs on the other, reserving the jewels only without division to Mozuffer Jung. Any claim which the French might have upon the latter for the part they had played in helping him to his dignities, he left entirely to his own generous impulses.

Having thus, and by some other arrangements which it is unnecessary to detail, effected an amicable settlement of all misunderstandings, Dupleix prepared for the solemn investiture of Mozuffer Jung, as Subadar of the Carnatic, in the presence of his tributaries and vassals. This imposing ceremony,—a ceremony noticeable as indicating the period when French

power in India had almost attained its zenith,—took place in a magnificent tent pitched in the great square of Pondichery. The splendours of that day, the honours granted to Dupleix, the high position he assumed, have scarcely yet been obliterated from the traditions of Southern India. Let us imagine, as we well can, either side of the gorgeously draped tent lined by the armed nobility of the Dekkan. Mozuffer Jung enters and takes his seat at the head of the assembly. Quickly behind him follows the governor of French India, and presents to the Subadar, as he salutes him, the offering due to his rank. Mozuffer Jung advances to meet the French governor and places him on a seat designedly set there, and betokening a rank equal to his own. To them, thus seated, though nominally only to the Subadar, the assembled nobles offer their gifts. On the conclusion of this ceremony, the Subadar rises, and proclaims the honours he proposes to confer on his French ally. He declares him Nawab or Governor of the country south of the river Kistna up to Cape Cormorin, including Mysore and the entire Carnatic; he bestows upon him as a personal gift the fortress of Valdaur, about fifteen miles from Pondichery, with the villages and lands dependent upon it, as well as a separate Jagkire of 100,000 rupees a year. He confers upon him the title of *munsab*, or commander of 7,000 horse, with permission to bear the ensign of the fish, one of the highest honours in the Mogul empire. He directs that the Pondichery currency shall be the sole currency of Southern India: he confirms the sovereignty of the French Company over the newly-acquired districts of Masulipatam and Yanoon, and an extension of the territories about Karikal. Then, turning to Dupleix with the air of a vassal to his liege lord, he promises never even to grant a favour without his previous approval, and to be guided in all things by his advice. Dupleix, on his side, is true to himself, to his policy, on this tempting and trying occasion. With a generosity which, if assumed, shews his political fitness in a still stronger light, he calls up Chunda Sahib to his side, presents to the Sudadar his old and tried companion, and urges that if he himself is to hold the nominal dignity of Nawab over the country south of the Kistna, the real sovereignty and emoluments of that part of it known as the Carnatic may be bestowed upon one who had shewn so much steadfastness and fidelity. We can well imagine the impression that would be conveyed to the minds of an Oriental assembly by an act so generous and graceful. He who could thus give away kingdoms, who, in the height of his prosperity could recollect and reward those who, under all circumstances, had been true to him, shewed the possession of

the secret intentions which Mahomed Ali still cherished, he might have delayed the departure of his troops until the affairs of the Carnatic and its dependencies had been quite settled. But he had excellent reasons for believing that Mahomed Ali had entered into his schemes; that he would resign Trichinopoly in favour of a government elsewhere. Had he not been satisfied with the assurances he had received on this head, it is certain he would not have detached so far from Pondichery a considerable contingent of his little army, and—what was of far greater importance—his best officer to command it. But, as it was, believing peace re-established, anxious to have French interests powerfully represented at the court of the Subadar, and not indifferent to the financial considerations resulting from the transfer to another exchequer of all the charges connected with the troops thus detached, he agreed to send with the Subadar to Aurungabad, his capital, a force of 300 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys, the whole under the command of Bussy. For such a purpose, or indeed for any office, political or military, a better selection than that of Bussy could not have been made; but in sending him, d'Auteuil being still incapacitated by sickness and de la Touche having died, Dupleix deprived himself of the one man upon whom he could depend in the event of any unforeseen military disaster.

On the 7th January 1751, Mozuffer Jung left Pondichery to join his army, and on the 15th, in pursuance of the agreement he had entered into with Dupleix, he was joined by Bussy and the French contingent. At the end of about three weeks they entered the territories of the Nawab of Kuddapah, who was himself with the army. Here a tumult, apparently accidental, but really preconcerted, occurred between some troops belonging to the army of the Subadar and some villagers. The Nawab of Kuddapah hastened to support his tenants, and attacked the rear-guard of the main body of the Subadar's army, that being the part of the force with which the ladies of his harem travelled. Muzuffer Jung, enraged at this insolence, determined to avenge it, but wished in the first instance to assure himself of the countenance and support of Bussy. The orders given to this officer had been to avoid as much as possible all appearance of hostility, and in accordance with these, he addressed himself to the task of bringing about an accommodation between the two angry chieftains. But it soon appeared that the Nawab of Kuddapah had allied himself with the Nawabs of Kanoul and Savanore against their former confederate Muzuffer Jung, and that although anxious, if possible, to avoid hostilities with the French, they were resolved to seize the opportunity of one of the

confederates being within his own district, to effect the destruction of the Subadar. Mozuffer Jung had no sooner satisfied himself regarding their plans than he ordered out his troops to attack them, calling upon Bussy to support him. This Bussy, who considered himself bound to side with the Subadar against traitors, promised to do. Mozuffer Jung, without waiting for the slower march of the infantry, at once attacked the confederates with his cavalry. An obstinate contest ensued, many being killed on both sides. The confederates, however, maintained the position they had taken up, until Bussy and the French contingent arrived on the ground. A few rounds from their artillery and a general advance of their infantry decided the day. The rebel army broke, fled, and dispersed, leaving the Nawab of Savanore dead on the field, and taking with them the Nawab of Kuddapah grievously wounded. Mozuffer Jung, indignant at the idea that he, the principal conspirator, should escape, outstripped his French allies to pursue him on his elephant. In his headlong course he came upon the third confederate, the Nawab of Kanoul. A desperate hand-to-hand contest ensued, in the course of which the newly made Subadar, Mozuffer Jung, was thrust through the brain by a spear, whilst his antagonist, the Nawab of Kanoul was instantly afterwards hacked to pieces.

The death of Mozuffer Jung, Subadar of the Dekkan, was in itself a severe, and might have been a fatal blow to the policy of Dupleix. In his person was struck down the main defender of the French alliance, the man who had personally experienced the advantages to be derived from French wisdom and French valour, the personal friend and *protégé* of Dupleix. No successor could occupy the position he had occupied with reference to French India. It was indeed possible that the government of the vast possessions he had inherited only to lose might devolve upon a minor, or a declared antagonist, who might repudiate all the engagements and cancel all the advantages to which Mozuffer Jung had agreed. Under these circumstances the wisdom evinced by the selection of Bussy became apparent. Feeling that to secure French interests it was necessary for him to act, and act on the moment:—that it was essential that the chiefs and the army should not be left in doubt as to their ruler, but that a man should be appointed equally agreeable to them and to the French, Bussy, with the concurrence of the principal officers of the army, set aside the infant son of Mozuffer Jung, and at once proclaimed the next brother of the old Subadar Nazir Jung, Salabut Jung by name, as viceroy of the Dekkan for the Emperor Ahmed Shah. From a throne to a prison, from a prison to a throne, constituted in those days a condition of affairs which might almost

be termed normal. Salabut Jung was no exception to the rule. He was taken from confinement to rule over thirty-five millions of his fellow-creatures.

The first act of the new viceroy was to confirm all the concessions which his predecessor had made to the French. His next was to add to them. In gratitude, we may suppose, for his elevation, he adjoined to the French possessions at Masulipatam the lands attached to the villages of Nizampatnam, of Condore, of Alemenava, and of Narsapore in its neighborhood. He ordered the re-building of all the factories at Yanoon which his brother Nazir Jung had destroyed; and finally he presented to Dupleix the territory of Mafoosbundur in the district of Chicacole. A few days later the army resumed its route, stormed on the 18th March the fortress of Kanoul, the residence of the deceased rebel Nawab of that title, bought off the threatened hostilities of the Maharatta Bajee Rao by a present of two lakhs of rupees, reached Hyderabad on the 12th April, remained there a month, and finally made a triumphant entry into Aurungabad on the 29th June. Here Salabut Jung in the presence of Bussy and all the nobles of the province was solemnly invested as Subadar of the Dekkan on the authority of a firman stated to have been received from the Imperial Court of Delhi, but which, there can be no doubt, was a forgery. Here we must leave him, and with him, for a time, the indefatigable Bussy, revolving, and not only revolving but carrying out great schemes which, had all gone well in the Carnatic, would, there can be no question, have brought forth abundant fruit in their season.

We can leave them, indeed, with the greater satisfaction at this conjuncture, because it constitutes the period at which French domination in India may be said to have attained its zenith. A glance at the map of India will shew the enormous extent of territory which, in the spring of 1751, was subject to French influence. The entire country between the Vindya mountains and the Kistna, exceeding the limits of the territory now known as that of the Nizam, was virtually ruled by a French general. A French army occupied the capital; French influence predominated in the viceregal councils. To the north-east of Hyderabad, the coastlands situated between the river Mahanuddy and the Godavery, known as the Northern Circars, and south of that, the country between the Godavery and the Kistna, were secured to the French by means of the possession of the towns of Masulipatam and Yanoon, and of the provinces of Montfanagar, of Ellore, of Rajahmundry, and of Chicacole. South of the Kistna again, the governor of French India had been constituted by the Mahomedan viceroy of Southern India, Nawab of the entire country,—

a country comprehending, be it remembered, the entire Carnatic, the whole of Mysore, the kingdoms of Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Cochin, and the provinces of Madura and Tinivelly. If, indeed, the French governor did not hold these places under his own sway, it was mainly because it was a part of his settled policy to keep his authority in the background, and to govern through the princes of the country. It was for this reason that he had made over the Carnatic to Chanda Sahib, and contented himself with exercising a moral influence, amounting, in fact, to a real supremacy, over the others. But in the beginning of 1751, his power was so far established, that there was nowhere a sign of opposition. Mahomed Ali, the rival of Chanda Sahib, had promised submission and obedience, and had consented to retire from the stronghold of Trichinopoly. The English, thus deprived of all pretext for interference, were sulking at Madras and Fort St. David. Their presence, it is true, constituted a thorn in the side of the French ruler, but his hands, too, were withheld from attacking them, and the utmost he could aim at was to bring about such a state of things in Southern India, a condition of such universal acquiescence in French arbitration, as would leave them without consideration and without power. Armed with the promise of Mahomed Ali to agree to the conditions that had been proposed, he seemed almost to have brought matters to that point in the spring of 1751.

To us, who, after the fall of the French power in India, required forty years of hard fighting to gain a position equal in influence to that which Dupleix had acquired after an administration of less than ten years' duration, these results may well appear marvellous. For a solution of them we must look to the character of the man himself. His mental resources appear perfectly inexhaustible. Difficulties seem to occur merely that he may find means for riding over them. Whether it is a repulse in the field, mutiny of his troops, the defeat or defection of an ally, he is prepared for all, ready to remedy all. Nay more, a repulse is to him always the prelude for a further advance. Uniting with extreme prudence the readiness to greatly dare, he never fails to trust fortune, at the same time that he exhausts every effort to make her his ally. Who but he would have sent Paradis to bid defiance to the hitherto unconquered armies of the representative of the Mogul? Who but he would have ordered the attack on the impregnable Gingee? Who but he would have sent Bussy with but three hundred Frenchmen into the heart of Southern India, then a *terra incognita* to Europeans? A march of a handful of Europeans from Pondichery to Aurungabad was considered in those days as wild and as dangerous a

project as would in these, the despatch of a detachment from Peshawur to Bokhara. His directors condemned it, France cried out against it, but Dupleix insisted upon it. It was, he well knew, the lever by which, Chanda Sahib being master of the Carnatic, he could shake even the throne of the Mogul.

It is very well for those who are wise after the event to declaim against the vastness of his schemes, and to aver that sooner or later they must have broken down. We cannot share that opinion. We believe, on the contrary, that under ordinary circumstances, his success would have been certain. Had he had but ordinary men to deal with, nothing could have stopped him. Had he even had another Bussy to support him, the chances would have been greatly in favour of his ultimate triumph. Had he even, if we may so far anticipate, not been replaced in his government at a most critical period of his fortunes, the soundness of his policy might even then have been verified. But it was written that India was not to become French. The history of the world abounds with instances in which everything turns on the action of an individual man. Had Ferdinand of Gratz never been born, the Austrian empire would have been for three hundred years the mainstay of Protestantism. Had Gustavus Adolphus never been born, that same Ferdinand would have brought all Germany under the yoke of the Jesuits. Charles I. had his Cromwell, Louis XIV. his Marlborough. It was fated, too, that the high-soaring Dupleix should meet with his Clive.

As yet, however, whilst Bussy is marching on Aurungabad,—the dictator of the Dekkan,—everything seems to smile on the daring statesman who, from his palace in Pondichery, directs every movement on the board, and to him thus triumphant, to him who in ten years has made Pondichery the centre point of Southern India, we cannot refuse the expression of our admiration of his soaring genius, his untiring energy, his vast and comprehensive intellect.

THE STRUGGLES OF DUPLEIX WITH ADVERSITY.

1. *Mémoire pour le Sieur Dupleix contre la compagnie des Indes, avec les pièces justificatives.* Paris, 1759.
2. *A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, from the year 1745.* By Robert Orme, M.A., F.A.S., 1803.
3. *Histoire de la conquête de l'Inde par l'Angleterre,* par le Baron Barchou de Penhoen. Paris, 1844.
4. *Inde,* par M. Dubois de Jancigny, Aide-dé-camp du Roi d'Oude, et par M. Xavier Raymond, Attaché à l'Ambassade de Chine. Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1845.
5. *The History of British India.* By Mill and Wilson, in ten volumes. London, Madden and Co., Leadenhall Street, 1858.
6. *The National Review*, Volume XV. London, Chapman and Hall, 193, Piccadilly, London,
7. *An Account of the War in India, between the French and English on the Coast of Coromandel, from the year 1750 to the year 1760.* Compiled by Richard Owen Cambridge, Esq., London, T. Jeffreys, 1761.
8. *Nouvelle Biographie Générale, depuis les temps les plus reculés, jusqu'à nos jours.* Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1862.

THE energetic measures taken by Bussy after the death of Mózuffer Jung had confirmed the ascendancy which the French had attained in the councils of the Subadar. All the promises, all the arrangements, made by the deceased prince, had been at once ratified by his successor.

Of these, perhaps, the most important at the moment was the engagement entered into with Mahomed Ali. It will be recollected that this noble, the representative of the family of Anwarooddeen, abandoned by every one after the downfall of Nazir Jung, had taken refuge in the strong fortress of Trichinopoly. Here at the instance of the Mahratta, Raja Janojee, he had opened with Dupleix negotiations, which had terminated in a promise on the part of Mahomed Ali to recognise Chanda Sahib as Nawab, and to make over to him Trichinopoly and its dependencies, on condition of being himself secured in the possession of his father's treasures, free from all enquiry as to his administration, and of being entrusted with a subordinate government in another part of the Dekkan. It was in the fullest belief that this engagement would be adhered to, and that the matter was settled, that Dupleix had despatched Bussy to Aurungabad.

Yet, notwithstanding that Mahomed Ali had before the march of Bussy agreed to the terms proposed, and that Dupleix, on his part, had obtained and forwarded to him the sanction of the Subadar to their being carried out in their entirety, the matter seemed to hang fire. Whether it was that he distrusted the promises of Dupleix, or that he trusted to the chapter of accidents, this at least is certain, that Mahomed Ali delayed, on one pretext after another, compliance with the terms to which he had agreed. At last, driven hard by Dupleix, he declared that further concessions would be necessary before he could give up Trichinopoly. So anxious was Dupleix for a peaceful settlement of the question, that even this new demand did not exhaust his patience. He sent the letter of Mahomed Ali to Bussy, with a request that he would obtain from the Subadar the necessary authority to enable him to agree to the terms it contained. Considerable as they were, these new demands were in his opinion small in comparison with the consequences which, he believed, compliance with them would entail, *viz.*, the evacuation of Trichinopoly, and with that, the pacification of the Carnatic. The consent of the Subadar was easily obtained by Bussy; the proper documents were then forwarded to Mahomed Ali, to be considered valid only on the condition that he signed the treaty without further delay. Mahomed Ali, however, still hesitated. He had been in fact throughout this period urgently beseeching the English for their assistance, and it was only when, at the end of four months after he had received intimation of the Subadar's consent to the additional conditions he had required,

he wrung from them a promise of substantive aid, that he boldly threw off the mask, and refused to surrender Trichinopoly on any conditions whatever.

Thus again was Dupleix, much against his own inclinations, much as he well knew, against the wishes of his masters in Paris, forced into war. Thus again did the question of French domination in India depend upon the capture of the city of Trichinopoly. The army, which in November 1749 had marched from Pondichery with the intention of carrying out this purpose, had been unwisely diverted to another object. But this time Dupleix was resolved there should be no such mistake. To the native army of Chanda Sahib, consisting of from 7,000 to 8,000 men, he added, therefore, a European detachment of 400 men, a few Africans, and some artillery,—the whole under the command of M. d'Auteuil. These left Pondichery in the month of March 1751.

Meanwhile the English, recognising and rightly recognising that their only chance of safety lay in their sustaining the cause of the anti-French pretender to the government of the Carnatic, had resolved to support Mahomed Ali with all the means at their disposal. In the early part of February, therefore, they despatched Captain Cope at the head of 280 Europeans and 300 sepoys to aid in the defence of Trichinopoly; at the end of March following, they ordered a force of 500 Europeans, 100 Caffres, 1,000 sepoys and eight field-pieces to march from Fort St. David, for the purpose of co-operating in the field with the troops that still adhered to Mahomed Ali, and which were expected from Trichinopoly. This force was commanded by Captain Gingen, and serving with it as Commissariat officer, the second time we have met him,—was Lieutenant Robert Clive.

The first detachment,—that under Captain Cope,—had, during the same month, made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city of Madura, held for Chanda Sahib by Allum Khan, and had returned dispirited to Trichinopoly. Captain Gingen, for his part, having been joined in the middle of May by Mahomed Ali's troops, 1,600 in number, had at once marched on the pagoda Verdachelum, about forty miles from the coast, and commanding the communications between Fort St. David and Trichinopoly. Taking and garrisoning this, and being joined by a further detachment of 4,000 men from Mahomed Ali, and 100 Europeans despatched to his aid by Captain Cope, he moved forward to intercept Chanda Sahib and the French, of whom he had last heard as marching on

Volcondah, about forty-five miles to the north of Trichinopoly, and on the high road to that place.

Volcondah was a considerable place, strong in its natural position, and, for a native town, very fairly fortified. The governor held it for the Nawab of the Carnatic, but as the rival forces approached it from different quarters, he was apparently undecided as to whether Chanda Sahib or Mahomed Ali had the better claim to that title. It was evident that a battle was imminent, and, uncertain as to its results, he feared the consequences which a premature declaration in favour of the faction that might be vanquished, might have on the party that should prove victorious. He therefore judiciously declared that the cession of the place would depend upon the issue of the impending contest, whilst at the same time he lent an attentive ear to the offers that were made him by both parties.

The march of Chanda Sahib had been so slow, that the English had had time to take up a position to the south-west of Volcondah, before he had advanced beyond that place on his road to Trichinopoly. It had now become indispensable for him either to occupy Volcondah, or, gaining the governor, to drive the English from the neighbourhood. To this second end he spared neither persuasion nor promises. Whether these would, under other circumstances, have brought about the desired result may be doubtful, but this at least is certain, that the shifty conduct of the governor so wearied the English commander, that after a fortnight's useless negotiation, he resolved to compel that which the other would not willingly yield. On the evening of the 19th July, therefore, without apparently acquainting the governor with his intention, Captain Gingen marched a great portion of his force against the place, with the intention of taking possession of it.

The outer defences of the town, and the town itself, fell at once into the hands of the assailants; but this attack, and the burning of some houses outside, roused the garrison of the Fort, and the English were compelled to recoil from its stone walls with considerable loss. Their ill-advised attack decided the governor. He threw himself at once into the arms of Chanda Sahib, and summoned the French to his aid. Before daylight, consequently d'Auteuil put his force in motion, and entering the Fort with a portion of his troops, poured upon the English such a fire of artillery, that notwithstanding all the efforts of their officers they quitted the field in a panic, abandoning their native allies, and leaving

six pieces of cannon, several muskets, all their camp equipage and stores of ammunition, as a prey to the conqueror. Had the French pursued with anything like vigour, the war would have been that day at an end. But a fatality seemed to attend all the operations that might have been decisive. D'Auteuil was laid up with gout, and was quite unable to give his personal attention to details, nor had he a single officer with him upon whom he could rely. Instead, therefore, of taking advantage of the panic which had overcome the English, and of converting their defeat into an overthrow which must have been ruinous, the French and their allies contented themselves with maintaining a brisk cannonade on the enemy from the north bank of the little river Valaru, which he had crossed in his retreat. It has been said,* indeed, that Chanda Sahib was hindered in his onward movements by the defection of one of his generals, in command of 4,000 horse. Desertions from a victorious to a vanquished enemy are not common, least of all among nations of the East. But however that may have been, it did not influence in the smallest degree the movements of the French. It was for them, on this as on previous occasions, to give the cue to their native allies. All the accounts of their historians, the memoirs of Dupleix himself, record that they failed to do this, and that they failed because of the illness and apathy of their general, and the want of spirit of their officers.

Never before, indeed, had such an opportunity been offered them; never such an opportunity neglected. The force under Captain Gingen constituted, with the exception of 80 men under Captain Cope at Trichinopoly, and a few left to mount guard at Fort St. David and Madras,† the entire available force of English soldiers on the Coromandel coast. A little display of energy on the part of d'Auteuil and his officers would not only have ensured the destruction of this force, but, as a necessary consequence, the fall of Trichinopoly, and the restriction of the few English who remained, to the limits of their possessions on the coast. This is no idle supposition. It is capable of positive proof. So complete was the panic which possessed the soldiers of the little army under Captain Gingen, that they left their native allies to fight whilst they fled in confusion; they heard

* Orme.

† The reinforcements, to be subsequently alluded to, did not reach Fort St. David till the end of July.

without shame the taunts of the brother of Mahomed Ali on their cowardice ; and notwithstanding that they were not pursued, they abandoned their encampment at midnight, and leaving behind them their guns, camp equipage, and munitions of war, fled precipitately in the direction of Trichinopoly. Can any one doubt that upon men so panic-stricken, the vigorous pursuit of an enemy would have produced the most decisive effect ? Can any one believe that the consequences of such decisive action would not have been ruinous to the English ?

But no pursuit was attempted that day : d'Auteuil contented himself with securing possession of Volcondah. On the following morning, however, finding that the enemy had disappeared, d'Auteuil followed on his track, halting within a few miles of the position he had taken up in the hilly country round Utatoor, about twenty miles north of Trichinopoly. Here, during a halt of three days, several skirmishes ensued, in one of which the English fell into an ambuscade and suffered severely. On the third day, Chanda Sahib attacked the English position, and although, owing to the non-arrival at the scene of action at the time agreed upon, of the French contingent, he was repulsed, yet his attack made so serious an impression upon the English, that they retreated the same night to the banks of the Coleroon. They crossed this river, followed by Chanda Sahib and the French, on the 25th, and took possession of Seringham, an island formed by the separation of the Coleroon from the river Cauveri, but not deeming themselves even here secure, they abandoned this also and the pagoda upon it,—a very strong position in which, supported by the troops in the city, they might have defended themselves against five times their number,—and took refuge on the 28th July under the walls of Trichinopoly.

The French and their allies meanwhile pushed on, and crossing the Coleroon took possession of Seringham. First completing the conquest of this island by the capture of the mud fort of Coiladdy at its eastern extremity, from which they expelled the English, they crossed the Cauveri and encamped on the plain to the east of the town near a position now known as the French Rock. From this they commenced a sort of bombardment of the place.

Trichinopoly * is situated on a plain which once was crowded with rich villages and plantations of trees. The town is in

* This description is taken from Colonel Lawrence's account of the war.

form of an oblong square, the longest sides of which are east and west. On the north runs the river Cauveri, less than half a mile from the fort. The town at the time of which we are writing was nearly four miles in circumference, with a double *enceinte* of walls with round towers at equal distances. The ditch was nearly thirty feet wide but not half so deep, and at different seasons was more or less supplied with water. The outer wall was built of grayish stone; it was about eighteen feet high, and four or five thick, without parapet or rampart; the inner wall, distant from it about twenty-five feet, was much stronger, and was thirty feet high. Its thickness at the bottom was thirty feet, and it gradually decreased as it ascended, by means of steps, to a width of ten feet at the summit. In the middle of the old town stood a most extraordinary rock about 300 feet high. On the top of it was a pagoda "which," says Colonel Lawrence, "was of singular use to us "the whole war; here was constantly stationed a man with a "telescope who gave us by signals and writings an account "of all the enemy's motions." It remains to be added that the city is about ninety miles from the coast, the river Cauveri, running about half a mile to north-east of its northern face; beyond that, about a mile from the south bank of the Cauveri, is the pagoda of Seringham, and beyond that again the branch of the Cauveri known as the Coleroon.

The French had, as we have seen, taken post to the east of the city, and had opened fire on the walls. Before however much progress had been made in the siege, d'Auteuil, whom gout had utterly incapacitated, was, at his own request, relieved from his command, and returned to Pondichery. His successor was M. Law, nephew of the famous Scotch Financier, and who had recently returned from France with strong recommendations from the Directors. We do not meet him here for the first time. He it was who, at the time of the attack on Pondichery by Admiral Boscawen, had been entrusted with the defence of the outpost of Ariancopan,—a service in which he had displayed energy and vigour. His past services and the character he then bore were sufficient to authorise the expectations which Duplex had formed from his nomination. He was indeed destined to be disappointed. But Captain Law's case is not the only instance in which showy qualities have covered infirmity of purpose, or where pomposity and self-assertion in the cabinet have been mistakenly regarded as indications of ability in the field.

Nevertheless, at the commencement of his proceedings, Law

displayed no lack of energy. Finding that the English were resolved to defend Trichinopoly to the last, and that its defences precluded the possibility of a successful assault, he determined to take advantage of the possession given him, by the recent French victory, of the neighbouring country, and to subject the town to a strict blockade. Everything seemed to favour such a proceeding. The great body of the English troops were shut up in Trichinopoly, the few that remained could not expect to cope successfully with the French in the field, still less to introduce supplies into the town; in the entire Carnatic, but one place, the small fort of Verdachelum, on the road from Fort St. David to Trichinopoly, held out for Mahomed Ali. The cause of the English seemed hopeless; the fall of Trichinopoly, if strictly blockaded and pressed vigorously, appeared certain.

Yet it was in these desperate circumstances, in this crisis of the fortunes of France and England, that there appeared upon the stage one of those men whose daring genius and power of original conception supply the want of armies. We have already stated that with the force led by Captain Gingen to endeavour to intercept the march of Chanda Sahib and the French on Trichinopoly, there served as commissariat officer Lieutenant Robert Clive. This officer had originally come out to India as a writer in the civil service of the Company in the year 1744, and had been in Madras when that place was taken by La Bourdonnais. On the departure of La Bourdonnais, and the disavowal by Dupleix of the terms of capitulation which he had unauthorisedly granted, Clive had escaped, as we have already stated, to Fort St. David. Here he enjoyed many opportunities of noticing the method of war adopted in the East, in the several attacks made upon Fort St. David by Dupleix and his allies, and in the movements of Anwarooddeen and his two sons to hinder their success. When subsequently the arrival of Admiral Boscawen secured for the English a preponderance on the Coromandel coast, and the siege of Pondichery was resolved upon, Clive obtain permission to join the besieging army in the rank of ensign. He is stated to have distinguished himself on this occasion by his daring courage, but the skill which was wanting in the leaders of the besieging army shone brilliantly within the walls of the town, and the enterprise miscarried. We next hear of Clive at Devicottah, as usual in the foremost rank; [and, shortly afterwards, as commissariat officer of the expedition sent to intercept Chanda Sahib. In the panic which followed the failure of Captain Gingen

to possess himself of Volcondah, Clive showed considerable presence of mind, and attempted, though in vain, to rally the fugitives.* When the force retreated the following day towards Trichinopoly, Clive returned to Fort St. David, arriving there just as a reinforcement of about 400 men landed from England. One detachment of these he accompanied to Verdachelum, and a second to Trichinopoly, increasing the English garrison in that place to 600 men. Lieutenant Clive himself did not remain in Trichinopoly. What he saw there was not encouraging. The men were dispirited, and had lost all confidence in their officers; these latter were none of them remarkable for capacity or presence of mind. The French were superior in numbers, and seemed to be pushing their attack with resolution. The surrender of the last stronghold of Mahomed Ali appeared to him therefore to be inevitable, unless it were possible to infuse a sort of revolutionary energy into the councils of the English. To attempt this at Trichinopoly would be, he knew, useless. The fate of the English must depend upon the action taken at the Presidency. To rouse and influence it, he left therefore Trichinopoly and returned to Fort St. David.

The plan which Clive had revolved in his own mind as the plan absolutely necessary for the safety of his countrymen, was due doubtless rather to his inborn genius than to extensive reading or study. It was nevertheless the plan which the greatest military leaders have loved to pursue,—a plan which, adopted by a man possessing daring and prudence, must always be successful, except when opposed by immensely superior numbers, or by genius of the very highest order. There is this, too, with respect to such a plan. No one but a great captain ever has tried it, ever could try it. It is too much for the spirit, for the capacity, of an inferior man. To him it seems too bold, too venturesome, too hazardous. It leaves too much at stake. And this,—though the plan is as safe as it is bold,—is safe because it is bold. We allude to the carrying the war into an enemy's country. The inferior general who hesitates to do this, though he sees that if it could be done it would save him and ruin his enemy, does not calculate on the inevitable effect which such a movement must produce on the "morable" of the force opposed to him, especially when that force constitutes the principal, perhaps, the entire available army of the enemy. He does not

* Orme states "Captains Gingen, Dalton, Kilpatrick, and Lieutenant Clive endeavoured to rally them, but in vain."

consider that such a movement must paralyse the onward march of his opponent. Yet history abounds with such examples. Even the great Frederic gave up, at a critical period, his movements in Saxony, when he found the Austrians were marching on Berlin. And if he, a consummate master of the art of war, would act thus, what may we imagine would be the effect of such a movement on men of inferior capacity? It must always be startling, almost always decisive.

Clive, we say, had arrived at such a conclusion by the mere force of his genius. He had the capacity to open the eyes of his mind, and see the result that must follow. He went, therefore, on his return from Trichinopoly, direct to the governor Mr. Saunders, pointed out to him, how, if matters were allowed to take their sluggish course, Trichinopoly, and with it, English interests, must fall; that Chanda Sahib, having brought all his resources to bear upon the siege, had left his capital comparatively unguarded; that there was no force of his, or of the French in the field; that Law was at Trichinopoly, Bussy at Aurungabad; that, therefore, a blow might be struck at the heart of the enemy's possessions, which, if successful, would either force him to leave his hold on Trichinopoly, or would open out a new field for military operations, success in which would compensate for the loss of that place. To add force to his proposition, he offered to lead himself the troops that might be destined to carry it into effect. Mr. Saunders, who had been appointed governor the preceding year, was a man who possessed the not inconsiderable merit of appreciating the large schemes of others, though he might not have been equal to devising any of his own. He cordially received the propositions made to him by Clive; placed under his command a force of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys,—thus reducing the garrisons of Madras and Fort St. David to their lowest point,—and crowned the whole by nominating Clive himself as Commandant with the rank of Captain, and with unlimited powers.*

Arcot, the place at which Clive aimed his blow, was the capital of the Carnatic,—the seat of the Nawab's government. At the time of which we are writing, it was an open town possessing about 100,000 inhabitants. There was, it is true, a fort with the outward signs of fortifications, but these had long since fallen into decay. The ramparts were

* Mr. Orme states that besides Clive, there were but eight officers with this force, six of whom had never been in action, and four of the six were members of the mercantile service.

in a state of ruin, and the bastions were crumbling from age and want of repair. The garrison, entirely native, consisted of about 1,000 men, nearly one-half of whom were cavalry; to the native gunners, however, had been attached two or three French artillerymen for the purpose of instructing them in the European method of rapid firing. These were at the time in Arcot.

To attack and take possession of this place, Clive, at the head of the force above detailed, left Madras on the 6th September on the 11th, after halting one day at Conjevaram, he arrived within ten miles of the capital. Thence he resumed his march, and, notwithstanding the unpropitiousness of the weather, which displayed itself in a thunder-storm of almost unprecedented violence, arrived the same day at the very gates of Arcot. The news of his march had preceded him, and the native garrison, terrified at the idea of opposing a man who could thus bid defiance to the elements, had hastened to evacuate the place. Clive therefore entered it without opposition, and, prescient as to the effect which its capture must have upon the enemy, proceeded at once to repair and improve its fortifications.

This successful occupation of the capital of his native *protégé* and ally, whilst it surprised and vexed, did not at all disconcert the active-minded and energetic governor of Pondichery. If Clive had calculated that his raid would lead at once to the abandonment of the siege of Trichinopoly, he found himself mistaken. Dupleix, in fact, looking at matters with the glance of a statesman and a general, saw that notwithstanding this diversion, the chances were still ten to one in his favour. It was by pressing more earnestly the siege of the strongly fortified Trichinopoly, the last refuge of Mahomed Ali, that he felt he could conquer Clive in Arcot. He therefore bent every energy of his mind to increase and render effective the force under Law. He sent him Europeans from Pondichery, and a battering-train from Karical, and he urged both upon him and Chanda Sahib the urgent necessity of permitting no consideration whatever to interfere with the pressing and absolute necessity of conquering Trichinopoly. This was the true policy for nullifying and defeating the daring action of Clive.

But, unfortunately for Dupleix, he was badly served. Law's action will be hereafter referred to. As for Chanda Sahib, no sooner had he heard of the capture of Arcot, than deaf to the entreaties of Dupleix, blind to his real interests, he insisted on detaching 4,000 of his best troops to retake his

lost capital. This force, as it passed Pondichery, was strengthened by 100 Europeans, and, increased by other native levies to the number of 10,000 men, marched under the command of Raja Sahib, son of Chanda Sahib, upon Arcot.

The siege which followed, not only presents one of the most glorious pictures of Anglo-Indian history, but it may be considered likewise as the turning-point in the Eastern career of the English,—the foundation-stone of their present empire. It was at Arcot that English officers taught their sepoys to follow them with the implicit confidence which superior skill and energy alone can inspire ; it was at Arcot that they, too, learned the lesson, followed up afterwards with such magnificent results by their leader at that place, that in Asiatic warfare the question of numbers is merely a secondary consideration ; that discipline and the self-confidence born of it are of infinitely greater importance ; that there is nothing which a capable general, one who can impress his spirit on his soldiers, may not prudently attempt against an undisciplined enemy. It was at Arcot, in fine, where the Anglo-Indian army received its baptism of victory.

The incidents of that famous siege are well known to the readers of Anglo-Indian history.* On the 4th October, Raja Sahib took possession of the town, and commenced the investment of the fort. On the 5th, the besiegers beat back a sortie headed by Clive in person. Fifteen days later their battering-train arrived, and on the 4th November, two 18-pounders from Pondichery. The garrison had been reduced to 120 Europeans and 200 sepoys. A reinforcement of 100 Europeans and 200 sepoys, sent from Madras and commanded by Lieutenant Innis, was attacked on the 5th at Trivatore, and forced to take refuge in Poonamalee. The garrison was thus left entirely to itself. Its stock of provisions, originally only a sixty days' supply, was more than half exhausted. On the 10th, a practicable breach having been made in the walls, Raja Sahib sent to Clive a proposal to surrender, offering honourable terms to the garrison and a considerable sum of money to himself, and accompanying it by a threat to storm the fort and put the garrison to the sword, if his proposition were not acceded to. In reply, Clive rejected the proffered terms, contemptuously as regarded the money, and tauntingly with respect to the threats.

* The detailed account of Orme and the brilliant sketch of Macaulay leave nothing to be desired on this head.

For some days Raja Sahib yet hesitated. He might still, indeed, had he been left alone, have forced the evacuation of the fort by a continued blockade, for he was well aware of the attenuated state of the supplies within its walls. But all this time, Mr. Saunders, the governor of Madras, had exerted himself with unsurpassable energy to deliver his young captain from his difficult position. First, by reinforcements to Lieutenant Innis, under a more experienced officer, Captain Kilpatrick, he had enabled the detachment to march from Poonamalce in the direction of Arcot. But, secondly, and with a far more important effect upon Raja Sahib, he had induced the Mahrattas to take up arms on behalf of Mahomed Ali. A body of 6,000 of these, under the command of Morari Rao, had been for some time awaiting the course of events in the pass of Damalchery. But, though nominally the allies of Mahomed Ali, the fortunes of that chieftain were at so low an ebb, that they hesitated to commit themselves in his favour. The sturdy defence of Arcot, however, had not been without its effect upon these hardy warriors. In the handful of men who had defended its dilapidated fortifications against numbers so superior, they recognised soldiers worthy of their alliance. They determined, therefore, without further hesitation, to cast in their lot with the English.

The intelligence of this finally determined Raja Sahib. He had to choose between an encounter with Morari Rao in the field, supported by a sortie from the garrison, or an immediate assault. With correct judgment he chose the latter alternative, and, on the evening of the 24th November, made his preparations for the storm. Unfortunately for the success of his plans, however, a deserter disclosed them to Clive; when, therefore, his troops advanced, early on the following morning to the assault, they found that every possible preparation had been made to receive them, that cannons were pointed at the breach, that spare muskets were loaded and in readiness, and that the small garrison had, by the ability of their Commander, been utilised so as to supply by their skilful disposition the paucity of their numbers. Nevertheless, preceded by elephants to burst open the gates, the native troops of Raja Sahib advanced boldly to the attack. Unsupported as they were, by the French contingent, which strangely kept aloof, they mounted the north-west breach, passed the first trench, and charged the English drawn up to receive them. They were, however, received with such a terrible and continuous fire, spare muskets lying handy for that purpose, that after vain efforts, in which they

lost their gallant leader, a Mahomedan, they recoiled. The attack on the south-west, made by means of a raft thrown across the wet ditch, was equally unsuccessful, and at the end of an hour, it became evident to Rajah Sahib that his attack had failed. His loss amounted to 400 men slain whilst gallantly attempting to storm a fortress defended by Europeans, few indeed in number but strong in discipline, and commanded by a hero. No greater proof indeed could be given of the means at the disposal of the defenders than this, that although not exceeding 200, including sepoy, in number, they, besides serving five pieces of cannon, fired off during this hour's attack, not less than 12,000 musket cartridges! *

The following morning Raja Sahib raised the siege and retreated on Vellore, accompanied only by the French and the troops which had been sent from Trichinopoly, all the rest deserting him. Here we will leave him whilst we describe the effect of this repulse on the French leader himself.

We have already stated that Dupleix had never regarded the attack upon Clive as aught but a very minor and subordinate part of his great scheme. He had strenuously opposed the weakening of the force before Trichinopoly for the purpose of aiding in any such enterprise. And when, owing to the fears of Chunda Sahib, the native portion of that force was temporarily diminished, he had reinforced it by 100 Europeans, chiefly with the view of enabling it to contend, without certainty of defeat, against the English. His hope was that, thus reinforced, Raja Sahib might detain Clive in Arcot until Trichinopoly should be taken. It was a well-considered policy, the success of which was seemingly certain, provided only that skill and energy directed the movements before the walls of Trichinopoly.

We see then Dupleix, in this crisis, fully alive to all its dangers; detecting the able conceptions of Clive, and taking the measures which, properly carried out, would have thwarted them. We see him, so far from being deterred by Clive's march upon Arcot from prosecuting the siege of Trichinopoly, pressing that siege with greater eagerness than ever; at the same time that he offered to Clive's movement an opposition just sufficient to secure for himself time to carry out, unmolested, the great object of the campaign.

We left Law before Trichinopoly at the head of a force of about 400 Europeans. All the energies of Dupleix had been from the first directed to increase the number of these to a force that should be irresistible. Every detachment that landed from Europe, every party that could be called in, was used for this end. They were all sent off to the plain before Trichinopoly. So energetic was Dupleix, so earnest and enthusiastic in all he did, that in an incredibly short space of time, Law saw himself at the head of one of the largest disciplined forces that had till then operated in the interior of the Carnatic, amounting of all arms to nearly 900 Europeans and 2,000 disciplined sepoys; whilst, encamped beside him, aiding him in all his undertakings, was the native army of Chunda Sahib, in number nearly 30,000, a very large proportion of whom were horsemen. Besides these he had a park of fifty guns, many of them of a very large calibre. The most pressing orders were at the same time sent from Pondichery to push on the works, in order to capture the place before the operations of Clive should make themselves felt in the vicinity. Law, in consequence, made a great show of activity, and succeeded in submitting the garrison to a strict blockade. This, however, was all he did do. The man so bold and vaunting in council, whose pre-eminent object in life seemed to be to impress others with a sense of his great cleverness, showed himself in command of an army, to be absolutely incapable. Overbearing to his officers, suspicious of everybody, haughty, vain, and obstinate, unenterprising himself, and checking enterprise in others, Law gained no confidence and conciliated no opinions. Like an obstinate commander, deficient in vision, who, unable to see himself, distrusts the eyesight of others, and thus allows opportunity after opportunity to slip away, so did Law, headstrong and incapable, persist in measures that were useless, and reject counsels that might have led to easy victory. The English that garrisoned Trichinopoly were led by Captain Gingen, of whose inferior abilities we have already spoken. They were animated by a spirit far less buoyant than that which had induced the soldiers of Clive to dare so many dangers and difficulties. They were dispirited by defeat, by retreat, and by being cooped up in a fortress, which they appeared to have but small chance of defending with success. An assault on the part of Law would almost certainly have succeeded. This was pressed upon him from all sides, by Chanda Sahib as much as by Dupleix. But, confident in his own cleverness, despising, or affecting to despise the opinions of others, Law clung to his own courses, and

adhered to the safe blockade which, he thought, would in the end pull him through.

Yet, even in this course, he showed singular blindness, and extraordinary deficiency in even the ordinary arrangements of his camp. The ruler of Mysore, encouraged by the resistance which Trichinopoly was making and by the diversion of Clive, had sent a detachment of 500 Mahratta cavalry to harass the besiegers. These not only defeated a small body of native horse, but were even successful, thanks to the want of order and arrangement in the French camp, and of spirit and enterprise on the part of the French leader, in entrapping sixty French dragoons into an ambuscade, and in destroying all but ten of that number. They were so encouraged by this success, that their leader, Innis Khan, proposed to Captain Gingen that he should march out with his English, and attack the united army of the besiegers. If Gingen would do this, and would undertake with his troops to engage the French, he promised on his part to encounter the entire cavalry of Chanda Sahib, though out-numbering them in the proportion of twelve to one. This was at first declined. On receiving, however, a reinforcement of 1,000 men, Innis Khan renewed his proposition. Captain Gingen being still unwilling, the commander of the Mahrattas did not hesitate to tell him that he and his soldiers were of a very different nature from the men he had seen fighting so gallantly at Arcot.* Captain Gingen was apparently confirmed in his objection to active measures by the ill-success of a small force he had detached against the little town of Kistinwaram, thirty miles from Trichinopoly, occupied by the French,—the force having been repulsed with some loss, and their leader Captain Cope, mortally wounded.

The measures of Law, unenterprising as they were, seemed, then to be on a fair way to success. But he forgot that there were other actors on the scene besides himself. He forgot that the time with which he was trifling, might be used to good purpose by his opponents. He forgot, or, at least acted as if he forgot, that his army and the fortress of Trichinopoly were not isolated from all the world; that if he looked upon its capture as the final seal to French domination, others were determined to use every means in their power to prevent it. Thus it happened that he slumbered whilst others acted. When a little energy would have given him possession of the coveted prize, he was content to act with more caution and more reserve than might have been expected even from a Nicias; nay more, he absolutely

threw away chances, courted defeat and by his conduct gave to his rival that empire of the East, which but for him, might have been gained for at least a time by the French. For whilst Law, disregarding the entreaties of Dupleix, slumbered before Trichinopoly, the daring energy of Clive was gaining for England advantages and resources of which the French were thus deprived. No sooner had the youthful victor of Arcot seen the besieging army of Raja Sahib melt away from before him than, having received the reinforcement commanded by Captain Kilpatrick, and having made the necessary arrangements for the defence of the capital he had conquered, he set out in pursuit of the enemy at the head of 200 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and three pieces of field artillery. Notwithstanding that his Mahratta allies, venturing too close to Vellore, had sustained a severe defeat at the hand of the French who were with Raja Sahib, and that a reinforcement of these from Pondichery had effected a junction with their countrymen, raising their number to 300, Clive did not hesitate to move in their direction. After a forced march of twenty miles he came up with them as they were preparing to cross the Arni. With their usual gallantry,^f the French turned to meet their rivals, but, though somewhat superior in numbers, they were absolutely deficient in that one necessity the possession of which by the English would have made up for even greater disparity. The force under Clive consisted of 200 Europeans, 700 sepoys, and 600 Mahratta horse. With the French, 300 in number, were 2,500 foot, and 2,000 horse levies. But whilst they had no general, the English had Clive. The consequence was that the French badly posted, and having no competent commander, were completely outmanœuvred. Charged in their flank at a critical period of the action, they were forced to abandon the field, and with it their guns, to the enemy. They retreated thence hastily on Gingee with a loss of 50 Europeans and 150 natives killed and wounded. The English lost not one of their own countrymen and but eight sepoys; of the Mahrattas about 50 were missing.*

Encouraged by this success, Clive marched on Conjeveram, which had been meanwhile retaken by the French, reduced it after a smart resistance, and then returned to Fort St. David to concert measures for the relief of Trichinopoly. Whilst engaged in this important design, intelligence reached the Presidency that Raja Sahib, taking advantage

* Orme.

of Clive's absence, had recovered Conjeveram, and had ravaged the country up to within a few miles of Madras itself. Determined to clear the province of this enemy before venturing on the greater achievement, Clive left Fort St. David at the head of a force which, though inferior to that of the enemy, was yet considerable. The terror of his name preceded him. Raja Sahib and his French allies at once abandoned the vicinity of Madras, and retreated to an entrenched camp at Vendalore. Here, however, they seem to have conceived the design of surprising Arcot, whilst Clive should be engaged in the reduction of Conjeveram. Strengthening this place, therefore, they moved by forced marches upon Arcot. But Clive, suspecting their design, managed to procure the surrender of Conjeveram on the first summons, and then hastened in pursuit of the enemy. He found them a little after sunset, strongly posted at Covrepauk, about two-thirds of the distance on the road to Arcot, evidently determined to resist his further progress. This time their artillery was so skilfully posted, and committed such havoc amongst the English gunners, that it appeared as though Clive would for the first time be forced to retreat. By means of one of his officers, however, who could speak French, the English leader, at the moment when matters seemed desperate, succeeded in deceiving the enemy's sentries, and in bringing a large force into their rear. These suddenly firing a volley, caused such a complete panic amongst the French, that they hastily abandoned their position and their guns, and fled as they best could. Many of them were taken prisoners, and by this artifice, an impending defeat was converted into a victory, till then, the greatest of the war. Another proof, if any were required, that valour and strong positions are useless if there is a general to attack, and none to defend them.

From the scene of this victory Clive marched to Arcot, and thence in the direction of Vellore. Whilst, however, contemplating the reduction of this place which was held by Mortiz Ali on behalf of Chanda Sahib, he received instructions to repair instantly to Fort St. David, there to undertake immediate measures for the relief of Trichinopoly, the garrison of which was suffering from the close blockade persisted in by Law. On his way to that place he came upon the site of the victory gained by de la Touche over Nazir Jung, on which the rising town of Dupleix-Futtehabad,* was already

* Mr. Orme speaks of this town as having been built to commemorate that detestable action, the death of Nazir Jung. The prejudices and

struggling into existence. Allowing for the moment his hatred of the great French statesman to stifle his more generous instincts, Clive rased the town to its foundations. He then marched in all haste to Fort St. David. Here he found that the governor had been unsparing in his exertions to make provision for the contemplated enterprise. So great, indeed, had been his energy, that in three days after his return, Clive found himself in readiness to march towards Trichinopoly.

This was on the 25th March 1752. The following day, however, brought once more to the shores of India the tried veteran, Major Lawrence. His arrival caused a delay of two days, as well as some change in the position of affairs. On the 28th, however, all was in readiness, and a party of 400 Europeans and 1,100 sepoys, with eight field-pieces escorting military stores and provisions, set out that morning for Trichinopoly under the command indeed of Lawrence, but with Clive as his trusted subordinate.

It is time now that we should return to Dupleix. He it was who, at the time when he learned that Clive had proceeded to Fort St. David to concert measures for the relief of Trichinopoly, had, considering it no disgrace to learn something even from an enemy, instigated Raja Sahib to make that raid into the English territories, the results of which we have recorded. Though unsuccessful, it cannot be denied that it eminently deserved to succeed, that it had almost succeeded, when at the moment when victory was in their grasp, the carelessness of the French commander at Covrepauk threw it absolutely away. Dupleix was terribly mortified at this failure. For the moment, indeed, it entirely upset his plans. The feat at Covrepauk had not only deprived him of soldiers whom he could scarcely spare, of field artillery that was priceless, but it had cast down the spirits of his native allies to an unprecedented and even dangerous degree. No longer could he hope by their aid to effect a diversion in the northern part of the Carnatic. The English had not only gained territory, but with it, of more importance, the confidence of the military class. Desertion by wholesale had taken place from the French to the English standard. More than one important satrap had renounced his adherence to Chanda Sahib, and taken the oath of fidelity to

passions of the hour may have disposed contemporary Englishmen thus to regard it, but the statement is incorrect. The town was built to commemorate the triumph of Dupleix's policy, brought to its crowning point by the victory of de la Touche. The death of Nazir Jung was an incident of that victory, for which the French were not responsible.

the besieged Mahomed Ali. And this was the consequence of the victories of Clive, of the repeated defeats sustained by the French, more especially of the fatal disaster at Covrepauk. To see advantages there so nearly gained, so carelessly abandoned, was more than even the composed spirit of Dupleix could bear. Those of his own officers, indeed, who he could have made responsible for the disaster, had either been captured or killed. Upon Raja Sahib, whose pusillanimity and incapacity had been conspicuous, the weight, therefore, of his anger fell. For several days he refused to see him, and when at last they did meet, he showed towards the son of Chanda Sahib a feeling of contempt, which it was impossible for him, practised as he was in dealing with native princes, to conceal.

But though mortified beyond measure at the ill-success of plans which so well deserved to succeed, Dupleix still adhered to that bold and daring policy, which he justly regarded as more than ever necessary to the attainment of his vast plans. What had been lost in the Northern Carnatic might be gained in the south. Trichinopoly might make amends for Arcot and Covrepauk. And now Trichinopoly was apparently at its last gasp. Without money, with little ammunition, with deficient and failing supplies, with a European commandant devoid of ability, the English garrison and the Mogul soldiers and their leader had already begun a course of recrimination, which, occurring between allies, is the almost invariable precursor of disaster. A little more energy on the part of Law, and the place must have fallen. It was at this crisis that intelligence reached Dupleix of the measures that were being concerted at Fort St. David: the number of the men destined for the relief of Trichinopoly, the nature of the stores they were to escort, the probable date of their departure,—all were known to him. He instantly took a resolution worthy of himself. Detailing to Law the information which he had acquired, he sent him, at the same time, the most stringent orders to mass a great number of his troops, leaving only a few to maintain the blockade of Trichinopoly in order to attack and intercept the enemy's convoy. These orders were reiterated and enforced in successive despatches. The very mode in which they could be carried out was indicated with a clearness which left nothing to desire. He sent him besides all the troops that had become available by the cessation of the campaign in the North-Carnatic, enjoining upon him that upon this stroke depended the issue of the campaign,—that the English beaten and the convoy captured, Trichinopoly must surrender, French influence must

triumph; that failing in this blow, France would have the mortification of seeing her power, her influence, her authority so dearly gained, and till then so vigilantly maintained, transferred to her hated rivals.

It was indeed a grand opportunity. Had there been a Bussy instead of a Law in the French camp, who can doubt how he would have executed the instructions of his superior? But unfortunately for the real interests of France, Bussy, the true soldier, was far away at Aurungabad, and Law, the pretender, was before Trichinopoly. It is vain, indeed, to speculate whether in the concussion between the rival and not unequal powers of Bussy and Clive, the latter or the former would have come forth the victor. This at least is certain, that the youthful hero who laid the first foundations of English empire in India, though displaying on all occasions military talents and resources of the very highest order, never did meet on the field of battle an opponent of even ordinary merit.

We will now see how Law used his opportunity. The distance from Fort St. David to Trichinopoly being about 150 miles, and the rout necessitating the crossing of eight considerable rivers, amongst which were the Valaru, the Coleroon, the Veller, the Pudu Cauveri, and the Cauveri, the latter three times, Law could calculate to a nicety the time and the means for best attacking and crushing the enemy. The necessity for the passage of so many broad and rapid rivers multiplied his opportunities for defending them. But he judged, it would seem wisely, that he would himself run less risk, and would ensure the more complete destruction of the enemy, if he were to allow him to approach within an easy distance of Trichinopoly, and were then to engage him in a position in which his defeat would be certain. So far Law judged correctly and wisely. But in the execution of this plan he failed lamentably. Instead of detaching from his own force a body of troops sufficient in number to render success a matter of certainty, he sent to meet a party of 400 Europeans and 1,100 sepoy, commanded by such men as Lawrence and Clive, a force consisting of but 200 Europeans and from 3 to 400 natives. He did this, too, at a time when the troops at his own disposal, independently of the levies of Chanda Sahib, consisted of 900 Europeans and about 2,000 sepoy. Well could he have spared one-half of this number for the important service he had in view! Far safer would it have been for him to have undergone the small risk of a sortie on the part of the English garrison, commanded, as it was, by a man whom recent experience had proved to be unenterprising, than to have courted defeat by sending against Lawrence a force which must have been beaten. He

might under the circumstances have safely left his camp under the protection of one-fourth of his army, and have marched with the rest to crush Lawrence. So would have acted a real general,* but experience has abundantly proved that over-caution and incapacity in the field are the almost invariable accompaniments of superciliousness and self-laudation in the cabinet.

Having persuaded himself that he could only, with safety to his main force, detach 250 Europeans and 3 or 400 natives to crush 400 English and 1,100 sepoys, commanded by Lawrence and inspired by Clive, Law sent them to occupy the fortified post of Coiladdy, on the northern bank of Cauveri river. The position was not ill-chosen, and, had it been occupied in sufficient force, would undoubtedly have proved an unsurmountable obstacle to the advance of the English. A glance at the map will show the inherent strength of this position. The advance of Colonel Lawrence must necessarily take place between the two branches of the river Cauveri. Of these, the upper branch was defended by the fortified post of Coiladdy on its northern bank, unassailable by the English. Between the northern and the southern bank the distance was less than half a mile. Possessing Coiladdy, and having an equal or superior force available to occupy the ground between the two branches, it would have been easy for the French commander to have inflicted upon an advancing enemy a crushing defeat. As, however, the defending force did not nearly equal in number the advancing foe, its commander resolved not to attempt anything desperate. He considered, however, that as the ordinary road led directly within shot of Coiladdy, and that the English would probably follow it, he would be able not only to inflict upon them considerable loss in men, but to capture or destroy a great portion of their convoy. Chance, at first, seemed to favour his designs. On the 7th April, Major Lawrence misled by his guides, took his force even nearer to the upper branch of the Cauveri, than would have been the case had he followed the ordinary route, and found himself all at once under the fire of the guns of Coiladdy. These did considerable execution, and before he could move out of range, he had lost 20 Europeans, and his convoy and baggage had been thrown in great disorder. This was the time which the French force, had it been strong enough, might have used with crushing effect. But its commander had apparently

* The behaviour of Lord Strathnairn before Jhansie in 1857, under circumstances not dissimilar, presents a striking instance of the manner in which an enemy marching to relieve a besieged place may be met and destroyed.

imbibed the hesitating and unenterprising nature of his chief. Partly on this account, partly doubtless because he felt himself tied down by the orders he had received, he remained stationary in his stronghold. Major Lawrence therefore was able not only to succeed in extricating himself from his position, but in safely conveying that portion of the convoy * he had with him to within ten miles of Trichinopoly.

Thus failed, and failed deservedly, Law's first attempt to crush the advancing English. Like all the measures of weak men it was a half measure, and was therefore ineffective. Fearing to run the risk of an attack from the garrison should he detach a strong force to meet Lawrence, he sent only a weak one, and thus incurred the greater risk of losing his whole army. For he exposed his force, first, to the risk of being beaten in detail; secondly, to its being overwhelmed by the combined forces, superior in numbers, of Lawrence and Gingen. To avert a very small risk, therefore, he ran a very great one, and drew upon his force the destruction in which a bolder course of action would most probably have involved the English. It is a crisis of this nature which really tries a man, which tests the material of which he is made. Law failed because, with all his pomposity and arrogance, he was essentially a man of a limited intellect and narrow views.†

His next measures appear to have been conceived in no abler spirit. Receiving intimation from the Commandant of the detachment at Coiladdy, that he had been unsuccessful in preventing the advance of the English, it was even then possible for him, commanding as he did the high road from that place to Trichinopoly, as well as the country in its neighbourhood, to atone, by a combined attack, for his previous inaction. But although he had for some time been well acquainted with all the movements of Major Lawrence, he had made no effort to mass his forces. They lay scattered in the various posts he had assigned them. When therefore the news reached him that the English had passed Coiladdy, he was for the moment, thanks to his own negligence, entirely

* He had left the remainder the previous day at Trictapolly, on the south of the upper Cauveri, a post belonging to the king of Tanjore.

† We are well aware that Law, in his "*Plainte contre le sieur Dupleix*," attempts to justify himself, but, admitting his facts, he must still be condemned. Had he, as he asserts, only 600 Europeans he should either have raised the siege, or have marched with those to crush Lawrence. Any course would have been preferable to that which he adopted.

without the means of offering an instantaneous obstruction to their further advance. Seeing nevertheless the great advantage over him which the enemy would certainly obtain, should they effect a junction with the garrison of Trichinopoly, he hastily called in his scattered detachments, prepared, when too late, to risk a general action. Such a resolution, taken twenty-four hours earlier, might have saved his army, and even have gained Trichinopoly.

This movement could not be effected till the following morning. All that night the detachments moved into camp, and at daylight the force proceeded to take up the position assigned to it by Law, and upon which, he fondly hoped, the English general would march. Yet, this position, although strong, was in a certain point of view almost necessarily ill-chosen. Law was too close to Trichinopoly to draw up his men so as to bar the road across which Lawrence must pass, for in that case he would have exposed himself to the serious danger of an attack on his rear from the garrison. He was compelled therefore to take up a position in which he could meet an assault from both parties on his front. In this view he drew up his forces in a line drawn obliquely from the village of Chucklepollam on the Cauveri to the French Rock, and extended thence still more obliquely to the almost inaccessible rock of Elmiseram. As the direct road to Trichinopoly lay between those two positions, Law was not without hope that the English would move upon them before attempting a junction with the garrison.

Major Lawrence, however, was far too wary. Marching early in the morning from Killycottah, where he had encamped the previous evening, he fell in, before he had gone more than a mile, with an officer sent by Captain Gingen to inform him of the disposition made by the French. Feeling that the game was too secure in his hands for him to risk the loss of it by a premature attack on a strong position, he made a *détour* round the point of Elmiseram in the direction of the Sugarloaf Rock, near which place he was joined by 200 soldiers of the garrison, under the command of Captains Clark and Dalton. At this place, therefore, the junction with the garrison may be regarded as having been virtually effected.

It was just this moment, when the English could no longer be assailed with advantage, when they might in case of defeat, have taken secure shelter under the guns of the fort, that the incompetent Law selected to assault them. Feebly made on his part, though supported with great resolution by the levies

of Chanda Sahib, his attack did not succeed. The superiority of the French in artillery was neutralised by the superior energy of Clive, who led the English to the attack; and after an interchange of cannon shot, considered, whilst it lasted, to have been hotter than any till then experienced on the plains of Hindostan, the French retreated to their rock with a loss on their part of 40 men, on the part of their native allies of 300. Had not Major Lawrence, in consideration of the intense heat of the day, stopped the pursuit, they would have suffered far more severely.* Having repulsed this attack, the English marched without molestation into Trichinopoly.

No language can paint the anger and mortification of Dupleix when intelligence of these events reached him. This then was the result of confiding the conduct of an army to a man whose principal credentials consisted in the super-excellent opinion which he allowed all the world to perceive he had formed of his own abilities. All his recommendations disregarded, inordinate caution prevailing when the necessities of the hour peculiarly required dashing and daring tactics, the English army, though encumbered by an enormous convoy, allowed to enter the beleaguered city virtually unmolested, —no serious attempt having been made to hinder them till they were under the walls of Trichinopoly! Was it for such a result that Dupleix had schemed and planned, that he had pledged the rising fortunes of French India to the support of native princes who should be but the puppets of France? Was it to see the superiority in the field passing from his hands to the hands of his hated rivals, to witness not only the loss of the capital of the Carnatic, but a repulse from the last refuge of Mahomed Ali? He was fated, indeed, to suffer disappointments more bitter even than these. But up to the present moment he had been so thoroughly buoyed up by hope; he had trusted that when the time came Law would show himself what he had always boasted himself to be: above all, he had counted so implicitly on the capture of this convoy, on the destruction, or at least, the repulse of this relieving party. To this end he had devoted all his faculties. He had been to Law the eye to see, the ear to hear; it was not, alas for him, in his power to be the mind to conceive or the arm to strike. He had given Law all the necessary information; the rest, being soldier's work, he had left to him as a soldier to perform. The result showed

* The English, who fought under cover, lost 14 men only from the cannonade, 7, however, were struck down by the sun.—*Orme*.

that the mere donning of epaulets does not make a man a soldier; that if devoid of the intellect given by God to a man, and not as some would seem to think, implanted in the dress he wears, that very dress and the fancied knowledge attaching to it makes the pedant more pedantic, the shallow-minded and narrow more vain, more obstinate, more contemptuous* of the opinion of the many wiser men who wear it not.

Law had come out to Dupleix recommended by letters from the Directors and by his own vauntings,—the latter probably the cause of the former. Had he, who boasted himself as a soldier, acted even as a man of ordinary common sense would have acted, it might have been pardoned him had he failed in fair fight before the genius of a Clive and the persistence of a Lawrence. But it is clear that he would have failed equally before men of far inferior capacity. It needed but for his opponent to be capable of advancing,—a rarer quality however than is generally supposed,—and Law would have succumbed. He did everything out of season, and the reason was, that although he wore a soldier's coat, he was not a soldier.

How keenly Dupleix felt the bitter disappointment can scarcely be described, nor will we attempt to describe it. We would rather dwell on the measures which, in spite of his disappointment, he adopted unhesitatingly to remedy, as far as possible, the disaster. His was indeed no easy position. Where was he to find a general? Bussy, the only competent commander he had under him, was at Aurungabad with the Subadar; Law, helpless at Trichinopoly. Besides those two, there was but the infirm d'Autueil, disabled by the climate, by age, and by gout, incapable certainly of making head against the vigorous energy of Clive. It seemed almost preferable to maintain Law, who was at least still young, in command, than to entrust the last remains of the army to d'Autueil.

Before, however, he could take any measures in this respect—in fact the second day after he heard of the entrance of Lawrence into Trichinopoly—Dupleix received from Law a despatch which threw him into even greater amazement. This was to the effect, that, threatened by the English and despairing now of gaining the place, he had determined to retreat at once into the island of Seringham. The madness of such a scheme was patent to the far-seeing vision of Dupleix. It seemed to him, indeed, that for a general deliberately to move his forces into an island, where he

would be cut off from all communication with his countrymen, was an act of which no one, who had not lost his head, could be guilty. There could not, he felt, be a more dangerous, a more incompetent commander at the head of an army, than the man who should propose such a step. Under such a feeling he instantly acted. Hoping that it might not possibly be yet too late to avert a great calamity, he sent strict orders to Law to retreat, if he must retreat, not into Seringham, but upon Pondichery. With the view of aiding him in this undertaking, and to be prepared, at all events, for the worst, he strained every nerve to levy a fresh force to move towards Trichinopoly, and to endeavour to effect a junction with Law. His own funds, constituting the bulk of the private fortune he had amassed during his service, were freely spent for this purpose. No regard for his own interests stood in the way of the performance of his duty to his masters and to France. Thus, by incredible exertions he succeeded in raising a force of 120 Europeans, 500 sepoys, and with four field-pieces. The command of it he made over to d' Auteuil, the only officer at his disposal, with instructions that on effecting a junction with Law, he was to assume command of the combined army. The party left Pondichery the second week in April.

Meanwhile, however, startling events had occurred in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly. Law, although repulsed on the 8th April in his attempt to prevent the march of the English into that fortress, still occupied an extremely strong position. His right resting on the Cauveri, maintained his communications with Seringham and with the country on the northern bank of the Coleroon; his centre was protected by the French Rock, whilst his left extended to the extremely strong post of Elmiseram, on the top of which cannon had been mounted. Chanda Sahib with his troops occupied the line of the Cauveri, forming an obtuse angle with the French position. Had the resolution of Law then consisted in anything but words, he might have safely awaited here the attack of the combined English force; for, although he would then be fighting with a river in his rear,—a most unpleasant position,—yet the ground he occupied was so strong, that had it been resolutely defended, an attack upon it must have resulted in the defeat of the assailants. It would appear that the English Commander, Major Lawrence, thoroughly recognised this fact, for he states in his memoirs that having sounded his native allies and having ascertained that on one pretext or another, they were evidently unwilling to aid him in an assault on the French position, he was extremely

concerned as to the steps he ought to adopt to force Law to retreat.

Law, however, played his game most effectually. The English, not thinking themselves strong enough to attack the French position unsupported by their native allies, had resolved to beat up the quarters of Chanda Sahib. For this purpose, a detachment of 400 men under Captain Dalton, moved out of Trichinopoly on the night of the 12th April, hoping to surprise the native levies. Unacquainted, however, with the road, they found themselves at break of day in front of the strongest part of the French position between the French Rock and Elmiseram. Discovering at once the danger which they ran of being crushed by the entire French force, they endeavoured to retreat without being perceived. The morning light, however, warned the French of their presence before they were out of danger, and the chances seemed all to be in favour of their destruction. But the sight which would have lent vigour and energy to an ordinary man, which would have been used by Clive to make his own cause triumphant, added terror and dismay to the palsied faculties of Law. Far from regarding the retreating English as men who by an energetic movement he could cut off and destroy, he looked upon their presence there as an indication that he and his force had been subjected to imminent peril, from which they had miraculously escaped. Instead, then, of moving to attack them, he rejoiced at their retreating of their own accord. His apprehension indeed carried him so far as to direct that, as soon as the English should be well out of sight, preparations should be made for an immediate retreat across the Cauveri into the island of Seringham.

It would appear, indeed, that this movement had been for a long time contemplated by Law, for he had often insisted upon its necessity to Chanda Sahib, and had even mentioned it in his letters to Dupleix. But Chanda Sahib, a better soldier than Law, had not only pointed out the insensate folly of the movement, but had absolutely refused to join in it; whilst Dupleix, though for a long time not regarding it as serious or possible, had pointed out in the clearest terms that such a movement would, more than any other, compromise his own force and the interests of French India. When finally he heard that it had been decided upon, he had replied, as we have already stated, by an imperative order to retreat upon Pondichery, and by the supersession of Law by d'Auteuil. It is difficult, indeed, to believe how a man in

the possession of his senses could have persuaded himself that Seringham was a proper place to retreat upon. It was, in the first place, actually within long cannon-shot of Trichinopoly. In the second place, the fact of a small force remaining in an island,—the river surrounding which could be crossed,—in the course of their retreat from a superior force, was surely to invite an enterprising enemy to cut them off, to force them in fact, unless relieved, to a surrender. To attempt such a movement in the presence of a Clive was a species of folly which that man only could have committed, whose nerves and whose senses had been utterly prostrated. Of all places that could have been selected for such a purpose, Seringham was, without exception, that one, which most completely shut the door of hope on the force occupying it.

Yet this was the place to which Law had resolved, not by a sudden inspiration of folly, but after many days of painful consideration, to carry over the French army. But though the matter had been long pre-determined in his own mind, he had made no preparations for carrying his plan into effect. Perhaps he had hoped that after all it would not be necessary. This at least is certain, that up to the moment when the appearance of the English retreating from before his own position brought so vividly to his own mind the idea of the dangers that might be in store for him on the right bank, not a single preparation for that retreat had been made. Nevertheless, bent on effecting it, he sent to Chanda Sahib, and to him communicated his resolution. This faithful ally of the French power received the intelligence with anger and disappointment. Not he alone, but his principal commanders, opposed it with all their resolution. Better far, they said, to meet defeat and death in open action, than to retreat to a position in which surrender must be necessitated. But all their remonstrances remained without effect on the paralysed spirit of Law. He would retreat, he said, they might act as they chose; and he issued orders at once to carry out his resolution. Chanda Sahib, though unconvinced, though despising the man, would not, at that dark hour, abandon the nation that had so long supported him. He might have escaped, but preferring to cast in his lot with the French, he accompanied them across the Cauveri.

Great was the confusion of the retreat. Not a single preparation had been made for it. The provisions necessary for their support in Seringham, were abandoned and burnt. Much of their

baggage was left behind. The guns were with great difficulty transported. However, after infinite labour, the French troops and those of Chanda Sahib found themselves in occupation of Seringham, a detachment of the former only having been left to guard the rock of Elmiseram, which it would have been wiser to abandon with the rest of the position.

The natural consequences of this movement were soon apparent. First ensued the capture of Elmiseram, effected on the 13th April by Captain Dalton, after a faint resistance. Next, the movement which Dupleix and Chanda Sahib had alike foreseen, the detaching of a portion of the English army to the northern bank of the Coleroon, in order not only to cut off their supplies, but to sever their communications with Pondichery. This measure was suggested to Major Lawrence by Clive, and the former, on consulting his native allies regarding it, found to his satisfaction that it met with their approval conditionally on the command of the English section of the force being entrusted to the conqueror of Arcot. This matter having been settled, a detachment consisting of 400 Europeans, 700 sepoys, 3,000 Mahrattas, 1,000 Tanjorean horse, with eight pieces of artillery, crossed the Cauveri and Coleroon on the night of the 17th April, and on the following morning took up a position at the village of Samiavaram, nine or ten miles north of Seringham, and on the high road between that place and Pondichery. This masterly movement owed its success as much to the boldness of the English as to the nerveless despondency of the French leader. Had Clive been in the position of Law, what an opportunity here presented itself of placing the English in the position in which they had hoped to pin the French, by crossing the Coleroon, and taking them between the Seringham force on one side, and that of d'Auteuil on the other. But all spirit and sense had apparently fled from the counsels of Law. He acted, as though he had but one object,—that of delivering himself and his allies, bound hand and foot, to the enemy.

Meanwhile d'Auteuil, who had left Pondichery on the 10th April at the head of 120 Europeans, 500 sepoys, and four field-pieces, reached Ootatoor, fifteen miles north of Samiavaram, on the 25th of that month. Here he learned the situation of affairs; that Law was cooped up in Seringham, and that between Law and himself lay Clive at the head of a superior force. Though old, infirm, and gouty, d'Auteuil had still spirit enough left in him not to be disheartened by these tidings. He had been sent expressly to relieve Law, and he

could not leave him to himself without at least an effort on his behalf. Accordingly, he resolved to make a *détour* so as to avoid Samiavaram, and thus to reach the Coleroon without molestation from the enemy. He sent intelligence to Law of his intended movement, but, unfortunately for him, one of his messengers was captured by Clive.

Ignorant of this, however, d'Auteuil set out on the evening of the 25th, taking a route to the westward; but he had not proceeded far before intelligence reached him that Clive, apprized of his movements, was on his march to intercept him; he accordingly returned to Ootatoor. Clive, learning this, moved back upon Samiavaram. Meanwhile, however, Law had learned from one of the messengers sent by d'Auteuil of his intended march. Certain information reached him at the same time of Clive's intention to intercept him. Here was a splendid opportunity. By making a forced march of ten miles from Seringham, with his whole force, he might seize Samiavaram whilst Clive should be engaged with d'Auteuil, and then press on to crush the former in the field. Of the many chances granted to the French leader, this was the last and not the least tempting,—not the least likely to lead to great and important consequences. To have even a probability of success, however, it was requisite that Law should move with the bulk of his force, and should move with the rapidity of lightning. But this unfortunate leader, though a little braced up by the intelligence of the approach of d'Auteuil, was still incapable of real vigour or energy. Instead of moving himself at the head of his force, he detached only 80 Europeans, of whom 40 were English deserters, and 700 sepoys, * to carry out a scheme, upon the success or ill-success of which depended the domination of the French or English in India.

This detachment arrived at Samiavaram after Clive had returned from his fruitless search after d'Auteuil. Little thinking, from his experience of the character of Law, that there was the smallest fear of an attack from the side of Seringham, Clive had made no preparations to meet one, and had gone quietly to bed. The French detachment meanwhile had succeeded, by means of the deserters who formed a part of it, in persuading the English sepoys that they had been sent by Major Lawrence to reinforce Clive, and they thus obtained entrance into the very heart of the English camp, before the presence of an enemy was suspected there,

* Orme.

and whilst Clive was still sleeping. Yet sleeping though he was, the presence of that one man on the side of the English alone made the difference between victory and defeat. Had he been the leader of the French, none can doubt but that they would have that night crushed their enemies in their camp, and have recovered all the results that had been so wilfully thrown away. But Clive was the leader of those opposed to them, and never did he vindicate so completely his title to be a leader of men, a prince amongst his people, as on that eventful night. Never did any one under such circumstances display a presence of mind more perfect, a courage more brilliant and ready. The circumstances were almost marvellous. The English force at Samiaveram occupied two pagodas, about a quarter of a mile distant from one another; round these were encamped the natives. Now the French force had advanced through the natives, and had penetrated to the lesser pagoda, in an open shed close to which Clive was sleeping in his palanquin. Here being challenged, they fired volleys into each place, one of them narrowly missing Clive, and most effectually awakening him. They then moved on, occupied the pagoda, and drew up the sepoys in front of it,—these keeping up an incessant fire in the supposed direction of the enemy. Meanwhile, Clive, on the first alarm, had run to the greater pagoda, and marched up 200 of his Europeans to see what could have caused the disturbance, still considering it a false alarm of his own sepoys, and never dreaming of an enemy. Approaching close to the lesser pagoda, he went among the French sepoys, still believing them to be his own, and ordered them to cease fire. He did not even discover his mistake when one of them, ascertaining him to be an Englishman, wounded him in two places, and then, when attacked by Clive, ran towards the lesser pagoda. Clive followed him, only however to find himself in the presence of six French soldiers, who called upon him to surrender. Then, for the first time, the whole truth burst upon him. Comprehending it all in a moment, he called upon the Frenchmen to yield in their turn; told them he had even come to offer them terms, and invited them to see for themselves his whole army drawn up to attack them. Completely deceived by this bold and ready artifice, three of the Frenchmen at once laid down their arms; the remainder communicated Clive's terms to the party in the pagoda. These, however, refused to surrender, and it was not till after a most sanguinary contest, in the course of which Clive had another narrow escape

caused mainly by the desperation of the English deserters, that they yielded to terms. The sepoys, meanwhile, had marched out of camp, but they were pursued by the Mahratta cavalry and cut to pieces, it is said, literally to a man.

After this repulse, the situation of the French in Seringham became desperate indeed. Entirely to cut them off from all relief, as well as from all hope of escape, possession was taken by the Tanjorean allies of the English of Coiladdy on the 7th May. There then remained only M. d'Auteuil with whom to deal. To rid that part of the country of him, Major Lawrence, on the 20th, despatched Captain Dalton at the head of 150 Europeans, 400 sepoys, 500 Mahrattas, and four field-pieces,—leaving Clive's detachment entire at Samiaveram.

Meanwhile, d'Auteuil, scared by the ill-result of his attempt to turn Samiaveram, and of the well-meant but ill-supported attempt of the Seringham party to surprise that place, had remained quietly at Ootatoor waiting his opportunity. The opportunity came, but did not find him capable of taking advantage of it. In fact Captain Dalton's party, after a skirmish in front of Ootatoor, which had no decisive results, had advanced at once upon that place. Late experience had shown the English that the surest way to victory was to advance straight on,—to destroy by that advance the *morale* of the enemy, and thus to more than half beat him before the actual fight had begun. Acting on this plan, Dalton made such a display of his troops, maintaining only a few with his guns and sending the infantry to attack the enemy in flank, that d'Auteuil imagined that he had not simply a detachment, but the whole force of Clive, before him. Having this impression, all his intellect fled, and he became the slave of his fears. Had he been as bold as Dalton, a resolute advance on the guns must have decided the action in his favour. But fear, not physical but moral, shutting his eyes and taking away his senses, he allowed himself to be deceived by this shallow device, and notwithstanding that he did actually repulse the English from Ootatoor, he abandoned that place in the night, and fled, unmolested, in the direction of Pondichery, thus leaving Law to his fate, to England an unlooked for triumph.

Whilst this was going on, Law, noticing from the watch-tower of Seringham the march of Dalton's troops, concluded that they must belong to Clive's force, and, this time acting with boldness, crossed the river with the bulk of his army, hoping to gain Samiaveram. But Clive was not the man to expose himself

twice to the chance of being surprised. He at once marched to meet him, and came up with him just as he had crossed the Coleroon. It was not for Clive, under the circumstances, to seek an engagement. The enemy was already in the toils. A battle alone could extricate him. On the other hand, every circumstance should have induced Law to court an action. It was, as we have said, his only chance, and here the numbers were rather in his favour. But,—he did not fight; he returned to Seringham, only, alas for French interests, to surrender.

The capture of Pitchandah, a fortified pagoda in the northern banks of the Coleroon opposite Seringham, completed the investment of the French, and took away from them the opportunity, till then open to them, of communicating in any way with the direct road from Pondichery. This place having been gained, still further to deprive them of all hopes of reinforcement from d'Auteuil, Clive marched in search of that officer, and coming up with him on the 8th June, at Volcondah, the native commandant of which place had been secretly gained by the English, he compelled him with his whole force to surrender.

Thus deprived of his last hope, what was there for the unfortunate Law to do? He, poor man, knew well, in his heart of hearts, to what end recent events had been tending, and for some days past he had been well aware that there was no alternative between cutting his way out and a surrender. Under such circumstances great men act; small men, on the contrary, allow themselves to be acted upon by every vague rumour, no matter whence it may have arisen; nay, they go so far as to delude themselves into the belief that somehow,—how they cannot say,—all will in the end be well. Thus it was with Law. He allowed himself to be deluded by all kinds of vain imaginings; for a long time it was d'Auteuil's advance; then it was the hope of reinforcements from France;—sometimes one thing, sometimes another. He appears never to have bethought him that a man's energy is given him to be employed; that there is no conjuncture, however trying, from which a man, by the exercise of that quality, may not extricate himself; that to depend on chance is altogether unworthy of a real man. Had he only dared to look facts in the face, he must have seen that he must surrender if he could not escape. His provisions were fast failing him, his native allies were deserting him in hundreds, but still he had his Europeans. In the beginning of June, there yet remained to him 750 of these, in addition to about

2,000 trained sepoys, and 3 or 4,000 native levies who still remained faithful to Chanda Sahib. With these he might easily have taken advantage of the first fall of the Cauveri to attack Major Lawrence's camp on the south of the river, to the troops guarding which he was in numbers vastly superior. Overpowering this, he might have thence cut his way, without much chance of molestation, to Karical. In vain did Chanda Sahib over and over again implore him to have recourse to some such means. He could not make up his mind,—he preferred to depend on accidents and chances,—and he was lost!

Nevertheless, it must not be supposed that he was so base as to be indifferent to the fate of that faithful supporter of French interests. Law knew full well that but one result to Chanda Sahib would follow his surrender to the now triumphant Mahomed Ali. As for surrender to the English, that was absolutely out of the question, for France and England were not at war. In the contest between Mahomed Ali and Chanda Sahib, the French and English were not principals, they were simply hired mercenaries engaged on opposite sides. Whichever party might be victorious neither then could claim the open direction of affairs. A proposition of surrender to the English could not, therefore, and would not, have been entertained. As for Mahomed Ali, it was not to be expected that, brought up as he had been to regard all means lawful to accomplish the death of a rival, he would hesitate as to the punishment to be meted out to one who had proved himself so persistent, so daring, so fertile in expedients as the French-protected Chanda Sahib. Having rejected all bolder counsels, and having made up his mind to surrender, Law busied himself therefore to find the means of saving the life of his ally. For this purpose he entered into negotiations with Manockjee, general of the army of the king of Tanjore. This chieftain readily accepted the terms offered and having received a stipulated sum of money in advance with the promise of more to follow, having likewise sworn solemnly to protect the life of the fugitive Nawab, Manockjee, on the night of the 11th June, sent an officer with a palanquin to escort him to his camp. No sooner, however, had the unfortunate man arrived there, than he was violently seized, loaded with irons, and placed under a guard. The next morning a conference was held to determine his fate, at which Major Lawrence was present. There can be no doubt whatever that a firm persistence on the part of that officer, more especially on the second day,—after the English

had become, by the surrender of Law, absolute masters of the situation,—would have saved the life of Chanda Sahib. Major Lawrence himself asserts that in the course of the debate, as to the manner in which Chanda Sahib should be disposed of, he himself was at first silent, but subsequently proposed that he should be made over to the English. This, however, was objected to, and no resolution was arrived at. The second day after, however; when Manockjee sent to enquire from him, whether he seriously desired to have charge of the prisoner, the English Commandant passed upon him virtual sentence of death, by declaring that he did not wish to interfere further in the dispute regarding his disposal.* A few hours later Chanda Sahib was stabbed to the heart by order of Manockjee, and his decapitated head was sent to his triumphant rival.

But before this tragedy had been consummated, Law himself had surrendered. Resting on the broken reed of delusive expectations, he had allowed every opportunity to pass

* This indifference,—to use a light term,—of the English commander to the fate of Chanda Sahib has been very gently treated by most English historians. The statement, however, of Orme biased as that writer is against the French, shows how completely it was in the power of Major Lawrence to have saved Chanda Sahib, had he chosen to stretch forth his hand. Orme, after alluding to the contest between Mahomed Ali, the Mysoreans, and the Mahrattas for the possession of the person of Chanda Sahib, writes thus :—"Terrified at the commotions which "would inevitably follow if he gave the preference to any one of the "competitors, he (Manockjee) saw no method of finishing the contest, "but by putting an end to the life of his prisoner; however, as the "Major (Lawrence) had expressed a desire that the English might have "him in their possession, *he thought it necessary to know whether* "they seriously expected this deference, and, accordingly, on the same "morning that the pagoda surrendered, went to the Major, *with whom* "he had a conference which convinced him that the English were his "friends, and that they were resolved not to interfere any further "in the dispute. He, therefore, immediately on his return to Chuchly- "pollam put his design into execution, by ordering the head of "Chanda Sahib to be struck off. It is unfortunately clear from this that Major Lawrence did connive at the death of the unfortunate prisoner. Professor Wilson states, in deprecation of this verdict, that at that period the English were not so well assured of their power, as to pretend to dictate to the native princes with whom they co-operated. It is clear that in the case now under notice, it was not at all a question of dictation. It is too evident that a word from Major Lawrence to Manockjee would have changed the fate of the victim. How can we avoid the simple conclusion to be drawn from the fact, that Manockjee went straight from the presence of Major Lawrence to order the execution of Chanda Sahib?

by, until at last the arrival of a battering-train from Devicotta, placed it in the power of the English to compel him to submit to their own terms. After the usual amount of protests and threats to defend himself to the last, should those protests not be acceded to, it was finally agreed that the French army should surrender prisoners of war; that the officers should be liberated on giving their parole never to serve against Mahomed Ali and his allies; that the English deserters should be pardoned, that all the arms, artillery, and munitions of war should be made over faithfully to the English Commandant, and that the island itself should be surrendered. These conditions were faithfully carried out. On the morning of the 13th June, 35 officers, 785 Frenchmen, and 2,000 sepoys laid down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners to the English Commander, this latter acting not on his own account, but as representative of Mahomed Ali. There were given up at the same time forty-one pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of ammunition.

Thus fatally ended, after intense labour and anxiety to its projector, the expedition which, but eleven months before, had been despatched, full of the certainty of success, from Pondichery. What a termination to prospects which shone with such brilliancy in the outset, what a sequel to plans which seemed, at the time of their projection, to be proof against failure! Then there was but one barrier to French domination in the Carnatic. They possessed commanding resources, a ruler whose influence with the natives was unparalleled, and, above all, the prestige of victory. Opposed to them was a pretender deserted by his allies, but occupying a fortified town, and a mere handful of dispirited English. But at the end of eleven months what a different picture do we behold! The pretender has become the *de facto* ruler; the handful of dispirited English, the arbiters of the Carnatic; the victorious French army are prisoners of war. Whence this revolution? Can we discern in the steady mind of Dupleix any symptoms of faltering, any signs of decay? On the contrary. Never had he shown more unflinching resolution; on no previous occasion did he manifest a more zealous energy. His orders to Law, his encouragement of Chanda Sahib, his attempt to infuse energy into d'Atueuil show the ardour of his spirit, the correct aim by which his views were guided. Had his orders been carried out, had even common prudence and energy been displayed by his commanders, his policy must have triumphed, the genius of France must have conquered.

If, then, we look for the causes of a contrary result, we must turn our eyes to another quarter. Dupleix was the civil governor, possessing a power of devising plans, even military plans,—for there is nothing in military plans which genius, though not specially trained to warfare, is unable to master,—such as has been accorded to but few men in any age. His was the eye to see, the brain to conceive; but he possessed not in addition the arm to strike. To carry out his vast plans he was compelled to confide in others, and it happened, unfortunately for him, that whilst at this period, those who alone he was able to employ were men of singularly feeble intellect, deficient in energy and enterprise, dreading responsibility, afraid to run small risks, and therefore exposing themselves to great dangers, his principal adversary was a man of vast and comprehensive genius, of an aptitude for war surpassing all his contemporaries, of a ready audacity and prompt execution in the field such as have never been surpassed. Whilst then the designs for the French campaign were most masterly,—being conceived in the brain of Dupleix;—their execution was feeble beyond the power of description,—that execution being left to his lieutenants. The orders, the letters, the entreaties of Dupleix stand living witnesses in the present day of the exactness of his conclusions. Had they been obeyed,—and it is clear that obedience to them was easy,—Trichinopoly would have fallen whilst Clive was still besieged in Arcot: or, had untimely occurrences prevented that great triumph, a literal obedience to his instructions would have ensured the interception and defeat of the relieving forces of Lawrence and Clive on the banks of the Cauveri. Who could have believed that imbecility and fear of responsibility would ever find the level reached in the manufacture of a Law,—imbecility and fear of responsibility so clear as to draw even from the English historian, jealous as he is on all occasions for the reputation of the English leaders, the remark, that “it is indeed difficult to determine whether the English conducted themselves with more ability and spirit, or the French with more irresolution and ignorance, after Major Lawrence and Captain Clive arrived at Trichinopoly?”*

To judge fairly and candidly the degree of merit or demerit attaching to Dupleix at this crisis of the fortunes of French India, we propose to examine his conduct after the occurrence of the misfortunes we have recounted. In what

a position was he then! Law, with the main body of the French troops, beaten and taken prisoners; d'Auteuil, with the relieving force consisting of the only French troops available for garrison purposes, beaten and taken prisoners; Bussy with all that yet remained, far off at Aurungabad; Chanda Sahib, his trusted ally, murdered, and his levies dispersed. To Dupleix, then, there remained at this crisis merely Pondichery, Gingee, and the French possessions on the coast, without garrisons to defend them, still less with troops available for operations in the field. His enemies, on the contrary, triumphant, possessors now of the influence and of the material advantages for which he had toiled, had it in their power apparently utterly to overwhelm him. They had not only an army and numerous native allies, but a Lawrence and a Clive to command them. Dupleix had no longer an army, no longer an ally; since the departure of Bussy he had never had a general: he had to depend upon no one but himself,—and one other trusted and indefatigable councillor,—his own wife. Let us watch now how this man, thus over-matched, thus driven into a corner, made head against the vast disproportion with which he had to contend.

His own experiences and alliances with native chieftains had satisfied Dupleix, that to such men there was no such disorganiser as victory. Prepared after defeat to sacrifice in appearance even their just claims, if by so doing they could retain a basis for future action, they would on a change of fortune, however occurring, show an absolute forgetfulness of past admissions, and increase their demands to a most exaggerated degree. If this were the case when a native prince might be in alliance with a European power, to a much more extended and dangerous degree, would it occur when three or four native princes should occupy such a position. For then each ally would measure his own claims by the claims of his rival, and it would inevitably happen that such claims would often clash. Now in the war that had just then concluded, Mahomed Ali, the rival of Chanda Sahib, had been aided by three native allies,—by the king of Tanjore, the king of Mysore, and the Mahrattas. So long as it seemed certain that Mahomed Ali and his English allies would prove triumphant,—a conclusion which the imbecility of Law had made clear to the acute intellects of the natives at an early period of the contest,—it was evident to Dupleix that no attempts to bring them over to his side would have the smallest effect. Nevertheless he maintained native envoys at their courts, instructed by him from time to time to act as circumstances might render advisable

It was then, when victory declared itself against him, when he had no more any troops and not a single ally, that he put in action those arts of which no one better than he understood the use. His attempts were not at first made on Mahomed Ali. The English, he well knew, were acting in the name of that prince, and would be bound to attend mainly to his interests. Of the other parties to the alliance, the Mahrattas were the most influential, and with these, at the moment the power he represented lay lowest in the estimation of the world, he commenced his secret negotiations.

So well did he succeed that Mahomed Ali and his English allies soon found that almost the only profit they had derived from their victory was the surrender of Law and his army. In a moment, as it were, they discovered that the animosity of the Mysoreans against Mahomed Ali, and of Morari Rao against both, would prevent that combined action in the field on which they had previously calculated, whilst the Tanjore contingent, sick of service which seemed likely to bring little advantage, were clamorous to return to their own country. So pronounced were the secret intrigues, and so undisguised the mutual suspicions that, although Law's force had surrendered on the 11th June, it was not till the 9th of the following month that the Nawab and his English allies were able to leave Trichinopoly, and even then he was forced to leave 200 of the latter and 1,500 of their sepoys as a garrison to protect the city against his former associates,—the Mysoreans and the Mahrattas.

The delay he had thus obtained, and the disaffection in the enemy's camp he had thus caused, were eminently serviceable to Dupleix. It so happened, that in that very interval the yearly reinforcements of troops arrived at Pondichery from France. It is true that the men composing it were not of the best material,—indeed, Dupleix himself asserts that they were a collection of the vilest rabble,—but they formed at least a basis upon which to work. To increase their number he landed the sailors from the fleet, and manned the vessels in their place with lascars. By these means he found himself provided with a body of nearly 500 European soldiers, able once more,—the knowledge of their strength and his own great personal influence acting and re-acting on one another,—to present a respectable appearance in the eyes of the native powers. To effect all this he had freely drawn upon his private resources, and made his entire fortune subservient to the cause of his country. An opportunity soon presented

itself still further to confirm such opinions, and to intimate very clearly to the native princes that Pondichery was yet unconquered. Harassed by their native allies, and by the intrigues fomenting around them, the English had made but slow progress after leaving Trichinopoly. They took indeed Trivadi, held by a small garrison of French sepoys, on the 17th July; but from that moment their councils became as uncertain as had been those of the French two months earlier. Major Lawrence had left them on account of his health; Clive had been compelled to proceed to Fort St. David from the same cause; and the command of the troops in the field was left to the incapable Gingen. This officer remaining idle at Trivadi, instructions were sent him from governor Saunders, contrary to the advice of Major Lawrence, to detach a portion of his force against Gingee. Major Gingen obeyed these orders by sending, on the 3rd August, 200 Europeans, 1,500 sepoys, and 600 of the Nawab's cavalry under the command of Major Kinneer, an officer who had but just arrived from Europe.

Intelligence of the march of this detachment having been promptly conveyed to Dupleix, he determined to use it to strike a blow for the recovery of the prestige of the French arms. Sending orders, therefore, to the Commandant of Gingee to hold that place to the last extremity, he organised from his new levies a force of 300 Europeans and 500 sepoys, and sent them with seven field-pieces to occupy a position half way between Pondichery and Gingee, and commanding the pass just traversed by the English on their route to the latter place.

Gingee was a fortress, on many accounts very dear to the French. Its almost marvellous capture by Bussy on the 11th September 1750, had raised the reputation of his countrymen to the highest point all over India; the victory gained near it by de la Touche over the forces of Nazir Jung, had seemed to consolidate and cement French power in the Carnatic. The possession of Gingee alone gave them a prestige in the eyes of the natives, which it would have taken much to eradicate. Its natural strength Dupleix was well aware, was sufficient to enable a well-commanded garrison to beat off a force double the strength, of that commanded by Kinneer. That officer, likewise, he knew, was a stranger to the country and its people, and it seemed highly improbable that in the lottery of the distribution of commands, the English should draw a second Lawrence, still less another heaven-born genius of the

stamp of Clive. His plan therefore seemed certain to succeed. Operating on the rear of the enemy, who, he was sure, would make nothing of his movement against Gingee, he would induce him to attack the French in a position previously chosen and previously fortified, and he would then, it seemed certain, take his revenge for Seringham.

It fell out just as he had anticipated. Kinneer arrived before Gingee on the 6th August, summoned it, and met with a determined refusal. Appalled at its strength he was hesitating as to his action, when news reached him that the French had taken up a position at Vicravandi, in his rear, cutting off his communications with Trivadi. With the spirit of a soldier Kinneer turned at once to attack this new enemy, and, rendered bold by the repeated successes of the English, he did not care to reconnoitre, but dashed boldly on the French position. To draw on the English against the strongest part of this, M. de Kerjean, a nephew of Dupleix, who held the command, directed his men to retire. The English on this advanced with greater audacity till they found themselves exposed to the full fire of the enemy's field-pieces, separated from them by a strongly fortified wall. At this moment Kinneer was wounded, the English sepoys retreated, and even the English white troops began to waver. Just then Kerjean directed a movement on their flank. On this service 100 French soldiers started. The manœuvre was decisive. The English fell back after but a slight resistance, leaving forty of their men dead on the field of action.

Thus in less than two months after the terrible and seemingly irreparable losses caused by the incapacity of Law, did Dupleix bring back victory to the French standards, and recover his influence amongst the native princes of the Carnatic. The effect was increased by the capture, shortly afterwards, of a company of Swiss mercenaries, employed by the English under the command of Captain Schauf on the high seas. The English denounced this action as opposed to the law of nations,—the two countries being nominally at peace. But Dupleix triumphantly replied that he had as much right to capture English soldiers on the seas, as the English had to capture French soldiers on land; that on this occasion he was merely acting in self-defence, as these soldiers had been sent to sea that they might the more effectually attack the French possessions on shore. There can be no doubt as to the soundness and completeness of this reply.

It was about this period that Dupleix received from the Subadar of the Deccan, Salabut Jung, a patent containing

his formal appointment as Nawab of the Carnatic, and of the countries south of the Kistna, and as possessor of all the other honours conferred upon him by Mozuffur Jung. Salabut Jung also informed him that the Emperor Ahmed Shah would shortly send an embassy with the imperial patents of confirmation. In consequence of the authority thus received, Dupleix appointed Raja Sahib, the son of the deceased Chanda Sahib, to hold the appointment under him. Finding, however, that the young man himself preferred pleasure and sloth to the occupation of war, he entered into negotiations with Mortiz Ali, the surviving son-in-law and nearest relative of the family of Dost Ali. Mortiz Ali responded freely to the conditions, and agreed to advance a considerable sum of money, and to levy troops in support of his title. In the same month likewise, the French Company wrote to Dupleix to express their entire satisfaction with his conduct, and to inform him that the King of France had been pleased, in compliance with their solicitations, to confer upon him the title of Marquis with reversion in direct line to his descendants. From all the eminent public men in France he received by the same opportunity congratulations on the receipt of this well-merited honour, and expressions of entire concurrence in the policy he had adopted. Meanwhile, all his hopes raised by the success at Viceravandi, Dupleix renewed his negotiations with the Mysoreans and Morari Rao, pressing them to declare openly in his favour. This they agreed to do, provided Dupleix should engage so to employ the main army of the English as to leave them free to prosecute their views upon Trichinopoly. In accordance with these views Dupleix reinforced Kerjean to the utmost extent possible, and sent him to enforce a blockade of Fort St. David, so as to prevent any possible co-operation by the English with their detachment at Trichinopoly. By this means Kerjean's force was increased to 400 Europeans, 1,500 sepoys, and 500 native horse.

The news of this vigorous action roused Major Lawrence from his bed of sickness. Proceeding to Fort St. David by sea, he arrived there on the 27th August, and on the following morning moved out at the head of 400 Europeans, 1,700 sepoys, and 400 troops belonging to Mahomed Ali, to reconnoitre the French position. Strong as it was, he resolved to attack it on the following day. But Kerjean, deeming the numbers too unequal, marched during the night to Bahoor, two miles from Fort St. David, and the following evening,—Major Lawrence still advancing,—to Villanore, within three miles of Pondichery.

At this time Dupleix was momentarily expecting the arrival of a ship called the *Prince*, having on board 700 men, and what was of equal importance, a tried commander on Indian soil,—M. de la Touche.* As Major Lawrence was forbidden by his instructions from attacking the French in their position on French soil, it would have been wise policy on the part of the French commander to remain where he was until the reinforcements should arrive. But it would appear that Major Lawrence was equally aware of the hopes entertained regarding the *Prince*, and he wisely bethought him of trading on the ambition of M. de Kerjean, who could scarcely expect to retain his command on the arrival of an officer with the reputation of de la Touche. He resolved, therefore, to move back to Bahoor, hoping that Kerjean would follow him. The result fully answered his expectations.† Kerjean followed the English major the next day, and early on the morning of the 6th September received the shock of his attack. The action was obstinate and bloody. The French received the assault with great intrepidity, crossing bayonets with the enemy. Their sepoy, however, who were stationed in the centre, could not support the English charge and gave way in disorder. Their centre thus pierced, the whole line fell back and fled in confusion. Kerjean himself, fifteen officers, and about 100 men were taken prisoners. The number of the killed and wounded on the part of the French is not recorded. The English, however, lost one officer killed, four wounded, and 78 men killed or wounded.

The worst result of the action for the French was the nugatory effect it had upon the Mysorean and Marhatta chieftains. Of the warriors of the latter nation, 3,000 under Innis Khan, who were on the march to join the French, at once transferred their allegiance to Mahomed Ali, and the

* We stated erroneously in our last number that de la Touche had died in 1750. It was so stated in one of the works we consulted. But it appears that he proceeded to France in a bad state of health that year, and lost his life with the remainder of his soldiers on board the *Prince* in 1752, when she was destroyed by fire.

† Major Lawrence states that Kerjean was forced to act thus by the repeated orders of Dupleix, and by the threat that he would be superseded by de la Touche. No authority is given for this assertion, and it can only be imagined that Kerjean, who was taken prisoner in the action, wished to clear himself at his uncle's expense. The movement was exactly that which Dupleix would have wished to delay.

Mysoreans deferred for a short time their plans against Trichinopoly. The work of Dupleix, however, had been too well performed for a defeat of this nature to cause its permanent failure. He promised the Mysoreans that if they could only take Trichinopoly, it should be theirs. The magic of his influence, still all-prevalent in the minds of the natives, was confirmed by the inaction of Lawrence after his late victory. Thus it happened that within six weeks of that both action, the Mysoreans and the Mahrattas abandoned the English alliance, and declared openly for the French.

Another advantage before the termination of the campaign of 1752 accrued to the French governor. The greatest of his opponents, Clive, was forced before the close of the year to abandon the scene of his triumphs, and to proceed to Europe for the benefit of his health. It is true that he signalled the few months prior to his departure by two achievements, showing not less energy, daring and military talent than had distinguished his early victories. We allude to the capture of the forts of Covelong and Chingleput; the former on the sea coast about midway between St. Thomé and Sadras, sixteen miles south of Madras; the latter on the river Piliyar, commanding the high road between Fort St. George and Pondichery, and about 40 miles from the English Presidency. The capture of these two places is memorable from the fact, that the 200 troops who formed the European portion of Clive's little army were raw recruits,* the sweepings of the English jails, and so little discipline, that on a shot from the fort of Covelong killing one of them, all the rest ran away. Nevertheless, even upon this rabble Clive exercised an influence so magical; he won their respect to such an extent by his own contempt of danger and personal daring, his failing health notwithstanding, that at their head and by their means he reduced Covelong, defeated a force of 700 sepoys and 40 Europeans sent by Dupleix to relieve it, and then marching on Chingleput, the strongest place next to Gingee in that part of the country, forced the French garrison of 40 Europeans and 500 sepoys to evacuate it. He then proceeded to Madras, and thence to England.

* Lord Macaulay, in his essay on Clive, states that the force was of such a description, that no officer but Clive would risk his reputation by commanding it. Orme, however, who was Lord Macaulay's authority for this statement, simply remarks, "it could hardly be expected that any officer who had acquired reputation would willingly risk it by taking the command of them."

Notwithstanding these losses, however, a careful survey of the position of Dupleix at the close of 1752, and a contrast with the state to which he had been reduced by the surrender of Law and d'Auteuil, but six months before, will show how much his vast genius had been able within that short period to accomplish. To do this completely his relations to the Directors of the French Company must be borne in mind. This Company, not possessing one-fourth part of the wealth of the English Company, had deceived itself by the hope that the position of Dupleix, as master of the Carnatic, was too assured too secure, for him to require any special aid from France. The Directors looked rather to Dupleix to transport to France vast sums of money. No doubt even up to the end of 1751, the position of Dupleix justified the public men in France in the most sanguine hopes as to the future of French India. But that was the very reason why real statesmen would have aided and supported him with all the means at their disposal. The transport of 2 or 3,000 men to Pondichery in 1751, would almost certainly have given France absolute possession of Southern India. She herself would not have felt the loss of that insignificant number of her soldiers, whilst they could scarcely have failed to gain for her the coveted prize. But instead of support of this nature, the Directors literally starved Dupleix. They sent him comparatively a small number of ships and no funds; the few men to serve as soldiers,—to gain for France an empire greater than herself,—were the offscourings of the jails and the sweepings of the galleys. When he asked them for a competent general, they sent him a Law. It is true that elevated by the hopes they had formed from the success of his large schemes, they vouchsafed him flattering letters and a Marquisate. These, however, were but cheap rewards which Dupleix would gladly have bartered for a few hundred of those brave troops who were idling their time in the garrisons of France. Thus left to his own resources we see him evoking material strength out of nothing, drawing to himself allies when, as it would appear, there remained to him nought but destruction. He thus succeeded because, in the first place, he possessed a genius for organisation of the highest order; because, in the second, he considered no sacrifice too great to be made for the glory and interests of France. Bitterly personal as was the hatred borne to him in that day by contemporary Englishmen, seizing as they did every occasion to attribute to him motives of personal ambition and

personal vanity, even they were forced to admit his genius and his devotion to his country. "To give Dupleix his due," writes Major Lawrence in his *Memoirs*, "he was not easily cast down; his pride supported him, and at the same time his mind was full of resources." Mr. Orme likewise admits that the French would have been compelled "to cease hostilities after the capture of Seringham," had not M. Dupleix been endowed (and this at last is much to his honour,) with a perseverance that even superseded "his regard to his own fortune, of which he had at that time disbursed £140,000, and he continued with the same spirit to furnish more." It was this disinterestedness, this abnegation of his own interests, when the interests of France were concerned, that gave him influence and authority with his own people, that gained the lasting admiration and respect of all the native princes with whom he came in contact. In Dupleix they recognised a man not only thoroughly in earnest, but who was proof against the ordinary consequences of disaster. Never was he more full of resources than when apparently the well of those resources had been dried up. They never felt safe when they were opposed to that versatile intellect, to that scheming genius. When in the enemy's camp they still continued to correspond with him. So thoroughly did the English recognise this magic power, that they kept their puppet, Mahomed Ali, in the strictest seclusion. Dupleix contrived nevertheless to correspond with Mahomed Ali. It was only however to receive an answer, begging Dupleix not to impute to him the fault of his conduct; "for," added Mahomed Ali, "you know that I am no longer master of my actions."

Never perhaps was his genius more eminently displayed than after the catastrophe of Seringham. Without troops he was exposed to the full fury of the victorious army of Lawrence and Clive, and though these were forbidden to attack Pondichery, they had it apparently in their power to reduce the French settlement to the most insignificant dimensions, to deprive it of all real power in the country, of all influence with the natives. Yet by raising up enemies within their own camp, Dupleix delayed their march from Trichinopoly, rendered any decided action on their part impossible, gained for himself that which of all other things was most necessary to him,—time,—and actually succeeded, in less than two months after that great disaster, in beating in the field the victorious English, and in determining

the most powerful native allies of that nation to transfer their material aid to the French colony. But for the precipitancy of Kerjean, the advantages gained by the English at Trichinopoly would have been almost neutralised.

It was, it must be admitted, an immense misfortune for Dupleix, that whilst his own commanders in the Carnatic were men of the most ordinary ability, and even, as in the case of Law, of marked imbecility of character, there should have been opposed to him the greatest genius for war of that epoch. The strong, sharp, incisive blows of Clive were terribly effective on the besotted leaders of the French forces; they were met by no counterstroke, by nought, in fact, but weakness and indecision. With a rough and determined hand Clive broke down the foundations of French dominion, infused a confidence into the English soldiers that never afterwards left them, and showed the world that the natives of India, when well led and when possessing confidence in their commander, are capable of evincing the best qualities of real soldiers, a like courage and constancy, heroism and self-denial. But for this one man no diversion would have been attempted on Arcot, the English garrison would have remained dispirited in Trichinopoly, and it is more than probable, would have yielded that city to the superior numbers of Law. But it was Clive that broke the spell of French invincibility: he it was who first showed his troops and the natives of the Carnatic, that it was possible to conquer even the soldiers of Dupleix. He transferred, moreover, to the English troops that opinion of their own qualities in the field, which, till his coming, had been monopolised by the French. It was a hard destiny that brought to the overthrow of the plans of Dupleix a genius so warlike, a mastery over men so unsurpassed.

Yet, though unsuccessful, on the whole in the Carnatic, the victories of the French troops in another part of Indian soil, more than compensated in the mind of Dupleix for the calamities they sustained near the coast. French influence was still paramount, the reputation of the French arms still supreme, the power of the French governor still unquestioned, at the court of the Subadar. To gain that influence, to maintain that reputation, to increase that power, Dupleix had not hesitated to deprive himself of the services of his best, his only, general, even to risk his supremacy on the Coromandel coast. Certainly in those days it was considered even by the enemies of Dupleix, that the gain at Aurungabad far out-weighed the losses in the Carnatic. To see how that

gain was achieved, how French influence was so consolidated as to be for many years proof against the overthrow of French power at Pondichery, we must now devote a few pages to the romantic career of the energetic and stout-hearted Bussy.
